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Abstract
The aim of this thesis is to advance a theory o f friendship and estrangement between 
states as an explanation for the emergence and decline o f interstate security cooperation, 
defined as costly investment in a shared international institution. It seeks to illuminate 
dynamics in (West)German-American relations between 1945 and 1995, specifically 
Germany’s subsequent investment in three different security institutions for the purpose 
of ‘European security’ which gradually excluded the United States: the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (1945-55), the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(1965-75) and the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (1985-95). Suggesting 
that the three dominant IR paradigms -  realism, institutionalism and constructivism -  
cannot explain this dynamic, the thesis applies a phenomenological lens to explore the 
parameters of the national security interest and the motivation for security cooperation 
by interrogating what it means for the state to exist.
Combining insights from Heidegger and Aristotle, the first part argues that states (i) 
attempt to control anxiety through the formulation o f an authentic biographical narrative 
inscribed in space and time, and that they (ii) attempt to stabilize their narrative by 
embedding it in a project of ‘world building’ negotiated with friends through shared 
institutions. It further argues that (iii) enduring dissonance within this relationship 
signifies a process of estrangement and leads to a strategy o f emancipation by investing 
in an alternative institution with another friend. The second part applies this theoretical 
frame to explain the abovementioned dynamic with (dis)agreements between German 
and American policymakers over visions of European order embedded in respective 
national biographies. The thesis argues that the consensus o f using NATO for building a 
‘peaceful Europe’ in the Western space on the principles of ‘freedom’ and ‘unity’ 
weakened when (a) US administrations came to question the desirability of the latter for 
the American narrative and were willing to use military means to build the ‘free world’, 
while (b) German governments came to pursue the vision o f having Germany unfold in a 
Greater European Peace Order marked by ‘unity’ through peaceful means.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Question and Objective
The aim of this thesis is to assess, both conceptually and empirically, the motives behind 
interstate cooperation in security policy and why/under what conditions states cease to 
cooperate. The overarching question addressed is ‘what explains the emergence (rise) 
and decline (demise) of interstate security cooperation?’ Defining interstate security 
cooperation as the costly investment in a shared international institution, the thesis 
applies this question to the empirical case o f German1 -American2 cooperation between 
1945 and 1995. Specifically, it develops a theoretical frame to explain 
Germany’ssubsequent investments in three different security institutions for the purpose 
of ‘European security’, namely the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the EU’s Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).
Seen in the context o f German-American relations, these investments are taken as 
indicators for the emergence and decline of security cooperation between Germany and 
the United States (US). Specifically, they signify a dynamic moving from shared 
commitment to NATO as the primary security institution in Europe (‘consensus’), via 
differing commitments to the CSCE process marked by strong German support and 
American reluctance to participate (‘tension’), to German investment in CFSP as a new 
institution in which the US was not a member and which US administrations viewed 
with suspicion (‘divergence’). In short, the question can be posed as ‘why did German 
governments invest in three different security institutions in Europe since the end of the 
Second World War which gradually excluded the United States?’
The relevance of engaging these questions is not difficult to see. Dynamics of interstate 
security cooperation are integral to the dynamics of war and peace and so investigating 
them is a well established exercise in the field o f International Relations (IR), if not its 
core concern. Yet for the most part this does not entail scrutinizing the motivations, or 
shared ‘security interests’, on which decisions for cooperation are based. Rather than 
fixing them on the level o f assumptions, this thesis problematizes the meaning of 
‘security interests’ by building on literature pointing to their political and context- 
specific nature. It reaches down to the level o f ontology to rethink the constitution of the
1 With ‘Germany’ this thesis refers to the Federal Republic (FRG) prior to unification.
2 This thesis uses the terms ‘America’ and ‘United States’ (US) interchangeably.
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state and the parameters within which its ‘security interest’ is formulated and, 
consequently, within which ‘common’ security interests must be situated to understand 
when security cooperation is likely to occur, endure, and decline.
The theoretical exploration o f these parameters makes up a significant part of the thesis. 
In a nutshell, the argument advanced is that common institutional investments signify 
projects of ‘world building’ among friends driven by the attempt to control ‘anxiety’ by 
establishing an authentic biographical narrative. The decline o f such relations, marked 
by the decision o f at least one side to invest in an alternative institution which does not 
include the previous partner, is said to be a reaction to a process o f estrangement and the 
decision to pursue a strategy of emancipation. With developing this argument, this thesis 
is not merely offering an explanation for the aforementioned dynamics of German- 
American security cooperation but is also outlining a new theory o f interstate security 
cooperation
The German-American relationship between 1945 and 1995 provides an important and 
challenging case for exploring dynamics o f interstate security cooperation. It is 
important because the two states are key actors in the Euro-American region and core 
member of NATO, hence the ‘health’ of their relationship affects the cohesiveness of the 
transatlantic link, sometimes also called ‘the West’, and the vitality of the Atlantic 
Alliance. Taking a fresh look at this relationship from a long term perspective is 
therefore not only of historical interest. It is hoped that by “expanding the data base” 
(Gaddis, 1987) the findings of this thesis will allow scholars and practitioners to better 
understand the opportunities and limits o f US-German cooperation today and improve 
expectations about their support for security institutions in Europe in the future.
The challenge is that by most measures these two states make for rather unequal partners 
and, for a significant part o f the period under investigation, appear in a hegemon-client 
relationship marked by one-sided dependency rather than eye-to-eye cooperation. In this 
narrative, the US emerged out of the Second World War as the leader o f ‘the West’ 
fixated on the Soviet Union whereas Germany emerged as an occupied state thrust into 
the arena of superpower competition without much opportunity for agency (e.g., 
Haftedom 1985; Hanrieder 1989). The thesis offers a slightly different perspective. 
Supporting the scholarly agenda of decentering Cold War history, it pays particular 
attention to the German role to assess and retrieve the agency governments in Bonn 
exercised during the periods in which those three institutions emerged: (i) The post-war 
decade (1945-55) characterized by a consensus about NATO as the primary security
10
institution in Europe, (ii) the period of Ostpolitik/detente (1965-75) showing differences 
in opinion over the need and relevance o f CSCE, and (iii) the decade surrounding the 
end o f the Cold War (1985-95) marked by German investment in CFSP as a potential 
alternative institution to NATO and from which the US is excluded. Applying the 
theoretical argument mentioned earlier, this dynamic is explained with (dis)agreements 
among political leaders over visions of European order embedded in respective national 
biographies, signifying a movement o f German-American security relations from 
friendship to estrangement, culminating in Bonn’s emancipation by investing in CFSP.
Contribution
The theoretical contribution can be summarised as follows: in addition to offering a 
certain understanding of ‘theory’ in IR, this thesis contributes to the analytical toolkit by 
advancing a new causal narrative made up of three building blocks: (i) the notion that 
states are driven by an attempt to control anxiety, (ii) an ontology o f the state as a 
national biography inscribed in space and time and (iii) a conceptualization of interstate 
relations as ‘friendship’ and an argument for the formation and the breakdown thereof. 
How these building blocks are conceptually embedded in the IR literature is discussed 
throughout the six theoretical chapters and summarised in the conclusion.
As for the empirical contribution, I am not aware of an analysis of German-American 
security cooperation that focuses on the question outlined above. By addressing this 
question the thesis contributes to research on three levels. First, as already noted, it 
stresses the creative role of German agency. Second, it strengthens the view that the 
security interdependence between Germany and the US was generated internally rather 
than by an external threat. These two points will be made by placing the three 
institutions -  NATO, CSCE, CFSP -  in one analytical story. By doing so, the thesis, 
third, contributes to a literature which, thus far, is characterised by imbalance and 
disconnect. While there is a large literature dealing with German-American relations in 
NATO in the post-war decade, most of it is confined to a military strategic angle. There 
is very little literature on the CSCE process and almost nothing on its role in German- 
American relations. And most of the literature on CFSP is embedded in analyses of 
‘EUropean Foreign Policy’ where the US, not being a member o f the EU, falls off the 
analytical radar. This thesis levels out this imbalance and connects the three institutions 
in a single study. In other words, it treats NATO, CSCE and CFSP as ‘equals’ by 
starting from the premise that they all deal with ‘European security’ and takes their 
difference in design as an invitation to explore how states come to have different 
understandings about what makes ‘Europe’ secure.
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The remainder of this introduction proceeds as follows. The next section clarifies the 
phenomenon of (non)cooperation, followed by identifying the parameters along which 
competing explanations can be assessed. The third section outlines the inadequacy of the 
explanations derived from three major IR paradigms (realism, institutionalism and 
constructivism). The fourth section addresses issues o f research design before, finally, 
presenting brief summaries of the individual major chapters.
Defining the Puzzle
A ‘puzzle’ is an intellectual challenge posed by an empirical phenomenon against the 
backdrop of existing theories, or ways of understanding how the world works. For this, 
the necessary first step is to clarify the phenomenon, namely what signifies 
(non)cooperation. This is by no means an easy task. As Robert Keohane warned, “the 
phenomenon of cooperation is elusive enough, and its sources are sufficiently 
multifaceted and intertwined, that it constitutes a difficult subject to study” (Keohane, 
1984: 10). And indeed, two decades after Robert Jervis pointed out that the meaning of 
cooperation is often left unclear in studies dealing with this very topic (Jervis, 1988: 
330), substantive definitions are still spare.3
In the most basic understanding cooperation designates ‘jo in t’ action or decision­
making. This is different from ‘alignment’ (Snyder, 1997: 6ff) in that the latter can be 
understood as a more passive ‘taking sides’ lacking interaction and, thus, politics. That 
said, many studies define ‘jo in t’ action negatively rather than positively, that is, they 
contrast cooperation against a relationship marked by o f conflict, confrontation, discord, 
or simply ‘competition’ (Keohane, 1984; Grieco, 1990; Stein, 1990).4 But even the 
meaning of these phenomena is often left sufficiently vague. For instance, defection, the 
juxtaposition to cooperation prominent in game theory and formal modelling, is simply 
described as “cheating” on an existing or expected arrangement (Stein, 1990: 42) and 
‘exploiting’ or ‘taking advantage’ of the other actor within a given “payoff structure” 
(Jervis, 1978; 1988; Axelrod, 1984). To get a meaningful grasp on the phenomenon of 
(non)cooperation it is necessary to go beyond these simple juxtapositions. Cooperation 
is more than the absence o f ‘conflict’ or ‘competition’ between two parties, and 
‘defection’ understood as ‘cheating’ carries little analytical weight outside the trade-off 
matrix of the prisoner’s dilemma (or Rousseau’s stag hunt, for that matter).
3 For an overview of theories of security cooperation, see Jervis (1999); Mueller (2002).
4 Competition does not necessarily designate confrontation but unilateral action (Glaser 1994: 95) 
or “independent decision-making” (Stein 1982: 324, in Baldwin, 1993: 4, 4 Iff).
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In this thesis cooperation is not understood as an instantaneous decision but as a process, 
that is, something occurring over time. It builds on Keohane’s definition of cooperation 
as the phenomenon when “the politics actually followed by one government are 
regarded by its partners as facilitating realization o f their own objectives, as the result of 
a process o f policy coordination”. Importantly, this process implies change where 
“actions of separate individuals...be brought into conformity with one another” 
(Keohane, 1984: 5 If, emphasis added). This is echoed by Grieco (1990: 22) who adds 
the qualification of cooperation as “voluntary adjustment” of policies, thereby limiting 
cooperation to those relationships where policy coordination was not a consequence of 
coercion but of choice, thus implying agency. Taken together, cooperation thus requires 
the convergence o f policies through a process o f mutual coordination and voluntary 
adjustment. The qualification that these policies are ‘actually followed’ is important and 
points out that cooperation goes beyond rhetoric and distinguishes, in Morgenthau’s 
(1960: 186) words, an operative from an inoperative alliance. In this sense, following 
Grieco (1990) and Stein (1990), cooperation is defined as costly investment in a shared 
institutions (or regime) on the international level over a period o f time.
Institutions are understood here along the lines of Stephen Krasner’s well-known 
definition as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making 
procedures around which actors’ expectations converge” (Krasner, 1983: 2) and refer to 
political agreements and treaties outlining common aims, means, and responsibilities 
incorporated in formal organizations (Hasenclever et al., 1996). In and o f itself 
membership in the same institution and occasional expressions of solidarity is not a 
sufficient indicator for a cooperative partnership. What is required is costly investment 
in the shared institution, understood as the mobilization of significant political capital to 
influence the formulation of strategic goals and the establishment/reform of 
organizational elements and/or use of the same. Cooperation as substantial and 
reciprocated political and financial investment towards common practices, ranging from 
consultation and shared strategic planning to common action in crisis situations, 
inevitably involves the conscious sacrifice of some degree of independence (Wolfers, 
1962:27).
The simplest indicator for non-cooperation would be the resignation of institutional 
membership, that is, the formal termination o f the contractual agreement under which 
the common institution was established. Yet, again, such a definition could not grasp the 
process of a disintegrating relationship, as everything short o f un-signing a treaty would
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move outside the analytical focus. In line with the above, non-cooperation is understood 
here not as a sudden breakdown of relations but as a degenerative process playing out 
over time. While ‘defection’ generally does not grasp this long-term perspective, its 
definition as “the action o f falling away from allegiance or adherence to a leader, party, 
or cause” (OED Online) or as the “conscious abandonment o f allegiance or duty (as to a 
person, cause, or doctrine)” and “withdrawing support or help despite allegiance or 
responsibility” (Merriam Webster Online) is nevertheless instructive. Although in the 
context of interstate relations it may seem more appropriate to speak o f the fading o f 
‘solidarity’ than ‘allegiance’, the notion of withdrawing support from a common cause 
reminds that cooperation is goal-oriented. Non-cooperation thus may be expressed in 
both passive non-compliance with and severe disputes over the common cause, and in 
the independent formulation and pursuit of policy against the expectation o f shared 
practice.
As it is difficult to establish a threshold for when non-compliance, disputes and 
independent decision-making count as non-cooperation, the favouring o f an ‘alternative’ 
is an important element.5 To be an alternative the new institution must cover the same 
policy realm and designed to fulfil a similar purpose, thus having, or be perceived as 
having, the potential to rival or compete with the old institution (Biermann 2007).6 
Hence, inversing the definition of cooperation outlined earlier, the demise o f cooperative 
relationship is defined here as a process in which a state ceases to give priority to the 
common security institution, signified by costly investment in an alternative institution 
over a period of time which does not include the previous partner.
Through this conceptual frame Germany’s subsequent investment in three different 
institutions for the purpose of providing for ‘European security’ which gradually 
excluded the United States -  NATO, CSCE, CFSP -  reads as a dynamic moving from 
cooperation to non-cooperation. This phenomenon turns into a ‘puzzle’ in light o f the 
inability of existing IR theories to explain it.
Sorting Existing Theories
While historians would explore the three decades of consensus (1945-55); tension 
(1965-75); and divergence (1985-1995) in great detail to offer a rich and nuanced picture 
of the political dynamics surrounding (and leading to) the institutional investments in
5 See Albert Hirschman’s notion of ‘exit’ defined as a dissatisfied member leaving an 
organization to join another one (Hirschman, 1970).
6 Such a move is also different from claiming a position of neutrality or ‘non-alignment’.
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each case, IR scholars approach history more selectively by viewing it through a 
theoretical prism which deliberately highlights some aspects and neglects others. Indeed, 
for some IR scholars meaningful analysis is only possible “with the guidance o f theory” 
(Waltz 1979: 5) holding that “theory is inescapable; all empirical or practical analysis 
rests on it” (Keohane and Nye 1989: 4). As discussed in more detail in the next chapter, 
behind this is the conviction that the ‘interpretative bias’ permeating all research is best 
compensated for by explicitly laying out the conceptual framework through which the 
historical material is approached. Instead of empirical richness IR scholars (should) offer 
a clearly stated angle focusing on a few but (allegedly) central factors explaining the 
phenomenon at hand. Yet when existing theofies are not capable of grasping an 
empirical phenomenon and, thus, provide insufficient explanatory guidance, the 
researcher is left with a ‘puzzle’. The following suggests that the dominant IR theories 
on interstate (security) cooperation fail to fully explain the empirical phenomenon at 
hand and that, in response to that puzzle, more careful theoretical reflection is needed.
The Question o f the ‘Common Security Interest'
To assess the adequacy of the dominant IR theories7 for explaining interstate security 
(non)cooperation -  structural realism, neoliberal institutionalism, social constructivism -  
there is the question whether/on what basis they can be compared. After all, despite their 
broad commitment to illuminate the issues o f conflict and cooperation, theories are 
constructed for different reasons and tailored towards explaining different things, thus, 
they may not speak to each other. In the present context, the question of comparability 
comes to light of two concepts generally kept apart in the IR literature, namely 
‘alliances’ and ‘security communities’.
‘Alliance’ is the older term found in writings of political thinkers, historians, and 
military planners dating back centuries. It is used in traditional security studies 
dominated by realism and game theory and, correspondingly, is the focus of the first two 
abovementioned approaches (structural realism and neoliberal institutionalism). Broadly 
speaking, an alliance designates a temporary military coalition formed in the face o f a 
(potential) common enemy. Whether for offensive or defensive/deterrence purposes, in 
this literature alliances are a temporary phenomena o f collaboration formed against a 
common military threat, and thus, under the prospect o f war (Morgenthau, 1960; Walt,
7 For a discussion on the meaning of theory and its adequacy, see the following chapter.
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1987; Snyder, 1997).8 The notion of a ‘security community’ is o f more recent origin. 
Often linked to the Kantian notion of a ‘foedus pacificum’, the term was coined by Karl 
Deutsch and colleagues in the 1950s and over the past decade has gained popularity 
among social constructivists. It designates the very absence o f war among states or, 
positively speaking, collaboration for peace. More than a simple nonaggression treaty, a 
security community describes a long-term association among states who have agreed to 
solve all disagreements between them through peaceful means, making war between 
them “unthinkable”.9
In short, it appears alliances are organised against something (an external enemy) and 
externally oriented, whereas security communities are organised fo r  something (internal 
peace), or internally oriented.10 In addition, the scholarly communities favouring the 
concepts of ‘alliances’ and ‘security communities’ are often seen as embedding them in 
two distinct ways of thinking about interstate relations, emphasizing a certain ‘logic of 
anarchy’ in which states pursue their interests by following a logic of consequence and a 
‘logic of community’ where states act according to a logic o f appropriateness, 
respectively.
Without denying these differences in emphasis (as chapter three shows, the major 
theories contain both ‘logics’), one must be careful o f not overstating the differences. In 
at least one important aspect the conceptualizations o f alliances and security 
communities build on common ground. Leaving aside alliances formed for strictly 
offensive purposes,11 there is no intrinsic reason to treat an arrangement formed against 
a threat and one fo r  peace as two different things. If anything, these are two sides of the 
same motivational coin as both alliances and security communities are formed by states 
for reasons of ‘national security’. To just mention a few examples, in their extensive 
literature review, Holsti et al. (1973: 4) define alliances as “a formal agreement between 
two or more nations to collaborate on national security issues” . Joseph Grieco (1990: 12) 
understands alliances as “a formal or informal arrangement for security cooperation 
between two or more sovereign states”, a definition almost identical to the one put 
forward by Stephen Walt (1987: 1). Among the handful of scholars advancing the notion
8 Glenn Snyder defines alliances as “formal associations of states for the use (or nonuse) of 
military force, in specified circumstances, against states outside their own membership” whose 
primary purpose is thus “to pool military strength against a common enemy” (Snyder 1997: 4).
9 Deutsch et al. (1957); Adler (1997a); Adler and Barnett (1998). Snyder’s (1997: 11) definition 
of an entente appears to describe a similar phenomenon. See also Kann (1976).
10 See also Wolfer’s (1962) distinction between collective defense and collective security.
11 Even offensively geared alliances are, in the words of one observer, often “rationalized in the 
service of the alleged goal of peace” (Kann 1976: 614).
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of security community, Emmanuel Adler (1998: 120) speaks about formations of 
“cooperative security” and Thomas Risse-Kappen (1995) frames NATO as a security 
community whose members cooperate because they perceive their state of security as 
interlinked.
Understanding (non)cooperation through the objective o f maintaining ‘national security’ 
falls back on three basic assumptions in which the three paradigms converge: First, 
states are egoistic or self-interested actors and pursue this interest in a rational manner. 
This may sound surprising to those who associate constructivism with explaining 
‘irrational’ or ‘altruistic’ behaviour. While this impression may have been fostered by 
some first-generation constructivists who presented their approach as an alternative to 
so-called ‘rational choice’ explanations, it since has become accepted that the ‘rational 
actor’ assumption is not reserved for utilitarian approaches. In its most basic form, 
rationality holds that actors make decisions based on cost-benefit calculations, or 
estimates of gains and losses, and how these are defined depends on what the actor 
intends to achieve, that is, depends on the definition o f its goals, or basic interests. In 
short, rational action refers to behaviour “designed to further the actor’s perceived self- 
interest” (Monroe, 1991: l) ,12 which is another way of saying that states are ‘egoists’ or 
‘interest-satisficers’ (Simon, 1984).13
Hence, second, decisions about cooperation can be traced back to the national security 
interest of the respective states involved. That states cooperate (or not) because it is in 
their interest to do so is not a ‘realist’ assumption but a view readily shared across the 
theoretical spectrum. Few IR scholars would contest Morgenthau’s point that “interest is 
the perennial standard by which political action must be judged” (Morgenthau, 1960: 
10), if only because ‘interest’ is an analytically empty concept which easily becomes 
tautological unless specified.14 Saying that states seek ‘security’ only begets the 
subsequent question what exactly that means.
12 Monroe (1991: 4) lists four foundational assumptions of rational action, namely (1) actors 
pursue goals, (2) these goals reflect the actor’s perceived self-interest, (3) behavior results from a 
process that actually involves conscious choice, and (4) the individual is the basic actor in 
society.
13 The debate in the social sciences in the 1990s over the merits of ‘rational choice’ came down to 
the question whether or not interests, and the preferences derived from them, should be 
exogenously defined (i.e. fixed) and, if so, whether they should be contextualized and, if so, how 
(Monroe, 1991, 2001; Green and Shapiro, 1994; Levy, 1997b). This thesis supports the 
contextual approach, for reasons discussed in the next chapter.
14 For a discussion, see Reese-Schaefer (1999: 1 Iff).
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The need to specify and justify the reading of the ‘national security interest’ becomes all 
the more important in light of, third, the assumption that cooperation is based on 
common (security) interests. As Keohane puts it cooperation occurs because states “have 
interests in common which can only be realized through cooperation” (Keohane 1984: 
6). Again, IR scholars will not disagree over the view that states cooperate to satisfy 
the(ir) ‘common interest’ and that, conversely, they will stop cooperating when the 
‘common interest’ is missing.15 The key question is what makes interests ‘common’. In 
most basic terms, it can be said that ‘common’ does not imply an ‘identity’ o f interests 
which, as Keohane (1984; 1988: 380) points out, would prompt automatic co-action. 
Instead, the ‘common’ must leave room for a process o f ‘voluntary adjustment’ and, 
hence, politics. Beyond that, specifying what makes security interests ‘common’ is the 
basic task of any theoretical explanation.
The Silence o f the Camps
By specifying this ‘common security interest’ on the basis o f which two states would be 
willing to invest in a shared international institution it is possible to compare arguments 
derived from those three major IR theories dealing with international cooperation, 
namely (structural) realism, (neoliberal) institutionalism and (social) constructivism. The 
following suggests that the logical thrust of each of the three theories leaves too many 
blank spots when trying to make sense of the phenomenon at hand.
The most prominent argument coming out of (structural or neo-)realism holds that in an 
anarchical environment states will cooperate on the basis o f a common threat, more 
precisely when facing a great power, by balancing against it.16 In line with balance of 
power logic, shifts in cooperative behavior are expected to follow shifts in the 
distribution o f power in the international system, with institutional investments thus 
being epiphenomena of the balance of power dynamic. For the case at hand this 
argument is o f little use. While the inherent conceptual vagueness (or contestedness) of
15 A word on the place of ‘trust’ in the argument: If trust is about “actors grant(ing) others 
discretion over their interests based on the belief that those interests will not be harmed” 
(Hoffman 2002: 377), this can be seen as an presupposing (a belief in) a common interest. As 
such, trust can be seen as a consequence of there being a common interest and is manifested in a 
three-part relation of the kind ‘A trusts B to do x’ (Hardin 1998: 12). It also must be noted that 
complete trust is not a necessary condition for cooperation to occur (Hardin 2002; Hoffman 
2002). Otherwise there could be no cooperation from a realist point of view, which holds that 
inter-state relations are characterized by mutual distrust. While institutionalists argue that 
institutions allow for ‘trust within limits’, constructivists argue that states can learn to fully trust 
each other by identifying with each other. This fits with Hardin’s (2002: 58f) point that trust 
cannot be chosen but “just is”, which moves attention to the question why states identify with 
each other. This thesis offers an answer to this question.
16 Waltz (1979, 2000); Mearsheimer (1994; 2001).
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‘power’ makes measuring the distribution of power notoriously difficult, on the basis of 
conventional realist indicators such as economic prosperity and military capabilities the 
US was the strongest player coming out of the Second World War and was also 
recognized by West German political leaders as such.17 Hence, German investment into 
NATO must count as bandwagoning. Investment in CSCE and CFSP also does not 
amount to a balancing act in realist terms as these institutions were not linked to (or 
accompanied by) an enhancement in Germany’s military power and, thus, from a realitst 
perspective do not count as alternatives to NATO. Even if one would frame these 
investments as tacit balancing attempts, this would need to be traced to a shift in the 
global balance o f power in which Germany became wary of a growth in US power. Yet 
if anything from 1965 to 1975, and certainly in the second half of that period when 
German support for CSCE became strong, there was a sense o f declining US power (due 
in large parts to Vietnam). And while the third period (1985-95) could be read as 
Germany reacting to an emerging unipolar world under US hegemony, investment into 
CFSP does not qualify as a ‘weak form’ of hard balancing, despite some attempts to 
frame it as such (Posen 2006: 164). German governments were unwilling to increase 
military expenditure despite US pressure to do so. Indeed, the opposite was the case: 
between 1985 and 1995 the defence budget was reduced.18
Not all realists emphasize balancing (Wohlforth 2008). In contrast to balance o f power 
proponents, hegemonic stability theory argues that smaller/weaker states may 
bandwagon because they benefit from the greatest power maintaining international 
‘stability’. Correspondingly, Investments in an alternative institution could be explained 
with smaller/weaker states’ fears of ‘abandonment’ and the rise of instability (Snyder 
1997). On this basis one could argue that Germany was bandwagoning in the first period 
because it felt comfortable with the US as a provider for ‘stability’. For subsequent 
periods the argument might be that German governments worried about a possible 
withdrawal o f the American ‘security umbrella’ expressed in a waning US commitment 
to NATO.19 As discussed in this thesis, the main empirical problem this argument faces
,7 See Walt (1987: 276ff); Ikenberry (2001: 168) and chapter eight.
18 Sarotte (2001: 19). Attributing CFSP to a desire for ‘soft balancing’ (Pape 2005; Paul 2005), 
that is, an attempt to constrain US power through diplomatic pressure and by entangling it in 
multilateral institutions, is even less plausible. Security institutions are not needed to provide 
Germany with economic leverage vis-a-vis the US. And even if Germany would be seen as using 
CFSP to strengthen international bodies such as the UN, it is a stretch to say that the primary 
reason for doing so would be to constrain the US. See also Brooks and Wohlforth (2005: 9 If); 
Ho worth (2007: 47f).
19 Snyder (1984: 486) suggests that ‘abandonment’ concerns of West Europeans during the Cold 
War were more part of a political game as they never really expected the US to abandon
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is the fact that in cannot explain investment in CSCE and CFSP. Despite occasional 
demands in Congress to reduce US troop presence in Europe and the US hesitancy to 
intervene in Bosnia in the early 1990s, there never were serious plans in the White 
House to withdraw NATO’s ‘security umbrella’ from Germany. Yet the main problem 
this approach faces is theoretical: not only is ‘stability’ too vague conceptually to qualify 
as a common security interest, moreover it is logically impossible to formulate opposing 
arguments (balancing/bandwagoning) out of the same realist paradigm (Legro and 
Moravcsik 1999; see also chapter three).
Institutionalism, by definition, pays considerable attention to international institutions. 
They are seen as valuable providers o f information which alleviate the security- and 
collective action dilemmas arising among states in an anarchical setting by creating an 
environment in which credible commitments between states become feasible.20 The 
attractiveness/value of an institution depends on its efficiency to perform this task. This 
approach has two central weaknesses, however, which make it unsuitable for making 
sense of the dynamic in the case at hand. Conceptually speaking, the force o f the 
institutionalist argument enters only once common interests among states are assumed to 
exist. Hence, while it is useful to explain how institutions enable states to pursue these 
interests more effectively, the theory is indeterminate about what makes a ‘common 
security interest’.21 It thus offers little theoretical traction as to what leads Bonn and 
Washington to invest in NATO together other than labeling it (ex-post) as the ‘rational’ 
thing to do. Furthermore, German investment in CSCE (and then CFSP) would only be 
explicable if it could be shown that NATO (and then CSCE) were ‘inefficient’ in 
addressing German security interests. Yet without a clear definition of the latter, 
(in)efficiency remains an empty concept. Moreover, due to its rootedness in functionalist 
logic, institutionalism faces the problem that its emphasis on ‘sunk costs’ creates an 
argument biased towards path-dependency (Pierson, 2000; Keohane 1988). This makes 
it useful for explaining how institutions contribute to the persistence or increase in 
cooperation but ill-suited for explaining the emergence and the demise of cooperative 
arrangements as defined earlier.22
‘Europe’. For attempts to attribute ‘European’ investment in CFSP with a fear of abandonment, 
see Press-Bamathan (2006) and Posen (2006). See also Howorth (2007: 52ff).
20 Keohane (1984); Keohane and Martin (1995); Simmons and Martin (2002).
21 In the 1980s and 90s neoliberal institutionalists were absorbed in the debate with neorealists 
about how much cooperation was possible in anarchy assuming the existence of ‘common 
interests’. In an influential article on the neo-neo debate, Jervis (1999) does not even touch on the 
question why states would want to cooperate or why existing arrangements would weaken.
22 For a historical institutionalist analysis of cooperation in European foreign and security policy 
more generally displaying the path-dependency bias, see Smith (2004).
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Finally, the (social) constructivist approach, in overlap with sociological institutionalism 
and writings on security communities, emphasizes the influence o f institutions in 
shaping identities and, subsequently, interests of its members.23 It puts emphasis on the 
phenomenon of ‘socialization’ and, crudely speaking, explains cooperation with the 
existence of a shared (‘collective’) identity embedded in common institutions. While this 
perspective often speaks of identities and institutions co-constituting each other, its 
sympathy for sociological structuralism renders institutions often as “chief socializing 
agents” (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 902). It suggests that if only states interact long 
enough and within the right institutions, they will increasingly ‘internalize’ collective 
norms around which shared identities revolve and, thus, progress towards an ever closer 
union. The problem with this socialization is twofold. First, it reads like a constructivist 
version of Haas’ functionalism (Risse 2005), that is, it suffers from the same built-in 
bias towards path-dependency leaving veiy little thought to how such communities 
could dissolve. Hence, as with institutionalism the social constructivist approach has 
great difficulties o f explaining how two states deeply embedded in a common institution 
(NATO) and sharing a collective identity (the West) could drift apart.24 This is a 
symptom of the second and deeper problem that by anchoring common interests in a 
shared identity the theory must necessarily address the issue of identity formation and, 
by extension, dissolution. However, as discussed in chapter three, existing constructivist 
approaches do so unsatisfactorily.
In sum, judged on their basic logic the dominant theoretical approaches in IR are ill- 
equipped to make sense of (‘explain’) the phenomenon because they suffer from a 
balancing bias (realism), a sunk-cost bias (institutionalism) and a socialization bias 
(constructivism).
The researcher is hence left with a puzzle to which (s)he can respond in one of two 
ways. The first response would be to take one of the theories and adjust it/the evidence 
in a way that makes an existing theory ‘work’. This arguably is the road preferred by 
most scholars.25 It leads to studies where, hidden in more or less sophisticated 
methodological frameworks, comparisons o f ‘competing’ explanations end up validating 
one. Yet if we accept Donald Spence’s (1982: 245) point that “each interpretation is
23 Katzenstein (1996); Ruggie (1998); Adler and Barnett (1998).
24 For a discussion of how an overemphasis on normative structure and the neglect of agency 
makes it difficult for moderate constructivists to come to terms with change, see Sending (2002).
25 King et al. (1994: 128-148) spend 20 pages on discussing the problem of selection bias and 
intentional selection of evidence. See also chapter two.
21
guided, unwittingly, by our favorite paradigm” the exercise of bending competing 
theories to the case to ‘test’ their ‘accuracy’ is not necessarily persuasive.26 The second 
road, taken here, asks what is wrong with existing theories and instead o f ‘fixing’ them 
takes the puzzle as an invitation/opportunity to rethink the causal narrative. In other 
words, it aims at a new theory o f security cooperation which can make sense of the 
phenomenon at hand. This is arguably the more difficult road to take, also because the 
IR literature provides little guidance on how to build a theory (see next chapter).
The first question arising is where to start, and an intuitive answer would be ‘with the 
fundamentals’. Thus, following the point made previously, the thesis begins the theory 
building enterprise at the level where the conception o f ‘security interests’ comes to rest. 
In effect, this requires engaging questions o f ontology, starting with a conceptualization 
of the state. The next chapter will justify this approach, yet a first hint at why this is a 
useful point o f departure is given by the phenomenon at hand. IR theories operating with 
a Weberian (or Westphalian) conception o f the state face the problem that the Federal 
Republic was not a fully sovereign state until 3 October 1990. This is not simply a legal 
issue. If one applies the Weberian definition o f the state as a community possessing the 
monopoly over the legitimate use o f force in a designated territory, the massive presence 
of foreign troops on the FRG’s territory and the fact that the Bundeswehr could not be 
used for combat engagement without NATO (i.e. US) consent significantly 
compromises the core feature of the FRG as a ‘state’. Certainly for the first period where 
Germany was formally under occupation, one could well argue that the FRG was not a 
state.27 Consequently, German-American relations did not amount to phenomenona of 
inter-state cooperation. Rather than brushing over this conceptual problem by noting that 
sovereignty is a contested term, this thesis takes the ambiguous status o f the FRG as an 
invitation for thinking more carefully about the meaning of the state.
Research Design
As justified and discussed more fully in the next chapter, the thesis pursues the task of 
theory building, or what is called here ‘creative theorizing’, not primarily through 
empirical analysis but by engaging other theories. This, in turn, rests on a specific 
understanding of what a theory is. In a nutshell, the thesis takes a ‘deep theorizing’ 
perspective which reaches down to the level o f ontology to make the phenomenon
26 A good example is Moravcsik (1998). While a methodologically sophisticated and balanced 
study, it is difficult to ignore the feeling that among his competing hypotheses for what drove the 
process of European integration, the ‘winning’ one (economic interests) is also the author’s 
favorite.
27 See also chapter eight.
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intelligible by placing it in the context o f the ‘human condition’. Theory understood in 
this way serves as preparation for ‘unravelling’ the three paradigms outlined earlier 
(realism, institutionalism, constructivism), that is, it provides a roadmap for carving out 
core insights as well as exposing conceptual tensions which can be carried forward for a 
new theory of security cooperation. The intellectual space opened up by this approach is 
filled with insights taken from the philosophy of, in particular, Heidegger and Aristotle. 
My reliance on them at different stages o f the argument is an attempt to creatively use 
their insights and weave them into a coherent whole. It does not intend to present a fully 
‘Heideggerian’ or fully ‘Aristotelian’ argument (whatever that might mean).
The case study in the second half of the thesis has a dual purpose.28 While its main 
function is to shed light on the phenomenon of German-American cooperation, it is also 
of exploratory nature intended to trace and refine the causal pathways of the theory 
developed in the first part o f the thesis (Gerring 2007: 40ff). As the case is not selected 
out o f a pool o f alternative cases but stimulates the task of theory building, the empirical 
analysis may seem biased to those subscribing to an agenda o f theory ‘testing’ (George 
and Bennett 2004: 22ff.). Yet for the purpose of creative theorizing this is not a problem 
at all. Indeed, the ‘bias’ is inevitable, as instead o f collecting empirical data for the 
purpose of validation or refutation, the phenomenon of German-American relations 
serves as both inspiration and playground for the new theoretical frame developed here. 
That said, to avoid the false impression that the theory is tailored towards ‘the case’, the 
theoretical discussion proceeds in general terms without reference to German-American 
relations and remains strictly separate from the case study.
Methodological Issues
The empirical study employs what may be broadly called an interpretative approach.29 
This is due to the theory’s phenomenological focus on ontology, more specifically on its 
emphasis on intersubjectively created structures of meaning and their function in the 
constitution o f the state as a biographical narrative. O f course, all empirical analysis 
involves some sort o f interpretation in some sense of the word. Yet as opposed to a 
‘rationalist’ approach which, in Keohane’s (1998) understanding o f the term, assumes a 
reality in which the identities and interests o f states (actors) are exogenously given/fixed,
28 On the problem of defining ‘case study’ and the multiple meanings that have been subsumed 
under this term, see Gerring (2007, Ch. 2).
29 See, for instance, Yanow and Schwartz-Shea (2006); Lebow and Lichbach (2007). Note that 
my approach differs from the view that an interpretative approach is ‘empiricist’ in the sense that 
it is all about ‘understanding’ the phenomenon from within without any theoretical 
predisposition.
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an interpretative approach is tailored towards investigating the reality states construct for 
themselves and discerning the reasons (goals, motives) driving their behaviour. Such an 
approach is non-positivist in orientation because it denies the existence o f a meaningful 
reality independent of conceptual frames employed by humans and, consequently, holds 
that theory cannot be ‘tested against’ such a reality. Hence, to the dismay of positivist- 
schooled analysts such as Moravcsik (1999), an interpretative approach cannot outline 
what kind of evidence would prove the theory ‘wrong’ and, hence, cannot provide a 
falsifiable hypothesis.30 Instead, it asks for a hermeneutical method (Kratochwil, 2000b; 
Tickner, 2005; Pouliot, 2007).31
Rather than opening the door to ‘anything goes’, an interpretative approach is not 
relieved from the task o f saying what makes the story generated thereby persuasive. For 
this, the analyst must address a number of challenges revolving around the overarching 
question of how to “interpret an already interpreted world” (Guzzini 2000: 148). 
Grasping how actors interpret their world is challenging because it requires analyzing 
the influence of ideas or ‘worldviews’.32 The question how ideas and values can shown 
to be formative forces opens up the ‘problem of other minds’ well familiar to social 
scientists and philosophers.33 There are three ways to address this problem.
The first would be to show that ‘material’ factors do not sufficiently explain the 
observed behaviour/phenomenon, thus narrowing the focus onto ideas by excluding 
alternative explanations. However, apart from the fact that such negative proof only 
delays addressing the ‘problem of other minds’, an approach emphasizing that the 
material world is interpreted through ideas actually cannot pitch ideational and material 
factors against each other. Second, leaving aside that one may not be consciously aware 
of ones’ worldviews and/or is unable to share them, they may be expressed and, in a 
sense, ‘materialize’ through some sort o f symbolic medium, most commonly language. 
Yet sceptics will always hold that ‘talk is cheap’ and that there is ho way to tell if 
someone actually means what (s)he says. Hence, third, recording the understanding 
actors have of themselves and what the world means to them must be approached with a 
broader analytical net which allows to evaluate and sort these meanings by putting them
30 For a view that an interpretative approach should accommodate the principle of ‘falsification’, 
see Hopf (2007), also Wendt (1999).
31 Hopf (2007: 63) differentiates between phenomenological, interpretive and hermeneutical 
approaches.
32 To be sure, the analysis of ideas is not reserved for ‘non-positivist’ approaches; yet positivists 
are more reluctant to engage it as the problem of knowing what is in other people’s heads makes 
a hypothesis testing approach rather difficult.
33 For attempts in IR, see Goldstein and Keohane (1993); Yee (1996); Parsons (2002).
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‘into perspective’. As Ted Hopf puts it “the meaning o f an individual’s action and words 
are not his to control or interpret” but must be “surfaced by the observer” (Hopf 2007: 
62f.).34 In other words, the analyst is both observer and interpreter analyzing state 
behaviour from ‘within’ while maintaining the broader view from ‘without’. This not 
only requires empathy to see the world from the perspective o f the research ‘object’ 
(rather: subject), ideally as a participant-observer (Klotz and Lynch 2007: 37),35 but also 
reflexivity on the side of the analyst to allow awareness o f its own biases when engaging 
this task (Guzzini 2000; Tickner 2005).
When it comes to specifying this broader analytical net which allows evaluating the 
evidence from a distance and placing it into ‘perspective’, constructivists like to stress 
the social structure and the historical trajectory actors are situated in (Pouliot 2007; Hopf 
2007). It builds on the view that meaning is constructed not in isolation but in a social 
setting and thereby turns into a ‘social fact’ situated between and across the minds of 
individuals and visible in social practice. Moreover, because the construction o f social 
reality is a temporal process, discerning and making intelligible social facts involves an 
evolutionary and, hence, historical perspective: “historicity...shows up as part of the 
contexts that make possible social reality” (Adler 2002: 102). Vincent Pouliot’s (2007: 
367) suggestion that contextualization and historicity ‘objectify’ knowledge because 
they require the analyst to ‘stand back’ from and go beyond purely subjective and 
current meanings is useful for gaining perspective, but not sufficient as they do not 
provide the analyst with guidance on which context and which history matters (and 
why). As noted earlier and discussed in more detail in the next chapter, the net offering 
such guidance must be spun by theory.
Theoretical guidance allows engaging the historical case in a systematic and 
discriminatory fashion through a “structured, focused comparison” (George and Bennett 
2004, Ch. 3) where the same sub-questions are “asked o f each case under study to guide 
and standardize data collection” and with the analyst dealing “only with certain aspects 
of the historical cases examined” (George and Bennett 2004: 67). Even though the 
phenomenon at hand is a ‘single’ case in that the three periods form one overarching 
dynamic o f (non)cooperation, it nevertheless carries a comparative element through the
34 Hopf also speaks of an act of ‘translation’.
35 As Guzzini puts it, using Bourdieusian terminology, “identity (agency), interests and strategies 
are field-specific and can be understood only after a prior analysis of the field itself’ (Guzzini 
2000: 166).
25
connection.36 More precisely, the empirical analysis is structured in that each period 
addresses the same set o f questions, assessing the government’s conception of 
Germany’s national biography, how it connects with the US narrative through a vision 
o f European order, and what implication this has for common institutional investments. 
And it is focused  in that the examination of these periods is tailored towards carving out 
only those parameters central to the theoretical argument and brackets other issues, such 
the relationship o f Bonn and Washington with Moscow. Slightly out o f focus but still 
present are the roles played by Britain and France in the process o f setting up the 
institutional structures o f NATO, CSCE, and CFSP.
On the question of what counts as evidence, two cautionary notes are in order. First, 
ideally a case study draws on a variety o f sources and, in particular, on primary sources 
gained through careful archival work (historical analysis obviously does not allow a 
participant-observation approach). This thesis does not quite fulfil that ideal. While 
occasionally the empirical narrative is backed through the study o f personal accounts, 
speeches and treaties, it relies mainly on secondary literature. This is justified by (i) the 
focus on theory development, (ii) the temporal scope o f the analysis and by (iii) the fact 
that the analysis gains its explanatory power through the theoretical argument.37 That 
said, one problem remains with ‘second order’ interpretation: If all secondary literature 
is written from a perspective, the empirical narrative may rely on evidence taken from 
work whose interpretations do not coincide with the angle taken here. Said differently, it 
runs the risk of ‘cherry picking’ evidence from studies whose argumentative thrust is 
different from, perhaps even in conflict with, the argument presented here.38 While 
ideally one would point out the differences and clarity contrasting angles wherever 
possible, given the vast amount o f studies done on German-American relations laying 
out all the instances where my interpretation diverges from the studies referenced in this 
thesis would require more space and disrupt the flow of the narrative. Hence, I merely
36 In Gerring’s terminology, the case study presented here is a diachronic single-case study, that 
is, it analyses a single case which contains internal temporal variation (Gerring 2007: 28).
37 Relying on secondary sources is common practice among social scientists working with a 
broad historical horizon. As Theda Skocpol notes “If a topic is too big for purely primary 
research -  and if excellent studies by specialists are already available in some profusion -  
secondary sources are appropriate as the basic source of evidence for a given study. Using them 
is not different from survey analysts reworking the results of previous surveys rather than asking 
all questions anew” (in Goldthorpe 1991: 224). For a critique, see Goldthorpe (1991).
38 On this problem, see Goldthorpe (1991); Hall and Kratochwil (1993); Lustick (1996); also 
Elman and Fendius Elman (1997). The criticism that many social scientists taking a (macro) 
historical perspective tend not to follow any substantial rules but “enjoy a delightful freedom to 
play ‘p 'ck-and-mix’ in history’s sweetshop” (Goldthorpe 1991: 225) is well taken but does not 
acknowledge the value of theoretical guidance.
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signal awareness o f the problem without offering a solution other than my commitment 
to minimize misrepresentation.
Finally, coming up with a new/original theoretical angle faces a semantic challenge, 
namely that one has to be careful with using established terms like the state, security, 
power, etc., as their meaning is always tied to a broader theoretical frame. As Waltz 
points out, changes o f theory produce changes in the meaning of terms and so it is 
necessary to clarify the vocabulary used and redefine basic concepts (Waltz 1979: 12). 
This concerns, in particular, the meaning of security policy, which for most scholars 
writing during or about the Cold War concerns strategic-military issues. Rather than 
engaging this kind o f thinking, the thesis contrasts the view that German-American 
security cooperation was based primarily on a military rationale, namely deterring a 
Soviet attack, and instead strengthens the view that throughout “Bonn’s demand for 
security was primarily political in nature” (Doering-Manteuffel 1983: 52).
Overview of C hapters
The thesis is divided in two major parts, a theoretical one (chapters 2 to 7) and an 
empirical one (chapters 8 to 10). Following this introduction, the theoretical part is 
subdivided into three sections: the first section prepares the meta-theoretical ground for 
‘creative theorizing’ and engages the task via an engagement o f the three existing IR 
paradigms (chapters 2 and 3). The second section draws on Heidegger for a reading of 
what ‘drives’ humans and subsequently offers a reconceptualization o f the state as a 
national biography (chapters 4 and 5), and the section third presents a reading o f the 
dynamics of interstate cooperation through the lens o f ‘friendship’ and 
‘estrangement/emancipation’ (chapters 6 and 7). The empirical part is also divided in 
three sections, each illuminating one decade of German-American cooperation, with a 
focus on Adenauer’s decision to invest in NATO in the decade following the end o f the 
Second World War (chapter 8), followed by Brandt’s decision to invest in CSCE 
(chapter 9) and, finally, the move of the Kohl government towards CFSP (chapter 10). 
The conclusion reviews the major findings and offers some thoughts on the theoretical 
and empirical implications.
Turning to the content of individual chapters, C hap ter Two outlines the basic 
parameters of and provides a roadmap for ‘creative theorizing’. It argues that a 
persuasive argument requires a strong theoretical foundation and reviews the positions 
of Kuhn, Popper, and Lakatos to adopt the latters’ notion of a ‘research programme’ 
revolving around a ‘hard core’ and the notion that a new theory is ‘better’ if it can
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produce and accommodating ‘novel facts’. Noting that Lakatos remains vague about the 
use of these terms and does not say much about the task of theory development, the 
discussion justifies a deductive approach and suggests that the intellectual space for 
theory building is opened via an exploration o f the theoretical limits of existing theories 
(‘unravelling’). The remainder o f the chapter specifies the nature of a ‘deep theoiy’ and 
suggests that it involves tracing the causal narrative o f a theory to an account o f the 
human condition defining the spatio-temporal situatedness o f the state. The chapter 
closes by showing how such an account operates on the level o f ontology and gives 
meaning to the ‘national security interest’ via an understanding of statehood and the 
corresponding ‘existential threat’ to the same.
C hapter Three unravels the three major ‘paradigms’ -  realism, institutionalism, and 
constructivism -  to (i) reveal both internal tensions and explore why they do not provide 
a convincing causal narrative for the phenomenon at hand, and to (ii) use them as a 
source of inspiration for ‘creative theorizing’, that is, to learn from their insights and 
limits. The chapter first traces realism’s ‘balance o f power’ proposition to the Hobbesian 
account of the human condition emphasizing territorial integrity (autonomy) as what 
makes ‘the state’. The discussion notes the conceptual void of realism on the question 
why states seek autonomy and highlights that realists locate the existential threat in time, 
addressing future uncertainty by reverting to worst-case thinking rooted in a reading of 
history as conflictual. The chapter then briefly discusses the institutionalist paradigm, 
divided into historical institutionalism and neoliberal (or utilitarian) institutionalism, to 
show that both versions are unsuitable for making sense o f the case at hand due to their 
path dependency bias. While their focus on interdependence offers interesting 
modifications to the reading of the spatiality o f interstate relations, it is noted that 
institutionalisms’ conception of the state remains grounded in the realist hard core. The 
final part of the chapter engages the constructivist paradigm. Differentiating between 
moderate and radical constructivism, it discusses the formers’ conceptualization of ‘state 
identity’ and criticizes it for (i) failing to come up with a notion o f the ‘state’ alternative 
to realism and (ii) for its overemphasis on socialization, i.e. a progressive dynamic 
which cannot account for a breakdown of relations as it lacks a conceptualisation of 
threat to ‘identity’. This weakness is attributed to the constructivist attempt to overcome 
realism without grounding constructivism in a new account o f the human condition 
(spatio-temporal situatedness of the state).
C hapter Four relies on Heidegger to argue that humans are driven by the desire to 
control anxiety. It takes the postmodern emphasis on identity and contingency as a
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starting point and engages Heidegger’s fundamental ontology to open up new ways o f 
conceptualizing ‘the S e lf and its basic interest. It picks up Heidegger’s argument that 
being-in-the-world is conditioned by awareness of finitude yet impossibility to know 
death, which generates ‘anxiety’ as the foundational sentiment. This provides an 
alternative to Hobbesian ontology by shifting attention to the S e lfs  attempt of coming to 
terms with anxiety by seeking orientation through meaningful ‘knowledge’ of itself and 
‘the world’. It is shown how the reflexive ability of the Self generates what is termed an 
‘anxiety paradox’, namely the attempt to regain a sense o f continuity/stability which 
denies contingency o f being and carries the Self beyond ‘death’. Two strategies, 
mathematical measuring and routine practices, are criticized with Heidegger for failing 
to provide the Self with ‘authenticity’, generating an ‘anxiety dilemma’. The chapter 
argues that the paradox does not need to end in a dilemma if past and future are 
conceptualized as meaningful places for the Self providing substance to a narrative of 
‘authentic becoming’.
C hapter Five discusses how the Self establishes a meaningful existence -  a narrative of 
authentic becoming -  through a ‘national biography’, that is, a coherent life story of 
coming into being-in-the-world in space and time. Maintaining Heidegger’s 
phenomenological perspective, the chapter first discusses the spatial embeddedness of 
being-in-the-world through the notion o f an experienced space. It suggests to grasp this 
through a taxonomy of centre/soul, valued order, and horizon to then explore the 
usefulness of existing frameworks in IR for conceptualizing the states’ situatedness in an 
‘experienced space’. The second half o f the chapter discusses the temporal features of 
the national biography. It highlights the importance o f memory spaces generated by 
significant experiences rendering the past meaningful, whose ambiguity provide the 
creative space to devise lessons projected into the future as visions of order, or utopias 
and devising an ‘envisioned space’. It argues that in merging the two the Self turns ‘its’ 
world into a meaningful project through a coherent biography, which is the site of 
political agency and provides political leaders with direction.
C hapter Six argues that states attempt to create a meaningful world through friendship. 
After reviewing the limits of Heidegger’s ontology as one in which authenticity does not 
(cannot) arise out of social relations, it argues that the Self is looking to realize its 
project with significant Others, or ‘friends’ as a way to maintain authenticity within an 
intimate relationship. It shows how IR scholarship has neglected looking at intimate 
relations as stabilizing the Self by either focusing on the negative Other ( ‘the enemy’) or 
vague notions of group membership (‘community’). The discussion takes up Aristotle’s
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notion o f true friendship and focuses on the features of reciprocity and equality 
established through moral particularity to define friendship between states arising out of 
a convergence o f national biographies. It argues that friends unfold through a shared 
experienced space and negotiate common visions (horizons o f expectations) and thereby 
order an ‘inter-subjective’ world in which biographical narratives resonate but are also, 
inevitably, compromised. Establishing friendship as a creative project which empowers 
both sides, it is argued that this project is pursued through common institutions as sites 
for negotiating visions of order, serving friends as political platforms for shared world- 
building.
C hap ter Seven argues that states invest in a new/alternative institution if their 
friendship undergoes a process of sustained dissonance, or estrangement. More
precisely, it argues that states do so when the existing institutional arrangement ceases to 
function as an anxiety controlling mechanism, that is, when it ceases to be the platform 
through which a coherent national biography can be negotiated with the friend. This 
argument is made by suggesting that the existential threat to a stable sense o f Self is 
posed by ambivalence produced by dissonance among friends over ideas of order, that 
is, different readings of the common project and adequate contribution to the same. 
Enduring dissonance, it is argued, leads to a process of ‘estrangement’ among friends. 
Two possible reactions are discussed: ‘adaptation’ and ‘emancipation’. Whereas the 
former refers to the attempt to renegotiate ideas o f order with the friend through the 
common institution, an enduring dissonance which violates authentic ideas of order 
leads states to pursue a strategy of emancipation. Such a strategy involves searching for 
an alternative significant Other with whom a ‘world building’ project can be negotiated 
through a new institution which better accommodates the national biography. The 
chapter concludes with outlining what to expect from the empirical analysis.
C hap ter Eight applies the theoretical lens established in the previous chapters to 
explain German and American investment in NATO in the decade following the end of 
the Second World War (1945-55) with overlapping narratives of being-in-the-world, 
creating binds o f friendship. The first part lays out how Adenauer sought to give 
‘Germany’ a new direction after the end of the war. He did so by formulating the 
narrative of Germany-in-Europe emphasizing the values o f ‘liberalism’ and 
‘antimilitarism’ in overlap with the American narrative and anchored in the Western 
space. The second part shows how this narrative resonated with the Truman and 
Churchill administrations in their attempt of making sense of the US presence in 
‘Europe’ by building a ‘United States of Europe’ through NATO. The third part
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demonstrates the German-American consensus in the debate over German rearmament 
as an attempt by Adenauer to secure German voice in the Western project through 
NATO membership. It is shown how this occurred with the help of a dystopia of a 
communist Europe captured in the ‘Korea model’ and the ‘Prague model’, further 
manifesting German-American commitment to shared ideal o f European order.
C hap ter Nine explores Willy Brandt’s motivation to invest in (what became) CSCE 
between 1965 and 1975 and the American reluctance to join this institution. It argues 
that Brandt envisioned ‘Germany’ unfolding into a Greater European Peace Order in a 
way that could not be done through NATO and that this raised suspicion in the US. It 
first shows how his idea to build a Germany in ‘Greater Europe’ through Ostpolitik was 
formulated with ‘Kennedy-America’ and that this creative relationship stalled with the 
Johnson and, particularly, the Nixon administration. Dissonance emerged between their 
narratives of Germany and America in the world over the vision of ‘peace in Europe’: 
whereas from Washington it meant stability in the ‘order o f Yalta’, from Berlin/Bonn it 
meant change and overcoming this very order. The chapter shows that while the ‘Harmel 
report’ and the ambiguous meaning o f detente allowed the Brandt government to 
formally pursue his vision through NATO, it considered a European Security 
Conference (later CSCE) the more suitable forum for building ‘Germany-in-Greater- 
Europe’. It discusses Nixon/Kissinger’s unease with Brandt’s course because it brought 
uncertainty into America’s conception o f ‘Europe’ and, hence, ‘the world’, prompting a 
US strategy to keep Brandt close through NATO. Both sides concealed their tensions 
over the shared project through a strategy o f silence and Nixon/Kissinger’s low-key 
participation in CSCE.
C hapter Ten discusses how the Kohl government came to invest in CFSP as a new 
forum and potential alternative to NATO and CSCE to manifest its vision of Germany- 
in-Europe. It addresses the divergence in German-American security cooperation in the 
decade between 1985 and 1995, when Bonn came to invest in WEU/CFSP as an 
alternative to NATO and CSCE. The first part lays out the orientation of the 
Kohl/Genscher government as a merger o f Adenauer’s and Brandt’s narrative of 
‘Germany-in-Europe’ and points out the tensions with the Reagan administration. The 
second part examines the ‘Bonn-Washington nexus’ during the negotiations leading to 
German unification to suggest that it blended out dissonance about the broader question 
of the Western project after the end of the Cold War. The third part discusses 
disagreements about the meaning o f the 1991 Gulf War and the conflict in Bosnia for the 
‘Western’ project, exposing German resistance to building a ‘New World Order’ with
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military force and the lacking American commitment to invest in a ‘European Peace 
Order’. The chapter suggests that over the entire decade an enduring dissonance between 
German and American narratives o f being-in-the-world prompted the Kohl government 
to pursue a strategy of emancipation through WEU/CFSP and with France.
C hapter Eleven concludes by summarizing the main theoretical and empirical insights 
and assesses the implications for IR theory as well as German-American relations and, 
by extension, the institutionalization o f ‘European security’.
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CHAPTER TWO: THE CASE FOR ‘DEEP THEORY’
Summary
This chapter lays the groundwork for creative theorizing. It has two purposes. First, it 
manifests the importance of theoretically-guided research and makes a case for what is 
called ‘deep theory’. Laying out its features, the chapter argues that causal narratives 
start not merely with an assumption of state interests but that the latter is anchored in an 
ontology o f the state which, in turn, is embedded in an account o f the human condition, 
that is, in an account o f spatial and temporal situatedness. Second, the chapter suggests 
that a deep engagement with theory is central to creative theorizing. It allows to 
‘unravel’ existing IR theories from within not only to lay out why they are unsuitable to 
make sense of the phenomenon at hand but also, and perhaps even more so, to use their 
internal tensions and shortcomings as a stimulus for building a new theoretical frame.
The discussion developing these points proceeds as follows: It begins by laying out the 
difference between shallow and deep theorizing. In an attempt to specify the latter, it 
then briefly reviews the debate between Kuhn, Popper and Lakatos, adopting Lakatos 
concept of the ‘hard core’ and his emphasis on the need for constructive criticism. The 
chapter proceeds by making the case for ‘creative theorizing’ as a deductive enterprise 
involving the ‘unraveling’ of existing approaches and searching for conceptual openings. 
It then presents a reading of the ‘hard core’ o f a theory as an account of the human 
condition (as opposed to human nature) in which the meaning of the state and o f its 
‘national security interest’ is embedded. The final section justifies this ‘deep’ approach 
with the ‘survival’ assumption popular in IR, pointing out that knowing what it means 
for states to ‘survive’ requires an account of what it means for the state to ‘be’.
The Interpretative Bias
All research must come to terms with the interpretative bias, namely that conceptual 
frames interfere both when delineating the phenomenon and in the subsequent enterprise 
of making sense of it. Although the ambition to present an accurate picture o f the past 
necessarily pervades the work of historians, since the beginning of the 20th century 
scholars have come to admit that the historical ‘record’ does not speak for itself. As E.H. 
Carr noted, ‘facts’ are not passively received but emerge out o f a continuous dialogue 
between present and past (Carr, 1990 (1961): 21-30; Spence, 1982). In this dialogue, 
which for those aiming at prediction also includes the future, theory plays the crucial 
role of categorizing and ordering the ‘record’. Hans Morgenthau, who believed that
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there was an ‘’’intrinsic nature” of international politics and in the ability of theory to 
capture the same “as it actually is” (Morgenthau 1960: 15), saw theory function “like a 
skeleton which, invisible from the naked eye, gives form and function to the body [of 
history]” (in Thompson, 1960: 18). Yet it is not only that theory tells us which ‘facts’ 
matter and which do not. Even more so, when ‘facts’ are selected, interpreted, and filled 
with meaning they also become the analyst’s creation. In other words, the angle from 
which events are observed and attributed with meaning -  historians would say 
‘represented’ -  also relies on an idea of how they matter. As Weber noted, “we cannot 
learn the meaning of the world from the result o f its analysis, be it ever so perfect; [we] 
must rather be in a position to create this meaning itself’ (in Smith, 1999: 23).
The theoretical lenses providing this meaning in turn are products/grow out of real- 
world concerns and experiences (Sabine, 1969 (1931); Cox, 1981; Puchala, 2003).39 
Theories arise out o f and respond to a very ‘real’ socio-political context, motivated by a 
certain Erkenntnisinteresse, a Kantian term literally translated as the interest in 
knowledge/insight and echoed in Robert Cox’s (1981: 128) famous statement that theory 
is always for someone and for some purpose.40 As George Sabine put it, there is no such 
thing as a disinterested political theory. In addition to a causal narrative, theories always 
contain ‘factual’ and ‘valuational’ properties emerging out o f the author’s socio-political 
context and normative agenda, respectively (Sabine, 1969: 11).41
If theoretical lenses and the reading of history are intertwined in this way and constitute 
each other, then the persuasiveness of an argument, its “narrative truth” (Spence 1982) 
depends on how the interaction between theory and history is managed.42 This 
interaction is central to the debate between positivism and its critics, what Gabriel 
Almond (1988: 839) called the “hard science -  soft science’ polarity endemic to the
39 Gaddis notes how the debate among historians in the late 1960s about the origins of the Cold 
War was “a dialogue thinly concealed by the fact that what many of the participants were really 
arguing about, and using history to support their respective positions, was the war in Vietnam” 
(Gaddis, 1987: 12).
40 For how personal experiences influence theorizing in feminism, see Tickner (2005).
41 Cox’s (1981) famous distinction between ‘problem-solving’ and ‘critical’ theories is overly 
crude as it does not capture theories aimed at explaining without ascribing to a positivist 
‘problem-solving’ approach. German theorists have classified theories in up to four types aimed 
at searching for the good life (normative), creating intersubjective understanding (historical- 
hermeneutic), prediction (empiric-analytic), and emancipation (critical-dialectic), respectively 
(Habermas 1986; von Beyme 1992). While useful for textbook-classification, a substantial theory 
cannot escape either dimension.
42 Gaddis (1987); Elman and Fendius Elman (2001); Smith (1999); Puchala (2003).
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discipline [of political science] since its origins”.43 While the scale characterized by 
poles of ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ may be useful for debating types/kinds o f science, it is less 
useful for the task of grasping different understandings o f theory aimed at organizing 
‘history’ and, thus, lending meaning to the world. The scale for the latter purpose, I 
suggest, is one that ranges between deep (or thick) and shallow (or thin) theorizing. 
Although both capture different ways of dealing with the theory-history relationship, the 
difference is not semantic: whereas the ‘soft/hard’ distinction is more about the method 
chosen (quantitative versus interpretative, crudely put), the ‘deep/shallow’ distinction 
captures whether the persuasiveness of an argument relies primarily (not exclusively) on 
philosophical depth or on empirical evidence. One could say the two draw different 
conclusions from the Humean insight that causality can never be truly experienced but is 
something that is formed and exists in the mind: while the ‘hard/soft’ pair assumes that 
causality can be ‘inferred’ through observation of regular patterns or through thick 
description, the deep/shallow pair captures how much weight the causal argument puts 
on theory. The question is what makes a theory ‘deep’?
Taking a ‘Deep’ Look at Theory
When Sabine (1969: 8) notes that political theory is “whatever philosophers 
have...called by that name” he suggests that theorising is the domain o f philosophers. 
While in the field of IR there may not be many claiming (or accepting) this title there 
clearly are some who theorize more carefully and ‘deeper’ than others. John Vasquez’s
(1995) point that not everything that calls itself such is a theory echoes a complaint 
voiced by the likes of Raymond Aron (1967) and Kenneth Waltz (1979), both of whom 
noted that ‘theory’ is an over-used and abused term among scholars o f international 
politics. Symptomatic are sweeping statements such as Donald Puchala’s (2003: 5) 
characterization of theory as “an intellectual treasure trove o f Weberian ideal types of 
phenomena, structures, processes, causes, effects, and outcomes” and leaving it at that. 
More recently, David Boucher suggested that international theory “missed the 
opportunity o f firmly anchoring itself on sound philosophical foundations” (Boucher, 
1998: 4). While this latter assessment may go a bit too far -  certainly according to the 
criteria outlined in this chapter there are philosophically grounded IR theories -  it 
highlights an important issue. As Scott Burchill notes, and a look at IR textbooks 
confirms, the plurality of views in an increasingly ‘fragmented’ discipline about the
43 The division between positivist and non-positivist approaches fueled the Methodenstreit in 
German sociology and still resonates in the distinction between rational-choice and postmodern 
frameworks in IR. For a discussion of the latter, see Lapid (1989); Vasquez (1995); Smith et al. 
(1996); Mayer (2003).
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purpose and character o f ‘theory’ has created a situation where scholars “do not agree 
about what they are actually doing when they theorize about international relations” 
(Burchill, 2001: 8, emphasis added).44 In short, while much energy has been spent on 
discussing what makes a theory of international politics', few have focussed on the 
question what makes a theory.45
Looking at Lakatos
In approaching this question and clarifying the meaning o f ‘deep theory’, it is useful to 
briefly review the debate between Thomas Kuhn (1996 [1962]), Karl Popper (1968), and 
Imre Lakatos (1970). Although focusing on the question o f how to evaluate theoretical 
progress in the hard sciences, they are frequently invoked by IR scholars46 as their 
arguments are sufficiently metaphysical to inspire questions of theorising in the social 
sciences.
Kuhn argues that the history of science is best understood as a succession o f overarching 
‘paradigms’, socio-psychological constructs defining ‘normal science’ in theoretical and 
methodological terms for an entire scholarly community. According to Kuhn, paradigms 
cannot be objectively compared, that is, they are “incommensurable”. Indeed, scholars 
situated within different paradigms cannot even engage in meaningful debate about 
reality because the latter is always interpreted within the confines o f the paradigm. As a 
consequence, paradigms cannot be effectively criticised from within and can only be 
replaced during moments of perceptual crisis, characterized by the emergence of 
‘anomalies’ eventually leading to a ‘scientific revolution’ in which one paradigm is 
replaced by another (Kuhn, 1996 (1962): 112ff).
Popper fundamentally disagrees with Kuhn and argues that existing theories could -  and 
should -  be continuously challenged on rational grounds. Aiming at establishing 
objective criteria of critique which would prevent ‘ideologically blind’ research and
44 See, for instance, Booth and Smith (1995); Burchill et al. (2001); Dunne et al. (2007).
45 It is too easy to lay the blame only at the doorstep of the ‘behavioural revolution’. As Boucher 
points out, Martin Wight’s differentiation of ‘Hobbesian’, ‘Grotian’, and ‘Kantian’ approaches, 
an influential counter-discourse to the positivist approach in the US and taken up by Bull (1977), 
amounts only to three descriptive lenses rather than philosophical arguments (Boucher 1998: 4). 
Although Wight/Bull’s taxonomy is useful for pointing to different ontologies of the international 
and has since been further developed and incorporated into more sophisticated arguments, most 
notably Wendt (1999) and Buzan (2004), the English School is a prime example for an 
‘approach’ considered both grand theory (Buzan, 2004) and not theory at all (Waltz, 1998). 
Tellingly, Dunne sees the English School as “the dominant theoretical voice” in Britain but also 
notes that “it needs a more rigorous account of exactly what is meant by ‘theory’” (Dunne, 2007: 
128, 130).
46 As Colin Wight (2002) points out most IR scholars merely pay lip service to these authors.
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allow (the monitoring of) progress, Poppers’ solution to the interpretative dilemma was 
logical positivism, namely that theories needed to produce propositions which could be 
‘falsified’ by stating clearly what evidence would be needed to ‘disprove’ the 
proposition. Although he knew that, ultimately, theories cannot be falsified in the strict 
sense as no conclusive disproof can ever be produced empirically, he saw the principle 
as a critical check on ‘intellectual honesty’ (Popper, 1968).47
The weakness of both Kuhn and Popper is that, for different reasons, their debate does 
not contribute much do a deeper understanding o f theory. Kuhn’s notion of ‘paradigm’ 
may be useful to capture meta-theoretical camps in IR whose ontological and 
epistemological positions are difficult to reconcile.48 Yet his definition o f ‘paradigm’ is 
notoriously vague and ill suited to substantiate the meaning o f ‘theory’.49 Among IR 
scholars, at least, Popper’s approach impoverished the meaning o f theory by narrowing 
it down to a causal statement, or hypothesis, thus giving rise to shallow theorizing. To be 
clear, this is not to suggest that the work of Popper is philosophically shallow but, rather, 
that most IR research adopting a positivist approach to deal with the interpretative 
dilemma reduces the meaning o f theory to a hypothesis of the kind ‘if A then B’. It leads 
to a conflation of theory and methodology, that is, to a cherishing o f research designs 
which place persuasive weight on empirical evidence and, as a consequence, talk theory 
but mean methodology (King et al. 1994; Shapiro et al. 2004). The focus on the 
falsification criterion tempted IR scholars to confuse the task o f identifying and 
specifying meaningful relationships through a philosophically grounded narrative with 
the procedure of ‘data collection’, thereby overshadowing thinking about what a theory 
actually is and effectively moving the philosophical dimension, or ‘deep’ theorizing, out 
o f sight.50 This left much of IR with a conception o f ‘theory’ treated equal to formal 
modelling with falsification as its most important ‘property’, producing statements such 
as “a ‘theory’ which cannot be wrong is not a theory” (King et al., 1994: 100).
The ironic consequence of this shallow understanding o f theory is that it requires 
dismissing one of the most important IR theories dealing with security cooperation,
47 As Klaus von Beyme (1992) reminds, Popper was no strict empiricist.
48 Although it appears that these ‘paradigms’ manage to exist side by side, occasionally even 
feeding off and modifying each other. In Kuhn’s frame, debate is necessarily limited/artificial 
because paradigms succeed each other and, except for a brief period of overlap, do not exist side 
by side.
49 See Masterman’s (1968) critique of Kuhn’s ‘paradigm’ -  she identifies 21 different readings -  
and Kuhn’s (1996: 174-190) attempt to clarify the concept in response.
50 Most notably, in King, Keohane and Verba, theory does not feature among the four elements 
characterizing “good research” (King et al., 1994: 7f), and where theory is discussed, it is 
understood as not much more than an “interrelated set of causal hypotheses” (Ibid: 99).
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Waltzian neorealism, which is repeatedly criticized for lacking clear statement of what 
counts for ‘falsifiable’ evidence (Vasquez, 1995, 1997). Notably, this critique is readily 
accepted by Waltz (1997) as well as Gilpin who calls realism “a philosophical 
position...not a scientific theory subject to the test of falsifiability” (Gilpin, 1996: 6). 
The same can be said about constructivism. Although some prefer to call it a “meta- 
theoretical position” instead of a theory (Wendt 1999: 7; Guzzini 2000), its proponents 
generally present a philosophically grounded argument which, despite claims to the 
contrary, cannot produce ‘falsifiable’ hypotheses, not the least because of the 
constructivist emphasis on norms which are counterfactually valid (Kratochwil and 
Ruggie, 1986: 767).51
Lakatos provides a more fruitful roadmap. Joining Popper in criticising Kuhn’s 
suggestion that scholars are trapped in paradigms, he saw constant critique and the 
replacement o f theories as both necessary and possible. More precisely, in contrast to 
Kuhn’s view of scientific revolutions occurring in rather unexpected and seemingly 
‘irrational’ fashion coming from the outside, Lakatos emphasises that new theories can 
be put forward through gradual and systematic critique also from the inside. In his 
words, “conceptual frameworks can be developed and also replaced by new ones; it is 
we who create our prisons and we can also, critically, demolish them” (Lakatos, 1970: 
104).52
Furthermore, in a move away from Popper,53 for Lakatos criticism needs to be 
constructive; there can be no falsification before the emergence of a better theory as 
“refutation without alternatives shows nothing but the poverty o f our imagination” 
(Lakatos, 1970: 120, Fn). Instead o f spending much valuable time on finding ‘falsifiable 
evidence’, theories should be evaluated as to how much they can accommodate ‘novel 
facts’. Lakatos suggests that one needs to deploy a ‘pluralistic’ model o f theorizing by 
differentiating between two types of theory, an interpretative one “to provide the facts” 
and an .explanatory one to explain them (Lakatos 1970: 129). This pluralistic model 
forms what he calls a ‘research programme’ consists o f a succession of theories
51 Wendt (1999: 373) pays lip service to the importance of falsifiability in order to stay in the 
‘scientific’ camp. Yet as far as I am aware, Wendt never produced a falsifiable hypothesis.
52 Where Kuhn saw conceptual orthodoxy punctuated only during rare perceptual crises, Popper 
and Lakatos saw constant theoretical competition, a “revolution in permanence” (Lakatos, 1970: 
92) driving forward and making possible continuous ‘growth of knowledge’.
53 In his key essay, Lakatos tries to hide his deviation from Popper by adopting much of his 
language. Yet despite the semantic parallels such as naming his approach “sophisticated 
methodological falsificationism” aimed at “the logic of discovery”, his argument is quite different 
to that of Popper.
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grounded in a shared ‘hard core’ o f irrefutable assumptions and “a protective belt of 
auxiliary hypotheses” (Ibid, 133). While the latter can be adjusted to accommodate ‘new 
facts’, what Lakatos calls the ‘positive heuristics’ of the research programme, he 
emphasizes that protagonists cannot change the ‘hard core’ (negative heuristic). From 
this he posits that the criteria for evaluating the quality o f a research programme -  
whether it is progressive or degenerative -  lies in its ability to provide ‘auxiliary 
hypotheses’ which can anticipate and adjust to ‘novel facts’ (maintaining external 
consistency) without loosing connection to the ‘hard core’ (maintaining internal 
consistency). When the ‘hard core’ must be altered to generate and accommodate ‘novel 
facts’, it “crumbles” and the programme should be considered ‘degenerative’.
In crude terms, one could say the Lakatosian approach is twofold: (1) it calls for 
assessing ‘theories’ for internal (logical) and external (empirical) consistency in coming 
to terms with ‘novel facts’ and (2) it requires constructive criticism by holding that the 
only valid rejection o f existing theories is the presentation of a better theory able to 
accommodate the ‘novel fact’.54 Although, like Kuhn and Popper, Lakatos is primarily 
interested in discussing the possibility o f scientific progress, for the present purpose 
these two elements contain useful insights.
First, his criteria of what makes a ‘good’ theory can be taken as conceptual building 
blocks of a ‘deep theory’. To be sure, scholars applying Lakatos’ framework have 
pointed out that the main concepts -  the scope of a ‘research programme’, the meaning 
o f a ‘novel fact’, and the indicators for a ‘progressive’ or ‘degenerative’ programme -  
remain unspecified in his writings.55 Yet if one takes Lakatos as an inspiration than a 
blueprint, this does not necessarily pose a problem but rather allows interpreting his 
meta-theoretical building blocks as needed. Coming up with ‘novel facts’ is thus read 
here not as making new predictions but, instead, as reframing past events in a way which 
gives rise to a phenomenon not previously addressed.56 The difficulty o f identifying the 
boundaries of a research programme (DiCicco and Levy, 2003) is not much different 
from attempting to define a Kuhnian paradigm or a scholarly ‘tradition’ (Williams, 
2005, Fn 15; Walker, 1993; Jeffery, 2005). Delineating a research programme inevitably 
violates the richness and complexity o f individual thinkers and requires recognizing that
54 Here my reading differs from Vasquez (1997) who imports a Popperian falsifiability test into 
Lakatos (to criticize Waltzian realism), which is precisely what Lakatos argued against. See 
Elman and Elman (1997).
55 See the contributions in Elman and Elman (2003) and the debate between Vasquez and 
(neo)realist scholars in the American Political Science Review, December 1997.
56 For a discussion on the contestedness of ‘novelty’ claims, see Elman and Elman (2003: 34-39).
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there is no correct middle path between understanding their theories from ‘within’, by 
focusing on their inner logic, and from ‘without’, by embedding them in the socio­
cultural context in which they emerged (Fetscher and Muenkler 1985: 19). A decision 
for the former requires a delineation of the ‘hard core’ grounding the research 
programme. Similarly, whether a research programme is ‘degenerating’ or ‘progressive’ 
depends on the question what counts as a valid adjustment o f its explanatory narrative in 
accommodating the ‘novel fact’, which in turn also relies on a clear understanding of the 
‘hard core’.
Second, Lakatos is useful in insisting that the dismissal of existing theories is only valid 
if a new theory/research programme can better accommodate the ‘novel fact’. Yet his 
emphasis on constructive criticism also poses a great challenge, as his call for the 
construction of a ‘new/better’ theory/research programme is not accompanied by a 
substantial discussion o f how to do so.
The Challenge of Theory Building
Popper’s slience o f how to actually build a ‘new/better’ theory also permeates IR 
scholarship. Kenneth Waltz (1979) is one o f the few IR theorists offering some thoughts 
on the process of theory development. Adopting Lakatos’ stance that theories can never 
be proven ‘true’ but only be overthrown by a better theory (Waltz 1979: 9), Waltz notes 
that “theories can only be invented, not discovered”. While he avoids discussing the 
process of ‘invention’, he points towards the limits of inductive and deductive attempts 
to generate a theory.
The question whether or to what extent ‘new knowledge’ can be generated through 
induction (empirical observation) or deduction (logical reflection) has occupied 
philosophers for a long time. As noted at the outset o f this chapter, both inevitably 
inform our understanding o f the world; theory is always inspired by the socio-political 
context and could not be built without abstract reasoning. We seek inspiration from 
‘history’ through ‘unscientific’ impressions from personal experiences as well as by 
systematically acquiring information, often second hand, through careful observation.57 
Yet the usefulness o f the inductive approach meets its limits in the interpretative bias. As
57 One systematic way of doing the latter is discussed by Alexander George and Andrew Bennett 
(2004). Yet their manual for ‘theory development’, written largely in juxtaposition to King et al. 
(1994), operates with a shallow understanding of theory and focuses on “procedures... conducive 
to the generation of new hypothesis”. Moreover, while useful in emphasizing the value of single 
case studies and causal complexity, they say little about the creative process of case study 
research.
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Waltz reminds, without theory one cannot decide “which materials to select and how to 
arrange them”, and hence no inductive procedure can answer the question o f how to 
make sense of the world “for the very problem is to figure out the criteria by which 
induction can usefully proceed” (Waltz 1979: 5). Similarly, Waltz argues that a theory 
cannot be created solely via deduction. He points out that this implies some “initial 
premises” and hence a pre-existing theoretical frame from which something can be 
deducted yet, according to Waltz, nothing new can emerge from deducting out o f a 
frame already in place (Waltz 1979: 11).
If the best strategy is to somehow combine inductive and deductive approaches, the 
question is what this means in practice. One example o f the fruitless attempt to 
‘discover’ a theory of alliance formation and disintegration through a mix of induction 
and deduction, operating with a shallow understanding o f theory, is the study by Kalevi 
Holsti and colleagues (Holsti et al. 1973). The team conducted an exhaustive literature 
survey from which it extracted a large number o f propositions o f alliance formation, 
performance, and termination, that is, “all statements that link alliances to their causes 
and effects...irrespective o f discipline or definition of alliance or coalition”. This 
provided them with 347 propositions on the formation and disintegration o f alliances, 
laid out in an appendix o f almost 30 pages. These were then clustered and tested “on all 
alliances formed between the end o f the Napoleonic Wars and the outbreak o f World 
War II” to determine “the relative merits o f alternative candidates for a theory of 
alliances” (Holsti et al., 1973: v-vi). The result, however, is vague and disappointing, 
with the authors conceding that their objective of identifying a ‘theory’ of alliances had 
to be buried under the sheer diversity o f arguments and angles their study had found, 
leaving them with not much more than the hope that their efforts would at least “assist 
others to write a more definitive conclusion”.
The reason Holsti and his colleagues failed in their task o f finding a theory o f alliances 
is that their approach did not take into account what Popper knew, namely that “there is 
no such thing as a logical method of having new ideas” and that discovery contains a 
“creative intuition” (in King et al., 1994: 14). Similarly, Waltz notes that inductive and 
deductive procedures are “indispensable” in the construction o f theory yet that “using 
them in combination gives rise to a theory only if a creative idea emerges” (Waltz 1979: 
11). In other words, while taking historical observations/experiences and 
ordering/placing them in some sort of relationship to then throwing them back at ‘the 
world’ for re-evaluation plays a crucial part in generating theory, somewhere in this 
process there must be a creative act in which something new emerges. Waltz captures
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this by saying that theories are “artistic creations”, that they require “creative ideas” and 
the flashing of a “brilliant intuition” (Ibid., 9), yet he also concedes that one cannot say 
much beyond the fact that theories are made ‘creatively’: “Even by those who have 
authored them, the emergence o f theories cannot be described in other than uncertain 
and impressionistic ways” (Ibid., 10).
As sitting around and waiting for a creative idea to emerge seems hardly a productive 
strategy, this thesis pursues ‘creative theorizing’ through an approach of ‘unraveling’ by 
challenging Waltz’ contention that nothing new can emerge from deducting out of a 
frame already in place. Encouraged by the view that it is possible to generate new 
knowledge through logical reflection,58 the strategy here is to find a way in which 
theoretical deduction becomes a creative process. Without denying that reflections are 
informed by (learning more about) the empirical phenomenon, the approach o f ‘creative 
theorizing’ advanced here takes place in two steps.
The first step is to seek inspiration from existing theories, more precisely from their 
limits and internal tensions. This is a strategy IR theorists arguably pursue all the time; 
the attempt here is merely to make this process explicit and give it a name. It is termed 
‘unravelling’ and holds that theory creation benefits from taking a ‘deep’ look at the 
hard core of existing research programmes which have proven inadequate to 
accommodate the ‘novel fact’. More precisely, the task is to isolate ‘fundamentals’, 
namely insights on which the originality o f the causal narrative is based, and to identify 
‘openings’, namely insights identified as important yet which are not fully thought 
through and often a source of ambiguity and tension in the causal narrative.
Applied to the case at hand, this requires engaging the logical thrust of theories at the 
centre of the three dominant research programmes in IR -  (neo)realism, (liberal) 
institutionalism, and (social) constructivism -  which cannot fully explain the emergence 
and demise of the German-American security cooperation as defined here. Rather than 
trying to adjust their ‘protection belts’ by devising new ‘auxiliary hypothesis’, the 
strategy here is to trace their basic weaknesses to their respective ‘hard core’. An 
unravelling approach requires ignoring the claim made by some that the hard core is 
‘privileged knowledge’ not to be challenged directly (Elman and Fendius Elman, 1997), 
which echoes Waltz’ repeated claim that one cannot criticize (his) assumptions. Such 
disciplining claims can be ignored if the primary motivation to engage the ‘hard core’ is
58 Most famously upheld by John Stuart Mill, see Russell (2001 [1912]: 44).
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not to criticize existing research programmes,59 but to tap into this ‘privileged 
knowledge’ in the hope that doing so opens up sites o f inspiration through which a new 
theory can be created.
The second step is to take these ‘fundamentals’ and ‘openings’ as signposts for building 
a new argument (causal narrative), directing attention to certain points which need to be 
addressed. In line with the notion that ‘deep theorizing’ is a philosophical approach, 
those signposts are turned into creative material and a new theoretical argument 
grounded in a ‘hard core’ by drawing on insights from philosophers who have addressed 
the issues identified through unravelling existing research programmes. This thesis does 
so by engaging mainly, but not exclusively, insights offered by Heidegger and Aristotle. 
Again, the purpose for engaging philosophers is not to turn them into IR theorists but to 
use them as sources of inspiration for the building a new theory.
Reading the Hard Core: Causation Begins With a ‘Condition1
As an unravelling approach is about engaging the ‘hard core’ of a research programme, 
it is necessary to get an understanding o f the ‘hard core’. This thesis goes beyond the 
view that it is made of irrefutable assumptions to argue that theories are anchored in an 
account of the human condition.
This point is arrived at by tracing arguments over what makes a theory internally 
persuasive. For Donald Spence (1982) the most important feature of a persuasive 
narrative is cohesiveness, which he discusses by drawing links to aesthetics and artistic 
beauty. This feature is often captured in the notion that a theory must be ‘elegant’ which 
for scholars like Waltz means simple or ‘parsimonious’. The maxim of parsimony is 
also captured in what according to Waltz are four basic ways -  isolation, abstraction, 
aggregation, and idealization -  alongside which theory building should be pursued and 
which boils down to creating an ‘ideal type’ model o f interstate relations which focuses 
only on what ‘really’ matters. For him the overarching aim is “to find the central 
tendency among a confusion o f tendencies, to single out the propelling principle even 
though other principles operate, to seek the essential factors where innumerable factors 
are present” (Waltz 1979: 10). While not all agree on the virtue of ‘parsimony’ or 
simplicity (George and Bennett 2004), there is little dispute that a central tenet of a
59 Although if the hard core is where the explanatory narrative is anchored and so if ultimately 
this ‘privileged knowledge’ makes or breaks a theory, then it must be the primary site of theory 
evaluation.
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theory is internal consistency, or logical coherence, of the argumentative chain. Indeed, 
argumentative logic for many is what holds a theory together. It is a central feature of 
the positivism of Ayer or Popper and the backbone o f some important theoretical 
interventions made in IR, such as Joseph Grieco’s comparison of neorealism and 
neoliberalism (Grieco, 1990, 1993). As Stefano Guzzini (1998: xii) puts it in his analysis 
o f the realist research programme “by understanding theories from their inner logic it 
becomes possible to ascertain how they shape...explanations”.
Yet logic is not sufficient. For one, it differs from beauty more in degree than in kind, 
that is, there is more than one ‘logic’. Moreover, it does not tell the analyst where to start 
or stop; as Peter Winch (1990) reminds so memorably, links between links can always 
be found. Most importantly, an explanatory narrative, or what Sabine calls “statements 
o f what may roughly be called a causal nature” (Sabine, 1969 (1931): 12) may be held 
together by logic but cannot be entirely generated by it. It is suggested here that the 
persuasiveness of a causal narrative broadly understood originates in a philosophical 
reflection about the human condition. Causality o f this kind informs David Boucher’s 
suggestion that a theory is an imaginative attempt to formulate principles and 
incorporate them into systematic order “directed not so much to the resolution o f the 
particular problems out o f which they arose, but primarily to the place o f  those problems 
generally in the human predicament” (Boucher 1998: 10. emphasis added). Boucher’s 
distinction between solving a problem and placing it in the context of the human 
predicament or, as emphasized here, the human condition, is important and must be 
looked at more carefully.
To begin with, an approach grounding the causal narrative in an account of the human 
condition is different from an approach building on certain assumptions about human 
nature (Arendt 1958: 9f.). While both face the issue of anthropomorphism (see below), 
their implications for and demands of theorizing are quite different. The former is 
concerned with delineating the spatio-temporal environment self-conscious humans 
finds themselves in and with exploring how their perception of these dimension 
influences behaviour (Harvey, 1989). Human nature arguments operate with fixed and 
quasi essentialist understandings of ‘interests’ or ‘drivers’ shared by all humans 
independent of time and space, most famously the ‘will to power’. Although there may 
be different ‘natures’ to chose from, once asserted the assumption is easily established as 
a universal baseline. By contrast, an account of the human condition requires a more 
context-sensitive approach. While the broad parameters of the condition are assumed to 
be a universal, that is, shared by all humans, such as in the famous ‘state o f nature’
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assumption underlying social contract philosophy (Kersting, 1996), this perspective does 
not necessarily assume that all humans respond in exactly the same way. In that sense, 
“the conditions of human existence...never condition us absolutely” and so one might 
say that the condition is “self-made to a considerable extent” (Arendt, 1958: 10, 9).
Judging from the literature, the ‘human nature’ assumption appears to be the more 
prominent road taken by IR theorists;60 although at closer look this is somewhat 
misleading. As the discussion in the next two chapters will show, the most significant 
interventions in IR theory have always involved, indeed focused upon, a re-reading o f 
the spatial and temporal dimension of the ‘units’ of investigation. Yet for most of the IR 
literature one can safely echo David Harvey’s note that “space and time are basic 
categories of human existence. Yet we rarely debate their meanings” (Harvey 1989: 
201). A key question arising with both human nature and human condition accounts is, 
of course, how it can be applied to the level of ‘the state’. This question will be 
bracketed for now and addressed further below.
A causal narrative anchored in an account of the human condition resonates with what 
has been called ‘constitutive’ theorizing popular in non-positivist research and thus 
distinguished from ‘causal’ theorizing attributed to positivists (Smith, 1995).61 As noted 
earlier, positivists demand not much more than a hypothesis stating a clear cause-effect 
relationship between ‘dependent’ and ‘independent’ variable. Statements of the kind ‘x 
causes y ’ are characterized by assuming that (1) x  and y  exist independent o f each other, 
(2) jc precedes y  temporally, and (3) without x, y  would not have occurred and gain their 
value only through empirical evidence (that is, in competition against other pairs 
proposing a different relationship).62 By contrast, non-positivists assume that human 
perceptions of their world, the definitions o f their interests/goals based and, ultimately, 
their behaviour is based on meanings which cannot be reduced to generalizing 
statements based on universal assumptions (Kratochwil, 1989: 24; Winch, 1990). They 
argue that research must focus on structures or processes attributing meaning to 
interests/motives/goals and suggest that these ‘constitutive’ forces operate in an 
intersubjective manner which cannot be grasped through linear/unidirectional 
understanding of relationships but require a hermeneutical approach.63
60 See Freyberg-Inan (2004); Doyle (1997); See also the symposium on ‘The Return of Human 
Nature in IR Theory’ in the Journal o f International Relations and Development vol. 9, no. 3 
(2006).
61 King et al. (1994) frame this in terms of causal versus descriptive research.
62 Ayer (1952); Popper (1968); King et al. (1994).
63 Hollis and Smith (1990); Adler (1997b); Hopf (1998); Ruggie (1998); Guzzini (2000).
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Whereas for Steve Smith these two approaches rest on different meta-theoretical 
positions which require “radically different types of theory” (Smith 1995: 27), scholars 
like Wendt argue that they should be seen as applying to different stages of the 
argumentative chain, addressing what others settle on the level of assumptions without 
abandoning the idea of doing causal or explanatory research (Wendt, 1998, 1999).64 The 
perspective advanced here falls somewhere in between. Smith is correct in pointing to 
the distinction between ‘shallow’ and ‘deep’ theorising, with the former prevailing 
among positivists, however Wendt has a point when he suggests that ‘constitutive’ 
research does not need to discard the notion of ‘causality’, broadly understood. 
Reflecting about how goals/motives are rooted in an account o f the human condition 
takes a ‘constitutive’ perspective; yet investigating how the ‘national interest’ acquires 
meaning is also part of a causal narrative.65 As Kratochwil notes
“to have explained an action often means to have made intelligible the 
goals for which it was undertaken. In this sense our explanations appear 
‘causal’...since, by definition, motives are always prior to the action and 
can thus be considered its antecedent conditions” (Kratochwil, 1989:
24f).66
In other words, making intelligibly a states’ decision to invest in a new institution relies 
significantly on understanding what goal the state pursues and what meaning this 
institution possesses in helping it to reach this goal. Expanding the scope of the ‘causal’ 
narrative in this ‘constitutive’ sense is engaging in what Nicholas Onuf calls “deep 
causality” and is a central feature of a ‘deep theory’ (Onuf, 1989; also Kurki, 2006).67
Although as noted earlier it is rarely specified in these terms, beginning a causal 
narrative with an account o f what ‘condition’ the state is in should be familiar to IR 
scholars. It lies at the heart of one o f the most influential conceptual frames in the study 
of international politics, namely the (neorealist) conception of international anarchy. 
This conception and its parameters will be engaged in the next chapter; for now it
64 Wendt is a bit confusing on this point. Constitutive theorizing not merely rejects the positivist 
view that x and y  exist independent from each other, it investigates' the meaning of x and y  
constituted by z.
65 Searle (1995) describes the constitutive processes in causal terms. See also (Kurki, 2006). 
Similarly, contra King et al. (1994), as pointed out by Max Weber ‘understanding’ is a form of 
explanation as well (Weber, 1992: 107f). See also Wendt (1998); Wight (2002).
66 Peter Winch initially argued for making a difference between ‘causes’ in the scientific sense
and human ‘motives’. However, three decades later he seemed to have changed his mind (Winch, 
1990: xii).
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suffices to point out that realist thinking about the ‘condition’ o f interstate relations has 
significant impact on their understanding what international politics is all about The 
fundamental distinction realists make between a theory about relations between states 
and a theory concerned with domestic order or, as Martin Wight puts it, “speculation 
about the state” (Wight, 1966: 17), rests on the view that these two settings are 
characterized by two different ‘conditions’. According to realists, whereas relations 
between states must deal with a Hobbesian ‘state of nature’ characterized by recurrence 
of violence/war, relations within states have escaped this setting and are about sorting 
the terms of the social contract. Consequently, the kinds o f ‘politics’ characterizing these 
two settings are different. As Wight put it, whereas in the domestic realm scholars can 
apply “the theory of the good life” international theory must be “the theory of survival” 
(Ibid., 33). This distinction between ‘domestic’ and ‘international’ also underlies Waltz’ 
claim that there is a difference between foreign policy analysis and a theory of 
international politics, which spurred the view that the latter is not concerned with 
explaining motives (Waltz 1979 in Keohane 1986: 12If; Elman 1996; Zakaria 1998: 
14).68
These claims actually sell short the depth of realist theorizing and are misleading (see 
chapter three). As noted earlier, deep theorizing is fundamentally about making 
intelligible motives. And as suggested below, it anchors the causal narrative on the level 
of the ontology o f the state, which is another way to say that discerning the ‘condition’ 
states find themselves in inevitably requires ‘speculation about the state’.
The Parameters of the ‘National (Security) Interest’
The introduction laid out that an explanation o f why states cooperate and cease to do so 
must give meaning to the ‘common interest’ or, more precisely, a shared self-interest. It 
also noted that although a focus on interests is often associated with ‘economic’ or 
‘utilitarian’ explanations, the assumption that states act out o f ‘self-interest’ underlies all 
three IR theories.69 This section does not aim at defining this interest but, rather, will 
provide the conceptual ground from which its formulation through an account of the 
human condition can proceed. More precisely, what are the parameters o f the national
68 As Fareed Zakaria summarizes this view, a theory of foreign policy explains why states have 
“different intentions”, or interests, while a theory of international politics explains “international 
events”, or outcomes. The former may illuminate the reasons for a particular nation’s ‘search for 
allies’, but a general explanation for the ‘formation of alliances’ can only be provided by a theory 
which fixes the meaning of intentions on the level of assumptions (Zakaria 1998: 14; also Rose 
1998).
69 For an overview of the concept of ‘interest’ and its centrality to (and creative use by) classical 
sociologists, see Reese-Schaefer (1999); Swedberg (2005).
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(security) interest governments are expected to pursue (for the successful pursuit o f 
which they are held responsible/accountable) on the basis o f which they make decisions 
over investment in international (security) institutions?
From Morgenthau (1960) onwards, IR scholars across the theoretical spectrum 
periodically remind us of the importance o f the concept of the ‘national interest’ 
(Nuechterlein 1985; Krasner 1987; Weldes 1999; Williams 2005). Yet they also point 
out that the question o f ‘what is the national interest’ has no single answer if it departs 
from a certain level of abstraction. As Arnold Wolfers puts it, “the national interest 
indicates that the policy is designed to promote demands that are ascribed to the nation 
(...). It emphasizes that the policy subordinates other interests to those of the nation. 
Beyond this, it has very little meaning” (Wolfers, 1962: 147, emphasis added). In an 
attempt to specify the concept, one might differentiate between short and long-term 
interests, or to see interests distinct from preferences and desires, the former 
(preferences) deducted from and advancing certain interests and the latter (desires) 
driving or giving rise to a certain interest. From that perspective one could try and trace 
the ‘preference’ for a certain institution to some sort o f ‘desire’, bypassing the concept 
of interest and render it analytically redundant. While there is something to this 
approach, it is easy to get lost in semantics. Even more so, if one accepts that 
policymakers are guided by something they consider the ‘national interest’, bypassing 
the concept does not seem to be analytically helpful (Williams 2005).
What can be said is that the national interest is assumed to refer to something basic, or 
vital, and in that sense is necessarily ‘long term’. One scholar captures this under the 
notion of a ‘vital national interest’: “an interest is vital when the highest policymakers in 
a sovereign state conclude that the issue at stake is so fundamental to the political, 
economic, and social well-being of their country that it should not be compromised” 
(Nuechterlein 1985: 26). Rather than splitting the ‘national interest’ up in various 
sectoral understandings o f ‘well being’, IR scholars in an attempt to pin down the 
national security interest (which by definition is a ‘vital’ interest) tend to make use of the 
human analogy and resort to Hobbes’ emphasis on self-preservation, or survival. At least 
since John Herz declared “let us think first of all about how to survive, thereafter about 
everything else” (Herz 1962: 3), scholars across the theoretical spectrum from Wolfers 
(1962) and Wight (1966) via Waltz (1979) to Wendt (1999) readily translate the 
Hobbesian assumption o f the individual’s ‘will’ for self-preservation into the realm of 
international politics. Even more sophisticated attempts to provide a ‘new framework’ 
for security analysis build on the assumption that “security is about survival” (Buzan et
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al., 1998: 21), and it certainly appears to be accepted wisdom among scholars dealing 
with the phenomenon of security cooperation (Powell, 1994: 320f; Stein 1990: 87f; 
Levy, 2002: 131).70
The focus on self-preservation implies that security policy is, at bottom, about protecting 
‘the state’ from serious harm by preventing things from happening which endangers ‘its’ 
existence. David Baldwin captures this by suggesting that the ‘national security interest’ 
is formulated on the basis o f two components: a referent object (the ‘state’) and an 
existential threat as something (perceived to be) capable of doing harm to the core 
features o f the former and endangering its existence (Baldwin 1997; also Buzan 1991; 
Waever et al., 1993). Hence, the conceptualization o f the state is crucial because it 
informs the definition of the existential threat. Without knowing what governments seek 
to preserve it is impossible for the analyst to understand what they fear. Said differently, 
the ‘national security interest’ only becomes intelligible by identifying the baseline 
features of the state’s existence and what its vulnerabilities are. As Barry Buzan points 
out, threats and vulnerabilities are intrinsically linked as “only when one has a 
reasonable idea o f both the nature of threats, and the vulnerabilities of the objects 
towards which they are directed, can one begin to make sense of national security” 
(Buzan 1991: 112).
This means that, logically speaking, a causal narrative explaining choices made in the 
name of ‘national security’ cannot simply stop with an emphasis on ‘survival’ as the 
basic interest. Questions o f whether and how to differentiate between ‘subjective’ and 
‘objective’ accounts of national security (Wolfers 1962: 150ff), echoed in the question 
whether threat may be misperceived (Jervis 1976), and the debate over the widening of 
the meaning o f security since the end of the Cold War suggest that state survival may be 
interpreted in different ways, a crucial point made by Wolfers some time ago (Wolfers 
1962: 73).71 Indeterminism about what it means for a state to survive is also reflected in 
the disagreement about the occurrence o f state ‘death’: while some scholars claim that 
“the world...provides a historical record replete with examples of countries that have 
disappeared” (Stein 1990: 87), others assert that “the death rate among states is 
remarkably low” (Waltz, 1979: 95; also Strang, 1991) or “almost nil” (Wendt 1999: 
279). These different views do not stem from counting errors but from different 
conceptions o f what a state is, what it needs in order to be. It reflects that there are
70 For a critical discussion on survival, see Howes (2003).
71 On the contested meaning o f ‘security’, see Haftendom (1991); Buzan (1991); Baldwin (1997); 
Huysmans (1998b); Williams (2003).
49
multiple ways to conceptualize statehood, each version carrying a unique understanding 
of what it means for a state to exist, what its vulnerabilities and threats are and, 
consequently, what it means to die (Beitz, 1979: 52-55). Thus, the conceptualization of 
the state lies at the heart of a ‘deep’ causal narrative. Rather than separating theorizing 
about survival and ‘speculating about the state’, as Wight suggested, the two are 
intrinsically linked.
From Humans to ‘States’
A handful of IR scholars exploring the meaning o f the state show that this can be done in 
a variety of ways (e.g., Halliday, 1994; Ringmar 1996; Hobson, 2000). Yet an opening 
the black box and the attempt to ‘look inside’ the state can also end up without it. More 
precisely, it is useful to follow Erik Ringmar’s advice and avoid having the state 
disintegrate into various parts which do not make a whole. A fragmentation into 
different government branches, interests groups, public opinion, media, courts, and so on 
renders ‘the state’ too complex for theorising and empty o f meaning (Ringmar 1996: 
449). The underlying view, adopted here and discussed in more detail in chapter four, is 
that any conception of being, whether individuals or collectives, needs meaning. As 
Michael Walzer points out, the state “must be personified before it can be seen, 
symbolised before it can be loved, imagined before it can be conceived” (in Ruggie 
1993: 157).
Yet in ‘personifying’ the state the question of anthropomorphism emerges, namely 
whether the state can be imagined as a person, a human being. More precisely, the 
question is how far the human analogy can be carried analytically, which becomes all 
the more relevant given the earlier mentioned suggestion that the state and its interest 
should be read through an account o f the ‘human condition’. Roughly speaking, IR 
scholars have dealt with the state-human analogy in three ways.72
Most common is the ‘as i f  assumption, which holds that treating the state like an 
individual is a useful short cut to simplify matters, that is, a necessary abstraction to 
build theories. This position does not suggest that the state really is a human 
being/person (indeed, accepts that it is not) but argues that theories attributing 
assumptions about human desires to the state can provide useful models for making 
sense of international politics. Scholars like Waltz are thus able to treat the state as “a 
unit complete with will and purpose” (Waltz, 2001 (1959): 173).
72 See also Ringmar (1996) and the ‘Forum on the State as a Person’, Review o f International 
Studies 30, no. 2 (2004).
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The second position, put forward by Alexander Wendt, argues that the state actually is a 
person or, rather, can be conceptualised as possessing similar properties as a human 
being, including an organism, motives (cognitive and emotional) and a consciousness 
(Wendt 1999; 2004). Drawing on sociology, anthropology, and even biology it suggests 
that communities possess features similar to those of individual human beings,73 such as 
a ‘collective consciousness’, and that desires driving individuals also drive communities.
The third approach is sceptical about abstractions and o f transferring insights about 
humans to collectives, or communities. Instead, it holds that attributing human qualities 
to a state only makes sense to the extent that state is represented by actual persons, such 
as government officials. It conceptualises the state as, for instance, a structure in and 
through which individuals (political leaders) act, facing all kinds o f constraints and 
opportunities this structure brings with it (Sprout and Sprout 1965; Wight 2006).
While these three approaches appear substantially different, when combining theory 
with empirical analysis it is tempting to see them as overlapping, moving from the first 
to the third as the discussion proceeds from the theoretical to the empirical level. Yet 
this move needs to be justified conceptually. Even if one assumes that a society is 
conscious of its spatio-temporal situatedness as a collective, something must be said 
about how political leaders are embedded in and are able to represent this consciousness. 
Thus, applying philosophical accounts o f the human condition to ‘the state’ level and 
using this for explaining inter-state phenomena must conceptualize how the individual 
relates to and comes to ‘represent’ the collective (Self/Society) and the relationship 
between these representatives (Self/Society -  Self/Society).
How proponents of the three IR theories read ‘the state’ and ‘existential threats’ and how 
these readings are anchored in (presumably different) accounts o f the human condition 
will be discussed in the next chapter. Yet it should be pointed out here already that 
engaging these different conceptions inevitably brings up issues o f the relative (causal) 
importance of ‘material’ and ‘ideational’ factors. Indeed, there appears to be widespread 
consensus among IR scholars that the decision whether one chooses the ‘materialist’ or 
the ‘idealist’ path is a fundamental one. Anchored in the first ‘great debate’ in IR, they 
are portrayed as two orientations which stand not merely for a debate within IR but 
provide different approaches to the discipline (Crawford, 2000), with realists
73 For a warning against biological essentialism, see Bell (2001).
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representing the ‘material’ and constructivists the ‘ideational’ camp (Wendt 1999, 
Ruggie 1998). While there is something to this division o f labour, the question is how 
deep it goes, that is, whether it actually resonates with the hard core of respective 
research programmes. For now it suffices to say that all attempts advocating ideas as 
‘causes’ face the familiar problem of how to interpret ‘what is in peoples heads’, 
mentioned in the introduction. The problem that one cannot ‘see’ ideas in the same way 
as one can touch material elements like rocks means that causal narratives taking into 
account the former must make an even greater effort to theorize carefully about why and 
how ideas matter in the conception of the state and its existential threats.
To close the circle, if a deep theory perspective focuses on how the national security 
interest emerges in the conceptualization of ‘the state’ and the ‘existential threat’, the 
presence (or absence) o f a common security interest depends on the degree to which the 
two are shared. In other words, for states to cooperate in the security realm they must 
perceive their existence as somehow interlinked/interdependent and agree on a common 
(or shared) existential threat. A deep theory perspective suggests that the parameters on 
the basis of which such commonalities are established are logically embedded in an 
account of the human condition. The following chapter will discuss how the dominant 
research programmes in IR have dealt with this task by unravelling their causal 
narratives on interstate security cooperation.
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CHAPTER THREE: UNRAVELLING THE FIELD
Summary
This chapter unravels the three major research programmes, realism, institutionalism, 
and constructivism for the purpose of theory building. As such, it offers more than a 
literature overview. As outlined in the introduction, the logical thrust o f all three causal 
narratives runs into problems when trying to explain the ‘novel fact’ of German- 
American cooperation outlined in the first chapter, captured in the balancing bias 
(realism), sunk-cost bias (institutionalism) and socialization bias (constructivism). 
Following the strategy for creative theorizing laid out in the previous chapter, the 
purpose o f this chapter is to unravel the logic carrying their respective arguments by 
carving out their conception o f the ‘common interest’ and tracing it to their hard core, 
that is, to an account the spatio-temporal situatedness of the state. The purpose is not 
merely to identify weaknesses but openings, that is, conceptual insights identified by 
proponents o f each research programme as important yet which are not fully thought 
through and often a source o f ambiguity and tension within the causal narrative. Thus, 
the aim is not to turn these theories into straw men for the purpose of burning them, but 
to learn from them and use them as sources o f inspiration for building a new/better 
theory. As such, whereas the criticism presented here may not be new the angle from 
which it is formulated is.
As realism provides the baseline argument on which the other two research programmes 
are built, this chapter begins with and spends most time on the task o f unravelling the 
realist narrative. This is followed by a brief look at the instutionalist narrative, with the 
third part focusing on constructivism. Although the writings o f a large number of 
authors inform the discussion, for each (alleged) research programme the conception of 
the hard core is illustrated through the writings of key representatives, namely Kenneth 
Waltz (realism), Robert Keohane (institutionalism) and Alexander Wendt 
(constructivism).
(I) Realism: Providing the Baseline
Realism is intrinsically connected to the origin of IR as a discipline in Western academia 
-  Stefano Guzzini (1998) calls it the “initial paradigm” -  and, although challenged time 
and again, it remains the dominant research programme in the study o f international
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politics.74 William Wohlforth (2008) even claims that “it is only a slight exaggeration to 
say that the academic study of international relations is a debate about realism”. With an 
unbroken air of essentialism, realists claim to capture the basic forces governing our 
lives and to provide the best account of ‘common sense’ behaviour among states 
(Grieco, 1993: 3; Guzzini, 1998; Walt, 2002). They follow Machiavelli in propagating 
the necessity “to accept reality unvarnished” (Stein, 1990: 4) and “to understand 
international politics as it actually is” (Morgenthau, 1960: 15). The realist 
Erkenntnisinteresse is to identify the ‘true’ national interest and with it the ‘laws o f 
politics’ determining interstate conflict and cooperation.
Since the foundational writings o f E.H. Carr (2001) and Hans Morgenthau (1960) a 
number of realist ‘theories’ developed and generated “different worlds o f realism” 
(Guzzini 1998),75 which raises the question whether there still is a realist hard core. In an 
influential critique, Jeffrey Legro and Andrew Moravcsik (1999) argue from a 
Lakatosian perspective that ‘realism’ has become internally incoherent. They suggest 
that the theories formulated by a new generation o f realists -  sometimes labelled 
‘neoclassical’ realists (Rose 1998) -  share “little more than a generic commitment to 
rational state behavior in anarchy” (Legro and Moravcsik, 2000: 184). Legro and 
Moravcsik basically argue that the realist hard core has become too weak/elastic to serve 
as a meaningful reference point, with the consequence that the paradigm has become 
indistinguishable from institutionalism and constructivism.76
This chapter echoes some of that critique, although from a different angle and with a 
different intention. Whereas Legro and Moravcsik read the ‘hard core’ as made up o f 
assumptions and pursue the (unstated) objective to put realism back in ‘its’ box, here the 
aim is to unravel the realist account of the human condition with the objective to explore 
the paradigms’ argumentative weakness for the case at hand and retrieve its creative 
potential.
74 For influential challenges, see Keohane (1986); Baldwin (1993); Schroeder (1994); Powell 
(1994); Lebow (1994); Vasquez (1997); Legro and Moravcsik (1999).
75 After Waltz’ version (Waltz 1979; 2000) lost its appeal with the end of the Cold War, realism 
bounced back to life in fragments with scholars modifying neorealism (Buzan et al., 1993; 
Schweller, 1998; Mearsheimer, 2001), providing domestic explanations for realist assumptions 
(Snyder, 1991; Johnston, 1995; Wolforth, 1993; Zakaria, 1998) even giving it a constructivist 
touch (Williams, 2005; Goddard and Nexon, 2005). Waltz’s ‘neo’ prefix was rebranded as 
‘structural’ (Buzan et al. 1993), ‘offensive’ and ‘defensive’ (Snyder 1991), ‘contingent’ (Glaser, 
1994), ‘neoclassical’ (Rose, 1998), or ‘wilful’ (Williams 2005). For overviews see Frankel
(1996); Guzzini (2001); Donnelly (2000); Taliaferro (2000); Wohlforth (2008).
76 For responses, see Faever (2000); Schweller (2000).
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The Balancing Bias
As noted in chapter one, the logical thrust o f realism’s balance o f power argument 
cannot account for the dynamic o f German-American cooperation as defined here. It is 
at odds with parts o f Germany cooperating with the US in NATO at a time where the US 
was the strongest power in the system (period one), it cannot explain German investment 
in CSCE at a time of (perceived) decline in US power (period two), or German 
investment in CFSP, which occurred at a time of growing US power yet lacks 
characteristics of an instrument for deterrence and, hence, the key qualities o f a realist 
balancing move (period three).77
The task o f tracing the conceptual weakness o f the balancing argument to the realist hard 
core it makes sense to start with the four basic assumptions generally attributed to 
realism:78 (1) states are the principal actors in international politics, (2) states behave as 
rational and self-interested actors who (3) compete for power in an international system 
without central authority (anarchy), with (4) the anarchic character of the international 
system being the principal force shaping (the actions of) states. As the first two 
assumptions are also shared by other paradigms and generic for a theory of interstate 
security cooperation, the uniquely realist conception o f what makes a ‘self interest’ lies 
with the last two assumptions.
Implicit in the assumption that states compete for power is that states want power. This 
assumption has been central to realist attempts to make sense o f international politics 
from the start. Carr (2001: 92) famously noted that “politics cannot be divorced from 
power” and Morgenthau declared that “statesmen think and act in terms of interests 
defined as power” and that power is “the immediate aim” of all states (Morgenthau 
1960: 5, 27). Indeed, one is hard pressed to find an IR scholar who would disagree with 
Brian Schmidt’s observation that “realists throughout the ages have argued that power is 
the decisive determinant” in the relations among states, and that “all realists characterise 
international politics in terms o f a continuous struggle for power” (Schmidt 2007: 44f). 
Although some attribute the will for power to human nature and, thus, suggest that 
power is sought as an end in itself, the prevalent understanding among realists is that 
states seek power as a means to the end of ‘survival’. How this link is established is 
discussed later; for now it suffices to say that the basic realist assumption is that states
77 On the empirical weaknesses of the neorealist balance-of-power argument more generally, see 
Vasquez (1995, 1997), who uses a Lakatosian framework and relies significantly on Paul 
Schroeder’s (1994) work. For a response, see Waltz (1997); Elman and Fendius Elman (1997).
78 Grieco (1993: 118f); Mearsheimer (2001: 17f); Frankel (1996: xivff); Elman and Elman (1997: 
924).
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seek power as a means for protection against the existential threat, which also is defined 
in terms o f power. Indeed, the latter leads to the former, that is, because for realists 
“power...is the valid and complete measure of threat” (Doyle 1997: 168) states are 
assumed to want ‘power’ to ensure their security.
In seeming contradiction to the popular view (often attributed to realism) that state 
interests are inherently ‘conflicting’ and that cooperation is difficult to achieve,79 
common interests and cooperation lies at the heart o f the oldest segments o f realist 
thought, namely the balance-of-power proposition. This proposition comes in various 
forms united in the view that some sort o f ‘equilibrium’ is an integral part of the order of 
things.80 The most popular version, focused on here, emphasises the tendency o f states to 
cooperate in an effort to counter the most powerful state, or coalition o f states. In other 
words, the common interest bringing states together is the determination to prevent any 
(group of) state(s) to achieve or maintain a dominant position through ‘internal’ and/or 
‘external’ balancing (Waltz 1979). The latter leads to cooperation as “first and foremost 
a means for adding interchangeable, culmulative power” (Liska, 1968: 24) for the 
purpose of deterrence. Alliances are thus a “necessary function” (Morgenthau 1960: 
181) and an “integral part” (Levy, 2002) of the balance of power dynamic and security 
cooperation a permanent feature of the realist understanding o f international politics.81 
States may institutionalise their alliance for coordination purposes, yet because they 
don’t like to be constrained and aim at reducing interdependence (see below) they will 
keep investments in common institutions at a minimum.82
According to the balancing logic, states will end the cooperative relationship when there 
is a shift in the distribution of power, that is, either when a state within the alliance 
increases its relative power or when the hegemon experiences a decrease in its relative 
power. More precisely, states will cease to cooperate if they expect a shift in how gains
79 Realists may bridge the tension between saying that cooperation is difficult to achieve and 
implying that it occurs all the time by suggesting that it is a practical dilemma (Snyder 1997: 18). 
However, the tension is also due to the fact, rarely acknowledged, that there are two different 
kinds of cooperation, namely between ‘rivals’ and between ‘allies’ (Mearsheimer 1994: 338 in 
Brown).
80 For discussions, see Bull, (2002 [1977]); Levy (2002); Little (2007); Kaufman et al. (2007). 
For offensive realists (e.g., Mearsheimer 2001) and hegemonic stability theorists (e.g., Gilpin 
1981) balancing is neither something that occurs automatically nor is it the preferable/most stable 
configuration.
81 Glenn Snyder (1997) provides a comprehensive conceptual discussion of alliance dynamics, 
including the stage of bargaining omitted here. Yet while much of it rests on a (neo)realist frame, 
his discussion does not add up to a coherent theoretical argument (Snyder, 1997: 22ff).
82 Indeed, because realists focus on the distribution of ‘hard power’ capabilities they don’t pay 
much analytical attention to institutions (Mearsheimer, 1994; Jervis, 1999).
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are or will be distributed between allies, that is, if the partner is expected to grow too 
strong in comparison to others. Just as power shifts rather than disappears, it is more 
correct to speak o f shifting alliances than simply disintegration, which moves attention 
to the existence o f an alternative, prominent in the debate among realists whether 
bipolarity or multipolarity makes the more stable system (that is, produces more fragile 
alliances).83
As the main problem of the balancing argument for explaining the case at hand is that it 
cannot explain (German) bandwagoning (with the US), it is useful to briefly review 
attempts to conceptually integrate this phenomenon into the realist narrative. The 
simplest way out is to find refuge in the ‘historical record’ and maintain that ‘overall’ 
states were more likely to choose balancing over bandwagoning. Instances in which a 
weaker state aligns with the stronger state are seen as misguided outliers, the result o f 
irrational decisions.84 However, even then realists have difficulties integrating acts of 
‘irrationality’ in their balancing narrative. In part this is because realists pay little 
attention to the calculations of weak/small states.85 Guided by the famous Thucydides 
quote that ‘the weak suffer what they must’, the paradigm itself came to suffer from a 
great power bias captured by Waltz in noting that “the units of greatest capability set the 
scene of action for others” (Waltz 1979: 72).86 With balancing assumed to be a quasi 
natural process in which those who did not follow ‘common sense’ would learn to do so 
and otherwise ‘punished’,87 realists were mostly content with arguing that balancing 
occurs without specifying how (Levy 2002: 140).
One notable attempt to come to terms with ‘bandwagoning’ is presented by Stephen 
Walt, who tries to turn it into a rational decision within a balancing framework by 
arguing that states do not balance power but threats.88 More precisely, he holds that
83 Echoing George Liska (1962: 193) that “increases in alternatives available contribute to 
realignment and alliance dissolution”, Waltz argues that bipolarity is more stable because smaller 
states have no viable alternative, whereas in a multipolar world an alliance “unskillfully 
managed” may fall apart more easily (Waltz 1979: 170). What makes ‘(un)skilful management’ 
remains unclear.
84 Waltz (1979: 126f); Walt (1985); Snyder (1997); Jervis (1999); Levy (2002).
85 Against the argument that small states are manipulated by the hegemon to go against their 
‘common sense’, Walt (1985, 1987) shows that ‘bribery’ is effective only when a shared threat 
already exist.
86 For an exception, see Liska (1962, 1968).
87 As Holsti et al (1973: 6) write, the balance of power proposition “requires that statesmen 
adhere to certain rules, one of the most important of which is that they must form alliances to 
prevent any nation...from achieving a position of hegemony. Failure to do so when the situation 
demands it is not merely irrational, it is also a serious dereliction of duty”.
88 Walt also suggests that regions have their own dynamic (Walt 1985: 35ff; see also Buzan and 
Waever 2004). Yet decoupling regional power estimates from the international system or
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states feel threatened not simply by relative military capabilities but by a combination of 
(i) aggregate power, (ii) geographic proximity, (iii) offensive military capabilities, and 
(iv) aggressive intentions. The problem is that whereas the first three factors can be 
accommodated by the realist research programme, the fourth, which emphasizes the 
evaluation of others intentions, cannot. It is not merely that Walt remains unclear on 
what basis states’ evaluate the intentions of others; his empirical discussion leads him to 
emphasize ideology yet this factor is not translated into a coherent causal argument 
integrated into the realist narrative.89 The reason he fails to do so is because an argument 
emphasizing states weighing (future) intentions is in conflict with the realist account of 
the human condition and its consequence, discussed below, that states are (should be) 
inherently pessimistic about the (future) intentions of others and (should) mistrust each 
other (Waltz, 2000).
Randall Schweller (1998; 2006) takes up Walt’s (1985: 8, 18) suggestion that states 
bandwagon because they hope to benefit from the ‘spoils o f victory’ (also Snyder 1997: 
18) and suggests that states surrender to great powers because they pursue ‘revisionist’ 
aims and prefer being on the ‘winning side’ in the belief that it represents the “wave of 
the future” (Schweller 1998: 79). The problem with this avenue is, again, that states 
following such a ‘wave o f the future’ act ignore that down the road the strong state 
might turn against them.90 In response Schweller (2006) presents what he calls a theory 
of ‘underbalancing’, or a “theory of mistakes”. He presents a systematic analysis of the 
domestic configurations of states who bandwagon to explain misperception of intentions 
of a rising power and/or the failure to adopt protective policies with a lack of social and 
elite ‘cohesion’ (Schweller 2006: 1 Of.; 128). While this explanation may have empirical 
merits, Schweller’s suggestion that a domestically fractioned state fails to perceive a 
‘great power’ as an existential threat and, by implication, is less pessimistic about the 
future intentions of others is not grounded in something that could be called a deep 
theory (see also Legro and Moravcsik 1999).91
suggesting that the global distribution of power is viewed through a ‘regional lens’ is a serious 
compromise of the systemic scope of structural realism. Moreover, transferring the puzzle to a 
more confined geographical setting does not eliminate it.
89 Walt’s note that ideology only affects the choice of allies when states feel secure already, that 
is, “face no significant external threat” (1987: 217) is inconsistent with his argument that 
ideology may be part of the threat (Ibid).
90 This is the problem of hegemonic stability theory, which can account for bandwagoning but 
contradicts the assumption that power is threatening. On how hegemonic stability does not fit the 
realist research programme, see DiCicco and Levy (2003).
91 When Schweller (2006: 6f.) situates his argument in the realist paradigm he makes no 
mentioning of core realist assumptions but only re-states the case for opening up the ‘black box’ 
of the state and analyze the configuration of domestic political structures.
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An issue not directly addressed by either Walt or Schweller, yet which is at the heart of 
the realist conundrum why some states do not ‘answer’ great power threats in the way 
balancing logic dictates, is the question o f how to actually measure power. The 
ubiquitous nature of ‘power’ makes it difficult to trace patterns of alliance formation and 
disintegration to shifts in the distribution o f power. Morgenthau (1960: Ch. 10) already 
discussed the problem of recognising shifts in the balance o f power, quoting Lord 
Bolingbroke that “the precise point at which the scales of power turn...is imperceptible 
to common observation” (in Morgenthau 1960: 206). Yet the issue is not merely the 
(mis)perception among practitioners about the ‘real’ distribution of power (Wohlforth
1993) but the conceptual vagueness of the meaning o f ‘power’ as such. The recognition 
among sociologists that power is an essentially contested concept also bedevils 
realism.92 As a number o f scholars have pointed out, there is no unified understanding 
among realists as to how ‘power’ should be defined,93 reflected in disagreements about 
the distribution of power in ‘the system’ at a given point (Schweller 1998; Grieco 2007). 
One can find a complex and multifaceted understanding o f power (Carr 2001, 
Morgenthau 1960), a vague and general one lumping together all kinds o f factors (Waltz 
1979) and a more specific and more narrow one (Mearsheimer 2001).
The problem this poses for the realist narrative is obvious: it makes it difficult to 
conceptualize what counts for a threat and, hence, what makes for a ‘common interest’ 
and the absence thereof. The difficulty o f realists providing a straightforward reading of 
power is not intrinsic to the concept, however. Contested as it might be, realists could 
well choose one particular reading, as attempted by Mearsheimer (2001). I suggest the 
reason can be found elsewhere: the realist argument that states want power to ensure 
their survival ties the reading o f power to its conceptualization of the state. Thus, as 
suggested by a deep theory perspective, the realist assumption that states seek power 
needs to be traced to its account of the spatio-temporal situatedness of the state.
Tracing the H ard  Core
As outlined in the previous chapter, tracing a causal narrative to an account of the 
human condition is different from anchoring an assumption in ‘human nature’. Hence, it 
requires going beyond the view that humans have a natural desire for power often 
attributed to realists and traced to Machiavelli (Boucher 1998: 93f.; Doyle 1997;
92 On multiple meanings of power in IR, see Barnett and Duvall (2005); Berenskoetter (2007).
93 See David Baldwin’s critique of Waltz (Baldwin 1993, 2002). For different realist conceptions 
of power, see Guzzini (1993); Schmidt (2005).
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Freyberg-Inan 2004).94 Morgenthau is generally referred to as someone who anchors 
aggressive behaviour in human nature “in which the laws o f politics have their roots” 
(Morgenthau 1960: 4). However, even Morgenthau’s understanding o f human nature is 
complex and he does not link the drive for power to a single human nature attribute. He 
speaks o f bio-psychological drives “to live, to propagate, and to dominate” (Morgenthau 
1960: 33) and mentions sociological motivations like pride and prestige, as well as “the 
moral principle of national survival” (Morgenthau 1960: 10). In short, when Morgenthau 
claims that “whatever the ultimate aims o f international politics, power is always the 
immediate aim” (Morgenthau 1946: 13), he leaves open what this ‘ultimate aim’ is.
Since Waltz, structural realists reject the view that humans/states have a natural drive for 
power and, instead, resort to Hobbes in emphasizing the will for self-preservation or 
‘survival’. Waltz holds that “the survival motive is the ground for action” o f all states 
(Waltz 1979: 92),95 Gilpin argues that it constitutes the “objective component” in the 
definition of the national interest (Gilpin 1996: 8), and Grieco considers it to be the 
“core interest” o f states (Grieco, 1993: 127). Even for offensive realists like 
Mearsheimer survival is the “number one goal” (Mearsheimer 2001: 46;) and “the 
fundamental assumption dealing with motives” in realist theory (Mearsheimer, 1994 in 
Brown et al: 335).96 While acknowledging that states pursue other, “more noble” 
(Gilpin) goals as well, they are considered subordinate simply because “only if survival 
is assured can states safely seek other goals” (Waltz 1979: 126). On the question how 
states turn from a ‘survival-seeker’ into a ‘power-seeker’, realists point to international 
anarchy (see assumption (4) above) which, as is well known, realists adopt from the 
‘state of nature’ image provided by Hobbes (Waltz 2001; 1979; 2000; Mearsheimer 
2001). This image basically pictures individuals coexisting without a third party arbiter 
that can solve disputes and enforce rule above them. In Hobbes words, the state o f nature 
is a situation of “men living together without a common power to keep them in awe” (in 
Doyle 1997: 113). Adapted to the inter-state level, anarchy is “the ordering principle 
which says that the system comprises independent political units (states) that have no 
authority above them” (Mearsheimer, 1994: 334)97
94 Some have labeled this the ‘evil’ school of realism (Wolfers 1962: 83; Spirtas, 1996).
95 Waltz solves the tension (if not contradiction) between his embrace of the survival motive and 
his dismissal of human nature (or what he calls ‘first image’) arguments by treating the latter 
fairly narrow as either ‘good’ (peaceful) or ‘bad’ (aggressive).
96 Also Powell (1994: 3200; Zakaria (1998); Schweller (1998).
97 For Hobbes the ‘state of nature’ was fictitious, a backdrop imagination against which an 
ordering sovereign, known as the ‘Leviathan’, could be conceptualized. Realists build on 
Hobbes’ suggestion that by overcoming the ‘state of nature’ domestically this would come to 
characterize relations between states. For a discussion, see Doyle (1997: 116f.); Beitz (1999:
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While for most IR scholars the ‘condition’ o f anarchy is expressed in the distinction 
between a vertical (hierarchical) organization o f the legitimate use of force within states 
and a horizontal ( ’anarchical’) organization among states, the reading here emphasizes a 
different angle. It suggests that on a deeper level the ‘condition o f anarchy’ rests on a 
certain (realist) reading of the spatial and temporal situatedness of states, namely the 
reading that they are autonomous units organised on the principle o f territorial 
exclusivity (spatial dimension) emerging out o f a history of conflict and facing an 
uncertain future best engaged with a pessimistic outlook (temporal dimension).
The State in Space: Autonomy as Territorial Integrity
In a prominent realist image states situated in the ‘anarchical environment’ are pictured 
like billiard balls (Morgenthau 1960: 174ff). While this metaphor may appear simplistic, 
critics have repeatedly pointed out that beyond such a picture realists lack a theoiy o f the 
state.98 For Wendt (1987), realism is ontologically primitive. As realism is interrogated 
here as a ‘deep theory’, it is worth pursuing John Hobson’s suggestion that realism does 
provide a substantial conceptualisation of the state (Hobson, 2000).
In general terms, realists understand the state to be a ‘sovereign’ entity. Sovereignty of 
course is a contested term with a history o f different meanings,99 and realists generally 
use it synonymously with “autonomy” and “independence” (Waltz 1979: 90, 204; 
Grieco 1993: 127; Mearsheimer 2001: 31). Thus, when they note that states are driven 
primarily by their desire for survival understood as maintaining 
autonomy/independence,100 underlying this claim about what states want is an ideal of 
what a state is, namely a non-social or ‘atomistic’ unit. This ontology can be traced to 
Hobbes’ conception o f the individual as an autonomous/independent being and thus to 
the notion of individualism central to modem Western philosophy since Hobbes (Lukes 
2006 [1973]; Doyle 1997: 114). Realists project this ontology onto the ‘Westphalian’ 
state captured in Max Weber’s famous definition o f the state as “that human community 
which (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use o f physical force within 
a certain space [Gebiet]” (Weber, 1999 (1919): 6, my translation; see also Smith, M. 
1986: 24). Weber’s conception is echoed by Morgenthau, one o f the few realists
32f.); Boucher (1998). The application of Hobbes’ ‘state of nature’ image to interstate relations 
has been widely criticized by Ashley (1988); Wendt (1992); Beitz (1999); Hutchings 1999: 19f.).
98 See Cox (1981); Ashley (1986); Ruggie (1986); Wendt (1987); Walker (1993); Buzan et al. 
(1993: 47ff).
99 Jackson (1999); James (1999); Biersteker and Weber (1990); Krasner (1999).
100 See also Paul (1999); Howes (2003).
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discussing the meaning o f sovereignty, who defines it as ‘supreme authority’ in the 
realm of law-enforcement (Morgenthau, 1960: 312ff).101 Similarly, for Waltz, 
sovereignty is about “being able to decide for itself how to cope with internal and 
external problems” (Waltz, 1979: 95).
The main challenge this ontology faces is interdependence, that is, the fact that no 
decision-making process is completely autonomous or free from external constrains. 
Long before the phenomenon of interdependence became prominent in the literature in 
the 1970s, Morgenthau (1960: 328) grappled with the fact that sovereignty was “not 
actual independence”. He acknowledged that dependence o f some states on others in 
military, economic, or technological matters makes it difficult, or even impossible, for 
them to pursue independent domestic and foreign policies. More recently, Krasner 
(1999) in a comprehensive discussion o f the concept of sovereignty shows how states 
are regularly coerced into making decisions or even invite their dependence through 
voluntary agreements. Waltz concedes that sovereignty does not mean that the state can 
do whatever it wants. While he claims that “to be sovereign and to be dependent are not 
contradictory conditions”, Waltz still notes that sovereignty understood as decision­
making autonomy is a “bothersome concept” (Waltz 1979: 95). After all, if the concept 
is a defining feature of the state, then one cannot move too far away from the fact that 
“sovereignty is indivisible” (Morgenthau 1960: 320). Differently said, if sovereign 
statehood is characterized by degrees of interdependence, it becomes difficult to 
conceptualize at what point it becomes existentially threatening.
There are two further ontological implications, downplayed by realists. The first is that if 
sovereignty cannot be fully claimed from within it needs to be recognised by others, 
which introduces a social component. Notwithstanding repeated violations o f the norm, 
in acknowledging that ‘sovereignty’ is a relational attribute realism must compromise its 
atomistic ontology of the state as a non-social (or asocial) entity (see also below). The 
second implication is that decision-making autonomy understood as an ideal which 
states strive towards compromises the reading o f the state as a static entity. Said 
differently, conceiving o f the state as ‘sovereign-in-the-making’ implies a tacit 
evolutionary ontology. While the realist literature does grapple with these issues, visible
101 Morgenthau’s note that the sovereign has “the responsibility for making the final binding 
decision” (Morgenthau 1960: 326) overlaps with Carl Schmitt’s view that the state is the political 
entity which decides the “extreme case” (Schmitt, 1996 [1932]: 43).
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in Waltz’ account discussed below,102 this has not led realists to rethink the ontology of 
the state.
Instead, realists emphasize territoriality and make control over/possession o f an 
exclusive territory the central feature of the spatial configuration of the state (Hobson 
2000: 56ff; Ruggie, 1993). Carr, while acknowledging that the “most comprehensive 
power units” in international politics must not necessarily be territorially organized, 
notes that the modem state clearly is based on “territorial sovereignty” (Carr 2001: 210). 
Morgenthau also defines sovereignty as “supreme power over a certain territory” 
(Morgenthau 1960: 312), echoed by Krasner who, while distinguishing between four 
different types of sovereignty, focuses primarily on ‘Westphalian sovereignty’ based on 
“the exclusion o f external actors from authority structures within a given territory” 
(Krasner, 1999: 4, 20). John Herz perhaps most forcefully argued that territoriality forms 
the “existential basis” for the sovereign state (Herz 1959: 50), echoed in Gilpin’s 
assertion that “the essence o f the state is its territoriality” (Gilpin 1981: 17).
Conceptualizing the state as a certain territorial space and, correspondingly, o f survival 
as maintaining “territorial integrity” (Mearsheimer 2001: 31) moves analytical attention 
towards the importance o f borders. Although realists don’t spend much time talking 
about borders, they are obviously central to the notion of the state as an 
autonomous/independent entity. While it is unimportant to realists how communities are 
organised within a certain territory, what matters is that their authority to define and 
enforce order ends at a physical border. Borders are both markers for separating realms 
of authority and protectors of the same; they divide and compartmentalise the territorial 
surface of the planet and mark the existence of ‘states’ as exclusive territorial units. 
While few might use George Liska’s (1968: 47) words that the state is a territorial unit 
with natural boundaries -  although Carr at one point speaks of how states are built on 
“rigidly demarcated frontiers” (Carr 2001: 211) -  the very fact that borders are not part 
of realist theorizing is proof that they are assumed to be fixed.
While this focus on territoriality makes for a static ontology (Ruggie 1998), it allows 
realists to pin down the existential threat. The elasticity o f the meaning o f ‘sovereignty’
102 Waltz’ note that “states seek to control what they depend on or to lessen the extent of their 
dependency” (Waltz, 1979: 106; Waltz, 1986: 324) echoes the classification of states as either 
‘satisfied’ or ‘dissatisfied’ (Carr 2001; Morgenthau 1960; Wolfers, 1962) and also permeates the 
debate between ‘defensive’ and ‘offensive’ realism and its emphasis on ‘status quo’ and 
‘revisionist’ states, respectively. See Snyder (1991); Jervis (1999); Taliaferro (2000); 
Mearsheimer (2001); Schweller (1994, 1998).
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makes it difficult to conceptualise when exactly ‘the state’ is existentially threatened, yet 
the conception of the state as a territorial entity with fixed borders provides a clear 
target. It suggests that survival is at risk when borders are permeated and the territorial 
integrity of the state is violated, which happens in war.103 To be precise, war as such is 
not threatening but the possibility of losing is, and so the notion o f the existential threat 
will need to be qualified in what defines this possibility. This crucial point is engaged 
later.
Realist Attempts o f  Fixing the State: Learning and Nationalism  
How does realism account for the compartmentalization o f territory into units whose 
autonomy/integrity governments are expected to safeguard? Asked differently, how is 
the spatial fixation of states as exclusive territorial entities embedded in an account of a 
‘condition’ states are situated in? This section reviews the two arguments realists have 
used to justify their ontology, learning and nationalism, and points out their weaknesses.
As expressed in assumption (4) above, structural realists argue that the sovereign state is 
a product of the dynamic of interstate relations in the ‘anarchical environment’. They 
portray the state as what Hobson calls a “passive-adaptive” actor (Hobson 2000) and, 
thus, rely on a tacit learning argument. Waltz most famously (and murkily) blends 
sociological and microeconomic logic carried forward through two mechanisms, 
socialization and competitive selection, to argue that states have to adjust to ‘the rules of 
the game’ if they want to survive. He invokes Durkheim’s insight that groups establish 
norms of behaviour which members conform to (Waltz 1979: 75), remaining quiet about 
where these norms come from other than vaguely suggesting that “the persistent 
characteristics of group behaviour result in part from the qualities o f its members” 
(Waltz 1979: 76). Supplementing this rudimentary socialization dynamic with 
microeconomic logic, Waltz translates the market analogy that “competitive systems are 
regulated...by the rationality o f the more successful competitors” (Waltz 1979: 76) to IR 
and suggests that states will conform to successful practices o f the most powerful state 
and that “those who not...will fail to prosper, will lay themselves to dangers, will suffer”
103 This point is made by Morgenthau. In a section entitled ‘How Sovereignty is Lost’ he argues 
that such loss occurs when a nation is placed under the authority of another “so that is it the latter 
that exercises supreme authority to give and enforce the laws within the formers’ territory” 
(Morgenthau 1960: 318). This can take place in two possible ways, namely (i) by giving the other 
nation veto-power from the outside or (ii) through the physical violation of territorial integrity 
which “places the agents of B above A in terms of lawgiving and -enforcing”, in other words by 
taking physical control of the authority structure through occupation (Morgenthau 1960: 322). 
Ultimately, ‘civilian’ means do not fundamentally damage territorial integrity, only war does, as 
“it is the very essence of war to penetrate the territory of the enemy” (Morgenthau 1960: 314).
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Waltz 1979: 118).104 His notion that international structure “molds agents” and thereby 
“causes” states to be alike by encouraging “similarities o f attributes and of behaviour” 
(Waltz 1979: 74, 76) blends socialization and competition to some kind o f casual force, 
but it also involves reflective activity on the side o f states. Other than in Darwinian 
evolutionary processes where selection takes place randomly, Waltz suggests that states 
can come to understand the ‘rules of the game’ and learn to adapt.105
When Waltz asserts that “those who survive share certain characteristics” (Waltz 1979: 
77) the question is whether this refers only to behaviour or to the very understanding o f 
what a state is/should be. For scholars like Barry Buzan structural realisms’ 
“demonstration effect” of reward and punishment explains how life in anarchy “will 
push the range of governmental functions towards sovereignty” (Buzan et al., 1993: 39). 
This may be giving too much credit to the ‘logic o f anarchy’. While one may argue that 
the co-existence of autonomous units creates a situation of anarchy (Buzan et al. 1993 : 
Ch. 4), and while the condition of anarchy encourages the practice o f balancing (see 
below), there is no compelling logic in the realist narrative which suggests that anarchy 
conditions states to be autonomous, or desire autonomy/territorial integrity. Waltz does 
not distinguish between structure encouraging balancing and shaping states themselves, 
which masks that the constitutive argument is not there. As Wendt has pointed out, the 
static ontology of the state leaves structural realism without room for processes of 
socialisation or evolution operating on the level of ontology (Wendt 1987; 1992; 1999; 
also Ruggie 1986).106
The second prominent attempt of fixing the spatial configuration of the state as an 
autonomous entity seeking territorial integrity is to point towards the constitutive force 
of nationalism (thus focusing on the community in Weber’s definition). Classical realists 
like Carr and Morgenthau favoured ‘the nation’ as the political entity whose relations 
they studied. In his study on the evolution o f nationalism, Carr notes that the state 
merely was “a colourless legal word” (Carr, 1945: 1). Morgenthau identifies nationalism 
as the reason why the mass o f individuals in a society identify themselves with the 
foreign policy wielded by small number o f people. He defines the nation as “an
104 For critical discussions of Waltz’ market analogy, see Buzan et al. (1993); Walker (1993); 
Guzzini (1998); Inayatullah and Blaney (2004: Ch. 4). One observer notes that the relationship 
between ‘self-help’ and competition is underdeveloped, if not “fundamentally flawed” (Glaser,
1994).
105 For an attempt to buttress Waltz’ argument with Darwinian logic, see Thayer (2000). See also 
the critical response by Bell and Macdonald (2001).
106 For a more sympathetic interpretation, see Hobson (2000: 28ff), Goddard and Nexon (2005: 
34ff).
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abstraction from a number o f individuals who have certain characteristics in common” 
(Morgenthau 1960: 101) and suggests that there is an inverse relationship between “the 
emotional intensity o f the identification of the individual with his nation” and the 
stability and sense o f security within a society (Ibid., 106). He also argues that the 
existence of a “national character” and “national morale” are core elements of every 
state with decisive influence on its vitality (Ibid., 269f). The importance o f nationalism 
as a cohesive force is also noted by structural realists. Waltz in Man, the State and War 
takes up Rousseau’s point that the unity o f the state is achieved through a “public spirit 
or patriotism”, which Waltz sees mirrored in the idea o f nationality. He even comes to 
suggest that “the centripetal force o f nationalism may itself explain why states can be 
thought of as units” (Ibid., 174ff; also Grieco 1990.). Gilpin (1981: 14f) notes the close 
link between realist state-centrism and nationalism and Mearsheimer (1990: 18ff in 
Brown), mentions nationalism as beliefs o f uniqueness and pride “which hold that a 
nation should have its own state” and calls it a “second order force in international 
politics” (Ibid., 19; see also Posen 1993). Buzan’s conceptualization o f the state 
primarily as a “binding idea” or “organizing ideology” provides the most elaborate 
discussion among realists of the meaning of ‘national’ security (Buzan 1991: 64, 72-82).
There is an empirical and a conceptual problem with this argument. First, history is 
replete with examples of nationalism as a force undermining rather than strengthening 
‘the state’. The fact that nationalistic sentiments may lead to the disintegration o f a state 
does not fit with a static ontology and renders nationalism unsuitable for supporting the 
conception o f the state as a geographical unit with fixed borders. As Lapid and 
Kratochwil observe, Buzan (1991: 72) is aware of this conceptual problem and, hence, 
does not incorporate nationalism in his subsequent reformulation o f structural realism 
(Buzan et al. 1993). Similarly, the rudimentary attempts by Mearsheimer and Posen to 
integrate nationalism into structural realism are highly selective (Lapid and Kratochwil, 
1996). Even if one ignores these inconsistencies, second, from a deep theory perspective 
the ‘binding idea’ would need to embedded in an account o f the human condition. Yet 
realists do not elaborate why a state is formed around a ‘national morale’ or a ‘binding 
idea’, why this idea would be connected a certain territory, or when/how such an idea 
may be threatened.
The State in Time: Uncertainty and Experience
While the realist account of anarchy provides no convincing logic for why states should 
be conceptualized as autonomous/territorially exclusive and fixed units, it fares better in 
explaining their desire for a certain kind o f ‘power’ that protects this existence once this
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ontology is accepted. Notwithstanding the weakness this disconnect brings to realisms’ 
causal narrative, it is important to look at this account more closely because it shifts 
attention to the temporal dimension by emphasizing (future) uncertainty and (past) 
experience and highlights distrust/pessimism as a central feature o f the realist 
narrative.107
Realists stress that because under ‘anarchy’ no third party will protect individual states 
from arbitrary violence, states live in uncertainty. More precisely, they invoke the 
Hobbesian state of nature where individuals (states) can never be sure that others will 
not take advantage o f them and therefore live in “continual fear and danger of violent 
death” (Hobbes in Doyle 1997: 114). The key point here is not the states’ situatedness in 
space as exclusive territorial units co-existing without an overarching authority. The 
absence of a third party arbiter as such does not explain why states fear each other. This, 
states owe to their situatedness as reflexive beings in time. More precisely, the deeper 
reason is that there is no guarantee that agreements made today will be respected in the 
future, that is, there is no enforcement mechanism which constrains the future behaviour 
of others and makes the future (somewhat) predictable. States cannot rule out war as the 
existential threat to territorial integrity.
Importantly, the threat does not stem from war per se but from a particular war which 
holds the possibility of military defeat, that is, of being “conquered” (Mearsheimer 2001: 
3 1).108 This possibility emerges from another state possessing more military capabilities, 
specifically from the possibility that these capabilities are used offensively to invade and 
occupy the territory of others. The notion o f war as a possibility is important here 
because it clarifies that to say “among states, the state of nature is a state of war” (Waltz 
1979: 103) does not mean that war is ongoing but, rather, that it may break out at any 
point in time. In that sense, the condition foreign policy operates under is marked not by 
war itself but by the possibility of war, making war as an “ever present” threat 
(Morgenthau 1960: 9). As Carr phrases it, war forever “lurks in the background” (Can- 
2001: 102). Strictly speaking, the language o f the threat as ‘ever present’ and in the 
‘background’ does not fully capture the logic within which it emerges and that it relies 
on a particular understanding o fpast andfuture. This must be looked at more carefully.
107 From a deep theorizing perspective, pessimism is not grounded in human nature, as Annette 
Freyberg Inan (2004) suggests, but in an account of the human condition.
108 Morgenthau points out the difficulty of viewing war a ‘common threat’ when noting 
“humanity is united in its opposition to war as such, war in the abstract...[but] splits into its 
national components when the issue is...a particular war” (Morgenthau 1960: 267). States may 
worry about the violation of the territorial integrity of other states if this leads to a shift in the 
balance of power (Snyder 1997: 24)
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When realists emphasise that “uncertainty is given by the human condition” (Copeland, 
2000: 210) it is important to be clear that there are, strictly speaking, two ways in which 
uncertainty comes to play out: the impossibility o f knowing what others think (the 
famous ‘problem of other minds’) and the impossibility o f knowing (what others think 
in) the future. The two are often conflated in the literature. It is useful to keep them apart 
analytically because the inability to know the future is the more crucial one. Regardless 
of what the interests o f state Y are today, even in a state o f full transparency and perfect 
information state X cannot know what Y ’s interests will be like tomorrow and, 
consequently, what state Y might do with the military capabilities at its disposal (indeed, 
Y in all likelihood does not know for certain, either). Therefore even states with peaceful 
relations today evaluate each other from the position o f the future. And because the 
future is unknown, indeed contingent, the other state’s intention must also be considered 
unknown/contingent. More precisely, for realists states (should) respond to the 
unknowability/contingency of the future with pessimism, that is, with a worst-case 
scenario based on the possibility that the intentions of others might be hostile. They 
argue that states are better off mistrusting each other and frame the relationship as one of 
potential adversaries.109 Pessimist states are states which fear others in the future.
The concern that today’s friend might be tomorrow’s enemy informs Joseph Grieco’s 
well-known argument that states worry about ‘relative gains’, which he identifies as a 
central feature of realist logic. In Grieco’s words, because states are unable to predict or 
readily to control the future interest of partners, and hence are “uncertain about on 
another’s future intentions...they pay close attention to how cooperation might affect 
relative capabilities in the future  (Grieco, 1990: 45, emphasis in original). This distrust 
about future intentions makes them “acutely sensitive” to any (anticipated) erosion of 
their relative capabilities (Grieco 1993: 127). The tragic consequence of this logic was 
famously laid out by John Herz, the first IR theorist systematically thinking about the 
implications o f the condition of uncertainty states find themselves in and who, thereby, 
formulated a central element of the hard core o f the realist paradigm (Herz 1951; see 
also Booth and Wheeler 2008). Herz noted that states situated in an anarchical 
environment respond to “uncertainty and anxiety as to [its] neighbours’ intentions” by 
mistrusting each other and acquiring military means for protection (Herz, 1951: 3). As 
Waltz summarised the logic “because any state may at any time use force, all states must
109 Herein lies the logical problem realists have with conceptualizing ‘common interests’: because 
assuming the ‘worst case’ minimizes unpleasant surprises, for realists states are (or should be) 
pessimists and should always consider interests to be conflicting.
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constantly be ready either to counter force with force” (Waltz 2001: 160). Herz 
famously captured the tragic consequence of this distrust in the notion o f the security 
dilemma where uncertainty turns relations among states striving for self-preservation 
into a competition for military power (Herz 1951; Jervis, 1978, 1988; Booth and 
Wheeler 2008).
It is worth pointing out that differences exist among realists with regard to reading the 
future, observable in the split between ‘offensive’ and ‘defensive’ realism. The former 
suggest that states (must) always base their expectations on worst-case scenarios and 
follow the logic o f “the best defense is a good offense” by “relentlessly seeking power” 
(Mearsheimer, 2001: 21, 36). By contrast, defensive realists argue that states are aware 
of the potential danger of the spiral triggered by the security dilemma and hesitant to 
ever increase their capabilities (Jervis 1999: 4; Waltz 1979: 126). Indeed, they hold that 
the security dilemma can be eased by arguing that states can make the future more 
predictable by taking into account what Taliaferro (2000) has called “structural 
modifiers”, such as geography, signalled intentions and/or reciprocal behaviour. Hence, 
in an important way the disagreement is about the value o f present knowledge for 
predicting the future; more specifically about what kind o f knowledge should be used to 
deal with uncertainty.
The important question remaining is: what is this knowledge and where does it come 
from? Hobbes wrote in the Leviathan that the ‘state o f nature’ is a ‘state o f war’ because 
the former is a condition “wherein the will to battle is sufficiently known” (in Doyle 
1997: 114). This makes anarchy a state o f war not simply because of the absence of an 
overarching sovereign but because of a presence o f ‘sufficient knowledge’ which, for 
realists, comes from history. Worst case scenarios projected into an uncertain future are 
not invented out o f thin air but, rather, view the future through the past. Paradigmatic 
statements by realists, likely invoking Thucydides or Machiavelli, cannot go without 
pointing to the historical ‘record’ o f conflict as a recurrent phenomenon, a habit that 
stretches from Morgenthau’s note that the struggle for power is the law of politics 
“universal in time and space and space and an undeniable fact o f  experience” 
(Morgenthau 1960: 33, emphasis added) to Mearsheimer’s famous ‘back to the future’ 
argument which predicted that, with the end of the Cold War, European states were 
likely to return to competition and conflict (Mearsheimer, 1990). Colin Gray puts it 
succinctly when noting that for realists “the future is the past” (Gray, 1999).
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Because realists emphasize a particular history as a guide for reading of the future, 
namely the history of violent conflict, or war, the future also is one of violent conflict, or 
war.110 With emphasis put on ‘recurrent patterns’ the temporal plane takes on the 
appearance of a cyclical view of history where past and future merge as the latter is 
made intelligible by being filled with historical reference points to which the lessons of 
history can be applied. As Mearsheimer notes, realism not only aims to explain histories 
of conflict but also has a prescriptive element in that “states should behave according to 
the dictates of...realism, because it outlines the best way to survive in a dangerous 
world” (Mearsheimer 2001: 11, emphasis in original). The result is the image o f a world 
-  ‘reality’ -  marked by the possibility of violent conflict, or war. It follows that, 
paradoxically, from a realist perspective not-knowing the past and applying its lessons 
generates the greatest threat to state survival: ignorance about the recurrence o f conflict 
and/or the belief that the troubled past (read: conflict) could be ‘overcome’ is dangerous 
because it tempts governments to pursue policies blind to “the rational elements of 
political reality” which the past teaches (Morgenthau 1960: 8; Carr, 2001 (1946); 
Morgenthau, 1946; Herz, 1951).
In sum, in the realist narrative the national security interest forming in ‘anarchy’ is 
constituted to a significant degree in time, relying o f a particular knowledge o f the past 
(as one where conflict arose out of an imbalance of ‘power’) projected into an uncertain 
future (entertaining corresponding worst-case scenarios which depict great powers as 
threatening). Consequently, the common interest leading to cooperation converges 
around such shared knowledge of the past, ideally from shared experience, and 
corresponding agreement that the correct use of this knowledge is pessimism about 
others’ intentions.
(II) Institutionalism: Adjusting Realism
The institutionalist argument was originally developed to explain phenomena in political 
economy and attempts to explain cooperation in the security realm are relatively new.111 
The label o f ‘Institutionalism’ also encompasses a variety of approaches which often 
have not much more in common than emphasizing that ‘institutions matter’ in the study
110 Carr (2001: 4f) was quite explicit about the emancipatory purposes of theorizing. Morgenthau 
(I960: 8) pointed out that rational foreign policy as defined by realism would be “good” foreign 
policy.
111 Keohane and Hoffman (1991); Haftendom et al. (1999); Lake (2001); Wallander (2000); 
Smith (2004).
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of international politics.112 Here it is sufficient to distinguish between two strands, 
historical institutionalism and neoliberal institutionalism. As the former overlaps with 
social constructivism, discussed in the final section o f this chapter, the main focus will 
be on neoliberal institutionalism.
One might expect ‘institutionalism’ to provide the most suitable explanation. However, 
as noted in the first chapter this is not the case, for two reasons. First, the force o f the 
institutionalist argument enters only once common interests among states are assumed to 
exist and offers no argument why interests would drift apart. Related, second, the logical 
thrust of the argument is characterized by a path dependency bias ill-suited for 
explaining the decline in cooperation (marked by investment in alternative institutions). 
Thus, the institutionalist causal narrative does not offer a specific ‘common interest’ 
shared by Germany and the US cooperate through NATO and cannot account for why 
German governments subsequently invested in CSCE and CFSP. As this section will 
show, these shortcomings are explained by the fact that while institutionalism offers 
spatio-temporal modifications to the realist reading o f the ‘human condition’, it remains 
rooted in the same and, from a deep theory perspective, does not amount to an original 
research programme.
The Path Dependency Bias of Historical Institutionalism
An influential precursor of and inspiration for historical institutionalism, still prominent 
in European integration studies, is (neo)functionalism. Developed originally by Ernst 
Haas (1958, 1964), it suggests that shared institutions established in core sectors will 
gradually take on a life on their own and push forward an integrative dynamic through 
unintended ‘spill-over’ processes.113 Historical institutionalism adopts this emphasis on 
the evolutionary, indeed progressive character o f institutions,114 and some even stress 
socialising effects of institutions on their members (‘sociological institutionalism’).115 
The shared baseline of historical institutionalism is a causal narrative which contains a 
strong bias towards path dependency by emphasizing that institutions or, rather, the 
trajectory of their development, are ‘locked in’ at a certain point in time and then unfold 
from thereon in a certain direction. Such an emphasis may be useful for explaining how 
institutions contribute to the persistence in cooperation yet is ill suited for explaining
112 For overviews, see Hasenclever et al. (1996); Hall and Taylor (1996); Simmons and Martin 
(2002).
113 Haas (1958, 1964); for an overview see Rosamond (2000, Ch. 3).
114 The term comes from Theda Skocpol, see Thelen and Steinmo (1992) for an overview.
115 See Finnemore (1996); Finnemore and Sikkink, (1998). For an attempt to bring the sociology 
into Haas’ approach, see Risse (2005).
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why states choose to create new institutions, even more so if this is framed in terms of a 
degenerating cooperative dynamic. This weakness is reflected in the observation made 
by two prominent scholars who identified the emphasis on structural constraints and 
continuity as “a general problem in contemporary institutional analysis” (Streeck and 
Thelen 2005: 6).
To be sure, state agency does have a place in the institutionalist narrative. Historical 
institutionalism emphasises what Stephen Krasner (1984) calls a ‘punctuated 
equilibrium’, namely an interruption of the institutional trajectory as the moment when 
significant change occurs. These turning points, also called ‘historical junctures’ or 
‘critical moments’, open up space for agency, indeed are defined by the very fact that 
agents are able to influence the direction o f institutional development (e.g., Katznelson 
2003). The basic idea is that there is a moment in time when institutional structures are 
weakened or break down, and which thereby provides a window of opportunity for 
agents to recreate or change the institutional path. This perspective is buttressed by 
claims o f policymakers being “present at the creation” (Acheson 1969) and part o f an 
“architectural moment” (Holbrooke 1995: 38) after the end of a major conflict 
(Ikenberry 2001). Apart from running the tautological risk o f reading ‘critical moments’ 
back into events, the problem for the case at hand is how this approach portrays both the 
scale o f the change (radical) and when it happens (instantaneous). Picturing change as 
major and only during a specific point in time implies that between those rare moments, 
nothing really happens. When the window is closed the path is locked-in and there is no 
place for agency and, hence, no politics capable of bringing about change. This does not 
fit with the process-perspective taken here which emphasizes gradual change over a long 
period of time.116
Neoliberal Institutionalism: Limits and Openings
As the name suggests, neoliberal institutionalism is a mix of regime theory and 
neoliberal reasoning developed most coherently by Robert Keohane.117 In contrast to 
historical institutionalism it gives continuous prominence to state agency. Emerging out 
o f the work he did with Joseph Nye on the impact o f economic interdependence 
(Keohane and Nye 1989), Keohane challenges the realist view of the irrelevance of
116 For a discussion and critique of the analytical value o f ‘historical junctures’, see Capoccia and 
Kelemen (2007). Some scholars have called for shifting the analytical focus towards processes of 
continuous/incremental change, see Thelen and Steinmo (1992); Streeck and Thelen (2005). This 
seems similar to Haas’ emphasis on adaptation and learning (Haas 1990). Still, these approaches 
focus on change within institutions, not the creation of new ones and thus does not quite discard 
the path dependency bias.
117 See Keohane (1984); Keohane and Martin (1995); Keohane and Martin (2003)
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institutions and that cooperation would occur only on a shallow and ‘ad hoc’ basis, 
arguing instead that extensive and persistent cooperation is possible under anarchy even 
without the presence o f a hegemon enforcing commitments (Keohane 1984: 85f)."8 In 
managing interdependence institutions are neither irrelevant nor simply constraining but 
are enabling by allowing states to cooperate for mutual benefit. His basic argument is 
that states use institutions to ‘tame’ anarchy.
Like realists, institutionalists like Keohane situate their theory in the liberal tradition 
“that is rationalistic and individualistic without being optimistic about human nature” 
and accept the realist reading of the state as an ‘egoistic’ entity situated in anarchy 
(Keohane and Martin, 2003: 92f). They emphasizes the neoclassical view that states are 
utility maximizers with “consistent, ordered preferences” weighing alternatives on a 
cost-benefit basis to choose the one that is more efficient in meeting these preferences 
(Keohane, 1984: 27). The notion o f efficiency then becomes the “driving force” behind 
the institutionalist argument (Moe, 1984: 743). The argument is that, once common 
interest are known to exist which can be ‘more efficiently’ pursued by working together, 
states strive towards reaching a pareto-optimal level o f cooperation, that is, a level when 
no (known) alternative arrangement exists that could make one state better off without 
making the other worse off (Keohane, 1984: 51).119 To achieve this level, they will set 
up an institution whose primary function it is to reduce the transaction costs arising in an 
anarchy, mainly costs of coordination, by providing ‘reliable information’ about each 
other. Thus, institutions are said to be able to alleviate distrust by providing an 
environment in which credible commitments become feasible.120 The attractiveness o f an 
institution depends on its ability to fulfil this function, that is on its efficiency in 
“improving the informational environment” by providing mechanisms which reduce 
uncertainty (Keohane and Martin, 2003: 80).
The institutionalist narrative has two major weaknesses. First, its ‘sunk cost’ logic also 
contains a path dependency bias (Keohane, 1984: Ch. 4; 1988). This logic rests on the 
utilitarian view that institutions are costly to set up, so states will not create a new
118 As Jervis points out, this question of how much cooperation is possible and to what extent 
institutions can enhance the same was at the centre of the neo-neo debate (Jervis 1999, 2003).
119 As Milgrom and Robert (1992: 22) state it, pareto-optimality is achieved “if there is no 
available alternative that is universally preferred in terms of the goals and preferences of the 
actors involved”.
120 Specifically, institutions address the risk of free-riding and cheating (collective action 
dilemma), as well as mistrust and information asymmetries (security dilemma), obstacles to 
cooperation identified in games such as the prisoners’ dilemma (Jervis 1978). See also Moe 
(1984); Keohane (1984).
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institution if an existing one performs efficiently. In addition, the ‘sunk cost’ argument 
holds that the choice between abandoning an old institution and establishing a new one 
is biased. Because institutions are providing increasing returns, meaning that high start­
up costs pay off over time, even in the case of temporary inefficiency states are likely to 
stick with the old institution because the costs o f reform are considered lower than those 
of establishing a new institution. As a consequence, states are likely to be biased towards 
keeping and reforming existing institutions (Keohane, 1984: ch. 4; Keohane, 1988; 
Pierson, 2000). The ‘sunk cost’ factor holds that the decision to invest in a new 
institution would need to be preceded by a clear case o f institutional inefficiency (in this 
case of NATO and CSCE, respectively) and the ‘cheap’ availability o f a more efficient 
alternative.
Here the second and major weakness o f the argument arises: indeterminacy of the 
meaning o f ‘(in)efficiency’. Milgrom and Roberts (1992) point out that in applying the 
efficiency concept “it is necessary to be clear about whose interests are counted and 
what alternatives are considered to be feasible” (Milgrom and Roberts 1992: 22). An 
evaluation of an institutions’ efficiency comes down to the question whether it provides 
sufficient ‘information’ and satisfies the states’ security interests. The theory does not 
specify the kind of ‘information’ the institution must provide beyond the track record of 
past compliance and projecting expected gains and losses and a pareto-optimal situation. 
Yet institutionalist logic says nothing about what the interests are on the basis of which 
future calculations are made. Like rational choice approaches more generally, interests 
(or ‘preferences’) are plugged into the argument from the outside, they are exogenous to 
the theory. While some may see indeterminacy in defining security interests as an 
advantage because it allows institutionalism to be more flexible in defining ‘security 
interests’ depending on the case at hand (Haftendoren et al. 1999), from a theoretical 
perspective this luxury is symptom of the larger problem that the causal narrative does 
not go deep enough.
The reason institutionalism does not provide a unique reading o f (security) ‘interests’ is 
because it does not possess a distinctive hard core but relies on realist ontology o f the 
state as an actor striving for autonomy in an anarchical environment. While at one point 
claiming that it represents a distinct research programme (Keohane and Martin 2003), by 
their own admission this claim is difficult to uphold. From the earlier claim that the aim 
was “to broaden neorealism” (Keohane and Nye: 1989: 251) to the later concession that 
“institutionalism adopt[s] almost all of the hard core of realism” (Keohane and Martin 
2003: 73), Keohane’s institutionalism is not merely a “half sibling o f realism” but part of
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the realist family (Keohane and Martin 2003: 81; Jervis 2003: 280).121 That said, the 
institutionalist argument offers two slight modification o f the realist account of the 
‘human condition’ (its reading o f the spatio-temporal situatedness of states) worth 
pointing out.
First, institutionalism provides an opening in the spatial dimension by treating 
interdependence not merely as an ontological inconvenience but as something that is 
fundamental to the existence of states. Highlighting issue-specific linkages across state 
boundaries and, thus, spaces across borders reaching into domestic structures, the theory 
presents a picture in which states do not appear like a billiard balls anymore but are 
closely connected. These transnational linkages present the international as a space that 
is not confined to the ‘in-between’ state borders and, thus, changes the perspective on 
how states relate to each other spatially. Picturing states not as closed ‘units’ and borders 
not as rigidly separating but as permeable shifts the focus o f the spatial dimension 
towards the transnational and towards how states manage this condition. By moving the 
spotlight on ‘complex interdependence’ institutionalism also reveals new vulnerabilities 
and avenues of influence, consequently painting a picture of more complex power 
relations than does realism.
Second, the theory suggests that institutions can alter how states conceive of their 
situatedness in time. Loosely defined as rules, norms, and decision-making procedures, 
institutions are not merely regulating interdependence but are providing information 
which reduces uncertainty and, consequently, tames anarchy (see also Krasner 1982). In 
an overlap with ‘defensive realists’, institutions are thus said to function as ‘structural 
modifiers’ able to increase interstate trust by providing reliable information about each 
other’s commitments, thereby changing the ‘informational environment’ and making the 
future (somewhat) more predictable (Jervis, 1999; Keohane and Martin, 2003). By 
stressing that function, the institutionalist narrative recognizes the importance o f the 
temporal dimension in the realist argument, yet it does not quite grasp the latter’s depth. 
It does little in substantiating the ‘informational environment’ on the temporal 
dimension and, more specifically, does not address the root of the realist (pessimist) 
state of mind, namely that the reading of the future is based on a certain reading o f the 
past as one of recurring conflict.
121 Looking back, Keohane justified his adoption of Waltz’ world as a step “taken more for 
analytical convenience and rhetorical effect than out of deep conviction” (Keohane and Martin 
2003:81).
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(I ll)  Constructivism: Responding to the Postm odern Zeitgeist 
As noted in chapter one the (social) constructivist approach also has great difficulties 
with explaining how two states deeply embedded in a common institution could drift 
apart. While this perspective likes to speak o f ‘states’ and institutions co-constituting 
each other, it tends to emphasize processes of socialization o f the former by the latter, 
that is, it emphasizes the influence o f institutions in shaping identities and, subsequently, 
interests of its members. By suggesting that if only states interact long enough and 
within an institutionalized cooperative setting they will internalize collective norms and 
progress towards an ever closer union, it contains a path-dependency bias very similar 
to that of historical institutionalism. As this section will show, underlying is the same 
neglect of providing an alternative account of the human condition, yet also a promising 
opening by directing attention to ‘identity’.
Like realism, constructivism is a broad church housing a number of priests and 
congregations. Its emergence in IR is often portrayed as a response to the ‘failure’ of 
realist approaches to come to terms with the end of the Cold War. While this may help 
to explain why constructivism became popular among IR scholars when it did, it was not 
meant to be merely an explanatory corrective to realism, filling the gaps so to say. 
Rather, as part of the critical turn making its way through the social sciences in the 
1980s, constructivism, alongside feminist and postcolonial approaches, emerged out of a 
fundamental dissatisfaction with the ontology and epistemology of the realist-rationalist 
mainstream.122 This critical move was stimulated by the philosophical Zeitgeist of 
postmodernism and the contours o f the constructivist research programme developed 
through the intellectual openings this Zeitgeist provided. The meaning o f postmodernism 
is difficult to grasp and disputed even among (alleged) proponents, not the least because 
it depends on both the underlying understanding o f ‘modernity’ and the subsequent 
question of how to relate to it (i.e. what the ‘post’ stands for).123 In broad terms, 
postmodernism designates “a reaction to the monotomy of universal modernism’s vision 
of the world” as “positivistic, technocentric, and rationalistic” and marked by “the belief 
in linear progress, absolute truths, the rational planning of ideal social orders, and the 
standardization of knowledge” (Harvey 1989: 9). The postmodern reaction combines 
deconstruction of accepted categories and rejection of deterministic thinking with the
122 See, for instance, Hoffmann (1987); Onuf (1989); Kratochwil (1989); Wendt (1992); Der 
Derian and Shapiro (1989); Walker (1993). For discussions of how ‘constructivism’ is situated in 
IR, see Adler (1997, 2002); Ruggie (1998); Hopf (1998); Guzzini (2000); Zehfuss (2002).
123 For seminal discussions, see Harvey (1990) and Luhmann (1992). For a problematization of 
modernity in IR, see Ruggie (1993), for ‘p°strn°demism’ in IR, see Devetak (2001) and the 
epilogue in Campbell (1998a).
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aim of liberating human existence through the embrace o f contingency and diversity. 
Simply put, it advocates an agenda o f emancipation by bringing about the “death o f 
meta-narratives” (ibid.).
IR scholars stimulated by the postmodern Zeitgeist reject positivist methodology, the 
ontology of the atomistic conception o f ‘the state’ and a world where ideas, norms, and 
identities did not matter. Yet “fracturing and destabilizing the rationalist/positivist 
hegemony” was only “a necessary first step in establishing a new perspective on world 
politics” (Price and Reus-Smit 1998: 263). While this new perspective, broadly 
speaking, is marked by a shared commitment to ‘reflexivity’ (Adler 2002: 95), the 
question remains what exactly ‘reflexivity’ entails and how far it should go. In the words 
o f Stefano Guzzini, following the postmodern invitation to “think the unthinkable”, 
constructivists face the difficult task of engaging (and thinking in) categories mainly 
borrowed from the Enlightenment while having to invent new ones “to show us a way 
‘beyond’” (Guzzini 2000: 152).124 Opinions diverge over what this way looks like and 
whom to draw on for sign posts. Following the ‘critical turn’ there have been ‘linguistic’ 
and ‘sociological’ ones, with inspiration from Foucault, Derrida, Durkheim, Parsons, 
Mead, Giddens, Bourdieu, Habermas, Honneth, Luhmann, and so on.125 While this 
makes the ‘constructivist’ research programme rather incoherent, three issues are at the 
heart of the constructivist narrative.
First, as the name suggests, constructivists agree on problematising the subject-object 
distinction, that is, they don’t take the world as ‘given’ but inquire how “we construct 
worlds we know in a world we do not” (Onuf, 1989: 38). While ideas, norms and 
discourses are generally seen as playing an important role in this process, there is 
disagreement among scholars on how far the construction goes and, consequently, 
whether there is a ‘world’ left outside mental/discursive frames. Some say there is and 
use a scientific realism frame to argue that there are ‘natural’ and ‘unobservable’ 
structures which affect our lives independent from our thoughts (Wendt 1999; Wight 
2006). For others the crucial question is not what is ‘out there’ but how we relate to ‘the 
world’ and endow it with meaning, as it is meaning that makes human behaviour 
intelligible (Kratochwil 1989). This division also reaches into the reading o f ‘the world’, 
specifically concerning the degree to which it constructed, symbolised in the question
124 To be sure, Kant’s idea of enlightenment is an invitation to critical thinking and his insight 
that knowledge of reality occurs through a priori mental filters makes him “the great pioneer of 
constructivism” (Hacking, 1999: 41); Adler (2002: 97f).
125 See Onuf 1989; Ruggie 1998; Guzzini 2000; Adler (2002).
77
whether one should speak only of the construction o f social reality (Searle 1995) or of 
the social construction o f reality (Berger and Luckmann 1966). Whereas the former 
perspective assumes that there is a reality that can be understood by everyone and, thus, 
universally ‘known’, the latter perspective stresses that meaning is created 
intersubjectively and can only be comprehended from within the social setting, thus 
taking the route of epistemic relativism.
Second, with the commitment to reflexivity a central feature of constructivist ontology is 
a focus on ‘identity’.126 It emphasizes that “identities provide a frame o f reference from 
which political leaders can initiate, maintain, and structure their relationships with other 
states” (Cronin 1999: 18). This is in particular the case for scholars engaging with 
security issues where, in line with the notion that “the issue of identity...is inseparable 
from security” (Booth, 1997: 88), constructivists have come to focus on state ‘identity’ 
as that (referent object/subject) which needs to be secured.127 However, as discussed 
below in more detail, it rarely is clear what exactly identity is, what it does and how to 
study it. With becoming the analytical shooting star in the 1990s identity was often 
poorly conceptualised and (over)used to explain all kinds o f things, prompting a much 
noted critique by Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper that ‘identity’ was used so 
loosely that it had become an analytically empty concept (Brubaker and Cooper 
2000).128 In IR this weakness is particularly visible when it comes to the link between 
identity and interests. In the 1990s, the key intervention of constructivists against 
‘rationalists’ was to assert that the definition of ‘interests’ is dependent on the 
conception of identity, i.e. that identities ‘constitute’ interests (Wendt 1999; Chafetz et al 
1999). The rationale behind this assertion is that in order to recognize its interests, a state 
needs to be aware of itself as a subject, simply put “an actor cannot know what it wants 
unless it knows what it is” (Wendt, 1999: 231). Yet perhaps because this sounds 
intuitively convincing, constructivists rarely discuss in any detail why and how exactly 
identity ‘constitutes’ interests, with the result that identities and interests tend to be 
conflated (Reese-Schaefer, 1999).
126 Lapid and Kratochwil (1996); Wendt (1994, 1999); Chafetz et al. (1999); Zehfuss (2001).
127 Katzenstein (1996); Krause and Williams (1998); Adler and Barnett (1998); McSweeney 
(1999); Zehfuss (2002); Farrell (2002). Note that as part of the ‘cultural turn’, these works tend to 
argue that national identity is constituted by some sort o f ‘culture’ (strategic, political, military). I 
find the analytical value of the culture concept questionable and it is omitted here and throughout 
the thesis, for a simple reason: any application of ‘culture’ in a meaningful way -  other than a 
vague catch-all concept -  requires specification of the determinants or parameters making up a 
‘culture’, which constructivists suggest are norms and ideas. It makes more sense to jump directly 
to the latter and skip the ‘culture’ concept as a step in between that offers little value added.. For 
a critique o f ‘culture’, see Desch (1998) and Campbell (1998a: 217).
128 For two attempts to come to terms with the concept through “rigorous analysis”, see Fearon 
(1999); Abdel at et al. (2006). See also Hopf (1998: 184ff).
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Related, third, constructivists like to stress the ‘mutual constitution’ o f things. Yet in 
their attempt to come to terms with what Wendt (1987) called the ‘structure-agency 
dilemma’, constructivist reasoning tends to emphasize structure over agency. While 
early sound bites like ‘world o f our making’ (Onuf) and ‘anarchy is what states make of 
it’ (Wendt) point to agency, the focus on norms and discourses tempted constructivists 
to focus on the constitutive effect of structural forces at the cost o f accounting for 
agency and structural change (Sending, 2002).
In dealing with these issues, two constructivist strands can be identified.129 The first is 
that of ‘moderate’ (or thin) constructivism. Its proponents attempt to conceive of 
constructivism as a ‘bridge’ (Adler, Checkel) or ‘via media’ (Wendt) between 
‘reflexive’ and ‘rationalist’ positions, a motivation which responds to an influential 
article by Keohane (1988) and spurred what some have called the ‘Third Debate’.130 The 
second cluster is that o f ‘radical’ (or thick) constructivism, or post-structuralism. This 
approach remains committed to the critical agenda o f piercing through the ‘mainstream’ 
and exposing the ‘power/knowledge nexus’ (Foucault), hence regards attempts to speak 
with realists/rationalists as ‘selling out’ (Behnke; Zehfuss; Campbell). While more 
‘genuine’ from a postmodern perspective, the radical agenda to reveal, resist and 
emancipate makes it ill suited for devising a theory of interstate cooperation. Any 
attempt to establish a causal narrative in the deep theory sense inevitably risks stepping 
into the ‘enlightenment trap’, that is, it risks claiming a higher access to truth and 
thereby becomes part o f the very power/knowledge nexus the radical strand seeks to 
undermine. Hence, the following focuses on the ‘moderate’ strand and primarily on the 
work of Wendt (1999; also 1992; 1994; 2003), which comes closest to presenting a deep 
theory, as well as Adler and Barnett (1998) and Cronin (1999).
The Weakness of Moderate Constructivism
In line with the postmodern Zeitgeist, starting point is a critique of realism’s static/re­
productive conception of interstate relations and its alleged material and individualistic 
ontology. Drawing on ideas of Haas (1958) and Deutsch et al. (1957), the moderate 
constructivist narrative maintains that interstate relations are social and structured to a
129 This is close to the distinction made by Hopf (1998) and Wendt (1999). For slightly different 
categorisations, see Price and Reus-Smit (1998); Adler (2002).
130 On the Third Debate see Lapid (1989); Albert (1994); Price and Reus-Smit (1998).
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significant degree by ideas and that ideas change (through) the dynamic o f social 
relations.131
Strictly speaking, Wendt’s theory is not about cooperation but about three different 
kinds of interstate systems and about the (unidirectional) process of moving from one to 
another. Specifically, Wendt argues that different ‘political cultures’ or ‘logics of 
anarchy’ may develop between states which, borrowing English-school typology, he 
describes as (i) a Hobbesian culture ruled by fear of war, where states see each other as 
enemies, (ii) a Lockian culture regulated by mutual respect for the right o f sovereignty, 
where states considered each other rivals, and (iii) a Kantian culture in which states have 
ruled out war as a conflict-solving tool and identify each other as friends. Although 
cooperation can occur in all o f these settings, the move from one system into another not 
only describes a shift towards different kinds of cooperation but also a process 
establishing conditions for ever closer cooperation (more peaceful relations). Drawing 
on theories of symbolic interact ion ism and Haas’ neofunctionalism, Wendt argues that 
relations progress from Hobbesian to Kantian through a process o f learning in the course 
o f which mutual trust is being built through the gradual internalisation of shared 
knowledge (norms) (Wendt 1999: Ch. 6 and 7).132
This argument resonates with the one by Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett’s (1998) 
that interstate relations undergo an evolutionary dynamic bringing them from ‘nascent’ 
to ‘mature’ security communities (Adler and Barnett 1998: 48ff). Building on the work 
by Karl Deutsch, Adler and Barnett also emphasise the creation of shared knowledge 
through ‘social learning’ brought about by increased transactions and communication, 
which over time establishes “ ’we feeling’, trust, and mutual consideration” through 
“partial identification in terms of self-images and interests” (Deutsch et al. 1957: 36). 
Adapting the institutionalist perspective outlined earlier, Adler and Barnett see 
institutions as providing trust-enhancing mechanisms, as sites of interaction where 
learning occurs and as creative forces through which states develop “dependable 
expectations of peaceful change”. They also suggest that ‘power’ plays a crucial role in 
the formation of security communities with a ‘core state’ serving as a ‘magnet’,133 yet 
apart from noting that such power is exercised via “positive images” and expectations 
about “benefits” associated with the community they don’t elaborate on the nature of
131 See also Ruggie (1993); Reus-Smit (1998); Hall (1999).
132 For a different adaptation of the English School typology, see Buzan (2004).
133 This stands in contrast to Wendt’s narrative, where ‘power’ is understood in realist terms as 
military capabilities and becomes increasingly mediated by ideas and thus irrelevant for 
structuring relations.
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this magnet and how it works (Adler and Barnett 1998, 33-45). Finally, Bruce Cronin’s 
(1999) narrative, which falls between the above two, offers a slightly more complex 
typology of six different security arrangements ranging from one where cooperation is 
based on a balance of power logic, expressing interstate relations characterised by 
hostility, to a highly institutionalised system of collective security, characterised by 
symbiosis (Cronin 1999, Ch. 1). His argument explaining their formation relies less on 
social learning and more on symbolic interactionism and Social Identity Theory (also 
Mercer 1995), which describes collective identity formation through an ‘ingroup’ vs. 
‘outgroup’ dynamic, a point downplayed by Wendt and only hinted at by Adler and 
Barnett (Cronin 1999: 2 Iff).
Taken together, the moderate constructivist ‘signature argument’134 emerging out o f 
these narratives is that ongoing interaction within a common institution leads states (via 
some process o f ‘learning’) to share knowledge and a social/collective identity which, in 
turn, moves them to closer/improved cooperation. From a deep theory perspective, this 
argument has two key weaknesses reminiscent o f those faced by institutionalism noted 
earlier.
The first weakness is that the ‘common interest’ setting off this dynamic is neither 
specified nor theoretically accounted for. Adler and Barnett (1998: 38) mention a range 
of factors leading to the crucial first cooperative agreement from which security 
communities evolve. They overlap with what Wendt (1999: 343ff.) calls ‘efficient 
causes’, namely (economic) interdependence, a shared threat (what he labels ‘common 
fate’) and homogeneity (in language, domestic institutions, etc.),135 and with Cronin’s 
(1999: 32f.) suggestion that a common identity forms on the basis o f shared 
characteristics “salient to a society’s self-understanding”, exclusivity and a high level o f 
‘positive interdependence’. These factors either repeat realist/institutionalist reasoning or 
come close to a tautology; in any case they don’t hang together and remain outside the 
causal narrative offered by constructivists. The lack o f a theoretically grounded account 
for what sets off the cooperative dynamic is the price paid for holding that (shared) 
identity constitutes (shared) interests, which consequently means that the ‘factors’ 
generating a shared identity cannot be ‘interests’ as this would spark the question where 
these come from if not from ‘identity’. The above authors do not address this question,
1341 take this term from Wohlforth (2008) who uses it for realism.
135 Wendt also mentions self restraint as a ‘permissive cause’, which is said to enhance trust. For 
a critique, see also Kratochwil (2000).
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thereby exposing the murky conceptualization o f the link between identities and interests 
in the constructivist narrative.
Cronin’s reminder that the above ‘factors’ only provide favourable conditions as a 
shared identity is created through common experience “of high intensity and long 
duration” (Cronin 1999: 33) does not solve the problem. While an interesting avenue, 
this argument is not theoretically grounded in anything other than a reference to the 
integrative dynamic o f ‘continued interaction’ also emphasized by Wendt and 
Adler/Barnett. Moreover, if this interaction is occurring within common institutions, this 
puts the latter on the wrong end o f the causal narrative. Rather than using an ‘identity’ 
lens to highlight a specific interest leading to investment in a certain institution, the 
moderate constructivist narrative points the causal arrow from institutions to identities 
and, by extension, interests.
This feeds into the second weakness: the narrative lacks an account of what undermines 
a shared identity and, hence, what weakens the common interest keeping cooperation 
alive. Tailored towards explaining phenomena o f increasing (or improving) cooperation, 
the causal narrative is not only one o f process but also o f progress. Although strictly 
speaking ‘interaction’ is not necessarily cooperation (see chapter one), without making a 
clear distinction between the two the argument that ongoing interaction has a socializing 
effect suggests, crudely put, that cooperation leads to more cooperation in some sort of 
self-reinforcing mechanism. This undisturbed causal link between cooperation and 
socialization inserts a ‘socialization bias’ into the constructivist narrative and forestalls a 
substantial argument for reversal/breakdown of cooperative relations. And it exposes the 
flipside of constructivism’s departure from the realist definition of the common interest 
as constituted by a shared threat, namely a lacking conceptualisation of a threat to 
‘identity’ altogether.136 As a result of merging Durkheim’s emphasis on structure with 
the integrationist logic o f Deutsch and Haas, both Wendt (1999: 321) and Adler/Barnett 
(1998: 49) explicitly acknowledge the path dependency and unidirectional thrust of their 
argument (see also Wendt 2003).137 And while Cronin takes a slightly different approach 
by suggesting that cooperative arrangements are made/changed during “periods of social 
upheaval” (Cronin 1999: 37), his ‘punctuated equilibrium’ contains the same weakness
136 This is discussed in more detail in chapter seven.
137 Adler and Barnett only pay lip service to the possible ‘reversal’ of the dynamic, not going 
beyond the suggestion that “the same forces that ‘build up’ security communities can ‘tear them 
down’” leaving the reader in the dark as to how exactly this is supposed to work (Adler and 
Barnett 1998: 58).
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as institutionalism’s ‘historical juncture’ approach noted earlier and, in any case, he does 
not discuss what undermines transnational identities.
The ‘Identity’ Problem
From a deep theory perspective, behind the two above weaknesses lies the failure of 
moderate constructivists to formulate an original account o f the human condition which 
explains why states seek an ‘identity’ and lays out the parameters making up the latter. 
This becomes apparent when taking a closer look at how constructivists like Wendt 
conceptualize ‘identity’.
Constructivists argue that ‘identity’ has an ‘internal’ (or individual/personal/reflective) 
and an ‘external’ (collective/social) dimension.138 This insight is taken from social 
psychology and traceable to the famous distinction between ‘I’ and ‘Me’ made by 
George Herbert Mead (1934). Mead argues that Self-fulfilment takes place through an 
evolutionary process in which the acting Self, the ‘I ’ driven by intuition and instinct, 
comes to internalize the “attitude of the whole community”, devising the sense of ‘M e’ 
gained by adapting to a social group (Mead 1934). The difficulty is, however, to 
conceptualize the ‘internal’ and the ‘external’ dimension and their relationship beyond 
asserting that they are ‘co-constituted’. This is difficult because, as Heidegger points out, 
the very notion o f ‘identity’ contains an insolvable tension in meaning both ‘similarity’ 
and ‘distinctiveness’ (Heidegger 1957/1969).
This tension bedevils all ‘identity’ based arguments and invites the incoherent and often 
contradictory use of ‘identity’ pointed out by Brubaker and Coopers. Constructivists 
struggle with how to balance this dual nature. It is one thing to say that “the self- 
identification of individuals...is in part defined in terms of their participation in a 
collective identity” and that “individual identity acquires social significance only with 
reference to the identities o f others” (Hall 1999: 34fi), but what exactly does this mean? 
Scholars who, implicitly or explicitly, treat the state like a person read the ‘internal’ 
somehow into the state and attribute the ‘external’ or social/collective source o f identity 
to some notion o f international ‘community’ or ‘group’, that is, they remain vague on 
how to conceptualize the ‘internal’ source o f a states’ identity and specifying (how it 
relates to) the ‘external’.
138 Bloom (1990); Wendt (1994, 1999); Mercer (1995); Risse-Kappen (1995); Weller (1999); 
Hall (1999); Bially Mattem (2005).
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Yet the question if and how the T  has any influence on the kind of ‘community’ or 
‘group’ from which the social/collective identity is obtained is a crucial one for the 
constructivist narrative, as choosing to cooperate (or not) and, thus, to conceptualise 
change within cooperative relationships requires some sort o f standard against which the 
value of this relationship is assessed. For a causal argument explaining change in 
external relations, it thus makes sense to move analytical attention to the ‘internal’ 
source o f ‘identity’. Otherwise one is left with a purely social ontology in which ‘states’ 
are defined exclusively through a relation setting and turn into cultural dupes who 
merely take on a designated ‘role’ following a given script. While identities and interests 
must to some degree be internally generated to provide the state with agency, addressing 
this ‘internal’ dimension/source is not easy. Indeed, shunned by the anti-foundationalism 
of the postmodern Zeitgeist and neglected by the structural reasoning o f a neo- 
Durkheimean ontology which assumes that all construction must be social, it tends to be 
ignored.139
To his credit, Wendt tries to balance the ‘internal’ (or personal) and the ‘external’ (or 
social) dimension of ‘identity’ and keep a place for agency. When defining identity as 
“an actor’s self understanding” (Wendt 1999: 224) he does not assume that the Self is 
necessarily defined in relation to, and consequently involves the conception of, an 
‘Other’, which allows him to maintain an ‘individualistic’ element in his ontology. 
Unfortunately, despite inserting a multifaceted reading o f ‘identity’ into the 
conceptualisation of the state, at closer look Wendt’s solution to the structure-agency 
dilemma is complicated on the surface but unoriginal underneath.140
Wendt and the ‘Essential State’
Wendt defines identity vaguely as “a property of [states] that generates motivational and 
behavioural dispositions” (Wendt 1999: 224). This suggests that identity is something a 
state can possess, which logically gives the latter an ontological status independent from 
‘identity’, a move which will become clear once the discussion proceeds. Yet how or 
why this ‘property’ generates motivational dispositions remains unclear. This gets 
brushed over by the suggestion that interests are constituted by ideas (Wendt 1999: 
113ff), which in turn are seen as embedded in ‘culture’ defined as ‘shared knowledge’ 
(Wendt 1999: 141, 157ff). It is hence not ‘identity’ but this ‘shared knowledge’ which 
does the heavy lifting in Wendt’s causal narrative. It deceptively replaces the notion of a
139 As Cedermann and Daase (2003, fh. 5) note, ‘Meadian identity theory’ also tends to focus on 
the ‘Me’ while leaving the ‘I’ undertheorized.
140 For a good summary of Wendt’s complex argument, see Guzzini and Leander (2006).
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‘common interest’ and leaves ‘identity’ as a conceptual funnel through which ‘shared 
knowledge’ is channelled into behaviour.
This emphasis on ‘knowledge’ also guides Wendt’s conception o f the essence of ‘the 
state’. In an attempt to offer an ontology which integrates the ‘internal’ (individualistic) 
and the ‘external’ (holistic), Wendt conceptualises the state as an entity possessing four 
kinds o f identities (collective, role, type, corporate). These can be seen as situated on a 
spectrum ranging from as exclusively social (collective) to entirely pre-social 
(corporate). For Wendt these ‘identities’ are hierarchically organised, with the corporate 
one designating the ‘essential state’, a platform on which everything else is built (Wendt 
1999: 224-231).141 It is described as the states’ ‘body’, endowed with five ‘essential 
properties’ which taken together echo the realist conception of the state (Wendt 1999, 
Ch. 5, 197).142
Two properties stand out, namely territory and society (Wendt 1999: 225). In line with 
his critique of Waltz’ ontology as static Wendt tries to portray these properties as not- 
fixed. Hence, he notes that the territorial base can have “fuzzy” boundaries and whose 
meaning can vary and that states may include others “cognitively”, thereby making 
territorial borders less ‘rigid’ or exclusive (Ibid., 212, see also Cronin 1999: 21). Yet the 
core of his ontology is society, loosely defined as “people with shared knowledge”, and 
with the crucial qualification that this knowledge is “self organizing” (Wendt 1999: 
209). It is this notion of a self-organizing structure o f ‘private knowledge’ as something 
unique holding society together which makes the state essential. He distinguishes this 
‘stock o f knowledge’ from knowledge gradually shared beyond territorial borders, which 
he calls ‘common knowledge’ making up the ‘micro-structure’ o f specific relationships 
and ‘collective knowledge’ constituting the ‘macro structure’ o f the system (Wendt 
1999: 147ff, 159ff.).
Apart from the crucial question why and how knowledge is shared amongst states and 
how it relates to the domestic ‘stock of knowledge’ -  according to Wendt the two are not 
necessarily connected (Wendt 1999: 249, 257) -  Wendt does not specify what this 
‘knowledge’, in particular this private knowledge making up that self-organizing 
structure of the state, is about and where it comes from. He only vaguely suggests that
141 In his earlier writings he relied on Giddens’ structuration theory which puts forward the notion 
of mutual constitution in a ‘moment of structuration’ (Giddens 1984).
142 Wendt (1999: 201-214) discusses the following properties: (i) an institutional-legal order (ii) 
an organization claiming a monopoly on the legitimate use of organized violence, (iii) an 
organization with sovereignty, (iv) a society and (v) territory.
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the shared knowledge is an effect of state policy or “wellfed] up from the ‘bottom’ of the 
human experience” and elsewhere speaks o f the importance o f an ‘idea of the state’ 
rooted in collective memory, myths and traditions which allows society to “acquire 
continuity through time” (Wendt 1999: 209; 218, 163; see also Wendt 2004). These 
thoughts, which hint at the temporal situatedness of the state, are neither elaborated nor 
substantially integrated into the theory (also Cronin 1999).
This makes Wendt’s conceptualization of the states’ ‘S e lf as a ‘self-organizing 
structure’ ontologically incomplete. Against the view that understanding oneself as 
unique and distinct requires a social setting providing a standard o f comparison (Cronin 
1999: 24), Wendt argues that the ‘self organizing structure’ is like a body (of 
knowledge, presumably) and that “having a body means you are different than someone 
else’s body, but that does not mean that his body constitutes yours in any interesting 
way” (Wendt 1999: 225). This defense is weak not only because its appeal relies on the 
metaphor o f a human ‘body’ as a self-organizing biological organism, which cannot be 
applied to the state, as Wendt himself recognizes. He concedes that what really matters 
is not the body but “a consciousness and memory o f S elf’ (Ibid.). But, again, this claim 
is not followed up. Substantiating it would require discussing what constitutes a states’ 
self-consciousness, how it is organized and why society -  which always slips in when 
Wendt talks about the state as having a consciousness -  develops a (collective) mind-set 
isolated from others/the world. Yet Went does not offer such an argument.143 There is no 
discussion o f how to study a states’ consciousness, that is, how the ‘structure of 
knowledge’ is generated, what its parameters are and how its boundaries are drawn.
Thus, despite all the claims to the contrary, in Wendt’s picture ‘the essential state’ 
appears like a stable and isolated something.144 Instead of providing a theoretical 
narrative with a novel ontology and a corresponding conception of (security) interest, in 
the end Wendt’s discussion of the state as a ‘person’ only serves to justify defining the 
‘national interest’ with reference to familiar basic needs: survival, autonomy, economic 
well-being, and self-esteem (in that order). With the possible exception o f the last one, 
there is no sign that these interests are generated by identity or ideas or in any way
143 Wendt (2006) recognised this as being the central problem of his theory and is working on a 
new one that focuses on consciousness through Quantum theory.
144 His insistence that his theory is not concerned with “state identity formation” (Wendt 1999: 
11) nor with offering a “theory of the state” (Wendt 2006: 208) looks odd alongside an entire 
chapter on the state, including an extensive conceptualisation of state identities (Ch. 5), and a 
lengthy discussion of identity formation (317ff.).
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integrated into an original account of the human condition; Wendt simply attributes 
them to ‘human nature’ (Wendt 1999: 13If., 233-38).
Openings and Limits
The constructivist narrative o f interstate relations as a dynamic space under construction 
opens up a view on interstate relations through an evolutionary ontology and contains 
some useful conceptual openings in terms o f both space and time.
Whether Wendt’s ‘political culture’, Adler and Barnett’s collective identity, or Cronin’s 
shared social identity, all these terms capture a transnational conception of space. They 
go beyond the institutionalist insight that territorial boundaries are more porous than 
realists would like to have them by noting that the meaning/significance of territorial 
borders depends on the social setting and that they can be cognitively transcended. This 
reading of borders is captured in Wendt’s notion of ‘fuzzy’ boundaries and most 
explicitly in Adler’s notion of ‘cognitive regions’, which is echoed in the view of 
“communities developing] around networks, interactions, and face-to-face encounters 
that are not dependent on inhabiting the same geographic space” (Adler and Barnett 
1998: 33; Adler 1997; also Cronin 1999). The formation of ‘collective identities’ 
through ‘common knowledge’ thus also can be seen as bringing states closer together, as 
thickening the shared space and replacing, or reducing, the ‘inter’ as a separating realm. 
The ‘inter’ may not cease to exist but, rather, becomes a shared space that means 
something to the states evolving under this ‘collective identity’. The interdependence 
which challenged realist ontology is thus fully incorporated into the narrative as a 
positive ontological force.
But then, as we have seen the ontology is not transnational ‘all the way down’. In 
correspondence with his notion of the ‘essential state’ Wendt does not challenge the 
assumption of the state as autonomy-seeking. Although his ‘Kantian culture’ has the 
potential to break with this conception, this potential is not realized as Wendt ends the 
discussion by advocating a rethinking of the state and interstate relations (Wendt 1999: 
307f). Adler and Barnett assert that “domestic characteristics and practices” must be 
“consistent with the community” (36), yet at the same time they shy away from adopting 
a thorough transnational perspective by focusing on ‘pluralistic security communities’ 
where states maintain their ‘sovereignty’ (Adler and Barnett 1998: 5). While Cronin 
goes furthest in empirically substantiating the formation o f ‘transnational identities’ in 
an analysis of the formation of the German and Italian statehood as a merging of 
formerly separate ‘entities’, he does not underpin this theoretically with an ontology of
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‘the state’ which would allow for such a merger to occur. Hence, implicitly or explicitly, 
the narratives of transnationalism are carried out on the back o f the conception o f the 
state as a sovereign entity (also Risse-Kappen 1995; Bially Mattem 2005).
This fall-back on realist ontology has been criticized by radical constructivists, who 
targeted in particular Wendt’s essentialist reading o f identity and, hence, o f the state. As 
David Campbell (1998) and Maja Zehfuss (2001) highlight, the assumption o f the state 
as possessing a fixed/corporate identity - a fixed understanding o f Selfhood based on 
stable ‘properties’ -  fails to pay sufficient attention to the phenomenon of identity 
politics. They persuasively show that identity claims are contested and manipulated 
within society and that, therefore, an analysis seeking to understand how ‘identity’ 
influences state interests/policy must take into account the domestic political struggle 
over claims/representation of a certain ‘identity’, specifically the construction o f the 
‘Other. Hence, for both Campbell and Zehfuss the state is not a unitary/stable entity 
whose Selfhood is defined in isolation from the world, but something that exists only by 
constantly (re)instating ‘its’ borders, always “in the process o f becoming” through 
practices of representation of Otherness and the construction of boundaries (Campbell 
1998: 12).145 Wendt’s response to this critique that IR scholars only need to know which 
understanding ‘wins’ the domestic debate is unsatisfactory, not the least because it 
blocks out the role of transnational links in bringing this ‘victory’ about.146
The dynamic perspective brings the temporal dimension into the moderate constructivist 
narrative. Although insufficiently spelled out, the notion that collective identities and the 
‘shared knowledge’ they are based on are ‘sticky’ suggests that they reach into the future 
and reduce uncertainty. More precisely, the socialisation process marked by an increase 
in ‘shared knowledge’ o f what Cronin calls “constitutive rules” is assumed to affect the 
expectations states hold towards each other. According to the progressive narrative, 
these expectations are changed positively, creating relations marked by increased mutual 
trust, with trust defined as “believing despite uncertainty” (Adler and Barnett 1998: 46). 
In the constructivist narrative the content o f this belief depends on the ‘stage’ the 
relationship is in. Wendt’s ‘Kantian culture’, Adler/Barnett’s ‘mature’ security 
community and Cronin’s collective security systems all have in common that its 
members come to believe that the other will not attack them at any time and, hence, have
145 The role of the ‘Other’ in the formulation of the Self will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6.
146 Here Wendt’s thinking also appears stifled by the attempt to maintain Waltz’ ‘foreign policy 
versus IR theory’ distinction.
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a shared reading o f the future as something other than war, also contained in Cronin’s 
suggestion that states rally around a notion o f “common good” (Cronin, 1999: 131).
Yet the notion that shared knowledge plays a key role in managing the temporal 
situatedness of the state already reads more into the constructivist narrative than most 
authors care to do. Indeed, when looked at closely, the constructivist engagement with 
the temporal dimension is rather limited. Notably, Wendt’s discussion of the Hobbesian 
culture does not even address the problem of uncertainty/contingency and the cyclical 
view of history emphasised by realists (Wendt, 1999: 250ff). The relevance o f symbolic 
interaction for creating shared expectations reads like an extension of game theory, 
where future uncertainty is reduced through expected reciprocity based on “some degree 
of long-term interest derive[d] from knowledge of those with whom one is interacting” 
(Adler and Barnett 1998: 31). Yet because the causal narrative does not go deep enough 
in specifying what kind  of knowledge states come to share and how it matters. The 
‘shared knowledge’ binding states together is not specified beyond ‘norms’,147 and even 
if one accepts that the internalisation o f the same norm(s) increases states abilities to 
‘know’ each other, the argument that this affects how states conceive o f (each other in) 
the future is reduced to the assertion that norms are ‘sticky’ without specifying what that 
means, or why such is the case. More precisely, preoccupied with how norms are 
‘internalized’ through processes of interaction, the moderate constructivist narrative 
does not sufficiently engage the role of the past or specify why and how norms matter 
for the future. An over-reliance on the guiding function of norms, a function they seem 
to possess simply by being ‘norms’, brushes over the issue of contingency emphasized 
not only be realists but also by the postmodern Zeitgeist and leaves it insufficiently 
integrated in the constructivist narrative.
At bottom, these limits are symptoms of the fundamental weakness of the moderate 
constructivist ‘research programme’ or, rather, its attempt to represent one. Despite their 
seemingly radical shift towards focusing on ‘identity’, moderate constructivists (at least 
those discussed in this chapter) don’t provide an alternative to the ontology o f the state 
employed by realism and the corresponding understanding what states want.148 They 
don’t succeed in substantiating the concept of (collective) ‘identity’ with an alternative 
reading of how states are situated in space and time. This weakness is meta-theoretical 
and rooted in how moderate constructivists approach the task of ‘showing a way 
beyond’ realism: Because the causal narrative in which the concept is integrated focuses
147 For an attempt of a more substantial treatment of ‘communities of practice’, see Adler (2005).
148 For Wendt, see the contributions in Guzzini and Leander (2006); Paul (1999); Howes (2003).
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on how states (may) escape the condition manifested by realists, those ‘Kantian cultures’ 
and ‘thick communities’ are only endpoints o f a progressive dynamic whose main 
achievement is to overcome Hobbesian anarchy without replacing the ontology it is 
linked to. In short, moderate constructivism is not grounded in an original account o f the 
human condition.
Conclusion
This chapter interrogated three research programmes -  realism, institutionalism, 
constructivism -  by tracing their causal narratives to their respective hard core, that is, to 
an ontology o f the state and its ‘security interest’ deducted from an account o f the 
human condition, understood as a reading o f the spatio-temporal situatedness o f ‘the 
state’. The main purpose was to carve out the main elements of the three causal 
narratives and trace their weakness in explaining the ‘novel fact’ of German-American 
security cooperation, hoping to find some analytical openings which can be carried 
forward for the task o f creative theorizing.
The discussion showed that from a deep theory perspective only realism presents an 
original research programme and, as such, an original causal narrative of interstate 
security cooperation. Its definition of the national security interest as a desire for 
survival (or self-preservation) understood as maintaining territorial integrity is anchored 
in a (Hobbesian) account o f the human condition o f states as autonomous individuals 
distrusting each other because they read an uncertain future through a certain past, 
namely a past of conflict/violence. While institutionalism and constructivism were 
shown to offer useful adjustments to this spatio-temporal situatedness of the state by 
stressing institutions and shared identities, the causal narrative these concepts are 
integrated in are caught in the attempt to ‘tame’ and ‘overcome’ anarchy (e.g., realism) 
and, thus, are not anchored in an original account o f the human condition. They do not 
offer an alternative conception of the state and its national security interest and, 
consequently, lack a substantial argument for what is means for states to have such 
interests in common (or not).
That said, for the purpose of creative theorizing the analysis encourages taking seriously 
the three basic elements characterising these three causal narratives: uncertainty as a key 
feature of the human condition (realism), institutions as a modifying structure which can 
alter the ‘informational environment’ (institutionalism), and Self-Other interdependence 
as an integrative force leading to the spatial extension o f ‘the state’. In addition, the 
analysis identifies the following conceptual openings: (1) an evolutionary ontology of
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the state with an ability to learn, (2) the relevance of nationalism or a ‘binding idea’ 
more generally, (3) the notion of the state having a consciousness and an ‘identity’, (4) 
the social situatedness of the state marked by interdependence/transnational linkages, (5) 
the role of certain ‘knowledge’ to deal with uncertainty and the possibility to share this 
knowledge with others. These leads and openings are taken up over the following 
chapters and woven into a new causal narrative to build a deep theory which presents a 
substantial alternative to realism and is suitable to explain the case at hand. The next 
chapter begins by using opening (3) to explore how a causal narrative stressing ‘identity’ 
can be anchored philosophically in an account o f the human condition by drawing on 
Heidegger’s fundamental ontology.
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CHAPTER FOUR: RETHINKING THE HUMAN CONDITION
Sum m ary
The previous chapter unravelled three IR research programmes offering a causal 
narrative on international security cooperation, realism, institutionalism, and 
constructivism to reveal their logical weaknesses in explaining dynamics as in the case 
at hand and search for conceptual openings. One o f the key findings was that only 
realism offers an original reading of the human condition adopted from Hobbes’ state of 
nature image, which was modified yet not replaced by institutionalism and 
constructivism. In an attempt to build a ‘better’ -  more suitable -  deep theory, this 
chapter leaves the plane of IR to provide the philosophical ground from which the state 
and its motive for investing in international security institutions can be rethought (in 
subsequent chapters). Its objective is to offer a reading o f the human condition different 
from the Hobbesian one and to thereby arrive at a new ontology o f the state and its 
security interest, i.e. an understanding of what it means to be secure.
For this purpose, the chapter engages Heidegger’s fundamental ontology to open up new 
ways of conceptualizing the Self (‘identity’) in the face of uncertainty. It explores 
Heidegger’s argument that ‘being’ or, more precisely, coming into being-in-the-world is 
conditioned by awareness of finitude yet impossibility to know death and that this 
generates ‘anxiety’ as the foundational sentiment. The chapter suggests that shifting 
attention to the Selfs attempt of coming to terms with anxiety requires understanding 
how the Self seeks orientation through meaningful knowledge o f itself and ‘the world’. 
It is shown how the reflexive ability of the Self generates what is termed an ‘anxiety 
paradox’, namely the attempt to regain a sense o f continuity/stability which denies 
contingency of being and carries the Self beyond ‘death’. Two strategies for gaining 
such ‘ontological security’ are discussed, namely mathematical measuring and routine 
practices (Giddens), both of which are criticized by drawing on Heidegger’s notion of 
Verfallen for failing to provide the Self with ‘authenticity’. This dilemma -  gaining 
ontological security at the cost of authenticity -  is termed the ‘anxiety dilemma’. The 
chapter ends by arguing that the paradox does not need to end in a dilemma if past and 
future are conceptualized as meaningful ‘places’ for the Self providing substance to a 
narrative o f ‘authentic becoming’.
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From ‘Identity’ to ‘Self
The starting point here is given by the postmodern Zeitgeist, specifically its intervention 
that our understanding of ourselves and the world cannot be taken for granted. That said, 
rather than following the radical constructivist call and embrace contingency, the aim 
here is to revisit the question how humans react to contingency. In other words, this 
chapter does not aim at conceptualizing a ‘postmodern S e lf but to take the postmodern 
intervention as an invitation to think about the human condition and the 
desires/behaviour it gives rise to. As such, this chapter takes up Jef Huysmans’ point that 
“the postmodern project is a return to Hobbes; not to his answers...but to his 
question... [of] how to deal with the collapse of certainties”. Equally important, it is “not 
a celebration o f the undetermined... [but] a (plea for the) search for new life strategies” 
(Huysmans 1998a: 247f.).
I approach this task through the constructivist opening that ‘identity’ matters and that 
endogenizing state identity is the “next step in Constructivist IR Theory” (Cedermann 
and Daase 2003). Given the ambiguity of the term and the apparent failure of moderate 
constructivists to build a new theory on it, as discussed in the previous chapter, this step 
requires some adjustment. Indeed, in what may at first seem counterintuitive I follow 
Brubaker and Cooper’s (2000: 2) suggestion to move ‘beyond identity’. To be sure, 
eliminating a term from the analytical toolkit does not change the fact that it touches on 
something fundamental. In other words, while ‘identity’ has been overused analytically 
in IR, it cannot be ignored that scholars have provided convincing accounts of how 
concerns about ‘identity’ affect foreign and security policy.149 Indeed, as Hans Joas 
(2000: 15If) points out, ever since ‘identity’ was introduced as a sociological concept in 
the early 20th century the view has prevailed that it is good to have an ‘identity’. If one 
takes the position that states cannot or don’t want to ‘live’ without an identity,150 rather 
than asserting that identities constitute interests, as moderate constructivists do, it seems 
more fruitful to explore this very desire of establishing an ‘identity’. Thus, from a deep 
theory perspective the task is to discern the condition which gives rise to the “will-to- 
manifest-identity” (Hall 1999).
For understanding this process, I accept the point made by Brubaker and Cooper that it 
is useful to discard the concept of ‘identity’ and focus on the much older term which it
149 See contributions in Katzenstein (1996); also Prizel (1998); Campbell (1998a); Hopf (2002).
150 According to Ted Hopf a world without identities would be a “world of chaos, a world of 
pervasive and irremediable uncertainty, a world much more dangerous than anarchy” (Hopf 
1998: 175).
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entails, namely the ‘S elf. At least since Freud identity is understood as having a Self- 
consciousness, as having a ‘sense o f Self. And while the concept o f the Self emerged 
towards the end of the 19th century (Joas, 2000: 149) the notion can be traced back to 
Plato (Strong 1991). Conceptualizing the state as a Self is not as far-fetched as it may 
seem. It follows the logic, noted in chapter one, that to define a states’ security interest 
and, hence, to know what the state seeks protection from (the existential threat) requires 
an understanding of what it means for the state to be (to exist). Whereas realists took 
their clues from Hobbes, my reading relies on an account o f the human condition offered 
by Martin Heidegger.
Reading the Human Condition with Heidegger151
Largely ignored by IR scholars,152 Heidegger can be considered one o f the most 
influential philosophers of the 20th century.153 His standing as a thinker and relevance for 
the purpose at hand stems primarily from his attempt of devising an ontology o f ‘being’ 
in his 1927 magnum opus Sein und Zeit (‘Being and Time’).154 In this work, Heidegger 
explored the basic ontological question “what we actually mean with the expression 
‘being’” (Heidegger 1953: 1 1) and developed what is known as ‘existential 
phenomenology’. Phenomenology is a philosophical strand founded by his mentor 
Edmund Husserl which, broadly speaking, is concerned with the study of phenomena 
through structures of experience.155 Criticizing any kind o f scientific ‘naturalism’, 
phenomenologists start from the premise that one cannot come to understand ‘things’ 
other than through experience. In Husserl’s words, “the world is an experience which we 
live before is becomes an object which we know” (cited in Odysseos 2002a: 376).
151 Again, I am neither trying to turn Heidegger into an IR theorist nor to reconstruct his argument 
in detail (an impossible task anyhow). Instead, the aim is to discern some of his the broader 
insights and use them for creative theorizing, which is also how Heidegger encouraged others to 
engage his wo’rk.
152 Exceptions are Coker (1998); Odysseos (2002a, 2002b; 2007). This lack of interest in 
Heidegger among IR scholars stems likely from a combined dislike of his biography (a supporter 
of National Socialism in the 1930s), of what he said (not much about international politics) and of 
the way he wrote (complex arguments expressed in often opaque language), which has left him 
rarely engaged in fields outside philosophy (see also Elden 2004). The neglect of Heidegger is 
echoed by the observation that, despite the ‘interpretative turn’, theorists have been slow to 
engage the study of meaning (A. Williams 2003).
153 For different perspectives on Heidegger’s thought, see Guignon (1993, 2006); Dreyfus and 
Hall (1992); Holland and Huntington (2001); Kisiel and Sheehan (2006); and more generally 
Safranski (1998).
154 I am relying on the original German text, so all translations are my own. In addition to page 
numbers I refer to sections (§) where necessary. I use the version from 1953, republished in 2001, 
and thus will use the former as the year of reference. For popular English commentaries, see 
Dreyfus (1991); Mulhall (2005).
155 On Heidegger’s approach to phenomenology, see Dostal (1993); Carman (2006). On 
phenomenology more generelly, see Cerbone (2006) and the entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy, available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/phenomenology/.
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Importantly, such ‘knowledge’ gained through experience is not knowledge in the sense 
of accumulated information but as having generated structures o f meaning which lend 
significance to the world (meaning understood as Bedeutung). In short, phenomenology 
involves the study of how ‘things’, including Selfhood, obtain meaning through 
experience.156
Convinced that one cannot devise an abstract theory o f consciousness, as Husserl tried to 
do, Heidegger’s existential phenomenology puts forward a method for ‘fundamental 
ontology’ allowing for an “examination into what life might reveal itself to be” 
(Odysseos 2002: 381).157 It is important not to confuse this ‘existentialist’ perspective 
with a commitment to ‘essentialism’ in the sense o f locating the intrinsic substance of 
something (in this case the Self). Although existentialists, apart from Heidegger most 
famously Sartre, share the ambition of searching for the ‘authentic’ Self, existential 
phenomenology does not assume objectification or categorization to be possible or 
feasible.158 As Dorothea Frede reminds, Heidegger’s engagement with the ‘meaning of 
being’ and his embrace of phenomenology arose out of a dissatisfaction with 
Aristotelian ontology, specifically the latter’s suggestion that things have a substance 
independent from our perception of them, that there is “a primary category o f substance, 
designating natural ‘things’ that exist in their own right” (Frede 2006: 44, Aristotle NE). 
To Heidegger, such a view is mistaken in assuming that things were read off ‘nature’ 
rather than into it and misleading in that it did not address, indeed obscured, the 
underlying question of the meaning o f being in a unified, holistic sense, thereby ending 
up using an empty concept. In Heidegger’s view, the meaning of being can only be 
grasped through an account o f our specific understanding of being, which requires 
grasping our experience of and with ‘the world’ and the meaning structure this gives rise 
to (Frede 2006; also Odysseos 2007: 3 Iff). As discussed further below, in offering such 
an account Heidegger also rejects the Cartesian duality o f mind and matter (body) by 
arguing that ‘being’ is both more than a state o f mind and not reducible to a physical 
body.
156 Heidegger’s exploration of meaning comes at a time in Germany after the First World War 
where there was an atmosphere of disenchantment, of having lost the belief in enlightenment’s 
promise for progress. This feeling of a spiritual void is visible in the writings of a number of 
thinkers at the time such as Weber, Freud, or Mannheim. See Williams, A. (2003: 16f).
157 Here Heidegger departed from Husserl’s view of phenomenology as a scientific method, that 
is, with the possibility of finding the essence of consciousness (or perception), what Husserl 
called ‘transcendental subjectivity’, see Safranski (1998); Odysseos (2002); Dostal (1993).
158 For an introduction to existentialism (although weak on Heidegger), see Flynn (2006).
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As Louiza Odysseos points out, Heidegger’s fundamental ontology can be seen as a 
philosophical precursor for the postmodern agenda o f deconstructing assumptions about 
subjectivity -  his writings significantly influenced the icons o f postmodern thought such 
as Foucault, Levinas and Derrida -  yet it also opens up ways for reconstructing the same 
through understanding how Selfhood is constituted (Odysseos 2007). For some, this 
makes Heidegger’s fundamental ontology the continuation of the ‘Copemican 
revolution’ in philosophy brought about by Kant (Blattner 2006). While Heidegger did 
not present (did not aim at presenting) a theory o f the Self ‘as such’, his analysis of 
“existential understanding” (Heidegger 1953: 12) certainly makes him a foundational 
figure in hermeneutics, an interpretative approach similar to Weber’s notion of 
Verstehen and further developed by Hans-Georg Gadamer (2004 [1975]; Hoy 1993). For 
the present purpose, his hermeneutical exploration in Sein und Zeit engages the 
fundamental spatio-temporal parameters within which (the consciousness of) human 
existence unfolds.
Being-in-the-Worldas ‘Unfolding*
Heidegger develops his understanding of being or, in his terminology, Dasein ' 59 as one 
of ‘being-in-the-world’. The hyphens are used deliberately by Heidegger to symbolise 
that an account of ‘being’ cannot be ontologically separated from an understanding of 
‘the world’ (Heidegger 1953: §12). One does not exist previously of or independent 
from the other; their meanings are interwoven. For Heidegger the inherent ‘worldliness’ 
of human existence -  a term which he uses to describe “the structure o f a constitutive 
moment of ‘being-in-the-world’” (Heidegger 1953: 64) -  must be thought o f as the 
aspect of the human condition (Mulhall 2005: 61). Time and space are the two 
dimensions in and through which the Self develops its ‘worldliness’.
As the title of his study conveys, Heidegger’s attempt to conceptualise the ‘structural 
whole’ of being-in-the-world focuses primarily on the temporal dimension. He opens the 
study with declaring as his aim “the interpretation of time as the possible horizon of any 
understanding of being” (Heidegger, 1953: 1). As we shall see further below, this makes 
his philosophy particularly suitable to rethink how uncertainty conditions the Self. That
159 Heidegger (1953, §11) makes a terminological distinction between Sein and Dasein, the 
former acknowledging that there are different ‘beings’ or ‘things that are’ (Seinendes) and the 
latter designating human being, which he sees as distinct because of its ability to reflect about its 
existence (Dasein as an expression of understanding Sein). Dasein is what his study is primarily 
concerned with because, not disregarding other ‘beings’, for Heidegger Dasein is logically the 
only kind humans can reason about (and the question he and most philosophy is grappling with is 
how). For a extensive discussion on the difficulty of translating Dasein into English, see Malpas 
(2006: 47-50).
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said, more recently theorists have rediscovered Heidegger also as a philosopher o f being 
in space. As Peter Sloterdijk points out, Sein und Zeit “contains the seed o f a 
revolutionary treatise on being and space” (Sloterdijk 1998: 336, my translation) and 
Jeff Malpas even suggests that Heidegger’s overall work provides “perhaps the most 
important and sustained inquiry into place found in the history of Western thought” 
(Malpas 2006: 3; also Elden, 2001).
The spatial dimension becomes central to his ontology when Heidegger’s 
conceptualization of ‘being-towards-death’, discussed below, becomes an exploration of 
how being is constituted via its ‘orientation’ and ‘situatedness’ in the world (Heidegger 
1953, §23 and §24). In conceptualizing this ‘situatedness’ o f the Self, contained in the 
term Da-Sein which literally means ‘being-there’, Heidegger rejects the Cartesian notion 
of geometric space, a res extensa that can be measured objectively (see also below). For 
Heidegger a sense of being-there is generated by disclosing ‘the world’, by gaining a 
sense of ‘being in’. His conceptualisation of being-in-the-world fits neither with 
environmental determinism nor with the notion o f a Self dreaming up a world. 
Heidegger notes that ‘being-in-the-world’ can not be understood analogue to our 
understanding o f the ‘water in the glass’ or the ‘dress in the closet’. If this was so ‘the 
world’ would logically be independent from and thus prior to ‘being’, a possibility ruled 
out by the ontologically foundational nature o f ‘being’ (Heidegger 1953: 54). So being is 
not established by ‘discovering’ or ‘recognizing’ its place in a pre-existing world.
Yet neither is it the case that Selves are creators of their worlds, as this would imply that 
the Self comes into ‘being’ independently of and prior to this process of creation. For 
Heidegger, a phenomenological perspective holds that ‘being’ is not thinkable prior to 
‘the world’, that is, we cannot assume the Self to be some independent spirit which 
subsequently is placed, or finds its place, in space. ‘Being-in-the-world’ implies that this 
being has already discovered ‘the world’ or, more precisely, a world without which it 
could not exist (Heidegger 1953: 110). In contemporaiy terminology, one might say the 
‘Self and ‘the world’ are mutually constituted. In Heidegger’s words,
“space is ‘in’ the world to the extent that ‘being-in-the-world’...has 
disclosed space. The space is not situated in the subject, neither does it [the 
subject] regard the world ‘as i f  it was in a space, but the ontologically 
properly understood ‘subject’, the Dasein, is in an original sense [in einem 
urspruenglichen Sinn] spatial” (Heidegger 1953: 111).
97
Leaving the conceptualization of the spatial parameters o f being-in-the-world to the next 
chapter, the point to be made here is that spatial situatedness is not fixed but inscribed in 
time and, as a consequence, evolving.
The evolving character o f being-in-the-world is given by the overriding significance of 
the temporal dimension in Heidegger’s ontology, which starts with the recognition that 
being ‘takes place’ in a time-span between birth and death. As Heidegger puts it, the 
basic feature of the human condition is that the Self is ‘thrown’ into ‘the world’ and 
towards death. And because until it is dead there is always something the Self is not-yet, 
‘being’ is always incomplete, making “permanent incompleteness” a central feature in 
the configuration of being (Heidegger 1953: 233, 236, 242f.). This incompleteness gives 
‘being’ a dynamic or evolutionary character in which neither the Self nor ‘its’ world can 
ever be solidified. Being-in-the-world is constituted in a continuous process in which the 
Self discloses [erschliessen] ‘the world’ and by doing so discloses and comes to 
understand the possibilities of being. As he puts it, “das Dasein ist seine 
Erschlossenheit” (Heidegger 1953 : 133). The process o f disclosure (or understanding) of 
the Self and the world can be conceptualised as a mutually constitutive process of 
‘coming into being’ together. Said differently, the Self and its world are understood to 
be in a permanent process of becoming or unfolding, what Heidegger at one point calls 
Aufgehen (Heidegger 1953: 54, 110).,6°
Heidegger is clear that ‘unfolding’ is not reducible to a mental process. It is not mere 
spiritual fulfilment arrived at through internal reflection but occurs through 
involvement/engagement and, thus, activity (or practice, to use the term popular among 
pragmatists). He notes repeatedly that things only obtain meaning through their usage 
and are organised or ‘placed’ accordingly. As Henri Bergson, a French philosopher 
whose ideas found their way into Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit (although not always 
favourably) notes, conscious beings “do not find themselves in a world but make 
themselves...and make the world...through their activity, their engagement” (Grosz, 
2005: 121).161 At the same time, for Heidegger engagement with the world is not ‘a- 
theoretical’, that is, it is not the act as such that captures the ontological structure of 
being but the perspective from which it is done. Consequently, acts need to be 
understood in context o f this perspective. Even more so, as ‘the world’ is made in
160 The evolutionary perspective was of course prominent at the time, see Guerlac (2006: 26f). On 
Kierkegaard’s analysis of becoming as an influence on Heidegger, see Westphal (1996).
161 For an introduction to Bergson, see Guerlac (2005). For Bergson’s influence on Heidegger, 
see Collins-Cavanaugh (2005).
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mutual constitution with the Self, the process of disclosing is not simply about gathering 
information from a pre-existing world located outside the Self. Unfolding encompasses 
all kinds o f seeing ‘the world’, including forgetting (Heidegger 1953: 62) and is a 
creative process.
This creative process of coming into being-in-the-world ( ‘unfolding’) will be discussed 
in detail in the next chapter. For now, it suffices to say that the unfolding perspective 
offers an alternative to ‘Hobbesian’ ontology adopted by realists most obviously by 
rendering the assumption of the Self striving for self-preservation unsuitable. Instead of 
assuming an intrinsic property already ‘there’ to be preserved, ‘coming into being’ is 
more appropriately grasped as the Self pursuing an agenda o f se\f-determination without 
necessarily assuming this to mean striving for autonomy. To understand what drives this 
process from a deep-theory perspective and how it differs from the Hobbesian view, it 
necessary to take a closer look at Heidegger’s account of the human condition.
Anxiety as the Foundational Sentiment
Heidegger’s fundamental engagement with the temporal dimension o f ‘being’ leads him 
to identify, like Hobbes, uncertainty as a central factor in structuring the human 
condition. Yet Heidegger’s discussion about the impact of uncertainty on being and, by 
extension on its relations with others, takes a different route than Hobbes.
Heidegger starts with the seemingly trivial fact that the one thing affecting the Self in a 
unique way is its own death. Death is unique quite simply because it signifies the 
moment after which ‘being’ becomes impossible (Heidegger 1953: 250). Said the other 
way around, death is the utmost and unsurpassable possibility o f being. Because it is 
only then that the life-span is ‘complete’, and because the fmitude of ones’ existence 
cannot be shared, that is, because death happens only to the dying individual, Heidegger 
argues that it is here, in experiencing death, where ‘being’ is constituted in its 
wholeness. However, as noted earlier, being is always incomplete because until it 
happens, the Self is merely (inevitably) moving towards death. Heidegger solves the 
conceptual dilemma by arguing that it is not death as such but fear  of death which 
constitutes true being (Ibid, 184ff).162 This appears to be on par with Hobbes’ 
assumption that the fear of a future in which only death is certain is a shared by all 
individuals. Yet as Odysseos (2002b) points out, in contrast to Hobbes, Heideggerian 
logic does not conclude that this fear results in the fear o f others, that is, it does not
162 On this point (and others) Heidegger was influenced by Kierkegaard, one of the very few 
names Heidegger respectfully mentions in Sein und Zeit.
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translate in suspicion about other’s intentions and in considering its capabilities a 
potential threat. The reason is, again, that it is logically impossible to have an experience 
of what it means to die. As Heidegger discusses at length, even the death of a close 
family member is an experience that, ultimately, cannot be shared (Heidegger 1953, § 
47).
The implications of this seemingly trivial point are profound: without being able to 
experience death it is impossible to know what to fear. While knowledge o f inescapable 
finitude fundamentally affects ‘being’ and makes ‘death’ an integral part of our world, 
indeed “a phenomenon of life”, we are unable to comprehend ‘it’ in the sense of 
grasping it as a meaningful thing (Heidegger 1953: 246). And so we also cannot really 
fear that which brings death about, that is, we cannot ‘know’ the existential threat.163 The 
inability to locate the existential threat makes it seem to be potentially everywhere and 
appear out of nowhere (Ibid, 186). This leads Heidegger to the fundamental insight that 
it is not fear through which we have to comprehend the ontological structure o f being 
but anxiety [Sorge] (Heidegger 1953: 191 ff).164 It is this anxiety, coming out of the 
unknowability of the future, which is the foundational sentiment or mood 
[Befindlichkeit] of the human condition. In Heidegger’s words, the sentiment/mood of 
anxiety is prior to any wills, desires, needs, or drives and provides the ontology o f being 
with an “original structural whole” [ursprungliche Strukturganze] Although he is 
reluctant to reduce fear or anxiety to a strictly emotional experience, he thus places a 
feeling at the centre of the human condition (from which wills or desires can spring) 
(Heidegger 1953: §41, 192f.).
An ontology which takes anxiety as the basic sentiment/mood provides an alternative to 
the Hobbesian ‘condition’ -  indeed, one could argue surpasses Hobbes -  by taking the 
same starting point, fear of death, but embarking on a logically more compelling 
direction by problematizing the nature of this fear. The combination of knowing that 
death may occur at any moment and the inability o f comprehending it brings the 
Heideggerian account close to the postmodern emphasis on the radical contingency of 
the human condition. However, other than the postmodern agenda to expose 
contingency, a deep theory trying to understand how this reading o f the human condition
163 Strictly speaking, for Heidegger that which brings about death is not a threat to ‘existence’ 
because it is only through the awareness of such a threat that authentic existence is fully grasped.
164 Sometimes misleadingly translated as ‘care’. The term Sorge has a double meaning in German 
and can be used for both ‘care’ and ‘anxiety’. Heidegger uses it in the latter sense.
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influences behaviour requires exploring how the Self reacts to (deals with) anxiety, how 
it structures its sense of being-in-the-world.
As the following discussion shows, there is ample evidence that the Self does not 
embrace anxiety but seeks ways to tame the same by reducing or ‘controlling’ 
contingency. In simple terms, it is suggested that the Self seeks stability through gaining 
a sense of continuity o f being-in-the-world. To use the terminology offered by Anthony 
Giddens, the question then becomes what “anxiety controlling mechanisms” are 
employed by the unfolding Self to obtain this sense o f stability, or what Giddens calls 
‘ontological security’ (Giddens 1984: 50; also Giddens 1991). The below discussion 
reviews two prominent strategies of how humans attempt to ‘tame’ anxiety and create a 
sense of continuity -  through mathematical symbols and routine practices -  and draws 
on Heidegger to suggest that these ‘mechanisms’ fall short because they do not allow for 
authentic being.
The Anxiety Paradox: Contingency and Continuity
Awareness of contingency is not a ‘postmodern’ phenomenon but emerges at the very 
moment of enlightenment. Indeed, it is the very motivation for assuming universal 
reason. This insight has been noted by numerous analysts o f (post)modemity, such as 
Zygmunt Baumann or David Harvey, and is expressed perhaps most famously in 
Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic o f  Enlightenment, which points out that the 
‘knowledge’ generated by the enlightenment was not so different from the myth it 
sought to replace (Horkheimer and Adorno 1988).
The example used by Horkheimer and Adorno is the transition in ancient Greece to a 
‘post-mythical’ condition, that is, a condition when the conviction that time and space 
were cosmic creations ordered by the Gods was replaced by more ‘self conscious’ or 
reflexive thinking. Originally, ‘mythical’ or ‘cosmic’ time followed a natural rhythm and 
was not seen as passing, humans did not see themselves as masters of their own fate and 
hence did not (need to) reflect over their own finitude or contemplate about the past. 
Their world was one without uncertainty and anxiety (Horkheimer and Adorno 1988: 33, 
50ff; also Gunnell, 1987: 25ff). For Horkheimer and Adorno the emergence o f temporal 
self-consciousness, the transition from the myth to an understanding of human existence 
as a historical one and corresponding speculation about the human place in the world, 
had an “enlightenment character”. In John Gunnell’s (1987) reading, the transition 
occurred in two steps.
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The first was the separation of the past from the present, and the mortal from the 
immortal, as articulated in Homer’s Iliad  and Odyssey. In these epic poems, connections 
between the gods and humans still exist, but the gods become gradually disassociated 
from nature and are not portrayed as the creators o f the cosmos. Individual action is 
given a sense of uniqueness with humans being influenced by their experience, by 
emotions, aware of their mortality and partially claiming responsibility for their actions. 
The emergence o f the human as a self-conscious individual is visible in particular in the 
journey o f Ulysses where “historical time is strenuously...detached from space” 
(Horkheimer and Adorno 1988: 55; Gunnell 1987: 79f). Yet the poetic challenge did not 
go all the way. The unity of Ulysses’ adventures remains external to the individual, it is 
a sequence o f events in places dominated by local gods in which “the inner form of 
organizing individuality, time, remains weak” (Horkheimer and Adorno 1988: 55). 
While introducing awareness of human finitude, the possibility o f achieving a status of 
immortality of the soul was maintained and linked to the performance o f god-like heroic 
deeds (Gunnell 1987: 87). Furthermore, Homeric epics, as well as the histories of 
Thucydides and Heredot, described a present whose order remained oriented towards a 
past characterized by crisis, suffering, and tragedy, that is, towards a disorderly ‘origin’ 
from which there is no escape, captured in Thucydides’ famous statement that his 
account of the Peloponnesian War was to be ‘a possession for all time’ (Ibid, lOflf).
The mythic language o f Homeric poetry and the notion of eternal tragedy claimed by the 
historians was challenged by Plato. Convinced that knowledge was not cosmic but 
generated by humans, Plato criticized the Athenian society as ordered by values 
“embedded in a mesmeric folk memory” (Gunnell 1987: 127). By emphasizing the 
human ability for shaping the future, his view was that the creative mind should extricate 
itself from the Hellenic myth, that is, break with the gods and engage in re-envisioning 
order. Plato expressed this most famously in the Republic, where five types o f city are 
discussed as housing five arrangements of the soul.165 Having Socrates propose “let us 
create a city from the beginning, in our theory”, Plato broke with the repetitive 
conception of (dis)order tied to the memory o f tragedy and suggested that the poet and 
the philosopher (himself) were “expressing different modes o f existence” placing them 
in “a competition for the soul of Athens” (cited in Gunnell 1987: 152, 128f). Yet while 
emphasizing human creativity and, with it, agency and an open future, Plato kept the 
idea of immortality o f the soul. Instead o f linking the soul’s immortality to rituals or 
god-like heroic deeds, eternity now could be reached through the (philosophers’) ability
165 See the Plato chapter in Strong (1991).
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to envision/create a just/good order in which the soul could be embedded. The Self was 
to remain eternally linked to the polis, which was to serve as its permanent ‘home’, “an 
imperishable space” which would transcend human time (Gunnell 1987: 115).
The Anxiety Paradox
This account reveals the fundamental paradox characterizing the condition the 
‘enlightened’ individual, which I call the ‘anxiety-paradox’: awareness of its ability to 
organize the temporal world is accompanied by reluctance of fully accepting the 
consequences and an attempt to re-introduce an eternal perspective. More precisely, 
awareness of being positioned in finite time and recognizing that past and future are 
dimensions affected by, and affecting, human activity, ‘post-mythical’ conceptions of 
time did not embrace contingency but convey a desire to hold on to some sort of 
‘continuity’. Tellingly, Henri Bergson, whose work on the temporal constitution o f the 
evolutionary Self has recently been reclaimed as an avantgarde of postmodern thinking, 
notes at one point that the “natural inclination” of the mind is to proceed “by solid 
perceptions...and stable conceptions” (cited in Grosz 2005: 135). This inclination to 
‘solidify’ and/or ‘stabilise’ the world and the Self within it, and the strategies pursued to 
satisfy this desire reveals that humans, upon recognizing that they are masters o f their 
own future, attempt to extend themselves beyond ‘their’ time by becoming re-inscribed 
into a permanent space outside human intervention.
Examples how the freedom to intervene and imagine is used to re-order time in a way 
that allows for an eternal perspective surpassing death can be found everywhere. Since 
antiquity humans have placed a lot of effort in creating what Aleida Assmann calls 
‘spaces o f remembrance’ which allow being carried over into the ‘afterworld’ 
(Nachwelt), whether through poetry, scriptures, architecture, or images (Assmann 
1999).166 Attempts to insert a structural element into the conceptualization o f time are 
strongly visible in the teleology of Judeo-Christian narratives, not only in religious 
doctrines where eternity is sought most clearly through inscribing the Self into a moral 
universe, but also in the secular philosophies of Kant, Hegel, and Marx.167 Although 
these narratives differ regarding the relative openness of the future, ‘the world’ is
166 Consider the example of Alexander the Great shedding tears at the grave of Achilles not out of 
grievance but because he realized that Achilles was given immortality through Homer’s poetry, 
whereas he, Alexander, did not have a Homer (Assmann, 1999: 39-43).
167 On immortality ideologies in Western philosophy, see Sheets-Johnstone (2003); also 
Hutchings (2008). As Hutchings shows this reaches all the way into IR theory. It is not difficult 
to see that, for instance, realism’s emphasis of standing in a tradition beginning with Thucydides 
and stressing the same cyclical view of history also fulfils a stabilising function.
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portrayed as following a law-like path unfolding over time, and the individual must 
become aware of this path and optimize its standing in it.
Modern Answers: Numbers and Routines
There are two strategies o f mastering time and space dominating modem societies, 
namely mathematical measures (scientific time/space) and routine practices. They are 
important to look at because they significantly influence how analysts conceive o f states 
and their actions.
The first is the quantification of time and space. Mathematical measurement allows 
humans to increasingly live “within a world of symbols o f their own making” (Elias, 
1992: 42). It allows imagining time and space as part o f an eternal order o f things 
without contradicting human agency in timing and mapping by assuming that a sequence 
of events and the discovery of new ‘lands’ can be mentally ordered (‘calculated’) by 
everyone in the same way. Hence, along Kantian lines this ‘Cartesian’ approach assumes 
that the scientific conception o f time and space is universally accessible through reason 
(Elias 1992: 123). In this imagination, the temporal dimension is reduced to a succession 
of numbers and intervals with a universal logic, providing a scale into which all events 
and fluctuations can be neatly embedded. Designed and supported with 
mechanical/computerized measures, time becomes cognitively controllable and 
universally accessible through mathematical logic, manifest in the Western calendar, the 
24-hour clock, and ‘timetables’ which map out past and future and allow synchronised 
planning.168 Time thus is imagined as if part of the eternal order ‘running’ 
(flowing/passing) external to human thought. The same applies to space. Once the 
medieval image of a flat earth sandwiched between heaven and hell was discredited, 
science became the new authority for ‘accurately representing’ or mapping space, 
carefully recording of ‘the world’, including the existence o f states. Their spatial 
imagination became neutral, seemingly detached from a particular place. As John 
Agnew points out, mathematical measures enhance the sense that modem mapping is 
devoid of bias and convince the reader of “a fairly close approximation between the 
maps and what [lies] ‘out there’ in the world beyond immediate experience”. Its maps 
thus purport to convey an image of the world “without the actively mediating hand of
168 Bergson sees it as a psychological defense against the disorderly influx of experiences 
(Guerlac, 2006: 76), and Elias as a reaction to the fear of death, that is, the “longing for 
something permanent behind the impermanence of all observable data...for something 
imperishable... as the solid fundament of transient lives” (Elias 1992: 128).
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the cartographer” (Agnew 2003: 19), providing a sense o f knowing the world as it is 
today and will be tomorrow.
The second anxiety controlling mechanisms are eveiyday practices, or routines, which 
may be seen as complementary to scientific measures or as reducing contingency in their 
own right. Routines play a central role in Giddens’ structuration theory, a popular 
reference for moderate constructivists, some of whom have recently also emphasized 
their function of providing ontological security to states (Giddens 1984, 1991).169 
Echoing the human condition as marked by awareness o f being positioned in 
‘irreversible time’ (Giddens 1984: 35), a term taken from Bergson, Giddens draws on 
Heidegger to argue that the Self seeks ‘anxiety controlling mechanisms’. He argues that 
the Self attempts to establish a sense of temporal continuity through everyday practices, 
or routines which, for Giddens are carried over from the past and  established in a social 
setting.170 Yet contingency is reduced not simply because practices are being shared but 
by because it being a routine, that is, by carrying a familiarity that comes from being 
‘established’ in the past and carried over through formal or informal institutional rules. 
The appeal of routine practices is thus that they hold the promise to exist indefinitely. 
Said differently, although taking place in a moment, a routine act is not a contingent 
experience but implies continuity by making the individual part of a structure capable o f 
outliving its ‘irreversible time’. By plucking the individual into what Giddens calls the 
Tongue duree’ of institutional time, routines provide a structural frame which the 
individual can hold onto to experience the illusion of immortality.
Mathematical measures and routine practices seem well suited to control anxiety by 
providing individuals with a structural promise for continuity. Because their promise 
reaches above and beyond individuals, the accounts suggest that these mechanisms also 
satisfy a demand for ‘simultaneity’, highlighting the attraction o f a socially shared order 
for coping with anxiety. That said, these accounts show four interrelated weaknesses, 
most visibly in the case of scientific time but applying to routines as well. First, they 
contain a thin conceptualisation o f past and future; second, they are rather static and do 
not accommodate an evolutionary understanding of being as unfolding; third, their 
universal character of does not account for particular narratives of unfolding and,
169 For an application of Giddens’ structuration theory to IR, see Wendt (1992), for a critique see 
Jaeger (1996). For an adaptations of his notion of ontological security sustained through routine 
practice to IR, see Huysmans (1998a); Mitzen (2006).
70 In highlighting the importance of the social dimension for stabilising meaning, Giddens 
echoes what Benedikt Anderson (2006) calls the desire for ‘simultaneity’. The social dimension 
is addressed in chapter six.
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finally, these accounts disconnect the Self from a world o f meaningful experiences. In 
particular the last to points show that these ‘mechanisms’ stand in conflict with the 
search for authenticity as a response to anxiety. As the temporal dimension is the one in 
which the anxiety paradox emerges, the below will focus on the shortcomings with 
reference to that dimension. The next chapter will engage the spatial dimension as well.
Back to Experience
Most obviously, establishing a universal conception o f time as successive and 
unalterable units makes for a thin, indeed empty conception o f past and future. They are 
seamlessly connected on a numbered scale, distinguished cognitively merely by a 
number (1958 versus 2058) and trapped in a progressive logic where all ‘future’ 
numbers eventually become ‘past’ ones. While in a sense the Self evolves (‘ages’) by 
moving along the numeric time scale, this kind o f ‘becoming’ is primarily conceived of 
as a steady and gradual movement where experiences are recorded through marking the 
successive occurrence of events. Yet numbers do not convey the meaning associated 
with experiences and how they contributed to unique disclosures of being-in-the-world.
Criticizing the universal conception of, in particular, scientific time, scholars from 
different fields (philosophy, sociology, anthropology) have shown how unique temporal 
orders have evolved in spatially bounded social settings, giving rise to the phenomenon 
of ‘social time’. For instance, Norbert Elias discusses in detail how timing is a ‘socio- 
centric activity’ where context-specific experiences are organised along a “social time- 
grid” (Elias 1992: 91, 95). He argues that the sterile sequencing o f events in scientific 
time brushes over the fact that “the meaning o f past, present and future constantly 
changes, because the human beings...whose experiences they represent also constantly 
change and the connection with them” (Elias 1992: 76). The basic insight is that the way 
humans order/conceive o f time differs because their ‘tim e’ is filled with different 
experiences, rendering scientific time empty and homogenous.
Before Heidegger, the “strange timelessness of the Newtonian world” as one which is 
stripped of experiences and meaning has also been criticised perhaps most forcefully by 
Bergson (cited in Guerlac, 2006: 28). Whereas in Elias’ account the role o f meaningful 
experiences in ordering time is gradually blended out over the course of the 
civilising/modernisation process,171 they are at the centre o f Bergson’s critique o f the
171 Elias ends up arguing that different temporal orders are the result of being situated at different 
stages in the ‘civilizing process’, going hand in hand with an increased need to synchronize and 
coordinate activities in modem societies (Elias 1992: 122). This reading is similar to that of
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‘emptiness’ of scientific time. Against the view of a Self plugged into a neutralizing 
‘outer tim e’, where conceiving o f time through a succession o f numbers is akin to 
counting units in space, he argues that if we want to understand how conceptions o f Self 
evolve in the temporal dimension we need to focus on how meaningful experiences 
constitute what he calls ‘inner time’. According to Bergson the individual’s thinking in 
time primarily occurs not on a cognitive but on an emotional level, and its ‘inner tim e’ is 
grounded in the “quality” o f lived experience, in the “intensity” of the sensations 
triggered internally in response to ‘external’ events (Guerlac, 2006: 6 If). Hence these 
experiences cannot be conceptualized through static symbols but need to be understood 
through what he calls ‘duration’ of a unique experience. When drawing on these 
experiences, the individual is “closer to dreaming than to knowing”, acting on the basis 
of what is often called intuition (Guerlac 2006: 43). In line with his notion o f creative 
evolution, for Bergson sensations derived from experiences are not merely ‘conserved’ 
but evolve by mixing with other meaningful experiences, the synthesizing dynamic of 
which makes ‘inner time’ a creative process in which the fusion o f experiences is a 
source o f energy (Grosz, 2005).172
An important implication of Bergson’s notion o f ‘inner time’ ordered around significant 
experiences which cannot be quantified is that they cannot be fully communicated and 
are therefore difficult to share. Experiences differ in intensity/quality among individuals 
and so do their conceptions o f inner time. And just as a fusion o f experiences cannot be 
comprehended through scientific mapping along a numbered time-scale, Bergson argues 
that attempts to translate inner time into (communicate it through) a common language 
will succeed “only at the level of the superficial se lf’ inevitably leading to a loss o f the 
“passionate se lf’ (Guerlac, 2006: 77). Because language neutralizes the emotions 
associated with ‘quality’ experience, representations of inner times through shared 
symbols has the consequence that “little by little one looses sight of the fundamental 
se lf’ (ibid., 71). While some elements of Bergson’s approach, most significantly his 
disassociation o f time from space, 173 stand in tension with a phenomenological 
perspective pursued here, the notion of the Self organising its being-in-time through 
emotionally significant experiences and the creative potential of the same are important 
and will be further explored in the next chapter.
Anderson (2006) and Tilly (1994) who describe the evolution of temporal orders as a function of 
modernisation and focus on how the desire for continuity/simultaneity in modem societies is 
exploited by, that is, how the anxiety controlling mechanisms are controlled by, some larger 
structural force, such as capitalism.
172 Heidegger discusses something similar to synthesis in his notion o f ‘ecstasy’.
173 Because for him space only exists in the Newtonian conception, which he rejects.
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The Anxiety Dilemma: Verfallen and Authenticity
Much of the critique directed against scientific time can be extended to everyday 
practices through Heidegger’s discussion of the phenomenon of Verfallen. The view of 
the everyday as manifesting ‘being-in-the-world’ by providing a structure which tames 
temporal anxiety is discussed at length by Heidegger.174 Indeed, Heidegger sees the 
disclosure of everydayness as the dominant kind of unfolding. Others play a prominent 
role in this process, yet not so much in the sense of differentiation against which the Self 
sets itself apart but more as populating a world o f which the Self is a part just like 
‘anyone’ else, rendering ‘being in’ a neutralising ‘being-with’ (Heidegger 1953: 118). 
This structure of the ‘being with’ the world is the Man, a term similar to ‘one’ or ‘they’ 
signifying a general something, structuring everyday life through averageness and 
levelling. According to Heidegger, the Man dominates the state of being -  the Man 
“schreibt die Seinsart der Alltaeglichkeit vor” (Ibid., 127) -  because it allows the Self to 
diffuse the issue of its own death by giving in to idle talk [Rede], curiosity [Neugier] and 
ambiguity/ambivalence [Zweideutigkeit]. ‘Curiosity’ makes the Self eager to disclose 
ever more of the world, which is made accessible through ‘idle talk’ and ‘ambiguity’ 
enabling loose communication (Ibid., 167-175). These activities, which can be read as 
encompassing those everyday routines, allow the Self to order its world with reference 
to the Man and seemingly allow obtaining knowledge of ‘everything’ and suggesting 
that everything is ‘in order’ (Ibid., 177). Hence, because it provides comforting 
knowledge, the everyday structure o f the Man is a fundamental trait of human existence.
However, for Heidegger, the downside of this kind of unfolding is that, rather than 
manifesting the authentic Self, it places ‘being’ in a mode o f “groundless floatation”, a 
state of being-in “everywhere and nowhere” (Heidegger, 1953: §37, 177). Hence 
Heidegger calls this process Verfallen [‘falling away’] which designates a process of 
crumbling, decomposing, or loosing quality. Heidegger describes it as a process o f the 
Self “getting lost in the public [Offentlichkeit] of Man” (Ibid, 175). Although Heidegger 
notes that, analytically speaking, Verfallen should not be seen as a negative process of 
‘falling down’ from a higher or more ‘pure’ state of being (Ibid., 43, 175f), also because 
it is impossible to know the latter, it is clear that he does not consider Verfallen a 
desirable process. While by giving in to those temptations the Self responds to its desire 
of overcoming anxiety and thereby unconsciously confirms its own being, Heidegger is
174 For the following, see Heidegger (1953, §37).
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clear that being “swirled into the un-authenticity [ Uneigentlichkeit] o f the Man” means 
moving away from the experience of authentic being (Ibid., 179).175
A major reason why being in the Man is inauthentic is that that it is based on a thin 
conception o f past and future. As Heidegger argues, the temporal structure of Verfallen -  
the temporal experience of being in the Man -  is the presence (Heidegger, 1953: 346). A 
Self lost in the everyday is characterised mainly by forgetfulness o f what was and a by a 
lack of genuine engagement with what could be. Everyday practices are momentarily 
acts which make the presence stand out more sharply and which allow temporal 
orientation without paying attention to past and future. Even when routines are linked to 
a ‘tradition’ and seen as an extension of ‘quality’ experiences passed on through formal 
or informal rules, by themselves routines do not provide a source for meaningful 
orientation. Similarly, even when routines are seen as having a potential to endure by 
being institutionalised and thus reaching into the future, they do not consider the future 
as a significant place in and o f itself. Instead, routines are fundamentally conservative 
and rest on the hope that the future will be like the present. While the future is not absent 
in the ontological structure of being in the Man -  after all Verfallen as a response to 
uncertainty/contingency -  as Heidegger argues a Self giving in to the “constant 
temptation to Verfallen” (Heidegger, 1953: 177) is alienated from its future and 
dispersed in the presence (Ibid., §68c). Existing in the “modus o f the presence” in which 
being is everywhere and nowhere, the Self is in a state o f Aufenthaltslosigkeit (Ibid., 
347).
The Anxiety Dilemma
While these critiques of scientific time and the everyday echo the Zeitgeist o f the 1920s 
lamenting a dehumanization of the individual in the industrial age, from an analytical 
perspective the temptation of getting lost in these ‘calming’ temporal orders turns the
175 Similarly, Elias notes the calming effect of organizing temporal space in universal terms as 
“people’s attempts to run away from themselves” (Elias 1992: 84). Note that Vefallen differs 
from Marx’ notion of ‘alienation’ in important ways: For Marxists, alienation is seen as a result 
of economic structures built on capitalist logic (and, in the Gramscian variant, with ideology on 
top) controlled by the state and, thus, expression of a power structure which, if recognized by the 
oppressed, could be overcome. By contrast, for Heidegger Verfallen is a process not imposed by 
some political-economic superstructure but something chosen by the individual, an inevitable 
consequence of the human condition in search for ontological security. Although by speaking 
about temptations Heidegger opens up to the possibility to resist, this is more an internal struggle 
not one against an external structure such as the state. The two perspectives are combined in 
Foucault’s notion of ‘governmentality’ popular among poststructuralists. The problem is that 
their portrayal of the linear/universal conception of time as a disciplining power structure of ‘the 
state’ (e.g., Edkins, 2003) leads to a pre-occupation with the theme of resistance which blends out 
the anxiety paradox and the subsequent dilemma which Heidegger’s critique of the Man raises.
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anxiety paradox into a dilemma: scientific time and everyday routines may function as 
anxiety controlling mechanisms, but they prevent the Self from becoming authentic. 
They provide ontological security by embedding the Self into structures promising 
‘continuity’ and ‘simultaneity’ at the cost of authenticity, more precisely by reducing the 
possibility o f having an authentic experience (what Bergson called the ‘fundamental’ or 
‘passionate’ Self). The two seem mutually exclusive. Elias alludes to this anxiety 
dilemma as the ‘jaws o f a trap’ which studies of time inevitably come up against (Elias 
1992: 85).176
There are two possible strategies to deal with the anxiety dilemma (apart from ignoring 
it). One is to accept it and, like Heidegger, examine this paradoxical state of being from 
all angles in the most detailed manner. The other strategy, pursued here, is to come up 
with a view of how the Self unfolds into the world without getting lost to the everyday, 
the Man, by rethinking the possibility of ‘authentic (coming into) being’.
Rethinking Authenticity
The way out of the anxiety dilemma offered here is, first, to suggest that humans 
develop a desire for ‘authenticity’ to control (perhaps even take away) anxiety and, 
second, to rethink how a state of authentic being is obtained.
Despite his normative undertones, Heidegger’s discussion in Sein und Zeit does not 
suggest that the unfolding Self is driven by a desire for authenticity. Indeed, his 
suggestion that Verfallen is the desired path of unfolding is what gives the anxiety 
dilemma in the first place. One explanation might be that the Self does not want to face 
death because it does not want to be reminded of its finitude. Another, more significant 
explanation lies in Heidegger’s ambition to pursue a ‘fundamental ontology’ which rules 
out any preconceived wills, needs, or desires. However, there is no need to attribute the 
desire for authenticity to ‘human nature’. It can also be seen as emerging out of the 
human condition. All one needs to do is take the insight that humans respond to 
awareness of contingency with a desire for continuity and add to this a desire for 
authenticity.
Although generally remaining on the normative level, scholars have identified 
authenticity as a key force guiding people’s lives, coming from two directions. The first
176 How to conceive of ‘time’ constructed on the basis of experience occupied phenomenology 
from Husserl onwards, who struggled with the question whether time is a priori or a construct of 
human consciousness, that is, whether we are in time or whether time is in us, see Dostal (1993).
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suggests that becoming authentic is (would be) an improvement in people’s life and is 
desirable. Charles Taylor, whose writings on the Selfhood are influenced by Heidegger, 
notes that crucial for grounding a sense of Self is a feeling o f ‘doing it my way’. 
Authenticity, according to Taylor, is an ideal which holds that “being true to myself 
means being true to my own originality, which is something only I can articulate...In 
articulating it, I am also defining myself. I am realizing a potential that is properly my 
own” (Taylor 1994: 31). In correspondence with an unfolding perspective authenticity is 
understood as something that is to be realized, and this realisation is something which 
provides the Self with a sense of originality (see also Guignon 2006). The suggestion 
that humans have a desire for authenticity not only shines through in the normative 
undertones in Heidegger’s writings but also in his support o f the Nazi regime in the early 
1930s. The regime’s claims of what it meant to be authentically ‘German’ were greeted 
by Heidegger, who considered the National Socialist movement a ‘moment of 
awakening’ for the German people.177
Coming from another direction, Adorno criticizes authenticity as a dangerous ‘jargon’ 
(Adorno 2003 [1964]). More specifically, he criticizes the language o f authenticity as an 
ideology with “theological resonance” permeating public discourse enveloped in 
“judicial garb”, whose pretence of “closeness, noble and homey at once” is intertwined 
with unquestioned assertions o f “primalness” (Ibid., xix, 3-7). The importance of 
Adorno’s warning o f the negative consequences o f authenticity claims, namely the 
temptation to exclude, discriminate, and even eradicate the ‘inauthentic’, is indisputable 
and is echoed in the radical constructivist critique of reifying conceptions of culture and 
essentialist claims o f identity (Campbell 1998a; Zehfuss 2001; see also chapter six). This 
critique is not a case against the influence of the discourse of ‘authenticity’, quite the 
contrary. By noting its psychological effect of strengthening self-esteem and its 
capability to generate an “overflow of deep human emotion” readily (ab)used as a 
“means of power”, Adorno implies that there is a demand to feel ‘authentic’ and that the 
ability to satisfy this demand is a source o f power (Adorno 2003 [1964]: xix, 3-7).
Including a desire for authenticity in the causal narrative is only the first step. The 
second and more laborious task is to conceptualise how this desire is satisfied, that is, to 
understand the basic parameters in which authenticity claims are successfully made. For 
doing so it is useful to look once more at Heidegger, who, despite recognising the logical
177 Although the totalising character of ■ this narrative which eradicated any notion of 
individualism posed a paradox for Heidegger, visible in his tacit critique of Nazi bureaucracy.
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dead end he meets in the anxiety dilemma,178 spends considerable time (indeed the entire 
second part o f the book) discussing what authenticity might entail, that is, how it might 
be possible.179 To recall, for Heidegger (the fear of) death is the only authentic 
experience, and so the only point at which authentic being is logically possible is the 
moment at which the Self faces its own death (Heidegger 1953: §53). As he puts it 
“death is the ownmost (eigenste) possibility of being” (Ibid., 263). That moment of 
facing death does not refer to the actual experience, but to the understanding/recognition 
of being as ‘being-towards-death’ and of death as the end-state after which being is 
impossible. In this moment of understanding, the basic sentiment of anxiety is replaced 
by fear, and it is this fear which pulls the Self out o f its “complacent absorption in 
everydayness” (Guignon 2006: 282) and signifies authentic disclosure allowing being to 
“finds itself’ (Heidegger 1953: 25Of, 268, 308).
It can be said that in Heidegger’s discussion of authenticity four features stand out. First, 
authentic disclosure/being, conditioned by fear of ones own death, is an exception, 
occurring in rare moments of vision \Augenblick] (Heidegger 1953: 190f., 338). Such 
moments emerge suddenly and unexpectedly.180 Second, authentic being is an isolating 
or individualising experience. It does not place the Self in an empty world but it 
designates a process of Singularization [Vereinzelung] (Heidegger 1953: 187ff, 336ff.). 
Third, authentic being is characterised by a distinctive temporal structure in which past 
and future are meaningful places, in contrast to the inauthentic existence in a state of 
Verfallen where the Self is dispersed in the presence and, fourth, authentic being endows 
the Self with resoluteness/resolve [Entschlossenheit]. Recognising the possibilities of 
being provides a ‘clear view’ of what is ahead and enables moving into the future with a 
sense of direction (Heidegger 1953, §31, §68a). In particular the latter two points inform 
Charles Guignon’s suggestion that
“Authenticity is characterised by a distinctive temporal structure (...)  an 
authentic life is lived as a unified flow characterized by cumulativeness 
and direction. It involves taking over the possibilities made accessible by 
the past and acting in the present to accomplish something for the future.
Or to rephrase this in the narrativist mode, such a life is lived as a 
coherent story” (Guignon 2006: 282f.)
178 See Heidegger’s notes how the attempt to grasp being in its entirety “seems” to scheitem on 
the structure of anxiety (Heidegger 1953: 233, 317).
179 According to Flynn (2006: 65) Heidegger coined the term.
180 Heidegger’s discussion of how authentic disclosure ‘happens’, that is, how the Self comes to 
fear death and escape the neutralising experience of the Man, is difficult to follow (it revolves 
around a “call of conscience” and the acceptance of guilt, see Heidegger 1953, §55- §60). As I 
will offer a different reading of authentic being and, consequently, how authenticity is obtained, 
engaging Heidegger on this point is not necessary.
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My reformulation o f authentic being presented in the following chapters rejects the first 
two of Heidegger’s features and adopts features three and four, which are compatible 
with Guignon’s characterisation. Rejecting the first -  the notion that authenticity occurs 
in a sudden and rare moment -  is a consequence o f the assumption made earlier that that 
the Self actively seeks authenticity. Here arises the question how to combine a notion of 
authenticity with an unfolding perspective. In conjuncture with Taylor’s notions of 
‘articulation’ and ‘realization’ of authenticity, the task is to think about a process of 
authentic becoming, that is, about the generation o f authenticity in a creative process of 
living life as a coherent story, to use Guignon’s words. In suggesting what this may 
entail, my narrative departs from Heidegger’s focus on fear o f death as the only 
significant experience through which the Self can ‘find itself, as well as from his notion 
that authentic becoming is a process of singularization. Instead, the next chapter will 
sketch out the spatial and temporal parameters making up the ‘authentic’ life story o f the 
Self, what will be called a national biography. The subsequent chapter (six) will argue 
that the originality o f this story is not articulated in isolation but with significant others, 
or friends.
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE STATE AS A NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY
Summary
The previous chapter drew on Heidegger to lay out an account o f the human condition 
and its consequences for conceiving o f (what drives) the Self. It highlighted an 
evolutionary ontology of the Self in a process o f unfolding and suggested that being 
confronted with an uncertain future generates anxiety rather than fear. It was argued that 
the Self responds to this condition with a desire for continuity, that is, for a stable sense 
of ‘being-in-the-world’ through the generation of meaningful knowledge from 
experience. The chapter concluded with arguing that the attempt to control anxiety is 
expressed in a desire for ‘authentic becoming’. The present chapter has the dual purpose 
of substantiating these points and making them applicable to IR by conceptualizing what 
it means for the state to ‘exist’ in space and time. Using the opening o f statehood resting 
on a ‘binding idea’, the below discussion develops a reading o f the state as a national 
biography defined as a coherent life story through which societies gain orientation in 
‘the world’ by inscribing space and time with meaning. Against this backdrop, the 
national security interest can be understood as generating and safeguarding an authentic 
national biography.
After introducing the idea of a national biography, the chapter substantiates its 
parameters in two parts. The first half of the chapter is devoted to discuss the spatial 
dimension. More precisely, it discusses the spatial embeddedness of ‘being’ through the 
notion of an ‘experienced space’, specified analytically with a taxonomy o f centre/soul, 
valued order and horizon. It then explores the usefulness of existing frameworks in IR, 
such as empire, milieu, and region for conceptualizing the state as situated in an 
‘experienced space’. The second half o f the chapter then addresses the temporal 
dimension o f a national biography. Using the openings o f the constitutive effect of ideas, 
learning, and the past as a guide for the future, it discusses the importance o f (i) memory 
spaces generated by ‘significant experiences’ whose emotional impact provides the 
(national) ‘S elf with a significant place in the past and whose ambiguity provides (ii) 
space for creative learning of moral lessons projected into the future as visions of order, 
or utopias. Emphasizing the particular importance o f the latter, the chapter concludes by 
arguing that in merging the two the Self (the state) turns its world into a meaningful 
project providing it with direction and a sense of authentic becoming.
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The State as a National Biography
To conceptualize the state as a reflexive Self it is instructive to take as a starting point 
Weber’s definition o f the state as a community holding the monopoly over the legitimate 
use of force in a certain space and to ask what holds this community together. 
Answering this question touches on the phenomenon of nationalism. As the term 
inter national relations suggests, (the idea of) the nation is or, rather, should be 
constitutive of IR scholarship. While this task is taken up by IR scholars roughly once a 
decade,181 generally speaking it has become a habit in IR to collapse the ‘nation’ into the 
‘state’ and make the former disappear, resurfacing only when nationalist aspirations 
were identified as a source of conflict and disorder undermining rather than carrying ‘the 
system’. Yet some understanding of (the idea of) the nation’ certainly matters for a 
theory trying to come to terms with the concept of a ‘national interest’, at least if one 
accepts Wolfers’ point that “the national interest indicates that the policy is designed to 
promote demands that are ascribed to the nation” (Wolfers 1962: 147). In light o f the 
discussion in the previous chapter, this demand can be understood as ‘controlling 
anxiety’ by generating a stable sense o f ‘authentic becoming’.
Shifting the focus back to ‘the nation’ is not a straightforward task. Most importantly, it 
is useful to heed the advice of scholars of nationalism and distinguish between an 
analysis trying to discern the features o f a nation and a study o f the phenomenon of 
nationalism. The former assumes the existence of a certain group or community with or 
without a direct link to a state understood as a territorially exclusive entity, if anything 
considered more basic and preceding, indeed, claiming ‘their own’ state (nation -> 
state). By contrast, an analysis of dynamics o f nationalism focuses on how the state 
understood as a structure of governmental authority is able to create and manipulate the 
‘idea of the nation’ which otherwise would not exist (state nation). Another way of 
framing the debate is that it is about what holds communities together, with views 
oscillating between (i) the realist/primordialist position emphasizing intrinsic or fixed 
properties such as ethnicity and (ii) the constructivist/modernist position emphasizing 
that nations are ‘imagined’ and formed by things that can be learned. In both frames the 
debate is about who comes first, the chicken (state) or the egg (nation).182
I8IAs noted in chapter three, both Carr (1945) and Morgenthau (1960) wrote on 
nations/nationalism. So have Deutsch (1966), Bloom (1990); Buzan (1991); Hall (1999); Laitin 
(2007). The study of nationalism is intrinsically linked to the study o f ‘national identity’ (Bloom 
1990; Smith 1991), yet constructivist discussions of the latter often do not make this link 
(Katzenstein 1996).
182 A classic treatment is Gellner (1983). For an overview of classic texts, see Hutchinson and 
Smith (1994); also Smith (1998). For first position see Smith (1986), for the second Brubaker 
(1996; also Anderson 2006).
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The perspective taken in this chapter is of the constructivist kind, emphasizing 
nationalism as a phenomenon created, substantiated and sustained by political practice. 
It focuses on the state as a governmental authority which administers, manipulates and 
represents a certain ‘binding idea’ o f a nation and is held accountable for the protection 
of the same by its constituency. Understood as an unfolding and politically contestable 
idea, the conception also overlaps with Herder’s view of the nation as mobile 
community whose sense of order is “continuously renovated in terms o f the needs of 
each generation” (in Hutchinson 1987: 13). This ‘accountability’ qualifier is important 
insofar as it tames the constructivist position in assuming that governments can 
manipulate the idea only within certain limits acceptable to society. Hence, it does not 
entirely discard of the idea o f a nation as a living thing and accepts the existence of what 
John Hutchinson (1987) calls “cultural nationalism”. I will return to this point when 
speaking about political agency at the end o f this chapter.
The constructivist account presented in this chapter engages the concept, mentioned by 
Benedikt Anderson, of a ‘biography o f nations’ through which communities imagine 
their continuity in time (Anderson 2006: 205).183 Kenneth Boulding (1959: 122) captures 
something similar when he speaks o f a “national image” which “extends through time 
backwards into a supposedly recorded or perhaps mythological past and forward into an 
imagined future” (also Coker, 1989). By reading the state through the concept of a 
national biography, this chapter also makes use of Erik Ringmar’s suggestion, drawing 
on Paul Ricoeur, who in turn was influenced by Heidegger, to conceptualize the state as 
a narrative.184 Taking up the view that “when we wonder who we are...w e tell a story 
which locates us in the context o f a past, a present and a future” Ringmar argues that 
while ‘the state’ may not be empirically verifiable, “the spirit o f the nation does leaves 
its trace in time” (Ringmar 1996: 451, 454). This chapter substantiates these claims by 
exploring the idea of ‘Germany-in the world’ or ‘America-in-the-world’ and, by doing 
so, adds that a nations’ ‘trace in time’ cannot be meaningfully separated from its ‘trace 
in space’.
Carving out the parameters o f a national biography builds on the insight that ideas 
impact how states, or rather, those who represent them conceive o f their (respective 
state’s) place in ‘the world’. At least since Robert Jervis’ (1976) work on the effect of 
belief systems on foreign policy making, scholars have shown that ideas introduce a
183 The concept is also mentioned in passing by Steele (2005).
184 On the ‘narrative’ approach see also White (1987), applied to IR by Campbell (1998b, Ch. 3).
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‘cognitive bias’ among decision makers in their perception o f ‘the world’.185 Yet most 
studies in IR are concerned with demonstrating that ideas matter, they rarely engage the 
question which ideas matter, why they matter and where they come from , let alone 
embed the answers in an ontology of the state.186 This chapter addresses these questions 
by presenting ideas as an integrative element o f a national biography, specifically as 
providing anxiety-controlling mechanisms through authentic meaning structures which 
enable the state to situate itself in space and time.
Parameters of Authenticity I: Unfolding in Space
This section discusses the spatial dimension o f a national biography. Although some 
promising avenues are discussed further below, IR’s reliance on the Hobbesian ontology 
provided little incentive for scholars to rethink the spatial features of the state. Content 
with it as a clearly delineated and exclusive territory easily to locate on any (political) 
map, the problematization o f this space and spatial theorizing more generally has been 
left to critical geographers who, in turn, draw on social theory and philosophy to rethink 
space outside/beyond the state.187 Although, despite the recognition that “spatial 
orientation lies very deep in the human psyche” (Taylor 1989: 28) among philosophers 
the role of space in the formation o f Selfhood also has been somewhat neglected. As one 
scholar puts it, “the exclusive focus on the w/zo-question (“who am I?”) has often made 
philosophy forget the correlate where-question. All the answers given to the first 
question describe a [Self] which is essentially nowhere” (Manoussakis, 2007: 674). In 
seeking an answer to the whereabouts o f the Self, it is useful to return to Heidegger and 
his notion of being as unfolding in space.
As noted in the previous chapter, for Heidegger “the ontologically properly understood 
‘subject’, the Dasein, is in an original sense spatial” (Heidegger 1953: 111). And the 
Selfs unfolding into ‘the world’ and disclosing it by rendering it meaningful is not 
merely a spiritual or imagined process (Heidegger 1953: 106, 110). That is, just as the 
Self is not simply formed by stuff (events, people, etc) populating its spatial
185 Goldstein and Keohane (1993); Yee (1996); Wendt (1999); Parsons (2002); Tannenwald 
(2005).
186 As noted in the last chapter, even constructivists such as Wendt who strongly emphasize the 
“constitutive effect” of ideas on the self-conception of states don’t see them working ‘all the way 
down’ (Wendt 1999: Ch. 3). Systematic attempts such as by Judith Goldstein and Robert 
Keohane (1993) fail to anchor the notion that ideas help to order the world by providing “road 
maps” or “focal points” in a deep theory of international politics and end up treating them as 
‘intervening variables’.
187 For classic treatments, see Simmel (1922); Bollnow (1963); Lefebvre (1991). For recent 
engagements, see Agnew (2003); Sparke (2005). On the (missing) conversation between political 
scientists and geographers, see the contributions in Political Geography 18(8), 1999 and, more 
recently, Mamadouh and Dijkink (2006).
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surroundings, the world is not a vacuum into which the individual projects its ideas, i.e. 
something ‘empty’ that is gradually ‘filled’. Instead, the space is a dynamic ‘living’ 
mass, something that provides stimulus and opportunities for the creation o f meaning 
structures and, thus, for ‘self-realization’.188
This has tempted Hubert Dreyfus to analytically split Heidegger’s ontology into an 
‘objective’ space the Self in inhabiting and an ‘existential’ space in which the Self is 
getting involved (Dreyfus, 1991). Yet as Malpas (2006: 77-83) points out, this 
distinction risks loosing much of the value o f Heidegger’s topology. While Heidegger at 
one point makes a distinction between ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ worlds, this is a 
methodological step in his argument to show that the two meet in the experience rather 
than a distinction carrying his fundamental ontology. Heidegger endorses the notion of a 
‘subjective’ world where a concept like ‘nature’ must be seen as part of the S elfs 
conceptualization of ‘the world’. Assuming ‘nature’ as something ontologically 
independent skips the basic question of how the phenomenon o f worldliness in which 
something like ‘nature’ matters, emerges in the first place (Heidegger 1953: 64). More 
broadly speaking, for ‘things’ to be considered part of ‘the world’, they have to become 
part of the spatial conception of the Self. As Malpas puts it, the ‘objective/existential’ 
distinction only leads to the question of how the two spaces relate to each other 
conceptually, the answer to which would need to be that, from the perspective of the 
Self, they are the same (Malpas, 2006: 81). For instance, while it could be argued that 
the ‘objective’/ ‘existential’ distinction is analytically useful to explain how the ‘same’ 
event is experienced differently by different individuals, this actually does not require 
the notion o f an ‘objective’ world. If the world only becomes intelligible through 
disclosure by the Self, then the difference is not merely a matter of ‘perspective’ or 
‘angle’ on the ‘same’ event. Because the meaning o f the event is only constituted in the 
relation between the event and the experiencing subject, it is unique. From that 
perspective, there is nothing like the ‘same’ event, it is actually a different one.
Thus, conceptualising the spatial character o f ‘being-in-the-world’ from a 
phenomenological perspective needs to focus on how experience and the meaning 
structures derived from it are manifested in space. Said differently, the Heideggerian 
perspective emphasizes that the space that matters is the space that means something to
188 One important implication arising here is that because the Self cannot be established ‘without’ 
a world, as knowing the Self is interwoven with knowing the world, it cannot choose to make a 
connection or relate to the world (or not) and, thus, it also cannot choose to ‘reach out’ or 
‘withdraw from’ its world
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the Self. Heidegger uses terms such as the ‘surrounding’ space ( Umraum), ‘surrounding 
field’ (Umfeld) or the ‘surrounding world’/environment ( Umwelt) (Heidegger, 1953: 63, 
66, 102f.) to capture that space the Self has disclosed and filled with meaning. This is 
the space the Self has come to know and which is, therefore, ‘around’ or ‘close to’ the 
Self. As this closeness is constituted by experience, one could also refer to that particular 
environment which the Self has come to ‘know’ as the ‘experienced space’. This is the 
terminus used here.
The ‘Experienced Space’
The notion of the experienced space is taken from Otto Friedrich Bollnow (1963) and 
Reinhard Koselleck (1985: 271f.), both of whom were students of Heidegger. Whereas 
Koselleck remains in the temporal dimension and uses the term akin to that of a memory 
space, discussed below, Bollnow focuses on the spatiality o f the concept. He shares 
Heidegger’s view that the human conception o f and relation to ‘space’ must be 
understood differently from the mathematical/geometrical Cartesian one, and that such 
space is neither external to the human nor something purely ‘spiritual’ or ‘imagined’. 
Instead, it is a space in which ‘life happens’. With the terminus ‘living space’ 
[.Lebensraum] contaminated by the politics of Nazi Germany, Bollnow replaces it with 
that of the ‘lived space’ [erlebter Raum] (Bollnow 1963: 18f.), which can also be 
translated as ‘experienced space’ [erfahrener Raum or Erfahrungsraum].m
To be sure, the term is not ideal, for two reasons. First, as discussed further down in 
more detail, it does not quite capture that Erlebnis -  a term which as Gadamer (2004 
[1975]: 53f.) points out arises out o f the biographical literature -  designates not just any 
experience [.Erfahrung] but one which leaves a deep and lasting ‘impression’.190 Yet the 
space in which authentic being unfolds is not based on an everyday experience but only 
on those experiences which are in some sense ‘significant’. Second, by linking the 
definition of the space to (significant) experiences, it gives the impression that the space 
is defined primarily through the past. Yet as the discussion of the temporal dimension 
below will argue, the way the space is envisioned is just as if not more significant, hence
189 This reading of space is different from Henri Lefebvre’s Marxist-inspired attempt to combine 
physical, mental, and social dimensions into a universal theory of “produced space” (Lefebvre 
1991; Elden 2001). Although some of Lefebvre’s insights are useful, in particular if read with 
Elden (2004), as a critical engagement with Heidegger and existentialism more generally, his 
thrust towards revealing universal structures (economic or otherwise) does not suit the subjective 
perspective taken here.
190 Note that Erlebnis can be read as the significant experience of an event, or happening 
[Ereignis], which is semantically closely linked to the German term authentic [eigentlich] used 
by Heidegger and which links authenticity, understood as ‘being one’s own [eigenY to an event 
one owns (see also Malpas 2006: 58).
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it also must accommodate the notion of an envisioned or expected space. With those 
limitations in mind, the discussion will employ the notion o f the ‘experienced space’. 
Loosely following Bollnow, the features of this space are a centre (or soul) through 
which the Self evaluates and orders ‘its’ world along value horizons.
Centre: Feeling ‘at Home*
To begin with, if the experiences space contains the notion o f a ‘surrounding’ space this 
suggests that there must be something like a centre. As understood here, this centre is 
not simply a physical but an emotional location, a place which has something ‘familiar’ 
to it which lends it “a character o f trustworthiness” (Bollnow, 1963: 55ff). It is also 
captured by understanding being as inhabiting something, as residing or dwelling in a 
specific place .191 Heidegger is known for having emphasised the notion of ‘dwelling’, 
which is generally associated with living in the specific place that is ‘home’ or a 
‘house’.192 When Bollnow notes “only by dwelling in a house can the human be at home 
in the world, can he also dwell in the world” (Ibid., 148) he echoes Heidegger’s 
statement that “to be human means: to be on earth as a mortal, means: to dwell” (cited in 
Bollnow, 1963: 126). A German term capturing the significance of a place is Heimat, 
where familiarity is attributed in a more abstract way than ‘home’ and can be applied to 
the local, the region, and the nation (Confino, 1997: 9). A place considered Heimat is 
primarily associated with an emotional state, designating a place rising out o f a feeling, a 
Heimatgefuehl, which in the broadest sense could be translated as feeling at ‘home’ (see 
also Applegate 1990). For Gaston Bachelard, on whom Bollnow also draws, the notion 
of the home contains “one of the greatest powers of integration” without which a human 
would be a “dispersed being”. Bachelard links the home to the ‘soul’ as the place of 
emotional being, which he explicitly differentiates from the cognitive function o f the 
mind. While he sees mind and soul inseparable for the overall experience o f ‘being’, it is 
the soul where the world ‘reverberates’ (Bachelard, 1994: 7).
Whether the notion o f the place is grasped in terms of home, Heimat, or soul, the centre 
designates the place through which the Self organises its unfolding. Consequently, this 
centre is not permanent/static but a creative/evolving place. For Bachelard the soul is the 
site of an “inner light” which does not reflect ‘the world’ but, rather, where ‘intimate 
meanings’ are created and recognized, where worlds are inaugurated, which makes
191 For comprehensive discussions of the philosophy of place and its link to experience, with 
particular focus on Heidegger, see Malpas (1999, 2006), also Casey (1997).
192 On Heidegger’s notion of dwelling, see Malpas (2006: 74ff). It is no coincidence that 
‘dwelling’ (or the German wohneri) is often used synonymous to (or translated as) ‘living’
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‘home’ an intimate place (Bachelard, 1994: 10). It is a place where the Self ‘knows’ 
itself best, the centre of familiarity, where it can feel comfortable and emotionally ‘at 
peace’.193 Yet it is not merely a place o f shelter and withdrawal, but of creativity and 
engagement, with the potential for happiness and the good life (Bollnow, 1963: 132).194 
In the words o f Iris Marion Young, the ‘home’ is “the site o f the construction and 
reconstruction of the Self’ (Young, 2001: 286). This reading o f ‘home’ as a place from 
which world building occurs ties in with Heidegger’s conceptualisation o f building not 
only as constructing but also as cultivating something, which means that the idea of 
‘preserving’ is not entirely discarded; although clearly the notion o f building it is not a 
conservative enterprise (Young, 2001: 225).
Finally, reading the center as a ‘soul’ links the reading of Selfhood inscribed into space 
back to ancient Greek thought where having a soul was understood to be the very 
indicator o f being alive (and where, correspondingly, the departure thereof was taken as 
the evidence of death). The soul was not only considered a harbour o f emotions, 
feelings, and perceptions; a ‘strong’ soul was also an indicator for acts of courage and 
determination and for morally significant behaviour (Lorenz, 2003), characteristics 
echoed in Heidegger’s notion o f the ‘resolve’ of authentic being. And Plato’s claim that 
the soul can be made immortal by inscribing it into the good order of the polis, 
mentioned in the previous chapter, leads over to the second feature of the experienced 
space, namely that the process of gaining orientation in space is a process o f creating 
order (Bollnow, 1963: 36).
Order: The Valued Space
The argument that the Self is formed through identification with an ‘order’ is well- 
established in social theory, indeed has been central to Western thought since Plato 
(Strong 1992: 8, see also Baumann 1991). Perhaps just as long-standing is the debate
193 It is important not to read causal narratives attributing importance to such places (home, 
Heimat, soul) as a regression into romanticism or even reactionary thinking. Young’s defence of 
the idea of ‘home’ against feminist criticism of the same nicely shows that it is a mistake to 
automatically associate attempts linking understandings of Selfhood to a place like ‘home’ as 
supporting an exclusionary and essentializing understanding of Selfhood. Echoing the point made 
about authenticity in the previous chapter, Malpas reminds that “the real question...is just how 
place should be understood”, which he rightly suggests is “a pressing question because of the 
way in which place, and notions associated with place [such as authenticity] are indeed given 
powerful political employment across the political spectrum” (Malpas 2006: 26f.). In other 
words, it is to take serious the political implications of what Gaston Bachelard has called 
‘topophilia’, or love of place, as an anxiety controlling mechanism.
194 It only has the potential because the centre’s familiarity is generated by significant 
experiences which are not necessarily positive (see below).
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whether order rests (or should rest) on norms or values.195 . The interplay between the 
‘good’ and the ‘right’ and how they (should) relate is subject to much debate among 
social theorists (Joas 2000: 161 f), yet frequently brushed over by IR scholars.196 The 
distinction is important when it comes to understand what makes space meaningful.
The emphasis on norms is heavily influenced by social contract thinking and the related 
advocacy o f specific but potentially universally valid rules o f behaviour to organize 
social life. Norms are seen as necessary for regulating interaction through 
understandings o f what is the ‘right’ thing to do, such as stopping at red lights, guiding 
the S e lfs  activities along a ‘logic of appropriateness’. Leaving aside the notion o f a 
coercive order (as in Hobbes), the importance of norms for constituting Selfhood is said 
to be found in their cognitive-regulative function. As such, respect for norms may well 
be ‘neutral’ or ‘soulless’ in the sense that little emotional significance is attached to 
them. By themselves, norms understood as rules are not sufficient to inscribe a space 
with significant structures of meaning. This is done by values.197 As Kratochwil (1989: 
64) notes, values are more general than norms, or rules, and inform attitudes and 
generate emotional attachment. Having values allows for moral judgments guided by an 
understanding of the ‘good’ (Joas 2000: 21). As such, values rank the importance or 
quality o f something, including a norm, and are attributed to things which satisfy desires 
and create a ‘good’ feeling, stirring emotions. Values may find expression in, or lend 
support to, certain norms. Yet while one can imagine an abundance of possible norms, or 
rules, tied to and varying with specific contexts, values go deeper and are about 
evaluating which norms serve as the Selfs primary orientation devices and create the 
‘good’ feeling. Hence, it is not that norms don’t matter but, rather, that they are tailored 
towards (attached to) a certain value. The Self unfolds into the experienced space with 
an idea of what is a ‘good’ order, thereby making the space meaningful.
For Heidegger a meaningful space is one in which ‘things have their place’ and where 
distance to the Self is not measured in physical proximity but according to the value 
attributed to things (wertbehaftet) (Heidegger, 1953: 63, 66, 102f.). Similarly, Simmel 
suggests that space obtains significance through the classification o f its ‘parts’ carried 
out by the soul (Simmel, 1922: 461). The view that being-in-space gains significance 
through attachment to a conception of ‘the good’ is also captured by Charles Taylor
195 On how the interplay between values and norms, between the ‘good’ and the ‘right’, and how 
they (should) relate is subject to much debate among social theorists (Joas 2000: 161 f).
196 Most notably, Bull (2002) mixes norms and values as elements of order.
197 For a detailed discussion, see Joas (2000).
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(1989). For Taylor, having a sense of Self means knowing an answer to the question 
‘what kind of life is worth living’ and to make what he calls ‘strong evaluations’. 
Consequently, human beings aspire to be connected to what they consider good or of 
fundamental value (Taylor, 1989: 42). Taylor suggests that we should see the process of 
‘value-orientation’ as one of Self-positioning in a “moral space”, which he defines as “a 
space in which questions arise about what is good or bad, what is worth doing and what 
not, what has meaning and importance for you and what is trivial and secondary” 
(Taylor, 1989: 28).198 In this sense, gaining orientation in space, “‘value-ceiving’ 
( Wertnehmen) always precedes ‘perceiving’ (Wahrnehmen)” (Scheler cited in Joas 2000: 
88) and is always also an emotional orientation (Bollnow 1963; Unger 1990).
Horizons: Delineating the Possible
The third feature engages the understanding that spatial orientation requires some sort of 
boundary, or border (Simmel 1922: 465f). As discussed in the previous chapter, for 
realism and, indeed, for any theorist trying to conceptualize ‘the state’, the delineating 
function o f a border is central to conceive of an ‘entity’ at all. It differentiates one 
territorial claim from another. Similarly, constructivists consider the concept o f border 
as indispensable because it captures the attempt o f the Self to differentiate between 
appropriate and inappropriate behavior, making the concept of the ‘border’ form an 
analytical triad together with ‘identity’ and ‘order’ (Lapid, 2001). Whether this process 
o f ‘bordering’ must be problematized as a phenomenon of exclusion, as most 
constructivist literature suggests, depends very much on how the Self-Other relationship 
is conceptualized, which will be discussed in the next chapter. For now, the question is 
how to conceive of the boundary of an unfolding Self situated in an ‘experienced’ space 
without dependency on an ‘Other’.
Bollnow suggests that space always features both sharp borders and gradual transitions, 
that a world is ordered through clearly delineated features and at the same time is infinite 
and open for exploration and discovery. The sharp borders could be seen as those 
cognitive-regulative railings which help the Self to stay on a certain path in the 
everyday, yet the path is coming from somewhere and is leading to somewhere, from 
and to places not clearly defined. It is here where, from an unfolding perspective, those 
‘transitionary markers’ play a crucial role. Indeed, if understood as delineating the moral 
space, they are of primary importance for the S e lfs  orientation in space and are best 
understood as horizons (Bollnow, 1963: 74-80, Koselleck 1985: 273; Gadamer 2004
198 See also Campbell (1998a); Reus-Smit (1998). Note that for Taylor the moral space is devised 
in-relation to others. The relational dimension will be taken up in the next chapter.
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[1975]). The horizon has the peculiar character as both limiting the possibility of 
perception/experience and something that can never be reached, or surpassed. In this 
sense, the ‘horizon’ is an existential border, delineating realm of ones unfolding 
existence and, thus, delineating the world that is known to be possible.
Precisely because of its indeterminacy in the human experience, because of its unfolding 
character, the horizon is not a boundary that constrains but one that invites or, at least, 
holds the possibility to explore and change/open new perspectives, without ever 
disappearing. In correspondence with the discussion so far, the horizon is understood 
here in terms of value-creating experience, making it a ‘value horizon’, which may 
expand and contract, characterizing the Self through a ‘wide’ or ‘narrow’ horizon 
(Bollnow, 1963: 75). From this perspective, the horizon is not delineating space against 
something but is simply marking the realm of the familiar, the possible, as creating a 
‘comfort zone’ in which the Self can tame anxiety.199 It both fixes and fosters spatial 
imagination and in that sense is an invitation for devising a project that has no ‘end’.
Thinking Space ‘beyond’ Westphalia
How to translate this conceptualisation of the Self unfolding in an experienced space to 
IR? Are there any frameworks going ‘beyond’ Westphalia one can build on? At first 
sight, the conceptual landscape appears not very promising. The general observation 
made by Harold and Margaret Sprout that the ‘environmental’ terminology used by 
scholars of international politics is vague still holds true (Sprout and Sprout 1965: 5ff). 
In most IR scholarship the .‘environment’ is generally understood as the ‘external’ 
dimension, that what is outside the state, and reduced to the presence of other ‘actors’, 
mainly other states. And, if anything, the understanding o f Selfhood attached to a certain 
space/place has evaporated in the wake of postmodemity. Selfhood in what Baumann 
tellingly calls ‘liquid modernity’ is seen as fluid and disconnected from a specific sense 
of place and, correspondingly, the state is conceptualised by emphasising its spatial 
diffusion. While scholars have scrutinized the political construction o f borders to reveal 
the contingency of the spatial categories modem IR continues to operate in, they have 
done so without rethinking the situatedness o f the state in ‘the world’.200 Indeed, most 
contemporary attempts to expand IR’s reading of political spaces are trying to 
understand the extension of what calls “systems of rule” (Ruggie 1993) beyond the state,
199 An important question here is whether ‘borders’ are defining desirable behaviour (making 
everything else inappropriate) or inappropriateness (making everything else ‘normal’).
200 Walker (1993); Campbell (1998a); Agnew (1999, 2003); O Tuathail, (1999); O Tuathail et al. 
(2006); Rosenau (2004).
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thereby often loosing sight o f the state altogether.201 That said, there are three areas 
where scholars of international politics have devised perspectives which provide useful 
entry points for conceptualising the state as an experienced space, namely those dealing 
with phenomena or ‘empire’, ‘milieu’ and ‘regionalism’.
From Empire to Milieu
The notion of ‘empire’ most obviously invites a rethinking o f spatial boundaries beyond 
the state, perhaps even denoting a special kind of ‘state’. That said, the conceptualisation 
o f ‘empire’ is much debated and preoccupied with the nature o f control outside the 
‘core’ state rather than the ontological configuration o f the same. The distinction 
between territorial or non-territorial manifestation, as in the traditional distinctions of 
land (e.g., Russia) and maritime empires (e.g., Britain), has grown more complex in the 
question over the nature o f American hegemony, with scholars emphasizing US global 
military reach/presence, control o f international markets, and the spread of 
consumer/popular culture. While Gramscian and Foucauldian frameworks offer new 
ways o f ‘tracing’ empire, the spatial configuration o f empire, more precisely the spatial
situatedness o f states within it is overshadowed by questions o f (how to measure)
202power.
Political geographers in Britain and Germany in the late 19th century spoke to the 
imperial ambitions of their governments and developed concepts used for mapping 
spatial spheres of influence and areas of strategic (‘vital’) importance. In Britain, 
Halford Mackinder’s notion o f the Heartland stressed the idea o f space as “the stake of 
the struggle between human collectivities” and thus o f space as a contested terrain (Aron 
1966: 198). In Germany, Friedrich Ratzel developed conceptual ideas for the study of 
the state as a spatial phenomenon influenced by social Darwinism and suggested to 
conceive o f the state as a living organism and identified ‘space’ and ‘position’ as “the 
two principle determinants of the fortunes o f states” (Parker 1995: 170). This was 
married to notion of Lebensraum, or living space, the ‘adequate acquisition’ of which 
was, according to Ratzel, of fundamental importance to provide society with the
201 Studies exploring the ‘globalisation’ of space, in particular, emphasize the 
‘deterritorialisation’ of political space through (mainly economic) structures or networks 
emerging above and beyond ‘states’ without rethinking the spatial configuration of ‘states’ 
themselves (Ferguson and Jones, 2002). An exception is Michael Mann, whose reading of 
‘globalisation’ suggests that states are intertwined with those ‘new’ political spaces (Mann 1997; 
Weiss 2005). Mann’s view is close to (in his case not coincidentally) the spatial thinking one 
finds in the literature on ‘empire’.
202 Muenkler (2007); Katzenstein (2005); Forum on ‘The ‘New’ American Empire’ in Security 
Dialogue 35(2): 227-61.
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resources necessary to develop its potential (O Tuathail, 1998: 4, 20f). Intertwined with 
the racial ideology of National Socialism and providing a justification for Hitler’s 
expansionist-destructive agenda, Ratzel’s notion of Lebensraum and the related 
Grossraum concept used by Karl Haushofer and Carl Schmitt became highly 
problematic concepts after 1945.203
Disconnected concept from Nazi ideology the Grossraum concept is notable, however, 
as an attempt to think about spatial situatedness o f the state beyond Westphalia. As Aron 
points out, when Schmitt spoke about Raumsinn or ‘sense o f space’ he captured 
something important, namely “the image which man [sic] have made for themselves of 
their habitat” (Aron, 1966: 207). Whatever the character o f this habitat, it highlights that 
communities perceive/sense their existence as bound up with a broader environment that 
means something to them, whether the experiences generating this meaning are positive 
or negative (see below). Said differently, the Grossraum concept captures how states 
identify with an environment beyond their designated territorial borders, whether it is the 
US claiming the Western Hemisphere as its ‘backyard’ under the Monroe doctrine or, 
more recently, Russia declaring the former Soviet states as forming a space which is 
neither foreign nor domestic but ‘Near Abroad’ (Trenin, 2002). A broader sense of space 
is also identifiable amongst former subjects of empire. As J.G.A. Pocock notes, New 
Zealand’s ‘national existence’ was long situated less in the Pacific Ocean than in 
imperial area devised by the British and this area possessed “a consciously preserved 
history” of British culture of which New Zealanders “saw themselves as part” (Pocock, 
1997: 299). This notion of being situated in a cultural Grossraum also echoes in the 
suggestion that states may be part of a ‘civilization’ (Huntington 1993). However, as in 
Huntington’s version, the ‘civilization’ concept serves primarily to cluster ‘states’ 
according to vague ‘cultural’ characteristics and offers little in terms o f rethinking the 
spatial conception of the state (see, however, Jackson 2004, 2006).
A more useful concept which re-imagines the spatial situatedness of the state untainted 
by the politics of imperial domination is the ‘milieu’, put forward by Harold and 
Margaret Sprout (1965) in their attempt to bring clarity into how states relate to their 
‘environment’. The ‘milieu’ is broadly defined as a space encompassing human and 
nonhuman, intangible and tangible factors (Sprout and Sprout, 1965: 27). On whether 
one can (or should) think of this milieu as something independent from the state, the 
Sprouts make the distinction between subjective and objective worlds and suggest that
203 In Germany these terms remain banned from the conceptual vocabulary (Parker 1995: 172).
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the milieu can be understood either as a “psychological image”, which they call the 
‘psycho milieu’, or as something that exists independently from perception, the ‘milieu 
as is’ (Sprout and Sprout, 1965: 28f).204 While from a phenomenological perspective this 
distinction breaks down, the subjective character o f the ‘psycho milieu’ -  which the 
Sprouts acknowledge is the one that matters if one wants to explain ‘decisions’ (Sprout 
and Sprout, 1965: 30f) -  comes close to the notion o f the ‘experienced space’, except 
that it is a purely cognitive construct lacking the emotional dimension and the emphasis 
on values.
The Sprouts extensive discussion of the “man-milieu relationship” (Sprout and Sprout, 
1965: 47ff) deals with how the environment affects the state and vice versa and ranges 
from environmental determinism, a watered down version o f the same where the 
environment ‘conditions’ human existence, via what they call “environmental 
possibilism”, where the milieu is “simply there” and like clay “sometimes malleable, 
sometimes refractory...at the disposal of...the builder” (Ibid., 83), before settling with a 
complex model. While the Sprouts’ complex model is unsuitable for integrating it into 
the concept of a national biography, it draws attention to the interplay o f how the state 
forms and is formed by the space it is situated in (see also Aron, 1966: 187ff). It is 
echoed in Arnold Wolfers’ suggestion that states hold “milieu goals” aimed at shaping 
conditions “beyond national boundaries”. With the notion of milieu goals Wolfers seeks 
to capture that states “have reason to concern themselves with things other than their 
own possessions”, namely creating “peace and order” and making a difference in 
“happiness, in future opportunities, and perhaps in moral satisfaction” (Wolfers, 1962: 
73ff). Said differently, shaping the ‘milieu’ is about influencing the development of a 
space beyond its Westphalian borders, a space which ‘the state’ neither owns nor 
controls but whose constellation it nevertheless considers of vital importance for its well 
being.205
Although none of these authors are concerned with rethinking the ontology o f the state -  
indeed they do not question its composition as a territorial unit -  their attempt to think 
about a symbiotic relationship with the environment goes some way towards the idea o f 
an ‘experienced space’. From recognizing complex interactions between the state and its 
‘milieu’ it is only a short step to conceptualise this relationship as a process of mutual
204 After a lengthy discussion about the problems involved with ‘personifying the state’ the 
Sprouts accept that one may redefine states “in a manner compatible with psychological modes of 
speaking” (Sprout and Sprout 1965: 37).
205 For an application to the German case, see Bulmer et al. (2000).
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constitution. What still needs to be emphasized is that ‘the state’ is not ontologically 
separate from ‘its’ surrounding space, that the two unfold together and that in this 
process meaning is inscribed into both.
Thinking o f Regions: The European Space
The third concept for thinking differently about the state’s situatedness in space is 
regionalism. In IR a  focus on ‘regions’ and on processes o f ‘regionalisation’ is generally 
understood as analyzing interaction on the level somewhere between ‘the state’ and ‘the 
global’.206 For Karl Deutsch, a region is “a set o f countries that are more markedly 
interdependent over a wide range o f different dimensions -  and usually transactions -  
than they are with other countries. In many ways, therefore, regions are made by culture, 
history, politics, and economics rather than by geography alone” (cited in Adler 1997a: 
253). For many scholars the analysis of regions primarily is about a shift in the level of 
analysis within an anarchic world. For instance, Barry Buzan and Ole Waever’s 
‘Regional Security Complexes’ are objectively identifiable ‘subsystems’ in a neorealist 
world of anarchy, rooted in territoriality and defined by (perceived) security 
interdependence amongst its entities (states) (Buzan and Waever 2003: 11, 41-49, 80- 
87). As Buzan and Waever note, this framework does not deal with the political practice 
of “labelling regions”, that is, how regional spaces are constructed from the perspective 
of ‘the state’ and the meaning given to them, let alone how the state sees itself situated 
within a ‘region’ (Buzan and Waever 2003: 48).207
More fruitful for the present purpose is David Lake and Patrick Morgan’s (1997) 
conception of regions, which picks up Andrew Hurrell’s point that notions o f ‘regional 
awareness’, ‘regional identity’ and ‘regional consciousness’ are central to the analysis of 
regionalism. Hurrell even makes an explicit connection between nationalism and 
regionalism when noting that “as with nationalism, there is a good deal of historical 
rediscovery, myth-making, and invented traditions” within regions (Hurrell 1995: 41). In 
the same vein, and with a focus on the security realm, Emanuel Adler suggests that 
understanding of how people create security requires examining the link between their 
images of reality and “the places and regions that people feel comfortable calling 
‘home’” (Adler 1997a: 249). For Adler such places which are “perceived as ‘home’ and 
‘insideness’” are regions, defined not primarily on the basis of territory but values. In 
what echoes the Sprouts’ psycho-milieu, Adler describes processes of identification with
206 For overviews of the conceptualisation of ‘regions’ in IR, see Hurrell (1995); Lake and 
Morgan (1997, ch. 1); Buzan and Waever (2003: 77-82); Katzenstein (2005, ch. 1).
207 Less ‘objective’ yet also focused on state-state interaction is Katzenstein (2005).
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what he calls “regional systems of meanings” or “cognitive regions” (Ibid., 252-254).208 
Although Adler downplays the significance o f emotional attachment, contradicting his 
own emphasis on ‘feeling comfortable’, his discussion makes three important points. 
First, and most strongly, Adler sees these regions as an extension of what Ruggie called 
“social epistemes”, namely webs of meaning and signification emerging out of “the 
process by which a society first comes to imagine itself’ (Ruggie 1993: 157). As such, 
second, he not only emphasises the importance o f institutions and interactions within 
them as playing a major role in constituting such regions, but the region is also 
understood to be part o f ‘the state’. This is linked to, third, Adler’s notes how regions, 
understood as cognitive spaces, serve to provide a sense of being at ‘home’. Although 
the last two points are made more tentatively, they provide important conceptual 
openings when now moving to the specific phenomenon of the ‘European’ region.
The final clues are taken from studies of the ‘European’ region. This is not merely 
because the empirical puzzle deals with institutions addressing ‘European security’ but, 
in confirmation o f Hurrell’s (1995: 45) claim that the study o f European integration has 
done most to advance the theoretical analysis of ‘regionalism’, because the phenomenon 
of ‘Europeanisation’ comes closest to capturing the image o f a state unfolding in an 
experienced space. Most obviously, the process o f European integration invites 
conceiving o f ‘Europe’ as a dynamic space under construction. Attempts to come to 
terms with Ruggie’s (1993: 140) assessment that the spatial complexes associated with 
the EU “may constitute nothing less than the emergence o f the truly postmodern 
international political form” provide fertile ground for rethinking ‘the state’ in space.
If one looks beyond the debate between ‘supranationalist’ and ‘intergovemmentalist’ 
designs, and if one leaves aside complex attempts to conceptualise EUrope as forming 
some sort o f neo-medieval system, valuable ontological insights on how ‘Europe’ 
features in the spatial configuration of the state emerge in the debate around a ‘European 
identity’ (Smith 1997; Strath 2002). When research on whether ‘Europe’ had replaced 
the ‘nation’ as the primary point of identification among the population o f EU member 
states produced inconclusive results, scholars came to realise that there is no trade-off in 
the interplay between national and European identities. Instead of replacing the state, 
‘Europe’ was inscribed into the conception o f ‘the state’, suggesting that “the 
states/nations themselves have been transformed and the European level integrated into 
the meaning o f the state/nation” (Weaver 1998: 94; also Wallace 1997). This process has
208 Adler’s conception of cognitive regions jumps immediately to the relational level by 
emphasising their intersubjective nature. See the following chapter.
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been captured in the literature under the notion o f ‘Europeanisation’, encompassing both 
‘bottom-up’ and ‘top-down’ movements of how either ‘state’ representatives have 
transformed the ‘European’ landscape of governance (most visible in terms of law) 
through EU institutions or how the latter have shaped the Member States’ understanding 
of themselves as ‘European’ (captured on the individual level in the notion o f ‘going 
native in Brussels’). In contrast to Adler’s notion o f cognitive regions as purely 
intersubjective constructs, studies of ‘Europeanisation’ have demonstrated that the 
European space takes on a genuine national outlook and, thus, that states have different 
(subjective) conceptions of ‘Europe’ (Marcussen et al. 1999; Herzfeld 2002; 
Featherstone and Radaelli 2003).209 This ‘Europeanisation’ phenomenon comes closest 
to offering a conception of the state unfolding in a broader experienced space whose 
meaning is incorporated in the national narrative (see also Delanty and Rumford 2005).
That said, the ‘Europeanisation’ perspective has one weakness which it shares with the 
moderate constructivist narrative discussed earlier: by implying a progressive 
development, the Westphalian state remains the starting point and the ‘European’ 
dimension is conceived of as something new, a recent phenomenon which is product of a 
socialisation process through participation in European integration. Yet from a deep 
theory perspective this spatial conception is nothing ‘new’. While it arguably is the case 
that the EC (now EU) process has advanced a certain idea of Europe, as Pocock (1997: 
302) reminds ‘Europe’ has always meant different things to different people. States 
which are geographically located on the European continent have always contained a 
some conception of ‘Europe’ in their national narrative, a point made recently by Ute 
Frevert’s (2005) in her call for a ‘Europeanisation’ of German history.210
Parameters of Authenticity II: Unfolding in Time
This section substantiates the temporal dimension o f the national biography and, hence, 
to conceptualize how “the good [is] woven into my understanding o f my life as an 
unfolding story” (Taylor 1989: 47). Simply put, it is about exploring how meaning is 
generated and manifested in time. In discussing how an unfolding Self gains a sense of 
stability/continuity by turning ‘past’ and ‘future’ into meaningful places, the below also 
considers how the spatial features discussed earlier -  centre/soul, valued order and 
value-horizons -  feature in time. By doing so, the discussion also weaves in two of
209 See also Green Cowles et al. (2003); Radaelli (2004); Major (2005).
210 Paul Schroeder (1994) suggests that a shift towards thinking ‘European’ occurred around the 
time of the Vienna Congress in 1815. On the history of the idea of Europe, see Pagden (2002).
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Bergson’s points, downplayed by Heidegger, namely how meaningful experience 
grounds the Self emotionally and how experiences have creative potential.211
Past: M emory Spaces
The ‘experienced’ space is one which, by definition, brings out the past as a category for 
orientation. Said the other way around, as an accumulation of experiences, the past is a 
reservoir for inscribing space with meaning. This reservoir is accessed through memory 
or, more precisely, by “memory space” (Assmann, 1999). Memories have long been 
recognized as a force of orientation central Self-consciousness. Indeed, scholars of 
memory hold that a sense of Self is defined primarily, if not exclusively, by engaging 
with the past: “an understanding of the past...tells us who we are” (Lebow, 2006: 3).212 
While this claim is a bit too strong as it misses taking into account the future, for now 
the important point is that through memories or “frames o f remembrance” (Irwin- 
Zarecka 1994) the Self is linked to its past. Indeed one might even say the memoiy space 
is the past the Self lives in.213 The significance of memories for the national biography is 
that they are rooted in and thereby give access to experience (Koselleck, 1985). As 
Iwona Irwin-Zarecka emphasizes,
“we have by now become so familiar with accounts of how history can be 
rewritten, manipulated for political ends, forgotten, or embellished, that 
we may be at risk of losing from view the experiential bases on 
which...memory, rests. In the most direct terms, as people first articulate 
and share the sense they make of their past, it is their experience, in all its 
emotional complexity, that serves as the key reference point” (Irwin- 
Zarecka, 1994: 17).
Unfolding through a memory space requires a reflective Self as the process of 
remembering involves an evaluation -  learning and interpretation -  of experience. This 
process is intertwined with forgetting, indeed as Heidegger and others have pointed out 
that the latter is a necessary element o f the former (Heidegger 1953: 339; Assmann 
1999: 30; Bleiker, 1997). Thus the notion of memory space does not simply add another 
layer to the experienced space but substantiates the conceptualisation of the latter. It
211 Bergson’s account is otherwise less suitable for three major reasons. First, rather than 
rethinking the spatiality of being, his critique of the mathematical conception of space leads 
Bergson to reject the link between experience and space (Guerlac 2006: 63-65). Second, 
Bergson’s reading of ‘inner time’ as a unique mental/emotional state places too much emphasis 
on the inward-looking individual rather than one constituted via ‘worldliness’. Third, by focusing 
on the fusion of experiences and the moment of creation, past and future cease to be meaningful 
analytical categories. Heidegger was highly critical of Bergson’s ontology of Self and time which 
he considered “completely unbestimmt and insufficient” (Heidegger 1953: 333). On Heidegger’s 
engagement with Bergson, see Collins-Cavanaugh (2005)
212 See also Assmann (1999); Irwin-Zarecka (1994); Fentress and Wickham (1992).
213 Historians have long ignored memory as a credible source because of its subjective bias.
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asks how meaning is extracted from (or, rather, attributed to) experience and how it 
becomes part of the ontological structure of being. More precisely, it asks how memory 
and experience relate.
Irwin-Zarecka (1994) speaks of a “household” or “infrastructure” of memory, where 
memory is ‘held alive’ through various media and practices. Yet to say that ‘memory’ is 
held alive, scholars are divided over whether memories should be regarded as 
‘knowledge containers’ which store and recall ‘facts’ on demand, or whether they 
should be seen as an unsystematic source of sensations (Fentress and Wickham 1992; 
Assmann 1999). One way out is to adopt the suggestion made by Fentress and Wickham 
(1992) that the question is not about two ‘kinds’ of memory but about representation. 
Those memories which appear like replica of the past do so because they are translated 
into and made accessible through language, whereas those experiences which cannot be 
articulated remain ‘personal’. In other words, the matter is one of communicability: 
“what emerges at the point o f articulation is not the objective part o f memory but its 
social aspect” (Fentress and Wickham 1992: 7).
The notion of a ‘personal’ memory echoes Bergson’s notion o f ‘inner time’ constituted 
by the idiosyncratic fusion o f significant experiences mentioned in the previous chapter. 
While its exclusivity makes it a source of authenticity, when applied to the level of a 
national biography, that is, when assuming that memory is held collectively in a 
‘society’ or ‘nation’, this exclusivity is compromised o f course. Distancing himself from 
Bergson, Maurice Halbwachs famously spoke of the existence of such a “collective 
memory”, or the “social frameworks o f memory” (cadres sociaux de la memoire), as he 
originally termed it (Halbwachs, 1992 [1952]). A national biography is such a social 
frameworks which binds a society through shared meaning structures generated from 
experiences. More precisely, political agents compete for the most ‘adequate’ 
representation and seek acceptance for the same amongst those sharing the experience 
and identifying with the national biography.214 To understand how memory space can 
give rise to competing representations, it is necessary to take a closer look at the ‘nature’ 
of the experience.
214 The role of agency will be taken up towards the end of this chapter. The next chapter (seven) 
will argue that this representation occurs in a transnational setting, that is, involves not only the 
domestic constituency but also external partners.
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The Ambiguity o f Significant Experience
A memory space is created by a significant experience, vaguely defined as an experience 
which disturbs and reconfigures the world the Self had disclosed. It is foundational by 
way of unsettling the Selfs understanding of the world and, hence, its position in it. It 
leaves a deep emotional impression. An extreme version o f a significant experience is 
the ‘shock’, which could be seen as similar to that Heideggerian moment in which the 
Self is pulled back from the everyday and able to grasp the authenticity of its existence. 
The difference is that while Heidegger fixes that moment as one in which the Self 
‘faces’ its own death, the shock as a significant experience constitutes a source for 
authentic becoming by turning the past into a source for meaning through which the Self 
understands its being-in-the-world.
While a significant experience is not necessarily negative, they often are. Amongst them, 
war can be seen as forming a crucial if not the most important memory space in a 
national biography. The experience of violence, suffering and loss it entails leaves a 
deep impression amongst all involved. As one scholar notes, “no single act o f politics 
interferes so radically and so profoundly in the lives of people...as war” (Krippendorf 
quoted in Rast 2006: 16). Although the degree o f interference varies in a society, war 
affects and leaves deep traces in society and shapes those cadres sociaux de la memoire 
(Rast 2006). Psychoanalysts have discussed the impact of war in shaping the biography 
of those experiencing it and historians have discussed its effect on nationalism and the 
‘making’ of states. Indeed, the central place of war in the memory of ‘states’ as reflexive 
beings is central to IR since its inception. As discussed in chapter three, realist 
theorizing fundamentally builds on the argument that the experience of war conditions 
how states (should) orientate themselves in space and time.
A significant experience such as war cannot be reproduced but only represented, and 
even this is difficult as pointed out by scholars investigating the phenomenon of 
‘trauma’.215 Introduced by Freud used to replace the term ‘shock’, the ‘trauma’ was to 
describe the psychological effects witnessed among soldiers in the First World War 
unable to explain what happened ‘out there’, witnessed also among survivors of other 
‘unimaginable’ experiences such as concentration camps in Nazi Germany, the 
detonation of atomic bombs in Japan, or the American defeat in Vietnam (Edkins 2003). 
Phenomenologically, what makes (war understood as) trauma significant is that it cannot 
be ‘unmade’ or forgotten. The Self has to live with it, quite literally, in what Saul
215 Caruth (1996); Edkins (2003); Fierke (2003); Bell (2003); Alexander et al. (2004).
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Friedlander has termed “deep memory” (see Young 2003), inscribed in the very 
definition of a trauma as an “event that leaves indelible marks upon...consciousness, 
will mark...memories forever, and will change (the) future in fundamental and 
irrevocable ways” (Alexander 2004: I).216
In contrast to the notion o f a ‘critical juncture’ employed by institutionalists, a 
significant experience (shock/trauma) does not lay out a clear path on which the Self 
moves forward. Hence, against the view put forward by realists, the experience o f war 
does not necessarily generate distrust and pessimism. By intervening in the S e lfs  
understanding/knowledge of the world, it not only magnifies the feeling of anxiety but 
also opens up the view for possibilities of being which the Self had not been aware of 
previously (see below). In the taxonomy used here, the significant experience 
necessarily alters the configuration of the centre/soul and the drawing o f value-horizons. 
In that sense, it does marks a ‘turning point’ in the biography of the Self by both 
‘breaking’ ground and providing necessary opportunities for ‘(re)making’ ground. Yet 
because the meaning o f a shock/trauma cannot be exhausted, it is not historically 
deterministic but a source o f creativity, as noted by scholars like Bergson, Walter 
Benjamin, or Hannah Arendt. As noted in the last chapter, Bergson particularly 
emphasised the creative process coming out o f the fusion o f experiences, which 
transforms the memory space and poses a permanent necessity and opportunity to, as 
Arendt put it, “think experience” and use this thinking as a guide for activity (Althaus, 
2001 ).
Significant experiences thus become a source of energy through which moral lessons are 
derived. They leave places in the past marked through not much more than names -  
Verdun, Auschwitz, Hiroshima, Vietnam -  which ‘stand for’ something. And when this 
something (linguists would say the ‘signifier’) is filled with meaning they become a 
space for creativity.217 Thus, ‘making sense’ o f significant experiences associated with 
these places implies that the lessons derived from them are made. Because lessons are a 
creation of the Self and not intrinsic to the experience, it comes to no surprise that 
scholars examining the use o f ‘history’ among foreign policy makers find that analogies
216 A war experience does not need to be exclusively traumatic and may be offset by the 
experience of victory. The emotional experience of ‘winning’ has a significant effect on how the 
Self sees its place in the world, as the phenomenon of ‘triumphalism’ visible in post-1990 
American foreign policy testifies.
217 Assmann (1999: 372ff) discusses various examples of how memory takes the form of a 
‘treasure of suffering’ [Leidschatz] and becomes a creative driving force for ‘traumatized’ 
individuals.
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are contested and that ‘learning’ is an ambiguous process which does not lend itself to 
prediction.218
Future: Envisioned Spaces
For ‘thinking experience’ the past is not enough. Memory spaces cannot sufficiently 
center the Self, that is, control its anxiety and satisfy the desire for stability/continuity, 
for two reasons: first, as noted above, significant experiences will always remain a 
source of ambiguity, and the lessons ‘learned’ from them are never definite. Second, 
while the ‘grounding’ in memory provides a centre of gravity in the past, even a strong 
‘sense of history’ cannot tame anxiety simply because it does not address the uncertainty 
of the future. Hence, what is missing from the biography of the Self is how the 
‘historicity’ of being is linked to the future. More precisely, it is necessary to connect the 
‘historical being’ with the ‘future being’ by thinking about how the future becomes a 
meaningful place which can be, if not ever ‘known’, at least imagined.
The importance of the category of the future is apparent in the fact that unfolding is a 
forward-movement. Indeed, in Heidegger’s understanding o f the ‘structural whole’ of 
being-in-the-world, being as becoming is fundamentally future oriented. The unknown 
future is the source of anxiety and is responsible for the fact that ‘being’ is always 
incomplete, something not-yet. And because the mood o f anxiety is directed into or, 
rather, comes out of the future, the orientation towards and its desire to ‘understand’ 
(give meaning to) the future is the most significant element o f ‘being’ (Heidegger 1953: 
§65, 327ff.).
As noted in the last chapter, for Heidegger authenticity emerges out of understanding 
ones “ownmost [or: innermost] possibilities” (Heidegger 1953: §31, §68a). As a future- 
oriented being, the Self is constituted through its understanding o f that it can-be. Being, 
Heidegger writes is not a present thing [ein Vorhandenes] but is “primarily possible- 
being [Moglichsein]. Being is always that which it can be and how it is its possibility 
[wie es seine Moglichkeit « /]”. This possibility is not an “empty, logical possibility” as 
contained in contingency, where one is randomly expecting that this or that may happen 
(Ibid., 143). Rather than being a free-floating possibility, the possible-being Heidegger 
speaks about is that being which has understood that it could become one way or 
another. The understanding of this possibility of being takes the form of what he calls 
Entwurf which might be translated as design, which delineates “the room of manoeuvre
218 May (1973); May and Neustadt (1986); Jervis (1976); Khong (1992); Levy (1994).
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[Spielraum]” of what the Self actually can become. Yet as Heidegger points out the 
Entwurf is not a carefully thought-through plan which the Self follows but, rather, is an 
understanding the possibilities of being, of what it can become, as possibilities (Ibid., 
145). The designing [entwerfende] Self is envisioning the places it can unfold towards, 
projects them into the future and draws its horizon of expectations around them. And by 
understanding its possibilities, by seeing these places, the Self always already is these 
possibilities and, to that extent, already is in these places. As Heidegger writes, “Only 
because [the Self] is constituted through understanding and its design-character, because 
it is what it becomes [bzw] does not become, can it...say to itself: ‘become what you 
are!’” (Ibid., 145). In Malpas’ words, being is “always ‘on the way’...but that which it is 
on the way toward is the place in which it already begins” (Malpas 2006: 17).
Understanding ones ‘ownmost’ possibilities, then, is a key feature o f authentic 
becoming. Heidegger calls this vorlaufen, which literally means ‘running forward/ahead’ 
but may be better translated as advancing into or anticipating, basically capturing the 
formulation of an authentic future (Heidegger 1953: 336). He juxtaposes the vorlaufende 
Self with the Self on the path of Verfallen, where the S e lfs  understanding of its 
possibilities is blurred because by getting lost in the everyday the Self looses sight of 
what it could be. It does not recognise that only death limits the possibilities available to 
being and thus also does not recognise the future as its place. Such a future is 
inauthentic. Hence, in the process of Verfallen the Self does not really grasp the 
potential of ‘being towards’, of projecting meaning into the world o f the ‘not yet’, it 
lacks full awareness of the ‘not yet’ as a source of hope, promise, and possibilities. Even 
if the theoretical narrative developed here does not adopt Heidegger’s point that only in 
facing ones own death the ‘moment of vision’ emerges in which grasping authentic 
being is possible, it does adopt the view that the ability to delineate a distinctive 
meaningful future, which one is able to ‘claim’ and move towards, is necessary for 
authentic becoming.
Recognizing the possibilities of the future implies not only that the future is understood 
to be ‘open’ (although not open-ended), it also makes the future a space which provides 
its own source of energy. Whereas the memory space and the significant experiences it 
contains is an inexhaustible source of meaning, as noted earlier, the energy o f the future 
is found in its ‘pull factor’, that is, of providing the Self with an opportunity to ‘rethink’ 
experience the past and move on, or ahead, on a certain ‘course’. It lends unfolding what 
Heidegger calls Entschlossenheit, namely the resolve to realize a vision which, by doing 
so, it is becoming. Conceptualising authentic becoming -  the formulation of an authentic
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biographical narrative -  as the ability of understanding ones future possibilities is not to 
argue that visions of future places are designed out o f thin air, or that they are sterile and 
fixed. Rather, in correspondence with the above discussion, they are created through the 
memory space formed by significant experiences in a process of creative projection. 
This conceptualisation of the connection between past and future will be arrived at via a 
discussion of utopias/visions.219
Utopia as the Place to Be220
Enabling the Self to unfold into a meaningful future, utopias are a central element of a 
coherent biographical narrative. In a way, utopias or visions o f the ‘good’ order 
projected into the future provide the complementary anxiety controlling mechanism to 
the memory space created by significant experiences. A utopia transforms the 
‘surrounding’ space the Self has disclosed into one in which the Self situates itself in the 
future and turns the same into a meaningful place. It delineates an envisioned space and 
corresponding “horizons of expectations” (Koselleck 1985) which the Self sees itself 
unfolding into/moving towards and in the possibility of which it believes. By delineating 
this place to be, utopias provide the direction for unfolding and, as such, are confirmed 
through practices. As such, the vision toward which political leaders direct the narrative 
of ‘the state’ also directs their policies and, in that sense, means and ends merge.
Unfortunately, while IR scholars accept that decision makers may be guided by 
‘worldviews’, utopias carry an analytical stigma in the discipline and do not receive 
much analytical attention. Paradoxically, this stigmatisation was advocated and 
continues to be upheld by those scholars who first recognised its importance, namely 
realists. The insight that utopias matter has been central to IR scholarship since Carr 
noted that “utopianism penetrates the citadel o f realism” (Carr 2001: 85). Realism 
emerged as a normative-analytical corrective intended to warn policymakers ‘blinded’ 
by the wrong ideas of how the world works, and so giving analytical importance to 
utopias other than those advocated by realist worst-case scenarios was discouraged.221 
Although scholars have rehabilitated ideas and acknowledge that they may serve as 
“road maps” and “focal points” defining “the universe o f possibilities” in the future 
(Goldstein and Keohane 1993: 8), with Wendt at one point suggesting that state
219 I am using ’visions’ when referring to ideas of order projected into the future because 
‘utopias’ and ‘ideologies’ are too laden with meaning in the general understanding.
220 In that sense, the place attributed to utopias here contradicts the original meaning of the term, 
a fusion of the Greek words ‘ou’ (not) and ‘topos’ (place), hence literally ‘no-place’.
221 The stigma also has lead some politicians to deny that they are guided by visions, as former 
German chancellor Helmut Schmidt once remarked “the one who has visions should go see a 
doctor” (cited in Der Spiegel, 44/2002, p. 26).
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behaviour is guided by “self-fulfilling prophecies” (Wendt 1999: 184ff.), the realist 
critique has left its mark and makes a closer look at them necessary.
Utopias have always played a central role in social life. While the term is said to have 
entered the world with the publication of Thomas More’s book of the same title in 1516, 
this publication can be placed in the line with political writings envisioning order 
initiated by Plato (Logan and Adams, 1989). Formulations of utopias can be found in all 
philosophies promising progress in human affairs, whether Kant’s idea o f a perpetual 
peace, Hobbes’ formulation of the Leviathan, or Marx’ promise o f a classless society 
(Ruesen et al. 2005; Hutchings 2008). Karl Mannheim describes utopias as “methods of 
thought by means of which we arrive at our most crucial decisions, and through which 
we seek to diagnose and guide our political and social destiny” (Mannheim 1936: If) 
and Tower Sargent claims that “utopian thinking it essential for our social, political, and 
psychological health”, quoting Oscar Wilde saying that “a map of the world that does 
not include utopia is not worth even glancing at” (Tower Sargent 2005: 4).
While for some utopia is “the best of all possible worlds” (Nozick, 1974: 298), the 
present conception is more modest, It does not understand utopia as a promise o f 
paradise but merely as a vision of a better world. This follows Lyman Tower Sargent’s 
(2005) point that envisioning the ‘good life’ does not necessarily mean envisioning a 
perfect world. Indeed, one can go all the way back to More’s character, who sees a 
society which he considers preferable to the one he lives but not one without flaws 
(Moore 1989 [1516]: 109-111). At the same time, visions o f the future may also 
encompass a dystopia, that is, they may include pictures not only o f ‘better worlds’ 
(characterized by the good/desirable order) but also of undesirable ones (characterized 
by the bad/undesirable order). Dystopian visions are also projected into the familiar 
space and paint the picture of an unpleasant future. To be envisioned, they must be 
considered just as ‘possible’ as a utopia, and their purpose is to call for certain activities 
for averting the dystopia. As such, dystopias are used to envision and order the Self 
could become i f  it does not sufficiently invest into the path given by the utopia. In 
manifesting an image of a ‘worse world’, dystopias further strengthen the future as a 
meaningful place by reinforcing the contours of the ‘better world’ through an image of 
the alternative unfolding. However, while a utopia is likely to be strengthened through 
the parallel formulation of a credible dystopia -  a prominent pairing being that of heaven 
and hell -  it is not assumed here that a utopia is necessarily accompanied by a dystopia.
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An important question is when visions of the future, whether utopias or dystopias, are 
considered possible (credible/believable). This brings in the realist critique o f utopias. 
Perhaps most famous is Marx’ critique of ideology and his complaint that religion was 
creating happiness through an illusion.222 Yet Marx’ critique of ideologies is not only 
evidence that he was well aware of their influence in shaping human consciousness 
(which for him was ‘false’ until it recognized the material conditions as he saw them), 
the fact that he still devised his own utopia of a class-less society is testimony to the 
ambivalence the role o f visions have in ‘materialist’ (or realist) writings.
One prominent example is Karl Mannheim’s work. For Mannheim, who was influenced 
by Marx, ‘ideologies’ and ‘utopias’ are psychological phenomena transcending the 
historically formed order or, in his words, ‘reality’ (Mannheim 1936: 193). The central 
feature distinguishing ‘ideologies’ and ‘utopias’ is the static (or conservative) character 
of the former and the progressive (or revolutionary) character of the latter (Mannheim 
1936: 40). More precisely, for Mannheim ‘ideology’ is not only a self-deceptive 
understanding of the world but a state of mind whose strong value-orientation makes 
people unaware of the dynamic of ‘reality’, an artificial stabilizer rendering its bearer 
prone to misperceptions and, therefore, functions as a source of error. By contrast, 
utopias are states of mind “oriented towards objects which do not exist in the actual 
situation” (Ibid, 192) and aimed at transformation. They are ‘wish-images’ giving rise to 
practice challenging and breaking with “the order of things prevailing at the time”, 
which makes them revolutionary in character and different from ‘ideologies’ which 
Mannheim sees as more conservative.223 Yet while Mannheim gives a negative 
connotation to both, he tries to reconcile the tension in M arx’ by mentioning forward- 
looking ideas that are ‘appropriate’ in the sense that they neither ignore nor challenge 
the existing order but remain “’organically’ and harmoniously integrated into the world­
view characteristic of the period” (Ibid, 193). In other words, here the vision is 
‘transcending’ by going beyond but not breaking with what ‘is’ or, rather, if reality is 
understood as a historically condition order, what ‘was’.
Carr, the most prominent IR scholar discussing utopias, was influenced by both Marx 
and Mannheim (Cox, 2001: xix) and also struggles with both criticizing utopias and 
acknowledging their importance. He approvingly quotes Reinhold Niebuhr saying that
222 In his Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right Marx called religion “the opium of the people”. 
Marx/Engels’ critique o f ‘The German Ideology’ was influential in casting ideology as deceptive.
223 „Not until certain social groups embodied these wish-images into their actual conduct, and 
tried to realize them, did these ideologies become utopian" (Mannheim, 1936: 193)
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“the truest visions of religions are illusions, which may be partly realized by being 
resolutely believed” (in Carr, 2001 [1946]: 85). He balances his attack on the specific 
belief of a ‘harmony o f interest’ with noting that political thinking always contains an 
element o f utopia because aspirations are an inevitable, even necessary part of (political) 
life. Indeed, for Carr ‘utopia’ and ‘reality’ -  the conditions given by history -  are related 
in a dialectic movement in which ideals (utopias) become embedded in institutions and 
over time turn into ‘reality’. In this process o f ‘materialization’ the ideal looses its 
utopian character and is eventually challenged by a new ideal (utopia). Carr’s critique of 
‘idealism’ thus is compromised by recognizing that ‘pure realism’ can offer nothing in 
satisfying human aspirations; once a utopia is demolished, he concedes, “we still need to 
build a new utopia (...) The human will continue to seek an escape...in the vision o f an 
international order” (Carr 2001 (1946): 87). It is not difficult to see why Carr’s 
analytical frame has been labelled “utopian realism” (Booth 1991) and “peculiar 
realism” (Wilson 2001).
Even realist scholars accept the human need for utopias as an anxiety controlling 
mechanism, indeed by producing their worst-case scenarios they are in the business of 
producing their own. More generally, realists share Marx’ basic point that utopias are 
dangerous if divorced from certain historically grown structures.224 Thus, Mannheim 
calls for an ‘appropriate’ utopia and others stress ‘relative’, ‘limited’ or ‘robust’ utopias, 
that is, visions which build their transformative agenda into/onto the existing order of 
things rather than against it (Alexander 2001; Tower Sargent 2005). In addition to the 
from an ethical standpoint crucial warning against totalizing utopias,225 what societies 
consider an ‘appropriate’ utopia in the sense o f it fitting in the national biography points 
to the fact that visions of order are not invented in a vacuum. As noted earlier, for it to 
work as a meaningful reference, a vision must be considered possible and must have a 
reference somewhere, which means that place in the future cannot be radically ‘new’.226 
In other words, the purpose o f utopias is not to confirm the contingency of the future but
224 For a recent argument along similar lines, see Lawson (2008). Although Mannheim also 
acknowledges that judgment is relative by noting that the label ‘utopia’ tends to be used by those 
who believe someone else’s plans to be unrealizable, whereas for those following it a ‘utopia’ 
may well mean the reality of tomorrow (Mannheim 1936: 196, 203).
225 The problem being, of course, that what may appears as a ‘better world’ containing a ‘good 
order’ utopia for some may be an undesirable order for others. Utopias which are clashing or 
irreconcilable with, or even ignore the lives of, others may produce trajectories the pursuit of 
which lead to oppression and violence. Unfortunately, there are many examples of national 
biographies adopting such totalizing utopias, the one propagated by Nazi Germany being just the 
most tragic example. For a critique of flawless and ‘pure’ ideas of order, see Baumann (1991: 10; 
1997: Ch. 1).
226 The emphasis on the creative ability of the human to imagine the future disconnected from 
what ‘exists’ is prominent among feminist scholars, see Grosz (2005).
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to turn it into a domain o f envisioned possibilities which, in one way or another, must be 
known to be imagined (Koselleck 1985). Hence, envisioning the future must go 
‘through’ the past, through the experienced space in a narrative.227 Just as in M ore’s 
novel -  his character discovers an island similar to the size o f England -  utopias are not 
completely invented but inscribed into a familiar space. They build upon and transform 
the ‘experienced space’.
To be sure, this construction of expectations/visions/utopias out of experience does 
mean envisioning the future as a return of past as the realist cyclical view of history 
would have it. As noted earlier, significant experiences do not issue clear guidelines, 
they are ambiguous and indeterminate. The meaning given to an experience and the 
inscription of value into an experience occurs through the formulation o f the lesson 
taken from it. And because these lessons are used as future guidelines, their generation 
occurs with an eye to the future. In other words, exactly what is remembered and exactly 
which lessons are extracted from the memory space emerges only in the process of 
sorting future possibilities of being. They only emerge by being linked to a design for 
the future, by being embedded in a vision of what being-in-the-world can (should) look 
like. It is only through that vision that the experienced space becomes a project in which 
the Self is constituted as a temporal whole.228
Agency in the Biographical Narrative
This project is the formulation of an authentic national biography. Pursuing a 
meaningful vision through the memory space connects past and future to a coherent 
narrative and controls anxiety. More precisely, where horizons o f experience and 
expectation are fused, where the experiences space merges with a meaningful vision of 
its future composition, where the ‘lessons’ can be used to give life to a ‘project’ -  this is 
where the biographical narrative feels authentic and the Self feels at ‘home’. In such a 
narrative, the design of the envisioned space resonates with the soul, as captured by 
Gaston Bachelard when he speaks of space gaining significance through a poetic image 
(Bachelard, 1969/1994). Just like a poem, a meaningful utopia makes a connection 
which Bachelard describes as “a veritable awakening”, the possibility o f the onset o f an 
image which takes emotional root in the soul. Just like a poem, the project and the
227 As Koselleck points out, this connection between past and future used to be understood among 
historians when Geschichte was more a narrative which “did not primarily mean the past, as it did 
later; rather it indicated that covert connection of the bygone with the future whose relationship 
can only be perceived when one has learned to construct history from modalities of memory and 
hope” (Koselleck 1985: 270). On narrative, see also Carr (1986); Ringmar (1996); Campbell 
(1998).
228 On the notion of the state as a project, see also Jackson and Nexon (1999: 307ff).
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design of the future being-in-the-world it contains is simple, “the property of a nai've 
consciousness...in its expression it is youthful language” (Bachelard, 1994: xix). It is 
necessarily naive because otherwise it could not be creative; and it is necessarily simple 
because it needs to evolve. This project constructed in the interstices of past and future is 
both intimate and sufficiently vague to accommodate changing interpretations and 
allowing the project’s endurance.
Generating and sustaining a biographical narrative thus is more than an act of 
transmitting signals, of putting together some lose ends. It is, rather, an existential of 
being which requires not administrative but creative capacity, that is, agency. Agency 
here appears similar to what Emirbayer and Mische (1998: 970) have described as a 
temporally embedded process where decisions are informed (1) by the past, stimulating 
an element of iteration based on past patterns of thought and action (here: ‘learning’), (2) 
by the future, stimulating an element of projection based on the capacity to imagine 
alternative possibilities, and (3) by the present, stimulating an element of practical 
evaluation. In its reflexive capacity to synthesize spatio-temporal orientations this way, 
the Self becomes an agent in the form of what might be called a “relational pragmatic” 
(Emirbayer and Mische 1998). As this interpretative act is open to debate and 
contestation, it is political. Scholars have captured this under the notion of ‘identity 
politics’, which mostly focuses on the ‘politics of history’, with the ‘politics of the 
future’ receiving far less attention.229
The formulation of a national biography is a contested terrain in which political actors 
compete for voice and authority. While every society contains a variety of agents 
engaged to greater or lesser degree in the formulation and maintenance of a meaningful 
biographical narrative -  ranging from teachers, via artists and intellectuals to editors, 
curators and bureaucrats -  in this thesis authority is assumed to lie primarily with 
political leaders. More precisely, it focuses on personalities which obtain the authority to 
formulate and represent the narrative by virtue of their position as formally accepted 
(elected) heads of state. How this position of authority is reached varies with each 
society. Weber’s (1976: 28) famous discussion on authority, derived from the belief in 
the legitimacy of a certain person, or body, to formulate and uphold order, distinguishes 
between authority based on cost-benefit calculation, custom, or personal affection 
amongst those accepting the order. Said differently, Weber suggests legitimacy is 
granted through either a legal arrangement, a belief in tradition, or the leader’s charisma
229 For a comprehensive analysis of the politics of time which, unfortunately, I could not 
adequately incorporate in this thesis, see Hutchings (2008).
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(Weber 1992: 151-166). In most cases it is a combination o f the three, to which 
democratic political systems put in place mechanisms which ensure that the leader 
(knows he/she) is held accountable for the formulation and maintenance of the 
narrative.230
230 The securitization literature is beginning to address questions of authority, see Stritzel (2007).
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CHAPTER SIX: INTERSTATE RELATIONS AS FRIENDSHIP
Sum m ary
The previous chapter conceptualized the state as a national biography and outlined its 
spatio-temporal parameters. It was argued that the state, maintained by a community 
sharing a sense of ‘Self, controls anxiety and stabilizes its being-in-the-world world 
through a coherent narrative where meaning is inscribed in an experienced space ordered 
and bound by value horizons and projected into an envisioned space. The formulation of 
an authentic national biography through the merger of memories and visions, thereby 
connecting horizons o f experience and of expectations, was said to be a creative project 
pursued by political leaders. This chapter discusses the social or intersubjective 
dimension o f this narrative and suggests that it is formulated with significant Others, that 
is, in the context of a particular or ‘intimate’ relationship defined as friendship.
The insertion of the friend into the causal narrative occurs in five steps: first, it will be 
shown that Heidegger’s logic is unsuitable for reading authenticity into a social 
dimension (and criticises attempts doing so). Second, the chapter argues that friendship 
has been underconceptualized in IR and that existing accounts focusing on ‘group 
membership’ are unsuitable for accommodating desires of authenticity. Third, the 
ontology of unfolding through friendship will be substantiated by drawing on Aristotle, 
discussing equality and a unique logic of reciprocity as key aspects of friendship. Fourth, 
the friendship ontology will be adapted into a reading of ‘interstate’ relations bonded by 
overlapping national biographies to argue that creating such bonds in a particular space 
enables ‘states’ to gain social stability (satisfying desires for belonging/recognition) as 
well as maintaining a sense o f authenticity. Finally, discussing the empowerment effect 
of friendship through investment in a shared project, the chapter concludes with arguing 
that international institutions serve as platforms through which this project is negotiated.
The Limits of Heidegger’s Social Ontology
So far, the conception of ‘states’ as striving for an authentic national biography might be 
seen as creating what Charles Taylor calls a “culture of narcissism” (Taylor 1994: 55), 
as supporting an individualistic, anti-social and potentially conflictual reading of 
interstate relations due to clashing narratives of meanings and values. Such a reading is 
premature, however, because it is based on an incomplete ontology and an incomplete 
causal narrative. While the previous chapter described the process o f authentic 
becoming, of unfolding in space and time, as a creative process merging past and future,
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little was said about the place of ‘Others’ in this process. Yet if cooperation is to be 
explained on the basis o f a common interest emerging out o f and supporting individual 
(national) interests, defined as the creation and maintenance o f a coherent biographical 
narrative, then the role of the ‘Other’ in this process needs to be looked at more 
carefully.
A Hobbesian account o f the human condition rests on the basic acknowledgment that the 
Self is not alone in the world. And as hinted at already in the previous chapter, 
Heidegger also is well aware that disclosure of being-in-the-world inevitably involves 
relating to other beings and these others play a central role in the individual’s attempt to 
tame anxiety. As Charles Guignon reminds us, contrary to the view of existentialist 
philosophy as emphasising being as self-centred and inward-looking, Heidegger’s 
fundamental ontology is not one o f ‘rugged individualism’ (Guignon 1993, 2006). This 
view is advanced, in particular, by feminist interpreters o f Heidegger, who pick up his 
point that ‘being in’ is always also ‘being with’. They have come to devise a social 
ontology of the Self by reading Heidegger’s statement that “being with” [Mitsein] is an 
“existential characteristic o f Dasein” (Heidegger, 1953: 120) as an invitation to 
conceptualise the authentic Self as one which recognises its being as one of 
‘coexistence’ (Chanter 2001: 88ff; Odysseos 2002b, 2007).
Most recently, this is the approach taken by Louiza Odysseos, one o f the few IR scholars 
engaging Heidegger. She focuses on Heidegger’s discussion of the Self disclosing the 
world as a process in which it becomes embedded “in a world always already 
constructed by otherness, and one that is not of Dasein’s sole making” (Odysseos 2002b: 
397). This leads her to suggest that not only does Heidegger provide an account in which 
the Self inevitably coexists with the Other, even more so for Odysseos it reads as if 
“Dasein seeks the safety o f companionship with the other” because “the other delivers 
(the Self) from anxiety” (2002b: 390). While Odysseos recognises Heidegger’s 
argument that being lost in the Man is a state o f /'//authenticity, she argues that it is 
primarily so because being ‘lost’ means the Self has ‘forgotten’ its ‘radical 
embeddedness’. Said differently, for her an inauthentic Self is one which does not 
recognise that it is ‘permeated through and through by otherness’ (Odysseos 2007: 58). 
For her, authentic being is thus the process of “traversing toward a proper intelligibility 
o f itself as a heteronomously constituted and fundamentally coexistential being...a 
recovery of its dispersed being as a ‘s e lf” (Ibid., 96f.).
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In my view this postmodern reading of Heidegger’s notion of ‘being with’, specifically 
Odysseos’ conceptualisation of the “other-determined constitution o f the S elf’ 
(Osysseos 2002b: 397) is problematic. To begin with, at the centre o f Heidegger’s 
ontology is not ‘the Other’ but ‘the world’ which, as discussed in the previous two 
chapters, must be seen first and foremost as a spatial-temporal experience.231 Most 
importantly, an interpretation building on Heideggerian insights must offer an answer to 
what has been called the anxiety dilemma (see chapter four), namely to reconcile the 
desire for ‘stability’ (continuity/simultaneity) with the desire for authenticity, while 
conceptualising the latter as a distinctive conception of unfolding in space and time. The 
problem with Odysseos’ reading of authenticity as a ‘dispersed being’ is not only that is 
stands in tension with Charles Taylor’s notion of authenticity as something original, as 
being ‘true to m yself (see chapter four), but that it stands in tension with both accounts 
o f ‘social’ relations found in Heidegger.
The first account, which for Heidegger captures the dominant state of being-in-the- 
world, is being as getting lost in the Man. As outlined in chapter four, in this state the 
Self is thoroughly enmeshed in the ‘social’ world, yet this world is one without deeper 
meaning; in this world being with and through ‘Others’ in the role of the Man puts the 
Self in a groundless floatation and renders ‘becoming’ a process of Verfallen. It is an 
evasion/flight of the possibility of authentic being, which appears only when the Self 
‘pulls back’ from the Man and faces its own death. In short, Heidegger’s discussion of 
the social dimension in terms of the Man is primarily to clarify what authentic being is 
not.
The second account is the possibility of ‘Being with’ [Mitsein] arising in the (rare) event 
that the Self faces (comes to fear) its own death. In this moment, the Self is able to 
recognize Others as distinct Others (rather than a Man) which it can relate to, because 
consciously facing death provides a basis for authentic Self-understanding and, thus, a 
basis for recognizing its being with or, rather, alongside Others. As Robert Dostal puts it 
“the prospect of death dissolves the anonymous {Man) into myself and the other” 
(Dostal 1992: 405). However, while Heidegger in this context speaks about solicitous 
being with Others, being-with does not rest on a social ontology but on the precondition 
that the Self recognizes itself as a unique and ultimately lonely individual. Because 
relations with Others can only arise on the basis o f gaining authenticity as an isolating
231 In ‘the world’ the experiences made by the Self arise from encounters with other things, which 
can be of various kinds. Heidegger’s illustrations of the process of disclosing the world and 
lending meaning to it often involves engagement with tools rather than other humans.
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experience, that is, by cutting social bonds rather than building them, Heidegger’s 
conception of Mitsein in one of a relation without bonds. As a consequence, his 
treatment of human ‘togetherness’ in the state o f authentic solicitude remains “sketchy” 
at best (Dostal 1992: 406).232
In sum, while Heidegger recognizes that disclosing the world in both authentic and 
inauthentic states of being is tied up with encountering Others, the logic he presents 
cannot accommodate a truly social ontology o f authentic being. Consequently, rather 
than attempting to think about the social dimension o f authentic becoming through 
Heidegger, it is necessary to make a clear departure from him, specifically from his 
notion of authenticity as logically tied to the lonely experience o f facing death. Said 
differently, it is necessary to seek inspiration elsewhere for conceptualising authentic 
becoming in space and time as an intersubjective experience. This task is pursued in this 
chapter by (a) picking up Taylor’s (1994) suggestion that an authentic narrative is 
created not through a monologue but through dialogue with a significant Other and (b) 
combine this with Robert Dostal’s point that the weakness o f Heidegger’s conception o f 
authentic solicitude becomes apparent when compared with Aristotle’s discussion of 
friendship as a fulfilling relationship.233 It thus follows the line o f reasoning that 
“cooperation is ultimately based on understandings actors develop about themselves, in 
particular, recognition of the importance of relationships to fulfilment o f their deepest 
needs” (Lebow 2003: 311). Leaving Heidegger behind and moving to Aristotle as a 
source for inspiration, the argument put forward in this chapter, and my suggestion as to 
how Selves respond to the anxiety dilemma, is that friendship defined as an intimate 
relationship allows for authentic unfolding within a social setting.
Friendship Matters (but is Missing from IR)
Friendship is complex and difficult to define, but scholars exploring the phenomenon 
agree that one of its core characteristics is intimacy. A review of scholarly definitions 
and survey responses suggests that friendship is commonly understood as a relationship 
satisfying cognitive and emotional needs and characterized by reciprocity, trust, 
openness, honesty, acceptance, and loyalty. Trust and openness is seen as both engaging
232 Indeed, on the basis of a review of all of Heidegger’s publications (available by the time he 
wrote his article) Dostal concludes that in Heidegger’s philosophy there is “no development of 
the understanding o f ‘Being-with’ (Mitsein)” (Dostal 1992: 408).
233 For Dostal the lack of attention paid to the phenomenon of friendship is one of Heidegger’s 
great ‘failings’, not because he was not aware of it but because his ontology provides no logical 
space for it. Thus, Mulhall’s (2005: 143f) attempt to insert friendship into Heidegger seems rather 
fruitless.
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irn intimate self-disclosure and keeping confidential information, while honesty and 
loyalty is linked to authenticity and genuine commitments (Fehr 1996: 3-16). These 
features coalesce in the view that friendship is a special relationship and that ‘true’ 
friends are few in number (Ibid; Allan, 1989; Pahl, 2000), a view which sociologists 
share with moral philosophers who see it as a particular and morally significant 
relationship affecting the Self (Blum 1993; Jollimore, 2001). Hence, they agree that a 
meaningful understanding o f friendship does not treat it as bond of solidarity among all 
humankind but as a partial or intimate relationship and, thereby, necessarily exclusive 
(Thomas, 1993; Friedman, 1993). Through this exclusivity, friends are seen as 
reinforcing and moulding each other’s sense o f Self by creating moral certainty and 
social capital for pursuing common projects, capable o f both carrying and transforming 
order through a space marked by intimacy and reciprocal assistance.234
These insights, which appear in writings on friendship all the way back to Aristotle, 
have not been picked up by scholars of international politics. To be sure, claims of 
‘friendship’ and ‘special relationships’ are found regularly in statements of government 
officials and political commentators, and from Morgenthau onwards the ‘friend’ is a 
word commonly used in the IR literature. However, little in-depth thinking about the 
meaning of friendship between states has occurred in IR. On the rare occasions when it 
is discussed, it is done thinly. Arnold Wolfers discusses the phenomenon of amity yet 
does not go beyond describing it as “a relationship of ‘going it with others’” based on 
“ inward-oriented” incentives such as promoting welfare and peace (Wolfers 1962: 27f). 
And Wendt, who notably suggests that IR needs a theory o f friendship, does not go 
beyond portraying it as a ‘Kantian culture’ where relations are characterized by non­
violence and mutual aid, mainly differing from alliances by being expected “to continue 
indefinitely”, which does not much more than echoing Adler’s reformulation of 
Deutsch’s security community (Wendt 1999: 298fi). More promising is Lebow’s 
drawing on classical Greek writers to suggest that friendship is vital for sustaining 
communities through ‘honest’ dialogue, or Janice Bially Mattem account o f the 
sociolinguistic construction of ‘special relationships’ and their importance for building 
order. Yet while offering valuable pointers, they also do not engage with theories of 
friendship in philosophy and social theory (Lebow, 2005; Bially Mattem, 2005a).235
234 On friendship’s impact on ‘identity’, see See Allan (1989: 59ff); Pahl (2000: 68f), Giddens 
(1991: 87-98). In contrast to philosophers (Hutter 1976) and early sociologists like Simmel 
(1950: 126), sociologists long assumed that the intimate character of friendship had no broader 
consequence for society. However, they changed their mind, see Allan (1989, 1998).
235 For a discourse analysis tracing the meaning ‘friendship’ or ‘amity’ has taken on in 
international politics, who uses it, why, and to what effect, see Roshchin (2006).
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The main reason for the thin conceptualization o f friendship in IR is the dominance of 
the Hobbesian ontology of the state as an autonomy-seeking entity, discussed in chapter 
three.236 It is not only the realist narrative which is unable to imagine friendship as a 
special relationship but also moderate constructivists who have to rely on the social 
contract, entered through reason and/or socialization, as a theoretical solution. Yet 
Kantian contracting partners, keeping open the promise o f universal membership, do not 
qualify as friends.237
The Issue of ‘the Other’
Even those constructivist attempts to depart from Hobbes and rethink interstate relations 
through a social ontology have neglected friendship as an intimate relationship. While 
there is consensus among constructivists that stabilization o f the Self occurs through 
ordering practices in a relationship involving ‘Others’, there is considerable 
disagreement (if not confusion) when it comes to specify the ‘nature’ o f the Self-Other 
relationship, that is, when it comes to the question how to conceptualize ‘Otherness’.238 
As noted earlier, diverse and potentially contradictory readings are rooted in the fact that 
the very notion o f ‘identity’ contains an insolvable tension between meaning ‘similarity’ 
(relationality) and ‘distinctiveness’ (individuality) between which all kinds o f Self-Other 
conceptualizations can flourish.239 Broadly speaking, two approaches can be identified in 
the IR literature, those emphasizing the Other as the ‘enemy’ and those emphasizing the 
comfort of ‘the community’.
The Conservative Limit o f (the Enemy ’
On one side are those who scrutinize and thereby emphasize that the Self turns the 
‘Other’ into a negative, an opposite, an enemy.240 Scholars like David Campbell (1998a) 
argue that foreign policy is mainly about the identification o f a threatening Other for the 
purpose of manifesting national Selfhood. This argument rests on the assumption that 
the Self gains knowledge o f what it is through an understanding what it is not. More 
precisely, it takes a specific reading of the consequence of this differentiation, which is
236 On the challenge modernity’s concern with individualism poses for conceiving of friendship, 
see King and Devere (2000).
237 Wendt’s ‘Kantian’ reading of friendship as a (potentially global) non-war community must be 
differentiated from Kant’s own discussion of friendship, which Blum describes as being 
“sensitive and sensible” (Blum, 1993: 203). Kant recognized that “to be the friend of everybody 
is impossible, for friendship is a particular relationship” (cited in Jollimore, 2001: 43).
238 See Kearney (2003); Neumann (1999); Hopf (2002); Rumelili (2004); Diez (2005).
239 See Heidegger (1957/1969); Brubaker and Cooper (2000), and chapter three.
240 Campbell (1998a); Weldes (1996); Neumann, (1999); Behnke (2004); Williams, M. (2003).
149
inspired by William Connolly’s argument that identity “requires difference” which is 
then turned into (negative) otherness (Connolly 1991: 64). To put it briefly, Connolly 
argues that the dualism of good and evil is not only central to religious doctrines but 
underlies all constructions of identity. Only through distinctiveness is the particular 
identity o f the Self assured, and this difference is turned into (negative) otherness, that 
is, degenerates into a hierarchical relationship to reassure the identity, or sense of Self, 
as “intrinsically good, coherent, complete” (Ibid. 65). Eager to guard the (illusion of) 
‘true’ identity, those questioning this truth are declared evil, or irrational/mad in the 
secular version (Ibid. 8). While according to Connolly this “problem of evil” resides 
within “structures of personal identity and social order” (Ibid, 3), he notes that turning 
difference into (negative) otherness is a “temptation” rather than a disposition. Adopted 
to the terminology used here, one would say that negative Othering is used as an anxiety 
controlling mechanism.
The focus on the ‘negative Other’ is also dominant among scholars who see international 
politics through a Schmittian lens, that is, who accept Carl Schmitt’s (1932) definition of 
the political as a decision identifying enemies and friends. As Schmitt’s primary point 
was to locate the meaning of politics in the act of making the distinction, not speculating 
about the specific meaning this distinction may take, the ‘friends’ category only appears 
as fundamental to politics because it is the opposite of enemy, not because it possesses 
an intrinsic value. Friendship is substantiated neither by Schmitt nor by any of his 
adaptations in IR, if anything, Schmitt is read as “the thinker o f the enemy” (Derrida 
1997: 161).241
Scholars emphasizing that Selves focus on the ‘negative Other’, or the enemy, as the 
stabilizing relationship could argue that this allows for the generation and maintenance 
of an authentic sense of Self. Indeed, this argument would even allow maintaining a 
Heideggerian notion of authenticity because the enemy raises the spectre of ones death 
by holding with Derrida that “the true enemy is a better friend than the friend. For the 
enemy can hate and wage war on me ( ...)  if he desires my death, at least he desires 
it... singularly” (Derrida 1997: 72). Yet even if one would find a way to ground ‘hate’ in 
an account of the human condition, there are a number o f problems with this argument. 
First, a process of ‘negative Othering’ says very little about the Self except that there is 
something it is not. Second, if a positive sense o f Self is gained by being hated, a 
relationship of mutual hatred and, hence, confrontation favours a conservative ontology
241 See Williams (2003); Behnke (2004); Prozorov (2006).
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o f the parties involves. Hate necessarily is fixated on a certain image of Self and, 
therefore, is ill suited for conceptualizing the relationship as a source for the creative 
unfolding, more suitable for a realist ontology o f states as fixed entities.242 Third, as 
visible in Connolly and Campbell, it risks losing the social dimension. The formation of 
national Selfhood is a domestic enterprise where the Other is merely a passive enemy- 
image, without agency, constructed for the purpose of demarcating national 
boundaries.243 Finally, while an account emphasizing mutual hatred could accommodate 
the desire for recognition stressed by social theorists, it cannot account for the 
complementary desire to belong. This latter point will need to be looked at more 
carefully.
The Elusiveness o f  ‘the Community’
The view that desires of belonging and recognition drive behaviour is found among 
scholars exploring ‘positive’ identification and the formation o f social or ‘collective’ 
identity (see chapter three).244 After Mead, the social dimension o f Selfhood was 
captured in Erik Erikson’s notion of ‘collective identity’ and has been further explored 
by social psychologists, most notably through the development o f social identity theory 
around Henri Tajfel, who argued that collective identity is seen as “that part of an 
individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership in a 
social group” (Tajfel 1978: 63).245 The key argument coming out o f this research is that 
groups make individuals ‘feel good’ by satisfying desires of belonging.246 In what 
echoes Anderson’s (1999) notion o f ‘simultaneity’, the desire for ‘belonging’ is seen as 
expressing the S elfs desire to have access to stable structures of meaning and thereby 
provide cognitive-emotional assurance. Brubaker and Cooper mention the “emotionally 
laden sense of belonging to a distinctive, bounded group” as an important avenue for 
researchers of the formation of Selfhood (Brubaker and Cooper 2000: 19). Logically 
desires for belonging are only satisfied when met with recognition, the need of which is 
a prominent element in Hegelian philosophy and revived by Axel Honneth, who locates 
the desire for recognition in Mead’s ‘I’ to suggest that the claim to recognition “is 
anchored in every subject as an enduring motive” (in Haacke 2005: 88; Honneth 2003; 
see also Gutmann 1994).
242 See also the argument by Mitzen (2006) of how states become locked-into a relationship of 
rivalry.
243 This risk also arises in the conceptualization of friendship, see below.
244 Wendt (1994, 1999); Mercer (1995); Risse-Kappen (1995); Weller (1999); Hall (1999).
245 On Erikson’s contribution, see Straub (2002). On ‘social identity’, see Jenkins (2004).
246 Smith (1991); Greenfeld (1992); Kratochwil (1996); Calhoun (2003); Migdal (2004).
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A number of IR scholars have used these insights to argue that desires for belonging and 
recognition are incentives for interstate cooperation. For instance, Larson and 
Shevchenko (2003) argue that Gorbachev’s new thinking was a consequence o f seeking 
recognition by ‘the West’ as a great power, Merje Kuus (2001) shows that Estonian 
security discourse in the 1990s and the question of NATO membership primarily 
evolved around the aim of becoming a member o f ‘the West’. Wendt (2003) even 
suggests that the desire for recognition will lead states to form a world state. These are 
useful pointers, yet for the current purpose these arguments have one weakness. While 
desires for belonging and recognition can be read as expressions o f the SelFs desire to 
tame anxiety by being with Others, the suggestion that these desires are satisfied through 
‘group membership’ or being part of a ‘community’ does not quite work as well when it 
comes to satisfying a desire of authenticity. Conceptually, the terms o f ‘collective’ and 
‘community’ are just one step away from Heideggers’ Man and too broad/generic for 
hosting a Self seeking authenticity.247 For this, a focus on friendship emphasizing the 
particular/special relationship is necessary.
To be sure, some studies recognize the importance of special relationships. One group of 
scholars speaks of “distinct communities” expressed in metaphorical structures of 
‘family of nations’ (Brysk et al., 2002: 268), yet this remains vague conceptually just 
like Huntington’s notion of “kin-countries” (Huntington, 1993: 35). More indicative are 
Thomas Risse-Kappens’ analysis of bilateral relations among NATO allies during the 
Cold War and Bially Mattem’s account of the British-US relationship during the Suez 
crisis (Risse-Kappen 1995; Bially Mattem, 2005a). Both focus on the interdependence 
of two specific state ‘identities’, embedded in broader conception of ‘the W est’. An 
understanding of ‘the West’ as a shared project must not necessarily lead to a falling 
back into the ‘group membership’ narrative. However, rather than theoretically 
anchoring this ‘West’ as something devised from within the special relationship, in their 
discussion the special relationship ends up as a function of the East-West conflict. From 
here it is not far to Jonathan Mercer’s (1995) adaptation o f social identity theory, where 
the value of group membership is reduced to winning a competition against another 
group and, thus, where the negative Other returns in form of an ‘out-group’ as the 
decisive factor which keeps the ‘in-group’ together.
247 For a critique of IR’s use o f ‘collective identity’, see Weller (1999), for ‘community’ see Tilly 
(1996) and Brown (1995). For a more substantial treatment see the introduction to Adler (2003).
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Where to go for a conceptualization of Selfhood formed within a special relationship? 
Interestingly, one place is Mead’s discussion of the formation o f the ‘M e’, the same 
source that generated the quasi-consensus among scholars that the social element o f 
Selfhood is provided by ‘community’ or ‘group membership’. This consensus brushes 
over Mead’s account o f the socialization process as one emphasising two stages: in the 
early stage of development the Self gains particular experiences in interaction with 
“significant others”, such as family members or friends, and only in the second stage the 
individual’s identity forms through adaptation to the larger community, which he terms 
the “generalized other” (Mead 1934: 154), which blends with Heidegger’s Man. The 
reason why the crucial role of the ‘significant other’ in the self-fulfilment process has 
been ignored by scholars can be explained with Mead reducing its relevance to a mere 
‘first phase’ or ‘stage’ and his subsequent argument that “the essential basis and 
prerequisite o f the fullest development” occurs through the adaptation to the ‘general 
Other’ (Ibid.). In that sense, Mead’s ontology deems the ‘generalized other’ as more 
relevant than the ‘significant other’.
This thesis suggests the reverse. It picks up on Mead’s insight that self fulfillment 
emerges out o f a conversation between ‘I’ and ‘Me’ yet without allowing for the Self to 
get lost in a conversation with the ‘general Other’. Said differently, the task here is to 
retrieve the ‘significant Other’ as the one “whose opinion matters most”248 as the partner 
who can satisfy both desires of belonging/recognition and authenticity. In Taylor’s 
words, “the key loci o f self-discovery and self-affirmation” is found on the “intimate 
level” (Taylor, 1994; 36), which is to say that in their attempt to combine the desire for 
authenticity with the desire for belonging/recognition, ‘individuals’ seek intimate 
relations. The next step is to conceptually ground such relations in friendship by going 
back to Aristotle.249
Aristotle: Others as Selves
Friendship is a central theme in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (NE), which is still 
considered the most substantial work on the subject.250 For Aristotle, as for most 
philosophers in ancient Greece, friends are an essential part o f life, “for no one would
248 The definition of the ‘significant other’ is from Hoelter (1984: 255).
249 Taylor does not pursue the friendship perspective, given his stance that “it would be utterly 
wrong...to draw the boundaries any narrower than around the whole human race” (Taylor 1989: 
6f). See also Giddens’ discussion of ‘pure’ relationships, friendship being one, which he sees as 
of “elementary importance for the reflexive project of the Self’ (Giddens, 1991: 87-98).
250 Cooper (1980); Smith Pangle (2003). For an overview of friendship in classical thought, see 
Devere (2000); Easterling (1989); Hutter (1978).
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choose to live without friends, even if he possessed all the other goods” (NE, Book VIII, 
1). Beyond the common assumption o f his days about the sociability o f human nature, 
Aristotle sees friends as central to the individual’s attempt to achieve virtue and 
happiness, which he considers the highest goal in life. (NE, Book I). Happiness is 
associated with stability, and thus as something which opens the experience of time by 
giving faith and certainty (Derrida 1997: 15). More than cognitive certainty, happiness is 
“a certain sort of activity of the soul in accord with virtue” and, thus, an emotional state. 
It also is not a property one is bom with, or which can be obtained in isolation, but 
something that comes into being through activity with friends (NE, Book IX, 9). In line 
with some commentators, this fundamental human sociability and the emotional desire 
to be with others is read here as a response to anxiety.251 In other words, the emphasis 
that friends are vital for emotional well-being (happiness) is understood to mean a 
feeling of having satisfied desires for belonging and recognition without loosing 
authenticity. In that sense, Aristotle provides an account o f how self sufficiency is 
relational “dependent upon and interwoven with others” (Sherman 1993: 94).
Aristotle differentiates between three different types o f friendship, namely friendship of 
utility, of pleasure, and of excellence (NE, Book VIII, 3).252 Only the latter amounts to 
excellent or ‘true’ friendship, because in the first two cases friendship is ‘instrumental’ 
in the sense that it cannot contribute to true happiness.253 A state o f happiness, for 
Aristotle, is a state of moral fulfillment and true friendship “is the friendship of good 
people similar in virtue” (NE, Book VIII: 3). Virtue is difficult to define in the abstract 
yet can be broadly defined as knowing what is ‘the right thing to do’. In accordance with 
his view that happiness is achieved through activity (or experience) Aristotle also 
emphasizes that virtue is expressed not only in knowing what is ‘right’ but also acting 
accordingly.254 Moreover, in what nicely fits into the perspective o f authentic becoming, 
for Aristotle virtue is neither a fixed property nor acquired naturally but obtainable 
primarily through activity with friends. As Sherman points out, this means that friends 
not only choose each other on the basis of a shared ‘sense of...commitment and ends,
251 Smith Pangle (2003: 15); Sherman (1993: 95).
252 Aristotle notes that complete friendship may well accommodate the previous two. For an 
influential discussion of the different forms of friendship, see Cooper (1980).
253 See also Smith Pangle (2003: 39ff); Pahl, (2000: 13ff).
254 For Aristotle virtue is about finding an intermediate between excess and deficiency, about 
expressing feelings such as pity, pleasure, anger, or pain in an appropriate and measured way. 
Having these feelings “at the right time, about the right things, toward the right people, for the 
right end, and in the right way...is proper to virtue” (NE, Book II: 6). For an attempt to pin down 
Aristotle’s notion of virtue, see Smith-Pangle (2003: 143-5). To “walk together in the path of 
virtue” also underlies the Confucian conception of friendship, see Kutcher (2000: 1618).
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and a sense of what we take to be ultimately good’, they also develop their moral 
capacities together over time (Sherman 1993: 97). In what points to a creative 
relationship of mutual learning, from an Aristotelian perspective “the virtuous agent 
continues to grow, and ... friendship itself is the most congenial context for such moral 
growth” (Ibid., 99). Hence, friends are functioning both as “moral witnesses” (Friedman) 
to each other and as active generators of the moral space in and through which their 
Selves unfold.255 For Aristotle the true friend thus takes on the role o f another-Self. The 
“shared life” (Sherman) of friends is marked by two important features worth looking at 
more closely.
Reciprocity
First, friendship operates on a unique logic of reciprocity. In his discussion of the 
‘Object of Friendship’ Aristotle emphasises that friendship is based on reciprocated 
goodwill (NE, Book VIII, 2 and 8; Smith-Pangle, 2003: 142ff). In the case o f ‘true’ 
friendship, such reciprocity does not follow a ‘tit-for-tat’ logic and cannot be seen in 
terms of an instrumental or utilitarian notion of exchange.256 Although he notes that “we 
should, generally speaking, return what we owe” (NE, Book IX, 2), and that friendships 
between those in formally unequal positions (see below) have to give proportionally, 
Aristotle argues that “friendship seeks what is possible, not what accords with worth”, as 
returning what is ‘worth’ is impossible in some cases (NE, Book VIII, 14, emphasis 
added). In the case where there is a friendship between unequals, Aristotle suggests the 
returns are (should be) different: “the superior should get more honour, and the needy 
person more profit” (Ibid.).
However, it appears there really can be no expectations among true friends about what 
exactly is being returned. As Aristotle puts it, “friends who give services because o f the 
friend himself are not open to accusation [of inappropriate return] since this is the 
character of friendship that accords with virtue”. Any return that is made “ is not 
measured by money and no equivalent honour can be paid; but it is enough ... to do 
what we can” (NE, Book XI, 1). Hence, there can be no ‘accusations’ for inadequate 
returns in true friendship, simply because both aim for what is good, and because the 
good is shared both benefit from activities contributing to it (NE, Book VIII, 13). Hence, 
the notion o f ‘debt’ as commonly understood has no place among friends, and the value 
of services exchanged is unique to their relationship and cannot be objectively fixed.
255 The notion of the friend as a ‘moral witness’ comes from Friedman (1993).
256 Hutter (1978: 3); Pahl (2000: 55). On the utilitarian notion of reciprocity as used in game 
theory, see Axelrod (1984: 4ff.).
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Friends trust each other that they contribute what they can/deem necessary, and so “if 
friends ‘owe’ [each other] anything, it is only thanks” (Smith Pangle 2003: 128). 
Furthermore, Aristotle notes that friends would neither provide ‘bad’ action for each 
other, nor request such action from the friend. Instead, Aristotle appears to endorse well- 
meant criticism among friends when he suggests that “it is proper to good people to 
avoid error themselves and not to permit it in their friends” (NE, Book VIII, 8).
Although the precise logic of this reciprocity remains unclear, there is no doubt true that 
for Aristotle friendship involves a unique kind o f ‘reciprocity’ which serves both sides 
as a mean to further and display virtue and reach ‘inner harmony’ (i.e. tame anxiety) and 
is characterised by the fact that friends ‘wish good to each other for each other’s own 
sake” (NE, Book VIII, 3).257 Hence, something done ‘for’ the friend cannot be seen as an 
exchange occurring between distinct individuals, just like wishing each other well 
cannot be grasped in terms of ‘selfless’ behaviour but is better seen as a merging o f self- 
interest and other-interest.258
Equality
The unique logic of reciprocity is intrinsically linked, second, to friendship as a 
relationship among ‘equals’. By definition, the Aristotelian notion o f true friendship 
formed among those similar in virtue is one characterised by equality, as the friend who 
perceives the Other as ‘another Self cannot conceive of this Other as inferior or 
superior. Equality in friendship, then, does not refer to a right but to a recognition of 
mutual benefit, contributing to each other’s happiness (NE, Book VIII, 2, 3 and Book 
IX, 8). Yet while true friends necessarily recognise each other as equal in this sense, the 
question is whether this is affected by and can be upheld in a situation in which the 
individuals stand in a formal institutional or otherwise functional relationship of 
hierarchy. Here, Aristotle is ambiguous.
On the one hand, he suggests that inequality in standing can be compensated through 
similarity in virtue and mutual love, a view echoed by most theorists of friendship who 
consider it the one thing which can transcend otherwise divisive hierarchies (Aristotle 
suggests that superiority in power and position rarely goes along with superiority of
257 Reciprocity was also important for Socrates, who equally struggled with grasping its nature
(Smith Pangle 2003: 21f). For a comprehensive discussion of how a logic of consequentialism
has no place in friendship, see Jollimore (2001).
258 On altruism in Aristotelian friendship, see Blum (1993).
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virtue).259 It is clear that the gap influences the logic o f reciprocity; however it is less 
clear to what extent it suffices to recognize each other as virtuous and adapt the ‘returns’ 
as noted above, and to what extent the gap puts more burden on the formally ‘inferior’ 
side to ‘give more’. Certainly Aristotle emphasizes that there are different kinds of 
inequality and suggests that each “must make the return that is proportionate to the types 
of superiority” (NE, Book VIII, 13). On the other hand, Aristotle argues that true 
friendship between ruler and ruled is difficult, if not impossible, as is being friends with 
kings or gods. The emergence of significant and gaps in, for instance, wealth is likely to 
corrupt the logic of reciprocity among friends by generating unequal expectations, 
thereby becoming a cause for the dissolution of friendships (NE, Book VIII, 7 and 14). 
This theme will be taken up again in the next chapter. For now, it suffices to say that 
while Aristotle’s ambiguity regarding the prospects of friendship across formal 
hierarchies does not invite conclusive or one-sided arguments, at least not in the abstract, 
it can be said that considering and treating each other as ‘equal’ despite differences in 
‘standing’ is a fundamental aspect of friendship.
In sum, Aristotle confirms the need for ‘being with’ and grounds it in friendship as an 
intimate social space marked by equality and a unique logic o f reciprocity. Yet how can 
these insights be translated to relations among states? More precisely, how can they be 
inserted into the causal narrative seeking to explain government decisions for investing 
in international security institutions? The remainder o f this chapter is devoted to 
answering this question.
The ‘In-Between’ of Friendship
For the purpose of conceptualizing interstate relations as friendship, it is useful to start 
by confirming that ‘friendship’ is actually a relationship and, thus, can be political. This 
is necessary because Aristotle’s notion o f true friendship as an extension of self-love can 
be seen as collapsing the Self with the Other. As Derrida suggests, when Aristotle 
emphasises “friendship seems to consist more in loving than being loved” (NE, Book 
VIII, 8 and Book IX) he seems to place more importance on ‘knowing rather than being 
known’, making the friend a narcissist construct rather than something arising between 
individuals. Hence, Derrida criticises Aristotle’s understanding o f true friendship for 
being ‘total’ and ignoring difference, that is, for not recognizing the separateness of
259 NE, Book VIII, 7 and 11. Aristotle even notes that friendship is possible between master and 
slave insofar as they recognize each other as human beings (NE, Book VIII, 11). See also Hutter 
(1978); Kutcher (2000). For a view that Aristotle does not provide a convincing account for ‘true 
friendship’ across hierarchies, see Smith Pangle (2003: 101f.).
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Selves (Derrida 1997: 11). The reading of true friends linked by an organic bond 
merging Self and Other is similar to what Hannah Arendt calls ‘fraternity’, a label she 
uses for relations grounded in unconditional love and characterised by closure and 
homogeneity. Such relations for Arendt are apolitical, even antipolitical because they are 
akin to natural relations: “love...destroys the in-between which relates us to and 
separates us from others” (Arendt, 1958: 242; Chiba 1995).260
One does not need to read totality into Aristotle’s notion o f true friendship, certainly not 
if reciprocity is considered the ‘object’ of friendship and if there is room for disputes and 
the dissolution o f friendship.261 Yet those voices are important to remind us that in order 
to conceptualize friendship as a political relationship it must be conceived “through a 
philosophy of difference so as to be rendered politically relevant” (Chiba, 1995: 522). 
This does not compromise the understanding of friendship as an intimate relationship262 
but points to the ‘in-between’ o f friendship as the space where the bonding occurs.
In IR terminology, it requires conceptualizing friendship between states through the 
‘inter’ (of the international). As Fred Halliday notes, the ‘inter’ is basically understood 
to denote “links between states” (Halliday 1994: 6).263 For approaches grounded in a 
Hobbesian ontology, the ‘inter’ is not filled with much substance but understood to be 
the space outside Westphalian borders with their dual nature as a simultaneous divider 
and the arena where states come to meet. This ‘meeting’ space is a realm defined by 
strategic interaction, also called a ‘theatre’ (Aron, 1966: 183), where states are reduced 
to ‘actors’ calculating how to achieve their objectives by taking into account the 
presence, understood as the activities and resources, of other ‘actors’ (Ibid, 191; Ruggie 
1993). To reframe the discussion in the third chapter, for realists, the space is reduced it 
to a map about the relative distribution of military capabilities (Aron 1966: 95ff); for 
institutionalists the ‘inter’ is filled with institutions managing economic 
interdependence, even reading it as a ‘trans’ (Keohane and Nye 1989), and for 
constructivists and English School the ‘inter’ is a realm o f order filled with mutually 
recognised norms (varying in thickness), such as sovereignty (Bull 2002; Wendt 1999).
260 Arendt’s discussion of ‘fraternity’ is set against her reading of friendship as involving 
heterogeneity and potentially global (Chiba, 1995: 520). Like Derrida, Arendt views politics as 
based on the plurality of being, as “about togetherness and being-with of the diverse [der 
Verschiedenen]”. Politics for her is about managing relations and thus “develops in the in- 
between and manifests itself as the relation” (Arendt 2003: 9f. emphasis added).
261 For how friends retain their separateness in Aristotle’s true friendship, see Sherman (1993: 
102-107).
262 Hutter (1978); Friedman (1993); Jollimore (2001).
263 For a discussion going in a similar direction, see Kratochwil (2007)
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Even though the latter two perspectives gradually compromise the Waltzian’ reading of 
the ‘inter’ as a realm ontologically separate from ‘the state’, the ‘inter’ still remains a 
space o f strategic interaction and, thus, reduced to “points of convening” (Latham 2002: 
133). The idea of interstate friendship as a relationship revolving around a shared sense 
o f ‘being-in-the-world’ offers a different reading, as discussed next.
Defining International Friendship
To begin with, friendships do not form because o f geographic proximity, economic ties, 
or some kind o f increased ‘interaction’.264 And while similar religions or similar political 
systems designate broad ideas o f order embedded in histories and visions for the good 
life, they do not provide sufficient ground for friendship bonds. They are too broad to 
satisfy the desire for authenticity and meaningfully capture the particularity o f 
friendship. These factors may, individually or in combination, facilitate the emergence 
and maintenance o f friendship, yet by themselves they do not make for intimate 
relations. For friendships to form and sustain, there must be some sort o f ‘attraction’. 
The concept is useful because it provides an alternative to the socialization argument and 
recognizes that friendship is a voluntary relationship, based on choice. If we combine 
this with the definition of the significant Other as that one “whose opinion matters most” 
(Hoelter 1984: 255), we arrive at Peter Blau’s note that, generally speaking, attraction 
rests on approving of each others opinions (Blau 1964: 69). On the question opinions 
about what, the answer offered here picks up the threads developed in the discussion so 
far.265
In basic terms, states form a friendship through a shared project o f ‘world building’ in 
which their national biographies are embedded. More specifically, friendship designates 
a an intimate relationship revolving around a shared sense of ‘being-in-the-world’, that 
is, a shared sense o f situatedness in space and time within which structures o f meaning 
are established. Bonds of friendship develop through a shared experienced space and the 
agreement o f transforming it into a shared envisioned space by coming to agree on an 
idea of the good order, that is, by agreeing on lessons from significant experiences and 
how to translate them into a common project lending significance to a shared future. One 
could say their ‘inner time’ becomes ‘social tim e’ through a convergence o f horizons of 
experience and expectations, through the formulation o f a shared utopia inscribed into a
264 On how increased interaction does not necessarily create communal bonds, see Brown (1996).
265 Like Aristotle, for contemporary scholars there is no blueprint or ‘typical’ form of friendship 
(Allan, 1989; Porter and Tomaselli, 1989; Fehr, 1996).
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certain space to which the parties become emotionally attached and commit to. In that 
sense, one could adapt C. S. Lewis’ suggestion that friends at any point in time give an 
affirmative answer to the question Do you see the same truth? (Lewis 1993: 42) by 
changing the question to Do you see the same world? Seeking and sustaining that Other 
which sincerely answers ‘yes’ is the ‘common interest’ in friendship.
Yet ‘sharing’ in the sense of agreeing to ‘see the same world’ does not mean a total 
merger, which would take away the space of the in-between. To reiterate the point made 
with regard to Aristotle’s notion of true friendship, there never is a total merger of 
national biographies and so friends can never completely ‘know’ each other (although, 
as discussed in the next chapter, they may be mislead to think they do). In a fundamental 
sense this is because, as discussed earlier, the temporal dimension of the Self makes it 
impossible to ever ‘know’ itself in its entirety simply because the Self is always also not- 
yet. Yet also the worlds they disclose and inscribe with meaning over the course of their 
unfolding and the visions they contain cannot be identical. An agreement o f seeing the 
‘same world’ really is an agreement, and is perhaps better understood as a commitment, 
confirmed through practice, for an intimately shared world which both consider possible 
and desirable. To use the terminology of the Sprouts, the milieu’s two states are situated 
in may overlap to greater or lesser degree (and in the case of friends the overlap is 
obviously great) but “no two [states] are environed by exactly the same milieu” (Sprout 
and Sprout 1965: 204). The shared world and its horizons delineating the shared moral 
space must always allow for some “personal maneuvering space” (Herzfeld 2002).
The primary reason why the conception of the ‘in-between’ cannot be identical is, of 
course, because the variety (or uniqueness) of experiences makes a truly common 
history impossible (Wagner 2002). While significant experiences are ambiguous, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, this lack of determinism not only makes the 
generation o f a shared world possible but also means that even those who share the 
experience never completely agree on what to do with it, that is, on its representation. 
Within a society, the lessons learned from significant experiences are often contested 
and so the shared place in the past is a compromise, an act of negotiation over 
representations and lessons with the view towards the creation of commonalities. It 
emerges in “the interaction between those who propose to the see the past as something 
shared, and those who let themselves be convinced to accept such representation for 
their own orientation in the...world” (Wagner 2002: 51).
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Thus, friendship is a project of shared world building. In this process o f devising a 
common storyline both sides feel comfortable with shared utopia/visions play a key role. 
As discussed earlier, the future is not only a source o f anxiety but also a source of 
energy. Because of its openness, the future has more room for shared world building 
than memory: it is through agreeing to a common place in the future that memory 
spaces, and the lessons learned from them, can be adjusted. And it is also in the shared 
vision of the ‘good order’ where trust is established. Trust, which in general terms is 
about “plac[ing] the fate of ones interest under the control o f others” (Hoffman 2006: 
17), is fundamentally about the future, about expectations that my becoming is taken 
into account “in some relevant way”.266 As Giddens points out, trust is based not so 
much on past experiences, let alone subject to a rational decision-making process, but 
presumes “a leap to commitment, a quality of ‘faith’ which is irreducible” (Giddens 
1991: 19). While in friendship this faith may not be ‘reducible’ it is anchored in the 
understanding that there is a mutual commitment to build a shared world. Friends trust 
each other because the shared vision which aligns horizons o f expectations is not 
controlled by one or the other but produced together.
Friendship as Empowerment
For specifying the process of world building we must return to the question of the 
political in friendship. Here it is important to note that the exclusiveness of friendship 
does not require falling into a Schmittian reading o f politics as making the distinction 
between friends and enemies, a reading which inevitably produces a black-and-white 
reading of the international (Behnke 2004). While friends may come to agree on a 
common enemy, no serious philosophy/sociology o f friendship, and certainly not one 
inspired by Aristotle, considers enmity vis-a-vis third parties to be a necessary condition 
for creating bonds of friendship. After all, the very reason why sociologists have long 
ignored friendship is because it is in many respects an inward-oriented relationship. 
While friendship does have external effects (see below), it excludes but does not 
automatically oppose others. Consequently, the argument made here goes against the 
view that a stable sense of Self requires both an Other the Self identifies with (the 
‘friend’) and one it identifies against (the ‘enemy’), as in Zygmunt Baumann’s assertion 
that “building and keeping order means making friends and fighting enemies” (Baumann 
1991: 24). Rather, it suggests that intimate relations are outnumbered by relations where
266 See also Russel Hardin’s account of trust in relationships: “I trust you with respect to some 
action if your reason for doing it is to take me into account in some relevant way. Typically your 
reason will be that it is in your interest to maintain our relationship. Hence, my trust in you is 
typically encapsulated in your interest in fulfilling my trust” (in Hoffman 2006: 21). See also 
footnote 15.
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there is no commitment to shared world building and where no emotional stakes are 
involved, an image where friends are surrounded by what has been called “familiar 
strangers” (Milgram 1972).
For the Aristotelian conception of politics as finding the (common) good it is redundant 
to ask for the ‘political’ in friendship relations. But if political relations are understood 
with Karl Deutsch (1967) as relations o f ‘power’ this needs to be specified. Within 
friendship relations one can identify two interrelated types o f power phenomena, one of 
empowerment and one o f ‘soft power over’. The latter will be picked up in the next 
chapter; here the argument is that by taming anxiety and providing self-confidence, 
friendship is a source o f empowerment for authentic becoming.
As noted by all scholars since Aristotle, learning from each other is intrinsic to unfolding 
within friendship and an important source for ‘moral growth’ and provision of 
happiness, that is, of taming anxiety. In stabilizing the horizons of each others’ 
biographical narratives, friendship processes are mutually strengthening Self-confidence 
and, in this sense, also enhance a sense of Self-sufficiency. Yet the creative force 
emerging out of friendship relations, the energy drawn from imagining a common future 
and the resolve to engage in a shared project is not merely stabilizing, it is empowering. 
This process of ‘world building’ (Chiba 1995: 523) expresses Arendt’s reading of power 
as the ability “to act in concert” and to achieve/produce something together (Arendt 
1970: 44). In other words, the power at work here is productive (power-to) rather than 
coercive (power-over). It not captured in the “opportunity [Chance] to have one’s will 
prevail [durchsetzen] within a social relationship”, as in Max Weber’s famous definition 
(Weber 1976: 28, author’s translation) but in the creative potential of the ‘in-between’, 
that is, power is expressed in an ‘emerging property’ generated through social exchange 
(Blau 1964), rather than by having something pre-existing prevail.
Importantly, in this process o f world building, friendship does not merely ‘strengthen’ 
the Self but inevitably transforms it as well (Friedman 1993: 195-202; Allan 1989). As 
noted earlier, national biographies cannot ever become identical and, indeed, the creative 
potential of friendship is drawn from unique understandings o f ‘being-in-the-world’. It 
builds on a conception of inner time in which experiences and expectations are formed, 
enables to exchange views and provide each other with slightly different perspectives, 
thereby stimulating the learning process. As Marilyn Friedman notes,
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“the experiences, projects, and dreams of our friends can frame for us 
new standpoints from which we can experience the significance and 
worth of moral values and standards. In friendship, our commitment to 
our friends, as such, afford us access to whole ranges o f experience 
beyond our own” (Friedman 1993: 197).
This learning process requires, obviously, that friends are willing to share concerns and 
to listen, that they are open for learning and moral growth. It is also here, in the 
provision of satisfying desires for belonging/recognition and in mutually providing 
stimuli and energy for common projects where friends relate as equals and contribute on 
a unique logic of reciprocity. In this sense, commitment to ‘world building’ is also a 
commitment to ‘burden sharing’, although not one that rests on a quantifiable division of 
labor. Empowerment understood as a transformative process implies that friends must 
not only “respect and take an interest in one another’s perspectives” (Friedman 1993: 
189) but are also willing to adapt (and recognize the benefits from doing so). For states 
conceived as national biographies this implies the willingness to adapt domestic orders 
and the narratives which uphold them, which echoes James Rosenau’s notion of states 
as “adaptive entities” constantly changing in response to stimuli from “salient 
environments” (Rosenau 1981). To be sure, this does not rule out the possibility that 
disagreements arise over how to read ‘the world’, what matters is that compromises are 
made not in response to coercion but voluntarily, arrived at through deliberations 
characterized by respect for occasional divergence o f views and the willingness for 
mutual understanding, solidarity and, again, learning (Risse-Kappen 1995). Friendship, 
then, does not fall into place but is an investment, a political project.
The empowerment process, expressed in the pursuit o f a common project, affects 
international order at large. Overlapping experienced spaces are likely to be shared 
with/inhabited by others and so the world built by friends is not that intimate, which is to 
say that the ‘in-between’ in friendship relations is not an exclusive space. By providing 
each other with ‘voice’, the agenda pursued by friends also weighs in interaction with 
third parties and is likely to affect them. The application o f a double standard may not 
merely exclude ‘third parties’ from decisions and leave them in the dark about the ‘real’ 
reasons for doing X or Y,267 the decisions taken may be very well directed against third 
parties. Hence, the finding by philosophers and sociologists that friendship affects
267 As Goffiman puts it “the self that is revealed in our dealings with our friends is closer to our 
self definition than the ‘self we portray in other contexts...friends are permitted ‘backstage’ 
more than most” (in Allan 1989: 59).
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society (Hutter 1978; Allan 1989) can be applied to the international level and supports 
Biially Mattem’s suggestion that special relationships are sources o f international order 
(Bially Mattem 2005a).
Institutions as Platforms for Negotiating World-Building
As noted earlier, friendship among ‘states’ as an evolving relationship is about 
negotiating a shared project across formal state boundaries, about entwining national 
biographies in a shared space. This negotiation is done by governments ( ‘heads o f state’) 
who have been given the mandate from, and are held accountable by, their domestic 
constituency to ‘represent’, administer and protect/enhance the national biography and 
negotiate it with government representatives o f the friend-state. Thus, the negotiation 
process takes place in a ‘two level game’268 where institutions play a crucial role. In the 
domestic setting institutions vary with the political system, and in most societies they 
encompass a complex setting in which political parties, parliament, courts, the media, 
and other public and private sector groups debate the national biography on the basis of 
a formal constitution. While these ‘domestic’ institutions may also organize themselves 
across formal borders, thus thickening the transnational space on the level ‘below’ the 
government, focus here is on how government representatives negotiate the shared 
project through formal international institutions.
More precisely, the argument is that states do so primarily through international security 
institutions. To be sure, what is ontologically secure, that is, what provides the national 
biography with a sense of coherence and authenticity, may well include ideas about 
economic order. Thus, the logic of the causal narrative presented here does not 
necessarily limit institutions to those formally in charge o f ‘security’. However, such 
institutions are explicitly devised to protect ‘the state’ and, in the reading presented here, 
a national biography. Moreover, it could be argued that security institutions are 
concerned with the use of force, and the definition o f what accounts for a legitimate use 
o f force, central to Weber’s definition of the state, is a key element o f ideas of the ‘good’ 
order inscribed in national biographies. Even in that case, security institutions, including 
those often described as military alliances such as NATO, are understood here as 
political platforms through which the very meaning o f ‘security’ for the Self and its
268 Or what Harald Mueller (2004) has called a “two-level discourse”, although 1 shy away from 
using the term ‘discourse’ to avoid the impression that shared world building is a purely 
rhetorical exercise.
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world is established, that is, agreed upon with friends. As such, the function of 
institutions is different from the realist reading o f stabilizing a certain distribution of 
economic/military ‘power’, and from the institutionalist reading o f mediating anarchy by 
providing reliable information for members with pre-existing common interests. Instead, 
institutions are seen here as platforms for creating a common understanding o f ‘being- 
in-the-world’, used by friends to negotiate, administer, and manifest the common 
project. They are, in short, vehicles for shared ‘world building’.269
To a degree, the purpose o f international institutions to facilitate the convergence of 
horizons of experience and expectations encompasses Krasner’s (1983: 2) definition of 
institutions as “principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which 
actor’s expectations converge in a given area” . What is missing from this definition is 
that institutions, as understood here, are forums for creating a valued order. While they 
also come to embody this order, it is more in form of holding an architectural promise 
for creating a certain moral space. Institutions come to symbolize the common project 
and are thus placeholders for the envisioned space that friends are unfolding towards; 
they are sites creating the ‘illusion’ of an eternal temporal structure providing the 
comfort that the future can be planned. This makes institutions projecting rather than 
preserving bodies, platforms for devising and pursuing shared visions and for 
administering the potential through which friends can carry out activities towards this 
end. In that sense, institutions are uncertainty-reducing structures, as friends investing in 
them confirm their commitment to a shared path, although without institutions 
themselves manifesting that path.
As inter-subjective constructs which are used by friends as platforms for building a 
shared world institutions only possess what John Ruggie (1998: 62) calls “transordinate 
authority”. Consequently, the relevance of an institution is dependent on the vitality of 
interstate friendship, which makes for a more limited reading of the influence of 
institutions along the lines suggested by Lebow (2003: 326f.) in contrast to those 
scholars emphasizing their socializing power (see previous chapter). And because 
intersubjectivity among friends is never total and their common project always subject to 
negotiation (and confirmation), institutions are not static but dynamic. Just as the entities 
investing in them, they unfold over time and are never complete (Wallander 2000).
269 For a discussion of institutions as structures of empowerment, see Ringmar (2007).
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In sum, the purpose of institutions is both symbolic and practical, serving as forums for 
negotiations and as a frame for common (expected) practices, providing friends with a 
space for devising a shared utopia and enabling them to confirm their commitment 
through co-operation. An institution through which this is achieved, that is, through 
which friends can weave together their national biographies in a shared project, through 
which a valued space can be imagined and moved towards, satisfies their respective 
‘national security interest’. To complete the causal narrative, the question then is why a 
state would invest in a new institution. This question will be addressed in the next 
chapter.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: PROCESSES OF ESTRANGEMENT AND 
EMANCIPATION
Summary
The previous chapter argued that states invest in common security institutions for the 
purpose o f controlling anxiety through common ‘world building’ project with friends. 
More precisely, it was argued that friendship understood as an intimate relationship 
allows for authentic becoming in a social setting and that institutions enable them to 
negotiate a shared narrative of order in space and time in which respective national 
biographies -  their sense of authentic ‘being-in-the-world’ -  can be embedded. This 
chapter continues the argumentative path to explain why states would invest in 
new/alternative institutions. It suggests that they do so when the existing institutional 
arrangement and the friendship sustained through it ceases to function as an anxiety 
controlling mechanism. More precisely, it puts forward the argument that the decision to 
invest in a new institution is an expression of a weakening/deteriorating friendship 
undergoing a process of estrangement and the decision to strengthen bonds with an 
alternative significant Other in a process of emancipation.
The argument is made in four steps: First, it explores what threatens friendship through 
the broader question of what poses a threat to ‘identity’ manifested in a social 
relationship, attention is directed to ambivalence. Second, it is argued that ambivalence 
arises in the figure of the stranger which enters friendship relations from within through 
a process of friend-tuming-stranger, or ‘estrangement’. Third, the chapter outlines what 
characterizes an estrangement process and points to some causes which may put 
friendship onto this path before, fourth, discussing two possible strategies for affected 
states of dealing with such a process, namely ‘adaptation’ and ‘emancipation’. The 
chapter concludes with some guiding thoughts on what can be expected when applying 
the causal narrative developed thus far to the empirical study o f the German-American 
relationship.
Conceptualising the ‘Existential Threat’
The intuitive answer to the question why a state would invest in a new institution is that 
it considers the old arrangement inadequate (or, as utilitarians would say, inefficient) in 
fulfilling the function it was set up for. In the theoretical frame developed here, it means 
the institution has become inadequate in providing ‘ontological security’ in the sense of 
enabling the Self to construct and ‘live’ (formulate and practice) a coherent biographical
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narrative inscribing meaning into time and space through a project devised with friends. 
Given the close link made in the causal narrative between costly investment in an 
institution and the maintenance of friendship, an exploration of what renders an 
institution ‘inadequate’ consequently requires taking a closer look at what 
undermines/weakens friendship. Said differently, to understand what makes an existing 
institutional arrangement inadequate requires a better understanding o f what generates a 
feeling o f ontological insecurity, that is, what poses an ‘existential threat’ to a stable 
sense o f Self generated within friendship. The task is thus to think more carefully about 
what possesses the potential to destabilize the narrative o f ‘authentic becoming’ 
generated with a significant Other and to give some clues where ‘it’ comes from.
Although there are some useful hints, IR scholarship fares poorly when it comes to 
conceptualizing the threat to socially constructed ‘identities’ and specifying how it 
emerges among states. The initial group of moderate constructivists dealt with the 
‘existential threat’ in two ways, both of which end up with an argument where such a 
threat has disappeared. The first does so deliberately and is most apparent in Wendt’s 
work. In his progressive narrative of states moving towards a Kantian world the ‘threat’ 
(along with ‘power’, tellingly) gradually disappears. When states move away from that 
Hobbesian ‘state of nature’ in which relations are characterized by a fear of war towards 
a world in which relations are peaceful and trusting, threats are socialized away 
accordingly.270
The second reason for why the existential threat drops out o f the causal narrative among 
moderate constructivists is a logical mistake found in the discussion by Adler/Barnett 
and Cronin. Like Wendt’s Kantian cultures, security communities are marked by 
expectations of peaceful co-existence amongst its members; yet in contrast to Wendt 
these works also rely an ‘ingroup’ versus ‘outgroup’ dynamic to explain how states 
come to share a collective identity. In this context, they cannot avoid noting that 
understandings of peaceful coexistence shared within the community may not be shared 
with those situated outside and, thus, may involve conceiving o f non-members as 
enemies. While this is safely rooted in Social Identity Theory, the logical mistake arises 
in conceptualising these outsiders/others as a threat to identity (Adler and Barnett 1998: 
56, also Cronin 1999: 141). As noted in the previous chapter and further below, the 
labelling of the excluded ‘Other’ as a ‘threat’ or ‘enemy’ is a political act to stabilise the
270 Again, this shows that Wendt has not gone beyond realist ontology when it comes to 
conceptualising what constitutes an existential threat. He only mentions in passing the “psychic 
threat of not having standing” (Wendt 1999: 237).
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sense o f Selfhood rather than endanger its existence (Campbell 1998; Walker 1993; 
Huysmans 1998a).
Two recent works exploring the socio-linguistic ties o f the Anglo-American ‘special 
relationship’ by Steele (2005) and Bially Mattem (2005b) offer some promising hints for 
conceptualising ontological insecurity. Steele looks at the British decision not to 
intervene in the American Civil War, which he attributes to Lincoln’s Emancipation 
Proclamation framing the war as one being fought over the issue of slavery. This would 
have made an intervention in support of the South inconsistent with the view that slavery 
was immoral and thus, according to Steele, would have undermined Britain’s 
biographical narrative. In short, the decision not to intervene was thus made to avert a 
threat to British ontological security (Steele 2005: 523, 538). Whereas Steele provides 
little conceptual guidance on the phenomenon of ontologically insecurity and does not 
embed it in a social ontology, Bially Mattem’s discussion o f the temporary breakdown 
of the special relationship between London and Washington in the 1956 ‘Suez crisis’ 
goes one step further. To explain why the Anglo-American friendship was eventually 
repaired, she suggests that ‘national identity’ was threatened by normative inconsistency 
produced by the breakdown of the special relationship. According to Mattem, mutual 
accusations of violating shared values/norms fundamental to the Western order in which 
American and British narratives of national Selfhood were embedded generated 
“episteifiological disorder” and, thus, threatened ontological security on both sides. And 
so “to prevent their very existence from cascading away” political leaders in London and 
Washington decided to re-produce ‘Anglo-American we-ness’ (Bially Mattem 2005b: 
57, 79, 121 and Ch. 7; see also Risse-Kappen 1995).
Although both analyses fall short of providing a substantial theoretical argument for this 
process, what emerges is the suggestion that national biographies are threatened by 
normative inconstancy/incoherence and that its emergence is somehow linked to 
‘discord’ in a special relationship. Part of the task of adapting this insight to the present 
theoretical argument is to conceptually substantiate what kind o f ‘discord’ is posing an 
existential threat, and why. Then there is the question when it occurs. Steele speaks of 
‘critical situations’ when “states must make a decision about who they are” (Steele 2005: 
537) and Bially Mattem of ‘crises’ as “moments during which statesmen...come to view 
[an] event as so divisive that it demands a complete reassessment o f the status quo 
relationship” (Bially Mattem 2005b: 57). While they have little to say about what makes 
certain situations ‘critical’ or why some moments turn into a ‘crisis’, both authors 
suggest that ontological insecurity emerges in the context o f wars/violent conflicts, more
169
precisely in the act o f interpreting such conflicts and integrating them into the meaning 
structure and o f being-in-the-world.
The following takes up these hints to conceptualize the threat to/weakening o f friendship 
and, correspondingly, the investment in a new institution, in accordance with the causal 
narrative presented so far. The guiding thought is that, having argued that ‘authentic 
becoming’ is established on the social level, the threat to the same must emerge from a 
loss of these social bonds into which the biographical narrative is embedded.271
Difference?
It is useful to start by addressing the prominent misconception that authentic becoming 
is threatened by ‘the enemy’, touched upon earlier, and the more fundamental but 
equally problematic notion of ‘difference’. One prominent source o f this mistake is 
Connolly’s discussion o f ‘the Other’ touched upon in the previous chapter. For 
Connolly, the identification o f evil and its synonyms, such as the enemy, is a political 
act to ‘fix’ difference, and this act of fixation is done because difference is seen as a 
threat to the attempt to establish a ‘true’ identity (Connolly, 1991: 71). According to 
Connolly ‘difference’ is perceived as threatening for those seeking a ‘true’ identity 
because it suggests that the ‘ultimate’ answer to what is, or can be, is not possible. 
Hence, “the threat is posed not merely by actions the other might take to injure or defeat 
the true identity but by the very visibility o f  its mode o f  being as other” (Ibid., 66, 
emphasis added). This view is echoed by Campbell who notes that the existence of “an 
alternative mode of being” denaturalizes the claim of a particular identity to be the 
“true” identity (Campbell, 1998: 3). Hence, to “secure identity in its truth” and keep 
difference at bay, everything that appears ‘different’ is fixed as the enemy ‘Other’ and 
degraded to an inferior status. Through this act of fixation the (perceived) threat to the 
Self disappears, which means the portrayal of the Other as ‘enemy’ (or evil) functions as 
a stabilizer of conceptions of Self (see also chapter six).
That said, Connolly sows confusion through his suggestion that the threat to the Self 
comes from ‘difference’. This sits uneasily with his portrayal of the fixed and non­
threatening Self-Other relationship for two reasons. First, his suggestion that the Self is 
capable of recognising difference, that the visibility o f ‘being other’ can be grasped as a
271 Here my argument further inverses Heidegger’s logic. While Heidegger does not explicitly 
address the issue of the existential threat, as discussed in chapter four he does offer a conception 
of what threatens ‘authentic being’, namely the process (the temptation) of Verfalien (although 
the irony is, of course, that the Self does not ‘know’ this threat). This theme is visible especially 
in his later writings on the impact of technology (Dreyfus, 2006: 361).
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possibility implies that this ‘other mode o f being’ already is part o f the meaning 
structure the Self ‘knows’ and, hence, moves within the horizons it understands. Such an 
understanding o f the possibility o f a different ‘mode o f existence’ is not a destabilizing 
experience. The reasoning applied here is similar to the one behind the argument that an 
apocalyptic scenario o f the future, a dystopia, does not pose an existential threat to the 
Self. As discussed in chapter five, any substantial vision of the future is a projection 
providing the Self with a meaningful reference and serving as an anxiety controlling 
mechanism. Rather than facing ‘nothing’ the Self sees ‘something’ unpleasant coming, 
which provides a sense of direction and purpose in the determination to avert the 
scenario from becoming ‘reality’. And this something must be ‘known’, must be 
considered possible. Just like dystopias can only be imagined by drawing on past 
experience, so difference can only be recognized if it is already part of the world the Self 
has disclosed.
Second, locating the threat to the Self prior to the act of ‘fixation’ is difficult to reconcile 
logically with the view that a stable sense o f Self is socially generated, that is, in a 
relationship. For there to be a conceivable ‘threat’, the Self must be in a state of 
ontological security and, hence, must already have identified its ‘Other’, which in 
Connolly’s version is the ‘enemy’. The threat must come after the act o f ‘fixation’ and, 
if we follow Connolly’s logic, from disappearance of ‘the enemy’. Ronnie Lipschutz 
(1995: 217) captures this in a well-known anecdote about a Soviet diplomat noting to an 
American colleague in the final days o f the Cold War: “We are about to do a terrible 
thing to you. We are going to deprive you of an enemy” . Adapted to the present 
argument, which takes friendship rather than enmity as the social relationship in which a 
stable sense o f ‘being’ is obtained, the threat emerges in the ‘disappearance’ o f the 
friend. Before engaging this, it is necessary to clarity what happens in this process by 
taking a closer look at the condition which the Self, striving for authentic becoming, 
fears.
Ambivalence!
The argument pursued here follows Jef Huysmans (1998a: 241), who relies on Zygmunt 
Baumann to argue that the nature o f the destabilising experience which generates 
ontological insecurity is best captured in the notion o f ‘ambivalence’ (Baumann 1991). 
Broadly speaking, ambivalence describes the simultaneous coexistence of 
opposed/conflicting feelings, thoughts and desires and, thus, a ,tom ’ or confused’ being 
unable to make a choice. A Self which finds itself in a state o f ambivalence is uncertain 
about how to evaluate its world and which direction it should take. As Baumann put it,
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in a state of ambivalence the Self is “unable to read the situation properly” which creates 
a feeling o f “acute discomfort” (Baumann, 1991: 1). Although it is not quite a state of 
meaninglessness but of a conflict of meanings, it is a state of disorientation and thus a 
state heightening the mood of anxiety. This becomes clear in Baumann’s discussion of 
ambivalence as juxtaposed to order.272 Whereas order enables the Self to comfortably 
place things into familiar categories, ambivalence is characterized by “the possibility of 
assigning an object or an event to more than one category” and therefore “disorder” 
(Baumann 1991: 1). For order-seeking individuals, a state of ambivalence signifies ‘the 
other’ o f order, “the indeterminate and unpredictable” and, thus, generates a feeling of 
uncertainty “that source and archetype o f all fear” (Ibid., 7). The significance of 
ambivalence hence is the ‘emptiness’ of the future, the difficulty to ‘read’ it as a 
meaningful place, and the negative emotional impact this has on the Self. In a section 
entitled ‘The horror of indetermination’, Baumann argues that this uncertainty about 
where to go is not only confusing and discomforting but “it carries a sense o f danger” 
(Ibid., 56).
The threat posed to the Self by ambivalence is that it is destabilizing and thereby creates 
an ‘identity crisis’, a concept introduced in the 1950s by Erik Erikson to capture 
individuals suffering from acute problems of orientation. While Erikson developed the 
notion o f an identity crisis to describe crises of adolescence, it has since been used more 
generally to describe a Self suffering from “massive dislocations” (Straub, 2002: 62), 
“an acute form of disorientation” (Taylor, 1989: 27). For a Self gaining orientation 
primarily by being placed in a valued space, a “radical uncertainty” about where to stand 
signifies a moral uncertainty. As Taylor phrases it, Selves suffering from an identity 
crisis
“lack a frame or horizon within which things can take on a stable 
significance, within which some life possibilities can be seen as good or 
meaningful, others as bad or trivial. The meaning o f all these possibilities 
is unfixed, labile, or undetermined. This is a painful and frightening 
experience” (Taylor 1989: 27f).
In other words, ambivalence means a blurring, if not loss, of the meaning structures 
through which the Self discloses the world. Having the world stripped of its familiarity 
is an experience o f instable foundations, if not loss o f ground, and thus uncertainty about 
where to stand. The lack of orientation is threatening to the Self because it faces a world
272 It is not difficult to see the Heideggerian lines in Baumann’s reasoning, with the neutralizing 
force of the everyday as a totality (modernity/order) which nevertheless contains the possibility 
of the ‘dreadful’ (ambivalence).
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it does not ‘know’ or understand, generating what Huysmans calls ‘epistemological 
fear” (Huysmans, 1998a: 235). In this sense, the S e lfs  ontological insecurity is brought 
about by epistemological insecurity. Applied to the terminology used here, ambivalence 
is a ‘frightening experience’ because it brings about incoherence into the biographical 
narrative, a loss o f centre or feeling to be at ‘home’. More precisely, as the centre is a 
duality consisting o f meaningful places in the past and the future, it moves these places 
out o f foqus, captured in Baumann’s note that ambivalence turns the world into a ‘grey 
area’. In such a world, the value attributed to the order the Self has disclosed is called 
into question and horizons of experience and expectations are disconnected. As the 
vision pursued cannot be satisfactorily placed inside the memory space anymore, lessons 
learned don’t appear to translate into a meaningful project, making it difficult if not 
impossible to simultaneously unfold out of and into a known ‘world’. Instead of being 
able to formulate a coherent national biography the Self faces “temporal and spatial 
diffusion” (Straub 2002: 61).
In one way, the destabilizing experience brought about by ambivalence is similar to the 
‘shock’ discussed in chapter five in that both shake the meaning structure of ‘the world’ 
the Self has disclosed for itself and trigger a heightened feeling o f anxiety. Apart from 
that the two are very different. The shock is an extreme version of a significant 
experience which creates a memory space and is given meaning together with the friend, 
thus coming to serve as a source of order integrated into the national biography. After 
rupturing ‘the world’ it takes on a stabilizing function by manifesting a past and certain 
‘lessons’ which friends can agree on and use for their project. By contrast, the 
ambivalence leading to an identity crisis, while it may become visible and crystallize in 
one moment, gradually undermines the coherence o f the biographical narrative and 
weakens the S e lfs  ability to generate stable meaning structures with the friend. The 
difference will become clearer when taking a closer look at how/where ‘ambivalence’ 
enters ‘being-in-the-world’.
Introducing ‘The Stranger’
For Baumann, ambivalence is an inevitably side product of modernity (Baumann 1991: 
15; also Huysmans 1998a). Adopting Horkheimer and Adorno’s diagnosis o f a dialectic 
of enlightenment, he suggests that ambivalence may appear as a disturbance to order but 
actually falls within the logic of creating order. In the process o f (trying to) categorize 
things into a coherent whole, or what Baumann calls a ‘dream of purity’, there is always 
something which does not fit and remains ‘outside’. Ambivalence thus is the very 
consequence of boundary drawing, more precisely a result of the fact that boundary
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drawing is “never foolproof’ (Ibid.: 57). Hence, Baumann argues, ambivalence cannot 
be eradicated, its appearance is unavoidable and thus a “normal condition”, creating an 
“ambient fear” (Baumann, 1997: 22). This dialectic is a bit too static because it assumes 
a fixed and rigid sense o f order and the desire for a totalizing closure, whereas the 
argument presented here emphasizes a dynamic o f ‘world building’, a creative and open 
process through a malleable memory space and a ‘limited utopia’. That said, Baumann 
makes gives a crucial hint in locating the emergence of ambivalence in the appearance 
of a ‘stranger’.
Except for a mentioning by Huysmans, the category o f ‘the stranger’ is by and large 
absent from the IR literature and remains under-conceptualized even among social 
theorists. Those who discuss the phenomenon describe the stranger as, broadly speaking, 
presenting a “ limit-experience for humans trying to identify themselves” (Kearney, 
2003: 3). Beyond that, there is no clear definition o f what makes a ‘stranger’ other than 
that it represents the ‘unknown’ (the German term Jremd  means both ‘strange’ and 
‘foreign’). For Richard Kearny the figure of the stranger is pretty much everything that 
is ‘uncanny’ and ranges from the ancient notion of ‘foreigner’ to the contemporary 
category o f ‘alien’, in a chapter entitled ‘Strangers and Scapegoats’ he tellingly does not 
really discuss the concept of the stranger (Kearny 2003: ch. 1).
The earliest discussion in sociology, which remains quite influential, is presented by 
Georg Simmel. For Simmel the stranger emerges in the image of “the potential 
wanderer” who “has not quite overcome the freedom of coming and going” (Simmel, 
1950 [1908]: 402). It is a person who simultaneously is and is not part of a ‘familiar 
setting’, whose position within a group is “determined...by the fact that he has not 
belonged to it from the beginning, that he imports qualities into it which do not and 
cannot stem from the group itself’ (Ibid.). The unique feature o f the stranger is that “it 
embodies that synthesis of nearness and distance” and is thus someone who is in close 
contact but not “organically connected” (Ibid, 404). In spatial terms, while present in the 
sense that it cannot be ignored the stranger cannot be placed by the Self within its frames 
of experience and expectations; it appears quite literally ‘out of place’. One can develop 
two slightly different conceptualizations o f the stranger out o f Simmel’s discussion, 
namely the ‘newcomer’ and the ‘marginal’ (Mclemore, 1970). It is easy to see how the 
two may be conflated in that the newcomer is marginalized by society because it does 
not ‘fit’, yet for the present purpose they must be kept apart. The reading of the stranger 
as ‘the marginal’ moves the analytical focus towards a study o f discrimination as a
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reaction to the appearance of the strange; the present task, instead, is to discern the 
threatening potential of the ‘wanderer’.
Whereas Simmel sees the stranger as a peculiar but not necessarily problematic feature 
of society, Baumann points out that the stranger is perceived as a threat to the Self 
striving for order by introducing ambivalence and interrupting familiarity. He describes 
the destabilizing atmosphere surrounding the appearance o f the stranger is stark colours: 
“the arrival of a Stranger has the impact o f an earthquake.. .the Stranger shatters the rock 
on which the security of daily life rests” (Baumann 1991 or 1997: 10). Baumann nicely 
captures the difference between the enemy and the stranger and makes clear that it is the 
latter which poses the ‘existential threat’ to the Self:
“The threat he [the stranger] carries is more horrifying than that which one can 
fear from the enemy. The stranger threatens the sociation itself -  the very 
possibility o f  sociation ( ...)  And this because the stranger is neither friend not 
enemy; and because he may be both ( ...)  The stranger is one (perhaps the main 
one, the archetypal one) member of the familiy o f ‘undecidables’” (Baumann 
1997: 55, emphasis added).
In other words, the stranger is feared because it defies sociability. It does not allow the 
Self to connect/establish bonds and appears to ‘empty’ the in-between space of meaning, 
thus standing for the fallibility of ‘the world’. It introduces the grey areas, a world of 
ambivalence, and thus the ‘horror of indetermination’ discussed above. This overlaps 
with Kearny’s description of strangers as triggering an ‘uncanny’ experience and with 
Julia Kristeva’s notion of the ‘horrific sublime’ experience when encountering the 
‘abject’ (Kearney 2003: 73ff., 89ff). And it is echoed by Baumann who suggests that for 
a Self seeking stability “it is best not to meet strangers at all” (Baumann 1997: 62).273
If the threat to a stable sense o f Self is associated with the figure o f the stranger, where 
does the stranger come from? Given that it is difficult to conceive o f ‘states’ as 
wandering around, where/how does it emerge? For Simmel and Baumann the stranger is 
an ‘Other’ being which cannot be understood but is present in ‘the world’. Taking up 
this hint and thinking about where, most likely, in ‘the world’ comes from, this thesis 
shifts the conception of the stranger away from the notion that it enters from the 
‘outside’. Furthermore, it is useful to differentiate the conception o f the stranger
273 Baumann echoes Connolly to some extent when arguing that “the national state is designed 
primarily to deal with the problem of strangers, not enemies” by “keeping the stranger at a mental 
distance through ‘locking him up’ in a shell of exoticism” to assert an actual identity (Baumann 
1991: 63-67).
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introduced here from what might be called the ‘familiar stranger’, which is not entirely 
‘unknown’ to the extent that it has a recognizable place in the experienced space but it 
remains at a distance to the centre, that is, it is disconnected from the soul. Whereas the 
familiar stranger is a being the Self does not feel emotionally close to, the argument is 
that in order to pose a threat to ontological security, ‘the stranger’ lacks this distance.
Emotional proximity is what the stranger has in common with the friend. Hence, picking 
up Simmel’s note that the phenomenon of “strangeness” enters “even the most intimate 
relationships” (Simmel 1950: 406) the argument put forward here is that ‘the stranger’ -  
the figure turning being in the world ‘ambivalent’ -  emerges from within friendship. 
Indeed, it can be argued that the notion of the stranger (or ‘strangeness’) as something 
that poses an existential threat must appear from within friendship because o f the 
vulnerability o f intimacy. To see this we must recall that the identification of what can 
pose an ‘existential threat’ is logically linked to an understanding of the vulnerabilities 
of that which sustains the Self. If friendship is crucial in sustaining a stable sense o f Self, 
in what sense is it vulnerable and who is in the position to exploit this vulnerability? 
Again, the answers are easy to see. Strengthening of friendship bonds inversely creates a 
relationship o f interdependence: by empowering each other in pursuing a project which 
lends coherence to and entwines their national biographies, friends also come to depend 
on each other for sustaining the same.
The social capital contained in friendship, namely the ability to provide stability by 
mutually satisfying desires of belonging/recognition and authenticity, turns into a sofit- 
power relationship in which interdependence exposes its flip side, namely 
vulnerability.274 In the process of developing ideas o f order / a shared a moral space 
together by collaborating on making sense of the past and planning for the future, friends 
tame their anxiety by coming to share intimate knowledge, and this intimacy implies 
great vulnerability. The trust that friends will continue to invest in the common project 
and, thereby, will continue making the world meaningful for each other, makes the 
friend powerful. Indeed, because no-one is as vital to the biographical narrative of the
274 This duality inherent in relationships of interdependence is discussed for the economic realm 
by Keohane and Nye (1989). Keohane and Nye conceptualize interdependence in terms of 
‘sensitivity’ and ‘vulnerability’, the first referring to the degree to which A is affected if B shifts 
its policy in a specific issue area (such as oil production), and the second referring to A’s 
(in)ability to switch to an alternative source (such as nuclear energy). They suggested that 
international regimes function as intervening factors through which interdependence among 
states is channeled and shows its effects.
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Self as the friend, no-one is as powerful to undermine it. As Horst Hutter in his 
comprehensive discussion o f The Politics o f  Friendship puts it: “there is no one who is 
as vulnerable to the actions of Self as a friend ( ...)  no power is as total as the power one 
has over friends” (Hutter, 1978: 12).
The dialectic relationship of empowerment producing vulnerability underscores the 
conceptualization of the unfolding Self as one which never completely ‘owns’ its world. 
The possibility of the friend-tuming-stranger and, hence, the inherent ability o f the 
friend to significantly destabilize the national biography is always ‘present’, so that the 
feeling of a loss of identity is “a threat against which no one can be completely secure” 
(Straub 2002: 62).275 And if the friend plays a key role in enabling authentic becoming, 
then its ‘disappearance’, the process o f the friend turning into a stranger, poses the 
greatest threat to the same. This process of estrangement, its character and causes, and 
the strategies available to the Self for dealing with it must be looked at in more detail.
Estrangement as Enduring Dissonance
The core features of an estrangement process are an inversion o f the central 
characteristics o f true friendship discussed in the previous chapter. It was argued that 
friends agree in the possibilities projected into the future and trust each other to commit 
to ‘realizing’ a shared vision. Friends invest in this process of shared world building 
according to a unique logic of reciprocity and regard each other as equals. Conversely, 
estrangement is characterised by disagreements over what the project entails and by 
mistrust over the other’s commitment and investment, expressed in 
perceptions/complaints of lacking reciprocity, that is, complaints about unequal ‘burden 
sharing’, ‘free-riding’ and unpaid debt, as well as accusations o f lacking solidarity and 
of not being treated as an equal.
The stranger brings ambivalence into the world, and so the threat of estrangement does 
not lie in an absence of ordering narratives among friends but, rather, in their 
incompatibility and, consequently, in the absence o f a shared narrative. Estrangement 
creates an ambivalent atmosphere because friends don’t ‘understand’ each other, which 
turns the world they were building into something unexpectedly fragile. The use o f the
275 This view is also prominent in the writings of Butler and Kristeva, modifying the Freudian 
theme of the (oppressed) otherness within and (unconsciously) projected into images like 
monsters and aliens located ‘outside’ (Kearney, 2003: 35, 72ff).
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term ‘unexpectedly’ here is deliberate to suggest that, given the fundamental importance 
of friendship in stabilising the sense of Self, friends have a common interest in 
maintaining their bonds, which means that processes of estrangement occur 
unintentionally.
How, then, can friends become strangers? For useful pointers to what might cause 
estrangement we shall return to Aristotle.276 His discussion o f problems arising in 
friendship mainly concerns friendships of utility and pleasure, which are expected to 
dissolve “whenever they are no longer pleasant or useful” (Aristotle, NE Book IX, 3). 
According to Aristotle, true friendship is characterized by stability because the virtue on 
which it is based is stable: “friendship o f virtue is enduring and immune to slander” (NE 
Book VIII, 7, 8). However, Aristotle discusses those three types of friendship as ideal 
types which do not exist in isolation in ‘real life’. In other words, true friendship 
encompasses the other two and/or may at times be difficult to tell apart.277 Hence, true 
friendship is not devoid o f ‘utilitarianism’. Aristotle writes that “if friends come to be 
separated by some wide gap in virtue, vice, wealth, or something else...then they are 
friends no more, and do not even expect to be” (NE, Book VIII, 7). There is a difference 
between the effect of an emerging gap in ‘virtue’ (NE, Book IX, 3) and a shift in 
wealth/material assets (NE, Book VIII, 14). While Aristotle is not clear as to how the 
two are related, the first is the more fundamental one, as gaps in formal inequality can be 
compensated by agreement on the desirable good, not the other way around.
As noted in the previous chapter, friendship is never unconditional in the sense that 
something is always expected in return (Smith Pangle, 2003: 138f). And just as the 
unique logic of reciprocity cannot be made intelligible from the ‘outside’, friends do not 
follow a formal objective code of conduct and so by trusting that each side contributes 
‘what is possible’ friends do not understand the logic o f reciprocity themselves. And so 
it is well worth taking seriously Aristotle’s warning that significant shifts in formal 
status and resources/assets available changes conceptions o f what/how much can be 
contributed, which in turn may lead to a corruption of reciprocity (NE, Book VIII,
276 For a comprehensive discussion of sociological studies on the dissolution of friendship which 
is rather indeterminate because it discusses all kinds of factors, see Fehr (1996: 178ff).
277 “Friendship for pleasure bears some resemblance to this complete sort, since good people are 
also pleasant to each other. And friendship of utility also resembles it, since good people are also 
useful to each other” (NE, Book VIII, 4).
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14).278 Yet in the end, serious disputes over adequate contributions to the shared project 
must be taken a symptom for disagreement over the good life, that is, a dissonance over 
ideas o f  order. The notion of dissonance over ideas o f order is similar to what 
Rratochwil has termed a “norm collision” (Kratochwil, 2000; see also Cardenas, 2004; 
Wiener 2004), although from an evolutionary perspective ‘collision’ is a misleading 
term because it suggests a one-off ‘cut’ or ‘clash’ o f views rather than gradual 
divergence.
Dissonance may occur if there is a misunderstanding between A and B regarding the 
terms of their friendship; as Aristotle puts it “friends are most at odds when they are not 
friends in the way they think they are” (NE, Book IX, 3). As noted in the previous 
chapter, despite their entwined national biographies friends never completely ‘know’ 
each other. In a sense, because friends meet in the project, they necessarily identify with 
an image o f the Other. Simmel argued that even if one can never know the other 
absolutely, “one forms some personal unity out o f those fragments in which alone [the 
other] is accessible to us” (Simmel 1950: 308, 326). This overlaps with Arendt’s note 
that prejudice \VorurteiI\ is a necessary element o f social life to compensate for the 
impossibility of sharing every experience (Arendt 2003: 13-27). Yet it is important that 
“the picture of each in the other” built in the relationship “interacts with the actual 
relation” (Simmel, 1950: 309). In other words, as noted by Aristotle, the image must be 
affirmed through common activity in pursuit of, and through costly investment into, the 
common project, showing consistency between stated values and action (also Mattem 
2005).279
A relationship which is entirely built on images, designed so the Other fits into a shared 
‘world’, is poised to encounter problems if these are not frequently adapted. In that case, 
friends’ understanding of each other may turn into a hollow prejudice where both sides 
believe they are still investing in the same project, share the same horizon of
278 Telling is Aristotle’s vagueness regarding the possibility of friendship among formally 
unequal actors and the question of what makes an appropriate return, to which his answer ranges 
from ‘honour’ to ‘affection’ to ‘what is possible’.
279 Commitment to shared world building does not form overnight. Peter Blau differentiated 
between intrinsic and lasting attraction, the first conceived of as “spontaneous reactions to [the 
Other’s] qualities” which lose their significance for the Self if it becomes apparent that they are 
“calculated to have a certain effect” (Blau 1964: 69). On the damaging nature of deceit, see 
Lebow (2005).
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expectations, when in fact they do not.280 Because the future holds a prominent place in 
the process o f coming into being-in-the-world, dissonance emerges primarily in 
diverging utopias -  visions o f the desirable future -  and, hence, in divergence of 
horizons of expectations. If A changes, for whatever reason, its vision of a desirable 
future it alters the direction o f its unfolding and consequently its ‘personal maneuvering 
space’ within which the common project is pursued. This inevitably leads to a change in 
what A considers an appropriate contribution to the project, which will be perceived by 
B as a reduced commitment to the shared project as B knows it. Said differently, A’s 
activities, meant to be investments in the shared project, move beyond B’s horizon of 
expectations. As a consequence, on both sides expectations and corresponding activities 
will not appear familiar to the friend and trigger disputes over adequate contributions to 
the shared project.281
Diverging expectations about what each can/should contributes to the shared project and 
inconsistency between the image A holds of B and B’s activities will insert a feeling of 
ambivalence into the process of ‘world building’. To be sure, a low level of dissonance 
is nothing unusual and does not necessarily lead to estrangement. What matters is the 
depth and endurance of dissonance. If dissonance is strong and long divergence reaches 
a critical level and common activities are difficult to pursue. Ambivalence may linger in 
the background, glossed over through vague rhetoric, yet it will ‘hit home’ if there is an 
event which A considers an integrative part of the world building task while B does not. 
More precisely, if A and B differ about whether/how the event fits into the shared 
project, their reactions and views about the appropriate response will differ as well, 
exposing the dissonance and turning ‘the world’ into an ambivalent place.
Friends perceive the significant other’s attempt to shift the shared project in a new 
direction as an alienating experience, and so the S elfs  reaction to the estrangement 
process can be understood as a struggle against alienation, a diversion from what it 
considers the path of authentic becoming. This understanding o f alienation as an
280 See also Peter Blau’s distinction between intrinsic and lasting attraction, the first conceived of 
as “spontaneous reactions to [the Other’s] qualities” which lose their significance for the Self if it 
becomes apparent that they are “calculated to have a certain effect” (Blau 1964: 69). On the 
damaging nature of deceit, see Lebow (2005).
281 One reason for expectations to diverge, not engaged here, is when there are conflicting 
loyalties, that is, when different friends make claims which cannot all be satisfied (Smith Pangle, 
2003: 135F). This opens up the issue of multiple friendships..
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unwanted separation282 expresses, more precisely, the disconnect o f horizons of 
expectation and experience which had previously lend coherence to the biographical 
narrative developed together with the significant Other. Fear o f alienation is the fear of 
‘loosing’ this narrative and requires finding a way to reduce the tension between the 
desires of recognition/belonging and the desire for authenticity.283
Preventing Alienation: Adaptation and Emancipation
Estrangement does not happen overnight but is a gradual process in which the parties 
have the opportunity to counter an increase in ambivalence and alienation by 
renegotiating the shared project. Crudely speaking, the affected state can choose 
between two (not mutually exclusive) strategies: adaptation and emancipation.
Adaptation
Taking up the suggestion that identities are ‘sticky’ or ‘resilient’, social conceptions of 
Self are not changed overnight as, after all, such a loss stability is precisely what the Self 
wants to avoid. And as the biography written through friendships contains sunk costs 
which the Self does not want to give up easily, it is assumed that adaptation is the 
preferred strategy. Adaptation basically refers to the attempt o f state representatives to 
renegotiate order with the friend, which can take various forms. As research in sociology 
shows, one o f the most important measures to ‘rescue’ friendships is ‘communication’ 
(Fehr 1996; see also Bially Mattem 2005b). However, even a Habermasian discourse 
ethics requires a common ‘lifeworld’, which is to say that communication reaches its 
limits when friends grow dissimilar in virtue, that is, when they start to diverge in their 
views over what is the desirable ‘good’ order. This comes close to Bergson’s point that 
different ‘inner times’ can be a hindrance for communication, echoed by Elias, who 
gives a number o f illustrations for how interaction between members situated in 
different ‘social time-grids’ may lead to communication difficulties and even 
‘blockages’ (Elias 1992: 39, 137).
282 For a discussion, see Der Derian (1987). This usage is found in the writings of religious and 
secular enlightenment thinkers accusing each other of advocating the individual’s distancing from 
god and from reason, respectively. It is different from the second meaning of ‘alienation’ 
prevalent among social contract scholars who put forward the idea of a limited transfer of rights 
to the sovereign in exchange of security (Der Derian, 1987: 15-19; Olsen 1969: 291 f>- See also 
Dean (1961).
283 By focusing on the fear of alienation, the phenomenon is approached from a different angle 
than the one found in Marxism, which places its focus on a situation in which the (subconscious) 
separation from authentic being has already occurred and is upheld by material power relations 
(Der Derian 1987: 24f).
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One strategy of dealing with such dissonance is to ignore it by glossing over the 
differences. This may involve consciously talking ‘past’ each other, that is, relying on 
old/familiar but sufficiently vague formulas which hide the different meanings given to 
them. Another and related strategy is to take a passive stance and remain silent. The 
underlying concern in both cases is that open confrontation may put the shared project at 
risk, and so using familiar formulas and/or silence is a strategy to ‘sit things out’ in the 
hope that they will ‘return’ to where resonance is restored. Although friendships lack 
formal “societal mechanisms” (Fehr, 1996: 183) which estranged parties could revert to, 
deteriorating friendships will likely continue to rely on formalized low-level procedures 
within the shared institution, which allows to keep the appearance of continuing the 
common project while knowing that these at they are not sufficient for 
maintaining/recreating the bond.
A more forceful strategy is that the parties will openly voice discontent and engage in 
making a “gesture of resistance” (Laclau 1996) against expectations placed by the 
significant Other to signal that these are considered unreasonable. Rather than hoping to 
‘sit out’ the dissonance, in this gesture of resistance the state invokes the theme of the 
‘true identity’ through what Ernesto Laclau calls “strategic essentialism” (Laclau, 1996: 
51). State representatives will claim the ‘essential’ parameters negotiated under the 
familiar (now endangered) relationship and use this ‘true identity’ position strategically 
to dmeonstrate the limits of their manoeuvring space and engage the significant Other in 
negotiations with the aim of re-adjustment. The gesture o f resistance, in other words, is 
aimed at reducing the depth of the expected changes and stake the position from which 
to renegotiate the common project without radically altering the biographical narrative.
In the attempt to balance desires of belonging/recognition with the desire for 
authenticity, governments may apply a combination o f these strategies. Their success 
depends on the both the willingness of the friend to compromise and on the depth of 
required changes of the national biography. The problem is, however, that the two may 
become caught in a downward-spiral: dissonance emerging due to a lack of 
‘understanding’ marks a relationship in which friends appear less familiar to each other 
and, consequently, in which the willingness to make voluntary compromises is 
significantly reduced. In this situation o f instability, where the familiar world is fading 
away and where its restoration requires one or both sides to adapt, that states will
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attempt to exert pressure on the significant Other to adapt. In other words, in a process 
o f estrangement, the social capital built up in friendship is transformed from a creative 
source of world building into a coercive force, turning the ‘power-with’ into a ‘power- 
over’ relationship. ’Soft power’ moves back into focus, yet this time not as 
empowerment but in attempts to impose a worldview on the significant Other. The 
relationship between significant Others turns into a confrontation over the meaning of 
order in which both sides attempt to model the ‘common’ project closer to ‘their’ 
respective places in past and future and request that the significant Other adjusts its 
national biography accordingly. This can range from subtle forms o f persuasion284 to the 
exercise of what Bially Mattem terms “representational force”, that is, a state where 
adjustments are not expected to be made voluntarily but under the threat of being thrown 
into a meaningless world, giving it a coercive character (Bially-Mattem, 2005a: 602).
Emancipation
If the state finds itself in a position where the significant Other is unwilling to reduce its 
expectations and where it thinks its voice is not sufficiently taken into account in the 
process of world building,285 and if adaptation is perceived to require an alteration of the 
national biography by pushing it beyond what James Rosenau (1981) calls “acceptable 
limits” that would lead to a loss of authenticity, the state will pursue a strategy of 
emancipation.
Generally speaking, ‘emancipation’ describes a process of liberation, that is, of setting 
oneself free from restraints “imposed by superior physical force or legal obligation” as 
well as “from intellectual, moral, or spiritual fetters” (OED). Emancipation thus has a 
progressive connotation implying the escaping/overcoming of a power-relationship. As 
Laclau (1996) points out, this classic account o f emancipation contains a tension: 
emancipation is said to be marked by an “absolute chasm”, that is, by radical 
discontinuity which, once achieved, eliminates power-relations. Yet understood as 
freeing/liberating the Self from  something/one it implies prior oppression o f  something 
that must be liberated and which, consequently, pre-exists the act o f emancipation. 
Hence, for emancipation to be meaningful it cannot simply be ground-breaking but also
284 On persuasion Mueller (2004); Lebow (2007).
285 Note: The emergence of a power-over dynamic in which A can ‘threaten’ B with a loss of the 
shared world implies that the relationship has turned into one of asymmetric interdependence. 
The question how asymmetry emerges, essentially about how one side can have more soft power 
than the other, is important yet difficult to answer in the abstract.
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requires a ‘dimension of ground’ to stand on. As Laclau points out, this ‘classic’ account 
of emancipation is logically incoherent. The main tension arises between seeing 
emancipation (i) as a complete break with what has been before, as a founding act which 
constitutes a radically new identity and (ii) as a process that liberates a pre-existing Self 
which had been oppressed, without which the very desire for emancipation would not 
arise (Laclau 1996: 3f.). Despite their logical incompatibility, he suggests the two 
dimensions are necessary elements of emancipation (Ibid, 6).
Laclau’s discussion is valuable in drawing attention to this tension between reading 
emancipation as ‘liberation’ and as ‘creation’, yet whether the two are logically 
incompatible depends on how radical the break is. The tension Laclau identifies, also 
captured in the paradox that, given the anxiety controlling function o f friendship, friends 
should never allow their relationship to dissolve in the first place, rests on the 
understanding that the sense o f Self is constituted in relation with the Other and that 
breaking with this relationship means it desires to become something else, the possibility 
of which it presumably has learned outside this relationship. Yet is this the case? Must 
this possibility have been disclosed in complete independence or can some of the 
previously established ‘ground’ not be carried over within that vision which drives the 
emancipatory move? The question is, once again, how to think about this ‘ground’ on 
which Selfhood stands, how the internal/personal (domestic) and the external/social 
(international) dimensions of Selfhood relate. For Bially Mattem ‘demagnetized’ friends 
are able to maintain their sense of Self and restore their special relationship by drawing 
on sources outside the friendship, by following Wendt and assuming that states have 
what she calls a ‘primordial nugget’ (Bially Mattem 2005: 60).
By contrast, for an ontology which understands authentic being as both social and 
evolutionary, the break can never be truly ‘radical’, for two reasons: First, there cannot 
be a complete break in the national biography, that is, it cannot become completely 
disconnected from its experienced space as even new utopias cannot leave the past 
‘behind’ in the sense of ignoring/denying it. Second, and quite importantly, it is not the 
relationship per se that is being abandoned but the relationship in which friends have 
become strangers. Said differently, the biographical narrative has the bygone 
‘friendship’ integrated into it because that relationship still fits, that is, it has become
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part of the experienced space and still resonates with the world building project.286 So 
rather than conceiving of emancipation as an ‘absolute chasm’, it is understood here as a 
conservative-creative process which allows change within some sort of continuity.
The question whether the Self will pursue a strategy o f emancipation depends not only 
on the how much change would be necessary for A to accommodate B’s expectations 
but also how much does A depend on B. In other words, there is the question o f the 
availability of an alternative as, after all, from a friendship perspective a state cannot 
maintain what it considers its authentic biographical narrative on its own. Hence, the 
process of emancipation as understood here is a search for alternative ways of satisfying 
desires of belonging and recognition, more specifically a search for an alternative 
significant Other with whom a common project can be more successfully negotiated. 
While in this process the biographical narrative also will also undergo change, the 
adaptation required will be more attractive if the Self has more influence in determining 
the direction these changes take.
Hence, adaptation and emancipation are not mutually exclusive strategies and affected 
states likely pursue a combination of both. As noted above, the emancipation process 
does not imply a radical discontinuity of relations in which everything is left behind 
(Laclau 1996: 2). However, strategies o f adaptation and emancipation can be pursued 
simultaneously only up to a point. While states may possess close relations with more 
than one significant Other, the phenomenon of ‘multiple identities’ has its limits in the 
fact that an authentic national biography can only accommodate so many compromises: 
“although we may have a diversity of relatively discrete selves, there needs to be...a  
continuing theme” (Hogg and Vaughan 2002: 125). To avoid becoming entangled in 
conflicting projects, intimate relations are layered, with the preference being placed on 
the one which supports the project in which the unfolding Self feels more ‘at home’.
286 This is not too different from Aristotle who argues that after friendships dissolve “surely [the 
Self] must keep some memory of the familiarity they had” (NE, Book IX, 3).
Applying the Lens: Looking Ahead
With the causal narrative completed in the abstract, the task ahead is to apply the 
theoretical frame developed thus far to the dynamic of German-American cooperation as 
captured at the outset: (i) the consensus that NATO was the institution most desirable for 
dealing with ‘European security’ in the post-WW II decade (1945-55), (ii) the tensions 
between Bonn and Washington over the usefulness of CSCE in the ‘detente’ decade 
(1965-75), and (iii) the divergence over institutional preferences for the purpose of 
‘European security’ in the decade surrounding the end of the Cold War (1985-95) 
signified by German investment in CFSP as an institution which excluded the US. The 
task is to make sense of this dynamic by framing it as a phenomenon of friendship and 
estrangement/emancipation and provide evidence for why it occurred.
The empirical analysis first needs to identify the parameters o f the ‘national security 
interest’ on each side to then determine the presence or absence o f a ‘common’ security 
interest. Rather than engaging military-strategic thinking about force structures among 
the military establishment, the theoretical lens applied here understands security policy 
as being about creating and maintaining order within a national biography and to assess 
the overlap between German and American conceptions of the same. This provides the 
basis on which the usefulness (or value) o f a security institution is evaluated and, 
consequently, the investment or lack thereof in a common institution can be explained. 
In more specific terms, the task is to identify how political leaders in Bonn and in 
Washington formulated national biographies in their spatial and temporal dimension -  a 
meaningful narrative of what Germany-in-the-world and America-in-the-world 
could/should become -  and to show how the (lacking) overlap o f those narratives 
explains the commitment (or lack thereof) to invest in NATO, CSCE, and CFSP, 
respectively.
As the formation and weakening of friendship bonds -  the emergence of resonance and 
dissonance in national biographies and the success or failure in negotiating a shared 
project -  and the corresponding investment in international institutions takes time, the 
empirical analysis spans three ten-year periods. Each period will address the same set of 
questions, namely (i) how political leaders formulated the national biography of 
‘Germany-in-the-world’ and ‘America-in-the-world’, respectively, (ii) whether and how 
these narratives connect and (iii) how this (dis)conriection motivates common 
institutional investments. Although the US side will be given ample consideration, for 
reasons outlined in the introduction the empirical analysis is biased towards the German
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side. Broken down for each period, the investigation is going to present the following 
account:
In the first period (1945-55) the analysis will be looking for the reformulation o f the 
narratives situating ‘Germany’ and ‘America’ in the world after the end of the Second 
World War were closely interwoven and resonated with each other. It presents evidence 
for how both sides agreed on a vision of how to order a shared experienced space in 
which national biographies could be embedded, and that NATO was the desirable 
institution through which the common project o f ‘world building’ should be pursued. In 
that context, it suggests that American and German policymakers saw each other as 
equals and were content with each other’s contribution to the shared project.
The analysis of the second period (1965-75) will show first signs estrangement. It will 
discuss how German enthusiasm and US hesitancy to invest in CSCE was accompanied 
by disagreement over the usefulness of NATO as the institution through which to build a 
meaningful ‘being-in-the-world’ and trace this to dissonance between Bonn and 
Washington over ideas/visions of order. While the analysis will present evidence of 
misunderstandings and signs of distrust, accusations o f lacking reciprocity (expressed in 
complaints to insufficient ‘burden sharing’) and unequal treatment (expressed, for 
instance, in complaints about arrogance), it suggests that sufficient adaptation took place 
to conceal/reconcile the dissonance, allowing sufficient ‘room o f manoeuvre’ for both 
along the limits o f the shared project.
The third period (1985-95) is will show further dissonance between German and 
American policymakers, only that now adaptation attempts are expected to remain 
insufficient in reconciling the dissonance and holding off the estrangement process, 
prompting Bonn to pursue a strategy of emancipation. The discussion provides evidence 
for deep and enduring disagreements over ideas of order, expressed in diverging 
expectations about appropriate contributions to the shared project and in feelings of 
ambivalence in Bonn about the direction for Germany’s unfolding. Furthermore, it 
suggests that German leaders concluded that expectations held in Washington could not 
be met without substantially compromising (violating) the authenticity of Germany’s 
national biography and that this motivated them to invest in CFSP with an alternative 
significant Other.
As noted in the introduction, the phenomenological lens on the development o f ‘national 
biographies’ requires a hermeneutical approach. This means adopting the perspective of
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the ‘state’ in question by standing in the shoes, so to say, of those political leaders in a 
position o f formulating and representing the national biography. It requires analytical 
empathy and seeks to offer a deliberately uncritical reconstruction of how these leaders 
represented Germany’s or America’s ‘being-in-the-world’.
In this context, it must be noted upfront that three central aspects of the theoretical 
narrative are difficult to carve out empirically. The first concerns identifying feelings of 
anxiety and, in an attempt to control the same, desires for belonging/recognition and for 
authenticity expressed by political leaders and the broader community they represent. 
While the empirical analysis must provide some indication that these feelings are present 
and drive decisions/behaviour, this requires some interpretative sensitivity/freedom as 
these feelings are rarely shown in public or voiced in these terms.
The second difficulty concerns the argument that national biographies are constructed 
together/in interaction with significant others (the intimate bonds of friendship). This 
process, in which both sides come to agree (or not) on how to order an overlapping 
experienced space by formulating a meaningful vision of it that resonates with their 
understanding of ‘being-in-the-world’ is difficult to trace systematically. It does not 
proceed in a neat sequential interaction which can be traced in a linear fashion, or in a 
feedback loop o f action and reaction. Rather, this process o f ‘mutual constitution’ is a 
messy one in which biographical narratives become interwoven with each other and 
draw on each other simultaneously and indirectly through the shared project.
The third aspect concerns the process of ‘emancipation’, namely that states which loosen 
their friendship bonds and, correspondingly, show reduced interest in the institution 
through which their shared project has been pursued, need an alternative friend with 
whom a common project can be more successfully negotiated. This effectively brings 
another ‘special’ relationship into the analysis. Specifically, the analysis of enduring 
dissonance between the German and the US narrative and the emancipation o f the 
former from the latter would ideally be accompanied by an analysis o f the growing 
resonance o f German ideas of order with those o f another state, namely France. Such a 
parallel analysis is omitted here, as it would either blow the third part out of proportion 
or come at a cost of a more detailed understanding o f the dynamics in German-American 
relations.287
287 The omission is compensated for by the fact that the development of intimate bonds between 
Bonn and Paris is well documented in the literature and can be referenced where appropriate.
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CHAPTER EIGHT: NATO / GERMAN-US CONSENSUS (1945-1955)
Introduction
This chapter offers an explanation for what motivated German and American investment 
in NATO in the decade following the end of the Second World War (1945-55). Echoing 
the view that German-American security cooperation was not based on a military 
rationale but about „wrapping political problems of an entirely different kind” (Krieger 
in Schwabe 1994: 47),288 the chapter assesses the explanatory power o f the ‘friendship’ 
argument developed over the previous chapters. It outlines the need for regaining 
orientation after the end of the war and how the narratives situating ‘Germany’ and 
‘America’ in ‘the world’ after 1945 came to resonate with each other. Specifically, the 
chapter explores how political leaders came to agree (a) on a particular vision giving rise 
to a project in which respective national biographies could be embedded and (b) on 
NATO as the most suitable institution for pursuing this project. With a focus on the 
German side, the chapter pays particular attention to Konrad Adenauer as an agent who 
successfully formulated a Germany-in-Europe narrative in mutual empowerment with 
American counterparts thereby establishing the German-American friendship through 
NATO.
The chapter proceeds as follows. The first part lays out the experiences and lessons on 
the basis of which a new narrative of ‘Germany’ was built and shows how these were 
linked to the vision of Germany unfolding into a ‘united Europe’ free and at peace. 
Capturing his anxiety of not being able to control Germany’s future in the ‘Potsdam 
complex’, it is shown how Adenauer projected Germany into the Western space and 
located the US as a friend. The second part shows how his vision of Germany in a 
‘United States of Europe’ resonated with the American agenda of finding a place for 
‘Europe’ and a new Germany in its national biography. The third part demonstrates how 
this formed the basis for a German-American consensus about German rearmament as 
an attempt to ‘contribute’ to the Western project and thereby increase Germany’s voice 
in the Western space through NATO.
Reinventing ‘Germany’
The end of the war required the reinvention of ‘Germany’. After Hitler’s death, the 
breakdown of the Nazi regime and the unconditional surrender in May 1945, relief that 
the war was over was mixed with a feeling of loss and disorientation. Indeed, it is
288 For the military debates, see Meier-Domberg (1990); Tuschhoff (1994); Wiggershaus (1994).
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important to be reminded with Axel Schildt that for the majority of Germans the end of 
the war appeared as “a catastrophic collapse rather than liberation” (Schildt 2007: 32). 
Germany had been defeated in yet another war which left the country in ruins, 
diminished its population by about 10 per cent, its territory by about 20 per cent, while 
displacing millions. The shadow government was dissolved by the Allies in late May 
and a week later, on 5 June 1945, the Allied Control Council proclaimed supreme 
authority. Alfred Grosser puts it succinctly: “the total war...ended with total 
disempowerment” (Grosser 1985: 14). Wilhelm Grewe, a German law professor and 
close advisor to Adenauer, noted that Germany had “lost...its character [Eigenschaft] of 
a state” (Grewe 1960/52: 3).
The loss was not merely a legal one (of ‘sovereignty’) or a material one (of people and 
territory). In addition, what was lost to most Germans with the collapse o f National 
Socialism was an understanding of what ‘Germany’ was meant to be(come). The 
biographical narrative constructed by Hitler’s regime culminating in a Thousand Year 
Reich utopia had defined the meaning of ‘Germany’ and its place in the world as the 
rightful ruler of ‘Europe’ for more than a decade. It had propagated a glorious German 
history, cultural/racial superiority and megalomaniac visions of a ‘Thousand Year 
Reich’ given aesthetic texture in all kinds o f exhibitions, Riefenstahl images and Speer’s 
architectural plans. As outlined by Hitler in Mein Kampf, in this narrative German 
authentic existence was intertwined with the claim to rule ‘Europe’. Picturing a world of 
great “spatial formations”, among which he counted the British Empire, the US, Russia, 
and China, Hitler’s aim was to have ‘Germany’ recognized as a great power and to 
expand the Lebensraum of the German people over and bring order to “our European 
homeland” (reprinted in O Tuathail et al. 1998: 36-39). While this narrative may not 
have been embraced by all, it was accepted by the majority o f the population until close 
to the end of the war and now needed to be replaced.289 As Schildt notes “national hubris 
was followed by a mood of moral depression” and abstract fear (Schildt 2007: 33).
Thus, in the summer of 1945, political leaders had to find a new answer to the ‘German 
question’ by recreating a narrative of Germany-in-the-world.290 In addition to physical 
reconstruction, the renewal of Germany as a country, a society, a participant in the world 
required an narrative which dealt with the memories and redefined the vision towards 
which a post-war ‘Germany’ could unfold. In an interview with a British journalist that 
summer, Adenauer described Germany as a spiritual desert and noted that just as
289 On how German society adopted the Third Reich narrative, see Fritzsche (2008).
290 For a comprehensive overview of the ‘German question’, see Verheyen (1991).
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important as material reconstruction was stilling hunger for new “spiritual values” 
[geistige Werte], stressing the need to “give the people new ideas!” (cited in Schwarz 
1986: 442). In the terminology introduced earlier, the task was to redefine a coherent 
national biography of Germany in space and time which satisfied desires for 
belonging/recognition and authenticity. It required an answer to what Verheyen (1991) 
calls the two faces of the ‘German question’, an internal and an external one: how to 
reconstruct a Germany its citizens would want to live in and one which others would 
agree to live with. As two emigres to the United States noted Germany was “a country in 
search o f friends, just as she is a country in search o f herself’ (Deutsch and Edinger 
1959: 20).
Who was in the position of remaking the biography of Germany-in-the-world? The 
Allied Council devised in Potsdam formally enjoyed supreme authority, yet this 
authority was soon decentralized and moved to the military (and later civilian) 
commanders of the respective (three, then four) zones. What was initially envisioned as 
a central administrative ‘European’ organ for occupied Germany was turned into a 
fractioned authority without much coordination; that is, fragmented not only in terms of 
location, but also in the directives it was to install (Mai 1994). Beyond a general 
agreement to set up measures preventing future German aggression and extracting 
reparation payments as outlined in the Potsdam Agreement, captured under the 
objectives of demilitarization, denazification, and decartellisation (which basically 
meant destroying German war industry), the Allies’ ideas about what to do with 
Germany after Hitler were “neither specific nor compatible” (Pulzer 1995: 24). Different 
answers were rooted in different views about the causes o f the Third Reich: was Nazism 
a disease from which the German society could be cured? Was there a logical 
continuation of ‘Prussian’ aggression from Bismarck to Hitler? Or was the rise of 
Nazism caused by structural economic inequality and the work of capitalist elites? 
Policymakers in London, Washington, Paris, and Moscow diverged in their views not 
only about the balance between punishment and re-education but also disagreed over 
what each would entail (Grosser 1985: 15f.; Mai, 1994). In short, there was no coherent 
plan in place in the summer of 1945 and one could say “there was a vacuum...in Allied 
policy” (Pulzer, 1995: 23; Judt 2005).
Into this ‘vacuum’, German political life developed rather quickly. The first two post­
war years saw a fast development of political institutions and, within them, an intense 
domestic debate about the direction the ‘new’ Germany should take (Pulzer 1995: 32). 
Although this happened with oversight from the occupying powers, the political figures
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emerging were no administrative puppets. Leadership was (allowed to be) claimed by 
experienced politicians who had either avoided or resisted the Nazi regime, gone into 
either mental or physical exile, or endured in captivity. These personalities had strong 
views over what had gone wrong and were eager to ‘correct’ the German path and were 
able to reactivate structures o f party organization deeply rooted in Germany’s political 
tradition. While success in creating the new narrative depended on a fruitful connection 
to narratives of the occupiers, their determination to redefine ‘Germany’ was not a 
response to external pressure and their ideas were not a result o f re-education 
programmes (Grosser, 1985: 42ff).
Adenauer
There was no consensus among German politicians on how to deal with the memory 
space left by the Third Reich. Beyond the condemnation and rejection o f Hitler’s 
narrative, domestic leaders disagreed, like the occupiers, over the adequate 
(re)placement of ‘Germany’ in time and space. Crudely speaking, there were three 
camps on the issue o f what was a ‘good’ order:291 Those envisioning a communist order, 
those emphasizing a socialist-democratic one, and those advocating a liberal-Christian- 
conservative society. Although the communist party existed in the Western zone until it 
was banned in 1956, most of its supporters moved to the Soviet zone. The second group, 
represented by the SPD under the leadership of Kurt Schumacher, appeared to be 
predestined to politically dominate the ‘new’ Germany due to its strong democratic 
tradition, its institutional base and the fact that it was the only one o f the major parties 
which had opposed Hitler’s rise and paid the costs. However, Schumacher and his SPD 
lost the leadership position to the third group around Konrad Adenauer and the newly 
created Christian Democratic Union (CDU), who won the 1949 election by one vote in 
coalition with the Bavarian sister party (CSU) and the Liberal Party (FDP) and was re­
elected in 1953 by a wide margin.
Adenauer’s rise and his success in claiming the political leadership in the Western 
occupied zones has been comprehensively discussed by historians like Hans-Peter 
Schwarz (1986).292 A seasoned politician who had experienced the occupation after the 
First World War as mayor of Cologne, Adenauer reemerged as the chairman of the CDU 
in the British zone and, after holding multiple offices, including o f the assembly writing
291 For a detailed discussion of the FRG’s domestic debate on security issues involving all parties 
and interest groups, see Volkmann (1990). For an overview of the main figures and fault lines on 
the question of German unity, see Zitelmann (1991).
292 See also Baring (1969); Koch (1985).
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the Basic Law, became Chancellor of the newly founded FRG in 1949. Viewed through 
the friendship lens, Adenauer’s successful claim of (West) German leadership was owed 
to his ability of redefining Germany’s course together with Western powers, in particular 
the United States, in a way that found approval of his domestic constituency and which 
famously lead Schumacher to call him ‘the chancellor of the allies’.293 Said differently, 
what united Adenauer’s domestic opponents, namely the discomfort with his course of 
Westintegration,294 was precisely what made him attractive to Americans. In outlining 
this (mutual) empowerment, this chapter agrees with the contention that “to an 
exceptional extent...the study of West German foreign policy [during this period] must 
be based on an appraisal of Adenauer” (Richardson, 1966: 11), while steering a course 
between the view that “in the beginning was Adenauer” (Baring 1969: 2) and the 
counter-argument that “in the beginning were the allies” (Haftendom, 2006: 9).
There is ample evidence that Adenauer, who also occupied the post o f Foreign Minister 
until 1955, embedded his decisions within a broader understanding o f a German national 
biography.295 Often described as a pragmatic and cunning tactitioner, he was also known 
to be stubborn and authoritarian in his aim of nudging the evolution o f things in one 
direction rather than another. According to his biographers, including his long-term 
assistant, Adenauer was convinced that political practice must be guided by basic 
principles (Grundsatze) and long trajectories or tendencies (Entwicklungstendenzen).296 
In his memoirs Adenauer wrote that fate was determined by “big ideas” and “ethical 
foundations” and defined politics as the art to realize over the long term what was 
recognized as morally right (in Poppinga 1975: 13). His ‘big ideas’ for Germany, more 
specifically for the direction it was going, were significantly influenced by the place 
from where he saw the world. As Amulf Baring (1969: 48-62) notes, whereas Bismarck 
had thought about Germany’s place in Europe from Prussia, Adenauer did the same 
from the Rhine region, more specifically from Cologne.297 Before delineating the broad 
contours o f the ‘Germany’ narrative Adenauer pursued, creating what some have called
293 On the debate between Adenauer and Schumacher, see Weber and Kowert (2007: Ch. 3). The 
friendship lens suggests that Schumacher was unable to create a vision of a new ‘Germany’ 
which resonated with both the German public and the Western Allies, in particular the US. This 
disconnect is not the purpose of this chapter, yet it is indicated by Schumacher’s skepticism about 
Westintegration and NATO membership and the labeling of him as a ‘nationalist’, points which 
Adenauer highlighted and skillfully exploited in his own meeting with US officials.
294 In addition to Schumacher, Adenauer fought party-internal political battles with Andreas 
Hermes and Karl Kaiser over party leadership and with Gustav Heinemann over rearmament.
295 Lord Pakenham, minister for Germany in the British cabinet, described Adenauer as acting 
“like a grandfather” on behalf of a German people he did not trust (cited in Baring 1969: 58).
296 Poppinga (1975); Schwarz (1986: 75, 518,638); Baring (1969: 61); Koch (1985: 245).
297 Also Poppinga (1975); Weidenfeld (1976); Schwarz (1986).
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a ‘Rhenish Republic’, it is necessary to outline his source o f anxiety, the Potsdam 
complex.
The *Potsdam Complex’
The ‘Potsdam complex’ is recognised among Adenauer scholars as a fundamental 
element guiding his policy and captures the concern that Germany’s future would be 
shaped by others (Poppinga 1975: 105, 124f). There is no doubt Adenauer resented 
being treated like a second rate head of state,298 yet at the core of the Potsdam complex 
was not hurt personal pride. Instead, it was his anxiety of not being able to influence 
what Germany would become and, thus, of not being able to ‘see’ Germany’s future 
because of the ever-present possibility o f a revival o f the Allied control council and its 
claim to supreme authority, that is, ‘another Potsdam’ (Grewe 1960: 57).299 Said 
differently, he was anxious about Fremdbestimmung, the possibility that the direction of 
the ‘new’ Germany would be determined by others he could not meaningfully 
communicate with and/or which would not listen to him.
Adenauer’s main concern was that incompatible worldviews would prevent the 
occupying powers from coming to an agreement about what to do with ‘Germany’, 
thereby keeping it in a state of uncertainty and without direction. This fear was fuelled 
through the experience of the immediate post-war years, where there appeared to be no 
coherent plan for Germany’s future among the Western allies. While the Russians 
seemed determined in creating their idea of order in the Eastern zone, Adenauer 
repeatedly complained about discriminatory practices and about chaos in planning and 
administration in the Western sectors, calling it a “verhaegnisvolles Durcheinander” (in 
Schwarz 1986: 443-447; Foschepoth 1997). For Adenauer this reduced Germany’s 
ability to re-invent herself and pursue a meaningful project. Indeed, across party lines 
the view prevailed that the occupiers were to assist reconstruction and open up a new 
path Germans could invest in.300 The second facet of Adenauer’s Potsdam complex was 
the concern that Germans could become attached to the wrong ideas (wrong, of course, 
in his estimate). He feared that should there be a four-power agreement resulting in
298 Symbolic is this well-known episode: when summoned onto the Petersberg to present his 
cabinet and receive the occupying statute in late 1949, the newly elected chancellor refused to 
follow the protocol and stay off the carpet on which the three High Commissioners were standing 
(Baring 1969: 66).
299 In 1953 Adenauer famously described his “nightmare” (‘it’s called Potsdam’) in an interview, 
see Schwabe (1994: 81).
300 A Sueddeutsche Zeitung article complained about “that floating uncertainty which currently 
makes German planning for the future more or less illusionary. Germany needs to know its path. 
It should be shown [this path] now” (von Briick, 1946).
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German ‘neutrality’, this would keep Germany unstable and increase the risk to again 
move down the ‘wrong path’ (Poppinga, 1975: 105f).301 This concern was behind his 
note to the steering committee of his party that the great danger to Germany was to be 
“sacrificed on the altar of reconciliation between East and West” (in Niedhart and 
Altmann 1988: 103).
Thus, for Adenauer the importance of creating stable bonds was not just a pragmatic 
strategy bom out of the inevitability of accommodating the occupiers. His conviction 
that ‘Germany’ needed to be developed with someone was a core theme reflected in his 
gloomy predictions o f what would happen if Germany became ‘neutral’. According to 
Adenauer, the wars and occupations in German history were the result o f a policy of 
shifting alignments or ‘seesaw policy’ [Schaukelpolitik] between East and West, of 
mishandling the country’s middle position in ‘Europe’, or its Mittellage.302 As he saw it, 
the failure of political leaders to create lasting bonds had made it difficult for Germans 
to manifest a stable sense of Self and eventually allowed the ‘wrong ideas’ to take hold. 
While his warning to party colleagues that “it was Germany’s great misfortune that it 
has always been without real friends” (in Poppinga 1975: 48) was clearly exaggerated, 
the scenario of a country (at risk of) drifting into loneliness was effectively (and 
repeatedly) used by Adenauer to denounce the directions chosen by his rivals.
Adenauer dealt with the ‘Potsdam complex’ by trying to gain a voice in the negotiations 
amongst the Western allies about Germany’s future and to thereby influence the 
parameters of the space the ‘new’ Germany would unfold into. As discussed below, he 
expressed this goal in repeated demands to gain the status o f an ‘equal’ or ‘full partner’ a 
demand which also applied to NATO membership after the formation o f the Atlantic 
Alliance in 1949. The reason this request was largely granted in Washington was that the 
narrative of ‘Germany-in-Europe’ Adenauer presented resonated with American 
policymakers.
Sorting the Memory Space
The formulation of a ‘new’ German narrative required connecting past (memory) and 
future (visions). The notion of 1945 as an ‘hour zero’ for Germany was not to imply that
301 That is, neutrality would provide no guard against the temptation to follow the communist 
vision, in case of which ‘Potsdam’ would lead to ‘Prague’. See the discussion below.
302 Adenauer’s complaint that the ‘discontinuity’ in the German narrative makes it difficult for its 
people to find a stable place (Poppinga 1975: 99) built on Helmut Plessner’s notion of the 
‘delayed nation’ (coined in 1935). Scholars have since called this the German ‘dilemma’ 
(Bracher, 1971) or ‘problem’ (Calleo, 1978). See also Schwarz (1994); Verheyen (1999).
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reconstruction was occurring from a historically blank slate; obviously it did not. The 
past could not be discarded and there remained plenty o f continuity in everyday life 
(Doering-Manteuffel 1983: 9-24; Schildt 2007). Adenauer’s task “to form a new state 
out of the Konkursmasse of the Reich” (Foschepoth 1988: 40) was to use the memory 
space the war had created in a way that signalled a break with the Third Reich and 
satisfied domestic and international audiences. This task was marked by the fact that the 
German question was really a European question. It was not only that ‘Europe’ was 
Germany’s experienced space and the situatedness o f the latter in the former had to be 
rethought. Given the violent way the ‘Third Reich’ had attempted to order this space, 
‘Germany-in-Europe’ had become a central and negative place in the experience o f other 
(European) nations, weaving German military aggression and genocide into their 
biographical narratives.
In order to make the past meaningful Adenauer drew on ‘usable pasts’ and frequently 
invoked historical analogies and their lessons (Poppinga 1975: 44-56). This was a 
balancing effort which also dealt with silences. Adenauer was aware that there were 
things many Germans preferred to ‘forget’ (Poppinga 1975: 99). This meant, in 
particular, establishing a “cordon sanitaire around Nazi crimes” (Kansteiner 2006: 111). 
Despite efforts by the occupying powers to confront Germans with the horrors o f the 
concentration camps, the Holocaust was eradicated from public debate by way of 
‘forgetting’ and deflecting responsibility to superiors, a strategy aided by the Nuremberg 
trials and the formal ‘denazification’ process. Adenauer knew that this silence and the 
maintenance o f memories of ‘better times’ and own suffering from bombardment and 
expulsion,303 was unsuitable for the reformulation o f a national biography, especially 
with outside partners. Adenauer knew that any project capable o f creating new 
friendships needed to start from a rejection o f the Third Reich, also reflected in his 
support for compensation -  ‘ Wiedergutmachung’ -  for Jewish victims of the Third 
Reich, which he considered essential for Germany’s moral regeneration (Schwarz 1986: 
898f.)
Broadly speaking, Adenauer’s narrative highlighted two negative legacies, ‘illiberalism’ 
and ‘militarism’. These two were core elements which the Allies had identified in the 
Potsdam Agreement and vowed to root out in their design for any post-war German 
order. It was not difficult for Adenauer to confirm them with a narrative that these had
303 Jarausch and Geyer (2003); Moeller (2001); Kansteiner (2006).
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been elements of a “misguided nationalism” embedded in the “wrong conception o f the 
state” (in Poppinga 1975: lOlf.).304
The ‘legacy of illiberalism’ portrayed the Third Reich as the climax of a Germany which 
in comparison to other European societies had failed to translate the values o f the 
enlightenment into a stable political, i.e. democratic order (Verheyen 1999: 20ff).305 For 
Adenauer, Germans had accepted an order without respect o f the dignity and value of 
the individual and ignored the spiritual foundation o f Christian-humanist thinking. He 
blamed this on a mix of modernity and Marxism, more precisely, on industrialisation 
having created a society focused on material values and seduced by the socialist idea, 
culminating in collectivist mass movement and the centralisation o f power which 
disrespected individual rights (Poppinga 1975; Schwarz 1986). In the German case, the 
‘legacy of militarism’ stood not only for aggressive foreign policy but for a way of 
organizing society, that is, as a principle of domestic order. It pictured a Germany 
dominated by the ‘Prussian tradition’ where the military was considered the ‘school of 
the nation’ and feeding an authoritarian mindset. With the military having enjoyed 
considerable political influence, it also was seen to have played a key role in the demise 
of the Weimar Republic, lifting Hitler to power and leading Germany into the war.
In Adenauer’s narrative that ‘wrong’ conception of the German state constituted by 
these two ideas was ‘Prussian’ (later replaced by the GDR). Symbolic for this was his 
first major speech as party leader of the British zone at Cologne University in 1946 
where he described orders of illiberalism and militarism as the character traits o f a 
‘Prussian spirit’ which had prepared the seedbed for the rise o f National Socialism.306 He 
used this image to both denounce political rivals, in particular Schumacher whom he 
frequently accused of carrying “the old Prussian spirit”, and to connect with the anti- 
Prussian sentiment prominent among the occupying powers (Schwarz 1986: 514; Baring 
1969: 53).
304 Despite declaring nationalism ‘the cancer of Europe’, Adenauer was convinced that people 
could not live without what he called a “national sentiment” (Poppinga 1975: 69f). The problem 
was not a national consciousness as such but, rather, the sort of ‘hypemationalism’ or 
‘aggressive’ nationalism Germans had displayed, see Jarausch (2004: 64-96).
305 This was later captured under the notion of Sonderweg, see Kocka (1982).
306 Baring (1969: 51ff); Schwarz (1986: 449ff); Poppinga (1975: lOlf)- This, again, is 
Adenauer’s reading of the Prussian legacy. It is worth noting that Hitler’s movement took off in 
Catholic Bavaria and that Hitler himself never was a fan of Prussia.
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Envisioning Germany-in-Europe
There was consensus among political leaders in Germany that a meaningful vision 
needed to picture German ‘unity’. On one level this vision was about uniting people and 
territory, concerned with overcoming ‘inner’ borders, that is, the division into zones by 
the occupying powers, and with the status o f ‘outer’ borders in the West (Ruhr/Saarland) 
and the East (Oder-Neisse). Yet because as argued in chapter four space only gains 
meaning/value through an understanding o f what is a ‘good’ order, the more 
fundamental question was what kind o f order a unified Germany should encompass. And 
because Germany’s experienced space was ‘Europe’ and the German question very 
much a European question, the idea of ‘German’ unity was inevitably entwined with the 
idea of ‘European’ unity.307
On the question what Germany and what Europe was to be ‘united’, Adenauer promoted 
the idea o f a space which ensured individual rights and safeguarded against militarism. 
Again, these were the cornerstones for post-war ‘Germany’ stated in the Allies’ Potsdam 
agreement, yet they were also considered desirable principles domestically In 
Adenauer’s version, they resonated with Christian values, which he considered 
fundamental for orienting the new Germany-in-Europe convinced that “only 
respect/pursuit of Christian principles is able to save humanity from falling back into the 
worst barbarism and, indeed, safe it from self-destruction” (in Poppinga 1975: 210).
The commitment to ‘freedom’ was a guiding theme in the (West)German political 
discourse throughout the first decade and featured in all of Adenauer’s statements. His 
interpretation of the ‘freedom’ principle as holding that all humans were equal and 
possessed fundamental and inalienable rights resonated with the emphasis in catholic 
social theory placed on the respect for human dignity and the intrinsic value o f human 
life (Poppinga 1975: 193ff; Weidenfeld 1976; Schwarz 1986). The draft of the party 
program for the newly founded Christian Democrats in the Rhine region, written by 
Adenauer in October 1945, emphasized that “the principles o f Christian ethics and 
culture, of true democracy must carry and pervade the life of the state”, noting the right 
to political and religious freedom, equal rights for all, protection of minorities, etc. (in 
Schwarz 1986: 496). Seven o f the first twelve Articles o f the German Basic, written by a 
cross-partisan committee chaired by Adenauer, manifested the guarantee o f personal 
freedoms as inalienable rights and emphasised the FRG’s “free and democratic basic 
order”.
307 For a passionate call to Germans for focusing on the ‘spiritual reconstruction of Europe’ [als 
die wesentliche Voraussetzungjedes politischen Anfangs], see Die Welt, 1946
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There also was a profound commitment to anti-militarism in post-45 German society, 
which at core really was an anti-war or pacifist sentiment.308 As Konrad Jarausch points 
out, in contrast to the heroisation of soldiers and battles following the First World War, 
this time the war experience was portrayed as profoundly negative. It was not only that 
total defeat left a feeling of meaninglessness about the war; across the ranks it was 
remembered as “bad times” and “a horrible thing” and there was consensus that the war, 
and everything that came with it, was an experience which “must never happen again” 
(Jarausch 2004: 47). This ‘lesson’ was formally manifested in the Occupation Statute 
from September 1949 where the Adenauer government stated its “firm determination” to 
maintain the demilitarization of the new German space and prevent the creation of 
armed forces (Schroder, 1988: 124).
Values of individual rights (liberalism) and pacifism (anti-militarism) were combined in 
the commitment towards “freedom’ and peace” which Adenauer constantly alluded to 
and which together with a commitment to ‘unity’ was formally anchored in the Basic 
Law and, in turn, inscribed into the European space. The future of ‘Germany’ was 
embedded in a vision of European order in which peace would be guaranteed through 
freedom and unity. This was in simple yet fundamental terms the authentic narrative of 
the ‘new Germany’. Specifically, for Adenauer, European order was captured in the 
notion of a ‘United States of Europe’, an idea of a federal union among European 
nations with an element o f supra-nationalism which carried the promise of ‘peace 
through unity’. The vision that a united Europe would be a formula for prosperity and 
peace was central to all conceptions of European order entertained at the time, no matter 
if formulated in religious (Catholic/Protestant) or secular terms (socialist/liberal). 
Developed in the 19th century and popular in the ‘Pan European’ movement in the 1920s 
this vision had lived on during the war in the resistance and among exiles.309 After the 
end of the war, Adenauer participated in meetings reviving the federal idea of a ‘United 
States o f Europe’ and adopted it as a promising design, endorsing it in his Cologne 
speech in 1946 a few months before Churchill famously did so in Zurich.310
308 This overlapped with the Allied objective, as Eisenhower put it, to educate Germans to the 
“self-evident truth” that war was “immoral” (in Jarausch 2004: 41).
309 For a topography laying out the history of the idea of Europe, including the United States of 
Europe first mentioned by Victor Hugo in the 19th century, see von Plessel (2003), also Pagden 
(2002). For a discussion of the various ‘Pan-Europe’ groups, see Loth (1991).
310 On the development of the European design in Adenauer’s thinking, see Weidenfeld (1976: 
47f); Schwarz (1986: 556-563).
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Not surprisingly, for Adenauer the ‘United States o f Europe’ was to be a Christian 
space. Even before the Vatican in 1948 officially declared its support for the federalist 
movement, Adenauer at a CDU party congress in August 1947 noted that it was “the 
Christian Occident we want to try to rescue” (in Schwarz 1986: 564). Although 
Adenauer’s appeal to Christianity resonated with both conservatives and liberal- 
progressive parts o f German society (Jarausch 2004: 149), it generated complaints from 
Social Democrats that he was aiming at establishing a ‘Vatican Europe’.311 To tone 
down this image in the German public and (once he recognised this) to prevent possible 
tensions with the American suspicion of the catholic faith as a ruling doctrine, Adenauer 
formulated the vision of Europe as an Occidental or Western space. This was not a 
compromise as, o f course, historically the Christian/Occidental/Westem notions blended 
into each other and were spatially confined to -  and arose out o f -  the narrative of 
Europe.312 For Adenauer they all met in Cologne, which he once called “the true centre 
o f the Occident” (in Baring 1969: 50). He constantly referred to the idea o f a ‘Western 
Civilisation’ and ‘Occident’ interchangeably as the place within which rebuilding 
Germany was to occur and committed to anchor the vision o f a united Germany in the 
‘Western’ space through a path of Westintegration (Jackson 2006).313 Viewed from 
Cologne, the vision o f a Germany-in-Europe and o f a Germany-in-the West were 
inseparable, as reflected in his inauguration speech as chancellor in September 1949 
when he claimed that Germany belonged to the “Western European world” (von 
Brentano 1964: 42).
Locating Friends in the West
The above reformulation of the authentic German narrative occurred not in isolation but 
with a significant Other. Adenauer from 1946 onwards tried to connect with Western 
occupiers and motivate them to invest in a ‘new’ Germany-in-Europe (Schwarz 1986: 
556). Having them shift the focus from punishment to rehabilitation/reconstruction in 
effect asked for a turn from occupier to friend.
Initially Adenauer hoped that the idea o f Germany in a ‘United States o f Europe’ could 
be engaged with France under British leadership (Foschepoth 1988: 33). In his view
311 While Schumacher was not very good in formulating the European dimension of his 
conception of ‘Germany’, other Social Democrats like Carlo Schmid did. Indeed, as Risse and 
Engelmann-Martin (2002: 298) point out, the Heidelberger Programm from 1925 embraced the 
notion of a ‘United States of Europe’ making the SPD the first major German party to do so.
312 Said (1976); Coker (1998); Neumann (1999); Pagden (2002).
3,3 Critics (then and now) accuse Adenauer of being content with a divided Germany, while 
sympathisers hold that his strategy of Westintegration was designed to attract and ‘pull over’ the 
Eastern part. My reading supports the latter. On the debate, see Foschepoth (1988); Loth (1994)
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Britain still was an empire and had proven a reasonable occupier to work with after the 
First World War. Adenauer was also sensitive to the fact that reinventing Germany-in- 
Europe required redefining the relationship with France. Indeed, when noting that 
building a ‘United States o f Europe’ promised “the best, safest, and most enduring 
protection o f Germany’s Western neighbours” (Schwarz 1986: 515), the neighbour 
Adenauer had particularly in mind was France. Having spent his life close to French 
border and aware of the marks which conflicts over designs of being-in-Europe had left 
in both biographies, French-German reconciliation in a new ‘Europe’ became a key 
theme in his speeches, noting in October 1948 that “The whole future o f Europe relies 
on a real and lasting accommodation/understanding [Verstandigung] between Germany 
and France” (in Poppinga, 1975: 68).
However, neither Paris nor London were ready to invest in a project which, in 
Adenauer’s view, provided a desirable ‘home’. In the French and British experience, 
Germany remained a notorious aggressor, an image they had no reasons to dispose o f 
anytime soon. Busy with their own recovery, they were not inclined to give Germany 
hope for quick rehabilitation. In France, the German narrative was not open for 
negotiation. Humiliated in the war and struggling with re-establishing its own political 
life after the split between resistance and collaboration, for France a rehabilitation of 
Germany would have meant giving up demands on the Saar and Ruhr regions, 
significant not only economically but also for the French status as the victorious nation. 
As such, French politicians were more interested in strengthening ties with Britain and 
the US. While the British did not dismiss the idea of ‘civilising’ Germany, this would be 
a slow process which it could be embark upon only after paying appropriately. Although 
the Churchill government, in particular Anthony Eden, had a more positive view of 
Adenauer than the Labour government under Atlee -  the Foreign Office in 1948 named 
Adenauer a “dangerous man” (Schwarz 1986: 592) -  there was little enthusiasm in 
London about investing in the vision of a united Europe. Apart from despising the idea 
of ‘Vatican Europe’ (Lundestad 1998: 30), Britain did not see herself as living in a 
shared European space, or only as a detached balancer, and was primarily oriented 
towards Washington and its (fading) empire.314
That neither Paris nor London were willing to conceive of Germany as a creative partner 
for the spatial reorganization of their post-war world became apparent in the creation of
3,4 The difference between these spaces was famously captured in the three circles which 
Churchill sketched for Adenauer in 1951, positioning Britain at the intersection of an Atlantic 
space with the US, the Commonwealth and Europe (Trachtenberg, 1999: 116).
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the ‘Brussels Pact’ in March 1948 (which the North Atlantic Treaty later built on and 
which, ironically, was to play a crucial role for eventually allowing German membership 
in NATO). It built on the Anglo-French Dunkirk Treaty from March 1947, formalizing 
the war-time alliance (Baylis, 1984). While the Dunkirk Treaty was accompanied by the 
idea o f a European ‘third force’ (Loth 1991: 34-40), its primary aim was resisting any 
possible future German aggression (Baylis 1984: 618). When the Benelux countries 
joined a year later, making it the ‘Brussels Pact’, the anti-German focus was toned down 
but the explicit commitment of resisting a ‘renewal of German policy o f aggression’ was 
maintained.315 While not excluding the possibility that Germany would eventually join, 
it was not considered to partake in actively shaping the ‘Western Union’, at least not 
until, as Ernest Bevin noted in January 1948, “circumstances permitted” (in Baylis 1984: 
620). The Brussels agreement thus lacked a decisive promise that the space negotiated 
through them was to include Germany in positive terms, it certainly did not cater to 
Adenauer’s vision o f recreating a Germany at the ‘heart’ o f Europe. Aware o f how 
deeply Germany’s ‘Prussian’ image was entrenched in France and Britain, Adenauer 
realised that overcoming their reservations and envisioning a new Germany as an ‘equal’ 
would take a long time (Poppinga 1975: 108).
The US position appeared different. While until late 1948 Adenauer had little knowledge 
about the workings of US politics and had difficulties grasping its direction, he 
recognised the US potential for the renewal o f ‘Germany-in-Europe’ early on (Schroder 
1988: 123).316 In March 1946 Adenauer wrote a colleague in the US to help convince the 
government “that the rescue of Europe can only succeed with help from the USA” and 
that such a rescue would also be “elementary” [wesentlich] for the US (Schwarz 1986: 
564). Even prior to the Marshall Plan, when it was not yet clear how the US would use 
its resources, across party lines the US attitude towards Germany appeared more 
benevolent than Britain’s, that is, it appeared more willing to support a reconstruction o f 
Germany-in-Europe (Foschepoth 1997: 83ff).317
315 French-British insistence to keep the anti-German clause may in part have been a strategy to 
ensure Moscow that the Pact was not directed against the Soviet Union (Baylis 1984; Loth 1991: 
65f.). In any case, the Pact was envisioned by Bevin as “a sort of spiritual federation of the West” 
aimed not at integrating Germany but at strengthening US engagement in Europe (cited in Baylis 
1984: 620). More precisely, the aim was to win the US as a member of the Western Union and to 
satisfy US demands for better cooperation in Western Europe. It did not endorse the vision of a 
‘new’ Germany (Ibid; Kaplan 1984: 59f; Loth 1991: 63f; Winand 1994: 18).
316 On Adenauer’s relationship with the US, see the contributions in Schwabe (1994). As Schwarz 
(1986: 656) points out, Adenauer’s understanding of the US and its politics sharpened only in 
1948 with the choice of Herbert Blankenhom, an experienced diplomat, as his advisor.
3,7 The positive perception of the US was also visible amongst the general population. It was 
aided by the fact that the America-image was underdeveloped and romanticized in Germany, and
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An important sign was the speech given by James Byrnes in Stuttgart in September 
1946, the first public speech by a Secretary of State in the destroyed Germany. In this 
speech, Byrnes basically used the principles of the Potsdam Agreement to shift the 
agenda from punishment to rehabilitation. From the German perspective, the speech 
offered a vision of a better future in three ways. First, it identified the interrelationship 
between ‘Germany’ and ‘Europe’ and, noting that German resources must be used “to 
rebuild a free, peaceful Germany and a free, peaceful Europe” explicitly connects the 
future well-being of Germany with that o f ‘Europe’. Second, it confirmed the 
commitment o f the Potsdam Agreement that Germany should be administered as an 
economic unit which, while falling short of formulating the aim of German political 
unity, holds the promise that zonal barriers would not be entrenched. Third, and most 
significantly, Byrnes called for a “successful rehabilitation o f Germany”, not restricted 
to the economic realm but connected to “setting up a democratic German government” 
and drafting a constitution for a “new Germany”. While reminding Germans that they 
were bearing the responsibility for their current situation, he closed his speech by saying
“the United States has no desire to increase those hardships or to deny 
the German people an opportunity to work their way out of those 
hardships (...)  The American people want to help the German people to 
win their way back to an honorable place among the free and peace- 
loving nations of the world”.318
The speech was received very positively, with German newspapers commenting that 
Byrnes had opened a “door of hope” through which “a friend and helper showed 
Germans the way to a new life” (cited in Jarausch 2004: 150). The next few years 
confirmed the American support for the creation o f a ‘new’ Germany and gave 
Adenauer the sense not only of US strength but also o f direction. In his inaugural speech 
as chancellor in September 1949 he noted: “I don’t think ever in history a victorious 
country tried to assist the defeated country in such a way, and [tried] to contribute to its 
reconstruction and its recovery like the United States did and [still] does towards 
Germany” (cited in Schroder 1988: 118). In a Bundestag speech in October that year he 
emphasised Germany’s “great luck that the American people are freedom-loving, 
progressive, and determined” (cited in Schroder, 1988: 123). Adenauer celebrated 
American determinism because it invested in a vision o f Germany-in-Europe he shared. 
As Rainer Barzel puts it in basic terms, his positive view of the US was based on a
so the disclosure of ‘America’ in a post-war world through interaction with friendly US soldiers 
and an influx of US popular culture had tremendous impact, see Jarausch (2004: 148ff).
318 All quotations are from Byrnes (1946).
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feeling that “these are people who want the order which I strive towards as well” (Barzel 
in Schwabe 1994: 61), as expressed in Adenauer’s comment at a CDU party congress in 
August 1947 that “the Occident, the Christian Occident, is not a geographic term, it is a 
spiritual-historical term which also encompasses America” (in Schwarz 1986: 564). 
How this space looked from Washington and why Germany was treated favourably in 
there is discussed next.
America-in-the-World: Shaping the West
Adenauer’s framing of the European project as crucial for re-instating the values of 
‘Western civilization’ resonated in Washington. ‘The W est’ was the value space within 
which the American narrative unfolded. It was forged through detachment from the 
European continent and the Westward-movement of ‘manifest destiny’, creating a space 
that was not ‘Europe’ but still linked to it through common roots in enlightenment 
values. The overarching ordering principle defining this space, and to which the 
existence o f America-in-the-West was tied, was ‘liberty’ or ‘freedom’ (Foner 2003). 
Expressed in the notion of American exceptionalism, this space and the order it contains 
was considered a space for human progress and the promise o f a better future, quite 
literally a ‘New World’. The identification o f America as an exceptional nation 
unfolding in the Western space generated the self-understanding of ‘America’ as the 
defender o f ‘the West’, a reading becoming visible in the Monroe doctrine and 
manifested with the First World War as a foreign policy principle (Coker, 1998; Gress 
1998; Jackson 2006).319 Freedom was the principle grounding Henry Luce’s 1941 
famous formulation of the authentic American narrative, and as Dean Acheson noted, 
the line o f American foreign policy was to be “the constructive task o f building, in 
cooperation with others, the kind of world in which freedom...can flourish. The success 
of our efforts rests on our faith in ourselves and in the values for which this Republic 
stands” (Acheson 1950: 10).
In spite of George Washington’s famous call not to become entangled with ‘Europe’, the 
two World Wars (re)integrated ‘Europe’ into America’s experienced space, ‘the W est’. 
The signing o f the Atlantic Charter by Roosevelt and Churchill in August 1941 is often 
referred to as a symbolic revival of the West as an Anglo-American sphere (Coker 1998, 
Ch. 2; Gress 1998).320 The Charter was not merely a declaration o f military solidarity but
319 Leffler calls the emphasis of the US military establishment to predominate throughout the 
Western Hemisphere “a natural evolution of the Monroe Doctrine”, see Leffler (1984: 354f.). On 
American exceptionalism and missionary ideology, see Blanke and Krakau (1992).
320 Christopher Coker calls the Charter the product of “a heightened consciousness of the values 
of Western civilization” and suggests that the idea of an “Atlantic world” came from Churchill
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captured a political project whose purpose it was but to lay out the vision o f a peaceful 
(potentially global) post-war order around the principles of sovereignty, political and 
economic liberalism and denouncing military aggression.321 It makes no reference to a 
geopolitical space, however, because the American vision differed from the British when 
it came to specifying ‘the world’ it should apply to. Most importantly, there was 
disagreement as to what extent the idea of a united Europe was, or should be, part o f ‘the 
West’. As symbolised in Churchill’s three circles, the British imagined the West more 
narrowly as an Anglo-American ‘Atlantic world’, a space separate not only from the 
British Empire but also from ‘Europe’. Investment in the ‘West’ and ‘Europe’ were 
considered two different and potentially conflicting projects (Coker 1998).
From Washington things looked different. The initial tension between the Truman 
doctrine’s global outlook and a regional focus on Europe gave way to the latter. While 
universalism remained visible in the Truman and Eisenhower administrations (Gaddis 
2005: 55), ‘Europe’ took a privileged place in the American conception o f the world. 
When Kennan convinced Washington in 1946 that views held in the Kremlin were 
irreconcilable with the idea of ‘one world’ and that ‘two spheres o f influence’ were 
emerging in Europe (Trachtenberg 1999), US planners saw Europe and, within it, 
Germany, as the place whose horizon o f expectations needed to be kept in line with the 
American one. By the time Marshall noted in June 1947 that the US was “one o f the 
bulwarks of Western civilization” and would not “stand by and watch the disintegration 
of the international community to which we belong” (in Jackson, 2003: 244), the future 
of ‘Europe’ had become central to the future of the Western space.
Envisioning the *United States o f Europe’
It is useful to being with the reminder that American designs for post-war Europe were 
not primarily responding to a perceived Soviet threat but aimed at addressing the causes 
of the war, namely preventing a resurgence o f rivalry and turmoil (Ikenberry 2001: 
170ff; Layne 2006: 43f). Yet from a phenomenological perspective the American 
motivation for becoming engaged in Europe was not merely to create a ‘zone of peace’ 
(McArdle Kelleher, 1983), but a particular peace, one which provided the US with 
authentic ontological security. The point made here is that, in contrast to explanations 
stressing pure economic motives (securing a new market) or a traditional security 
rationale (deterrence against Soviet aggression), from a national biography perspective
(Coker 1998: 32). The idea certainly resonated with Roosevelt who in his ‘four freedoms’ speech 
from January 1941 had outlined the values the US sought to defend (Kissinger, 1994: 385-391).
321 The principles were echoed in the Potsdam agreement and the UN Charter.
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the US investment in ‘Europe’ was aimed at positively integrating this space into the 
American narrative. And as suggested by the friendship lens, US policymakers were 
looking for pursuing this task through a special relationship.
Trachtenberg’s observation of an American desire “to pull out (of Europe) as soon as 
she reasonably could” (cited in McAllister 2002: 19) may be true where the stationing of 
troops was concerned. Yet on a more fundamental level the US needed (and wanted) to 
remain engaged simply because ‘Europe’ could not be pulled out of the American 
biography. ‘Europe’ had become spatially integrated in into the American understanding 
of ‘being-in-the-world’. Once this space had been disclosed and made part o f the world 
through the experience o f the war, America could not disengage from the memory but 
had to make it meaningful. From that perspective, the geopolitical argument why Europe 
mattered popular among strategic analysts at the time, building on the conviction that 
“who rules Eurasia controls the destinies o f the world” (see Leffler, 1984: fn 30),322 was 
informed less by a realist (balance o f power) mindset than by the view that a strong 
Europe within the West would vitalize America’s vision for and unfolding in ‘the 
world’.323 The aim was to integrate Europe for a creative project which accommodated 
American ideas of order and was supported by European nations thereby satisfying 
desires of both belonging/recognition and authenticity. As Kennan put it in the summer 
of 1949, without ‘Europe’ the US would be “a lonely nation... in the sense of philosophy 
and outlook on the world” (cited in Winand 1994: 15).
It is suggested here that the vision of ‘Europe’ in which the Truman and Eisenhower 
administration invested resonated with the one Adenauer pursued, namely that of a 
regional federal order, a ‘United States of Europe’. Yet whereas the Chancellor’s 
support for this design is well known, the American position requires some elaboration.
As Pascaline Winand (1993) and Geir Lundestad (1998) have shown, the US was a 
strong supporter of the idea of European integration from the start. One scholar has even 
spoken of an American “obsession with Western European unity” (McAllister 2002: 17). 
In addition to the paramount theme of creating ‘peace through freedom ’ present in all
322 For a comprehensive revisionist discussion of the American ‘national security interest’ at the 
time, including the view prevailing among strategists that “any power(s) attempting to dominate 
Eurasia must be regarded as potentially hostile to the United States”, see Leffler (1984: 456ff.).
323 In a speech emphasizing the importance of defending ‘freedom’, Acheson noted how millions 
of people in Europe were looking for a way out of misery and that “if we want them to move in 
the direction of freedom, we must help them” because “those who think like us should have the 
power to make safe the area in which we carry that faith [in freedom] into action” (Acheson 
1950: 4f.).
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key speeches o f US officials, the administration invested heavily in the vision o f ‘peace 
through unity'. In Washington the idea o f a ‘unified’ Europe was discussed already 
during the war, with reports on how to best organize economic aid highlighting a region- 
specific design with Germany at the centre (Winand 1993: 7-14). Like Adenauer, US 
planners and policymakers were exposed to the idea by advocates o f a European 
federation, including Monnet.324 The idea of a ‘United States o f Europe’ was prominent 
also in the State Department and favourably debated in the press and on Capitol Hill 
through groups such the ‘American Committee for a Free and United Europe’ (Winand 
1994: 19ff). After initial concerns that such an approach would compromise the idea of 
free trade, the Truman administration since late 1945 set course for the economic 
reconstruction o f ‘Europe’ and developed institutions were not just to distribute aid most 
efficiently, but to install the kind of European order o f ‘freedom’ and ‘unity’ the US 
deemed worth investing in .325
Rather than dismissing the popularity o f the ‘United States o f Europe’ vision as mere 
rhetoric, as Kaplan (1984; 1994) seems to suggest, the argument here is that it was 
fundamental for how Washington rationalized and justified its engagement in/with the 
European space. Turning Europe into a ‘free and unified’ space in a design familiar to 
Americans provided US policymakers with an opportunity to productively integrate 
‘Europe’ into America’s world. In other words, the reason the vision o f a ‘United States 
of Europe’ was adopted was that it resonated with the American biography. Just as the 
Founding Fathers had introduced the federal constitution as a solution to make unity out 
of diversity, and just as the American Civil War had been turned into a creative force to 
‘unify’ Americans, so the ‘European civil war’ could be turned into unity under the 
federal design. It was a foundational moment; the federal union had brought peace and 
prosperity to America and the ‘United States of Europe’ would do the same for Europe. 
This was the theme of Carl Van Doren’s widely read ‘Great Rehearsal’ and was echoed 
by Congressmen and administration officials in frequent lectures to Europeans on the 
importance o f these American lessons. As one British Foreign Office official remarked 
(in frustration) “the Americans want an integrated Europe looking like the United States 
of America -  ‘God’s own country’” (in Kaplan 1984: 131, 60f; 1994: 18f.; Lundestad 
1998: 15).
324 According to Winand, Monnet had strong bonds with key American officials such as Dulles 
and Kennan and inspired their pro-European stance (Winand 1994: 2fi), as was Coudenhove- 
Kalergi for Fulbright. For a more sceptical perspective of the influence of these figures, see 
Kaplan (1984: 52-58).
325 Most famously to ‘oversee’ the European Recovery Program (‘Marshall Plan’) through the 
Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) and administered through the Organisation for 
European Economic Co-Operation (OEEC).
207
Investing in this vision, then, had significant payoffs: It accommodated a vision of 
‘Europe’ within the Western space and it reduced the possibility of renewed conflict 
based on the dual belief that (i) a liberal and federal order had an intrinsic pacifying 
effect and that (ii) a society striving for an order built along the lines of the American 
model would be a ‘natural’ partner. In the belief that ‘all good things go together’ the 
vision of a ‘united Europe’ reduced uncertainty by holding the promise o f a recovered 
and peaceful Germany-in-Europe siding with the US. This trust that a ‘United States of 
Europe’ would be a peaceful and reliable partner explains why influential voices in both 
Truman and Eisenhower administrations were not worried about and, indeed, supported 
the idea of a ‘third force’ under the assumption that “as that third force, Europe would 
most often side with the United States” (Winand 1994: 15; Trachtenberg 1999).326 The 
vision of a ‘third force’ benevolent to the US provided the perfect balance between 
ensuring a strong link between the US and ‘Europe’ without becoming formally 
‘entangled’, thus not departing from George Washington’s dictum entirely.
Rebuilding Germany
One could ask whether ‘Germany’ mattered to the US because o f its concern for 
‘Europe’, or vice versa. From a phenomenological perspective this distinction makes 
little sense. As noted earlier, Hitler’s policies connected the two in the experience o f the 
participants and victims in that war and rendered it impossible to conceive o f one 
(‘Europe’) without the other (‘Germany’).327 Thus, the task o f ordering Europe 
inevitably included the task o f ordering Germany. As Tony Judt points out, 85 percent of 
American war effort had gone on the war against Germany (Judt 2005: 105) and so it 
was not the ‘Soviet question’ but the ‘German question’ which stood at the centre o f US 
post-war planning and informed the broader question how to order ‘Europe’: “the central 
question of the postwar world was and would remain the future o f Germany” 
(McAllister 2002: 4). Even when it was not always stated Germany was the “major issue 
in every meeting o f the Allies and in most of the planning sessions within the United 
States” (Kaplan 1984: 3; Lundestad, 1998; Gortemaker, 1994: 76; Trachtenberg, 1999; 
Layne, 2006).
326 Republican Presidential candidates Thomas Dewey in April 1948 asserted that “what is 
needed to restore stability in the world is a unified Europe -  a strong third power devoted to the 
cause o f peace. What is needed is a United States of Europe” (in Kaplan 1984: 71, emphasis 
added). For a view that the US wanted to prevent a ‘third force’, see Leffler (1993).
327 For remarks in this direction, see Acheson (1950: 114).
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The analytical lens used here does not follow the common portrayal of the US engaging 
in a “struggle over” or even “for” Germany (McAllister 2002), which reduces ‘it’ to a 
prize fought over by the victorious powers. Instead, it was about an investment in 
Germany-in-Europe with Adenauer. This perspective is supported by the fact that in 
discussions o f what to do with Germany after the war the ‘punishment’ agenda was 
abandoned relatively quickly. Proposals such as those advanced by Secretary o f the 
Treasury Henry Morgenthau which recommended stripping Germany of its industrial 
capacity and turning it de facto  into an agricultural society were discarded. Although 
Roosevelt initially leaned towards German punishment, in September 1944 he distanced 
himself from the Morgenthau Plan in the face of opposition from Congress, the press 
and from within the administration, who argued that such measures were 
counterproductive for achieving Tasting peace’ in Europe. Directive 1067 from the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, presented to Truman in April 1945 calling for treating occupied 
Germany as “a defeated enemy nation” faced similar criticism and faded in the 
implementation phase (Winand, 1993: 7; Judt 2005: 105). Neither was Washington’s 
approach towards Germany simply about containment, as suggested most prominently 
by Gaddis (2005; also Hanrieder 1989). While the aim clearly was to prevent a similar 
Germany from re-emerging, if ‘containment’ is understood as ‘keeping the Germans 
down’ the term is misleading. From Byrnes’ speech to the Marshall Plan to Acheson’s 
note that the US was “giving the Germans a goal to work as partners with other Western 
countries” (in Kaplan 1984: 6), US policy towards Germany is better captured in terms 
o f ‘recreation’.
Recognising the importance of Walter Lippmann’s insight in 1944 that a peaceable 
Germany “must have a place somewhere” (in Harper 1994: 186), the aim was to place 
the ‘new’ Germany firmly in, and have it contribute to America’s conception o f ‘the 
West’. Conceiving of and representing Germany as such a positive force was not 
difficult. Whereas the two wars had made it part of America’s experienced space, other 
than France and Britain the US lacked the trauma from German aggression. Thus, the 
US biography did not need to accommodate a ‘Germany’ which had brought destruction, 
suffering and/or occupation to the American ‘homeland’. The number o f American lives 
lost in the war was below that suffered by most European nations and the war itself had 
strengthened, rather than weakened, the US economy. When Acheson spoke about the 
difference between the American, French and British policies on post-war Germany, he 
noted “I suppose that it is a result of the depth of the historical background, the emotions 
and the passions that have been aroused by Germany’ aggressive wars and the inevitable 
importance attached to the course of German development” (Acheson 1950: 118). As
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Lawrence Kaplan (1984: 25) notes, whereas French memories made it impossible to 
accept Germans as “colleagues in a common effort”, the US had no problems 
rehabilitating Germany and channelling reparation payments into a common project. 
Building on the theme of redemption in the American narrative and the right to have ‘a 
second chance’, the view, as expressed in aforementioned Byrnes’ speech, was that 
Germans were capable and could be assisted to do better. In short, they were considered 
capable o f living the American Dream.328
The State Department was explicit in that Germany’s new place had to be defined 
together with Germans (Maier 1990: 33; Acheson 1950). Kennan, in particular, came to 
recognise that German public opinion would never give up on the idea o f unification and 
that a divided Germany de-facto meant a divided Europe and so, after initial scepticism, 
adopted the ideal o f German unity. However, the administration shared with Adenauer 
the assessment that there was “a gap between the desirable and the practicable” (Gaddis 
2005: 72f.). So Kennan’s proposal from November 1948 to aim towards a unified 
Germany was dropped by Acheson due to anticipated French and British opposition to 
seeing Germany ‘restored’, Russian unwillingness to withdraw its troops, and the 
concern that a united Germany could slip into the Soviet zone o f influence (the ‘Rapallo 
complex’, see below). Instead, the idea was formed, found in more general terms in NSC 
68, to build up a West German state which would serve as a magnet and ‘attract’ the 
Eastern part, thus pursuing the idea of German unity through a ‘politics of strength’, the 
path Adenauer embraced.
NATO as a Forum  for Building ‘Europe’
The signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949 and the commitment o f solidarity 
it contained is considered a milestone in the history o f a United States traditionally wary 
of becoming entangled in European affairs. Yet in contrast to the portrayal o f NATO as 
an institutionalization o f deterrence/containment, the lens used here suggests that the 
primary purpose of NATO was not the military defense o f Western Europe’s territorial 
integrity. Neither was it, as Ikenberry (2001) suggests, for making American 
preponderance “acceptable” to Europeans by setting up power sharing institutions. 
Instead, the argument here is that that the US sought an institutional frame through
328 On the theme of redemption ism in US foreign policy, see Coker (1989: 11-20). Indicative for 
American faith in German ‘learning abilities’ were the various re-education programmes targeted 
towards instilling a ‘democratic consciousness’ and war as a morally bad thing. This was 
supported by the view that Germans were not inherently evil but, for the most part, had been 
‘misguided’ by Hitler and his regime. On ‘re-education’ programmes, see Jarausch (2004). The 
fact that about 30% of Americans claimed German heritage, making it the largest immigrant 
group, in all likelihood also contributed to the hope in a ‘better’ Germany.
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which it could build a ‘United States o f Europe’ within the Western space. For this, the 
economic institutions set up around the Marshall Plan were not sufficient. Given the 
highly militarized environment after the war and the vivid memories of German 
aggression a new European order required an institution dealing with the question of the 
legitimate use of force. It is argued here that NATO came to be that institution which 
allowed creatively integrating, together with Germany, the European space into 
America’s national biography. Thus, In addition to “breaking down the barriers o f 
national sovereignty...that were held responsible for much of the disasters o f the 
twentieth century” (Kaplan 1984: 5), NATO was to create the conditions for setting up a 
‘United States of Europe’ containing a strong and friendly Germany.
To be sure, Washington was wary of British and French attempts to have to commit to 
an extended ‘Western Union’. As symbolized in the debate over the terms of mutual 
solidarity and what was to become Article five o f the North Atlantic Treaty, the US 
administration was unsure about the institution’s purpose or, more precisely, about how 
the US would benefit from it (Kaplan 1984: 113ff). Pentagon and State Department 
were concerned for different reasons. The former was wary o f over-commitment, that is, 
of promising military assistance to weak European forces without a clear military 
rationale and ambiguous statements of purpose, and of investing in what might be 
perceived as a military provocation by the Soviet Union (Ibid., 69f.). This last concern 
was shared by diplomats, who in addition were worried that a formal US commitment of 
military solidarity was undermining the idea o f a European ‘third force’. Both branches 
had a feeling that by joining an extended Western Union the US would be asked to 
commit over proportion in military and political terms.
Yet given the weakness of Europeans, the feeling o f a lacking reciprocity was less a 
matter of correcting the balance in terms of means supplied, it was a question of ends. 
For Kennan and John Hickerton, director o f the Office for Western European Affairs, 
the Brussels Pact was ‘too negative’, that is, at root still a military alliance which treated 
Germany as a potential enemy and was not politically advancing the project o f European 
unity. This was also Truman’s view. In his congratulating remarks on the signing of the 
Brussels Pact, Truman attempted to shift the focus by emphasizing the potential of a 
united Europe and embedding his support in the view that the treaty was “a notable step 
in the direction o f unity in Europe for protection and preservation of its civilization” (in 
Kaplan 1984: 66).
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The administration eventually engaged negotiations because it saw this as an investment 
in the project of a free and united Europe and hoped to thereby move closer to its vision 
o f a Western space promising a meaningful future in peace. When Acheson in March 
1949 explained the meaning of the North Atlantic Pact in a radio address, he stressed its 
purpose to be the defence o f Western civilisation, “the product o f at least 350 years of 
history” connecting the US with Western Europe fundamentally through “common 
institutions and moral and ethical beliefs... acceptance o f the same values in life”. Yet he 
portrayed it not merely as a conservative institution. Behind the characterisation of the 
Pact as a “self-defense arrangement” Acheson emphasised its creative function of 
‘waging peace’ understood as creating “an environment of freedom, from which flows 
the greatest amount of ingenuity, enterprise, and accomplishment” (Acheson 1950: 
82ff.).
Because the federal idea and German rehabilitation in it were cornerstones o f this vision, 
the US tied its signing of North Atlantic Treaty to concessions from Britain and France. 
The former had to accept the dilution of the Atlantic space by recognising the US plan to 
merge the Western and the European space and France had to accept that the US was 
disinclined to create the West as a space in which Germany would be discriminated 
against. Still, debates over membership, spatial terminology ( ‘Western’, ‘Europe’ 
‘Atlantic’) and the precise meaning and formulation o f Article Five highlighted that 
disagreements remained about the common project (Kaplan 1984).
Adenauer’s Germany turned out to be the ideal partner. The American plan to recreate 
Germany by integrating it into a ‘united Europe’ within the Western space resonated 
with Adenauer’s path of Westintegration and vice versa. The resonance of Adenauer’s 
thinking with both Truman and Eisenhower administrations concerning the future of 
‘Germany-in-Europe’ was so strong that already prior to his election as chancellor 
Adenauer was described by a high ranking American civil administrator in Bonn as “our 
man” (in Schwarz 1986: 591).329 During his first visit to the US in 1953, great efforts 
were made by the Americans to provide Adenauer with backing for the upcoming 
elections, with Dulles even noting at a press conference that it would be “disastrous” if 
he was not re-elected. From an American perspective Adenauer was considered so 
important for the direction of Germany that after his re-election in 1953, the US High 
Commission in an assessment o f his first term was not worried about the fact that his 
autocratic governing style but that there was ‘stagnation’ in public support for his
329 On Adenauer’s relationship with the US, see Schrdder (1988); Schwabe (1994).
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politics (Schroder 1988: 134-38). Ironically, the reason for this ‘stagnation’ was that 
Adenauer had decided that the FRG needed to adapt a core principle o f its (young) 
narrative to be able to negotiate its future in the West with the US.
Rearmament as Voice
Adenauer was convinced that German participation in the US effort of shaping the 
Western space would require NATO membership. This would bring recognition as an 
‘equal partner’ entitled and expected to help developing Germany-in-Europe. Hence, 
even before the North Atlantic Treaty was signed and his election as Chancellor, 
Adenauer noted in March 1949 that membership in NATO was “one of the first tasks of 
a West German government” (Baring 1969: 73). Aware of the American expectation for 
reciprocity, that is, strong voices coming out of the US Congress binding US 
engagement in Europe on corresponding European contributions,330 Adenauer needed to 
find a way for Germany to contribute to the vision of Europe as a ‘Third Force’.
That way was rearmament. In December 1949, a few months after he was elected 
chancellor, Adenauer publicly called for a European Army and a possible German 
contribution to it through, tellingly, interviews in American newspapers.331 Soon 
rearmament became the central political issue of his first term in office (Hanrieder, 
1989: 38; Baring, 1969: 70f.). Given that the idea of rearmament appeared incompatible 
with the anti-militarism/pacifism principle of the ‘new Germany’ narrative, this was a 
significant adaptation and highly contested. Domestically it triggered “one o f the 
sharpest controversies about a political issue ever carried out in the Federal Republic” 
(Volkmann, 1990: 237) and was met with opposition from France and viewed with some 
suspicion in the UK.
As concerns over a ‘remilitarization’ of Germany were understood and shared by 
Adenauer, it is not uncommon for scholars to apply the ‘great power bias’ and argue that 
German rearmament was result of pressure from Washington in the wake o f the Korean 
War. Specifically, the argument is that this was a price the Pentagon requested for 
agreeing to station additional troops in Western Europe (Gaddis, 2005 (1982): 112). This 
argument stands on weak ground, however. As Hans Peter Schwarz points out,
330 The call for Europeans to engage in ‘self help and mutual aid’ was stressed in the influential 
Senate Resolution from June 1948 sponsored by Arthur Vandenberg, the powerful chairman of 
the Foreign Relations Committee, who kept warning that a lack of progress in European 
integration would lead Congress to reduce the financial flow (Kaplan 1984: 70-77; Winand 1994: 
20; Maier, 1990: 139).
331 The interviews were given to the New York Times and the Cleveland Plain Dealer. Adenauer 
made frequent use of US newspapers to disseminate his ideas.
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Adenauer was thinking about the possibility of rebuilding some sort o f German army 
before being ‘encouraged’ by the US. While for Schwarz Adenauer’s interest in 
rearmament is “one o f the puzzles o f his personality which can never be fully explained” 
(Schwarz 1986: 734), Wolfram Hanrieder reminds that Adenauer viewed, rearmament 
primarily in political terms and that it became “the anchor o f Adenauer’s diplomacy” 
(Hanrieder 1989: 38). Building upon this argument, I take up the two reasons given by 
Adenauer for rearmament, namely (i) the acquisition o f sovereignty and (ii) the 
protection from a communist threat and suggest that both were used in support of 
recreating Germany’s place in ‘the West’ through NATO.
Adenauer repeatedly noted that the possession o f a military was a fundamental aspect of 
‘sovereignty’; however, sovereignty is a vague and contested term. For Adenauer, 
‘sovereignty’ did not mean ‘autonomy’ but having ‘equal rights’ [Gleichberechtigung]. 
He frequently used it synonymously with ‘equality’ and reminded his Cabinet that 
rearmament would speed up the path towards recognition as an ‘equal partner’ 
(Volkmann 1990: 240). Adenauer rejected the idea o f a national army, wanting German 
soldiers integrated into a supranational ‘European Army’ instead. Neither he nor 
Schumacher, who was an even stronger advocate of ‘sovereignty’, wanted a reduction of 
military presence of allied forces on German territory, quite the opposite.332 And while 
Adenauer was determined to end the Occupation Statute put in place after the founding 
of the FRG in 1949 (see below), this was because it kept open the possibility o f ‘another 
Potsdam’; Adenauer worked hard on tying the vision o f a unified Germany to the course 
of Westintegration and European unity.333 As Hanrieder observes, the sovereignty for 
which Adenauer aimed was “of a rather special kind: once obtained, it would be 
immediately ‘dissipitated’ within treaties that bound Germany to the West. (...). 
Integration and equality rather than the quest for sovereign independence became the 
central precepts” (Hanrieder 1989: 233).
In short, the sovereignty Adenauer wanted did not refer to autonomy but to having a 
voice in the development o f Germany-in-(Westem)Europe. The German military was 
the asset Adenauer could offer to the US as a contribution to the Western project. It 
allowed him to link the possibility of German participation in a ‘European army’ with
332 In his security memorandum to the High Commissioners from August 1950, Adenauer called 
for a reinforcement of occupying troops (Baring 1969: 86), as did Schumacher in his Bundestag 
speech from November 1950 (Schumacher 1950).
333 Adenauer tried to insert an article (Bindungsklausel) into the ‘Bonn Conventions’ which 
would tie future German governments and the Western Allies to the commitment that a united 
Germany would remain embedded in the Western project. The Article (7.2) was ultimately toned 
down on the insistence of the Allies, see Grewe (1952/1960: 58).
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the demand that Germany had to be considered an ‘equal partner’ in a supranational 
structure, ideally NATO. By arguing that it would be impossible to ask Germans to fight 
for an order in which they were discriminated against, Adenauer tied rearmament to the 
revision of the Occupation Statute and to the establishment of ‘Germany’ as a formative 
actor in the Western space through NATO. In this strategy, the ‘communist threat’ was a 
means to an end.
Negative Visions of Germany-in-Europe
Adenauer justified rearmament by through the use o f a dystopia (see chapter five), 
namely the negative vision that Germany-in-Europe could become a communist space. 
This allowed him to entrench the determination for the project, that is, to mobilize 
domestic support for rearmament and thus manifest the path o f Westintegration against 
domestic critics and to strengthen the bonds with the American narrative. Adopting the 
terminology offered by his advisor Wilhelm Grewe, Adenauer formulated two scenarios 
of the communist threat, the ‘Korea model’ and the ‘Prague model’, scenarios of Soviet 
military invasion and political subversion, respectively (Grewe 1960: 13). Both models 
lend the authentic texture for Adenauer’s narrative of undesirable futures and resonated 
with the US.
Dystopia I: The ‘Korea’ Model
The Korea model contained the fear of Soviet invasion through military attack in the 
style of North Korea’s invasion of the South in May 1950 with presumed support from 
China. The outbreak of the Korean War, which took American forces stationed there by 
surprise and almost drove them off the peninsula, triggered an atmosphere of panic in 
Bonn. The press service of the CDU described the events in Korea as an ‘educational 
film’ for future conflicts in Europe (Koch, 1985: 260) and Adenauer firmly expressed 
his conviction that Stalin was planning “the same procedure for Western Europe as had 
been used in Korea” (in Kaplan 1994: 42).
The task here is not to assess the ‘accuracy’ o f Adenauer’s vision, which had been laid 
out long before the Korean War in scenarios prepared by his military advisors, the 
former Wehrmacht Generals von Speidel and von Schwerin (Schwarz 1986: 740). It 
suffices to say that there were no signs of Soviet aggression against Western Europe and 
that from a balance of power perspective the Soviet Union was not a threat to a Germany 
occupied by the US and its allies. While measuring the distribution of ‘hard power’ in 
Europe in the first post-war years is notoriously difficult, on the basis of conventional 
indicators the US clearly outweighed the Soviet Union. During the war it had only
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suffered a fraction o f the over 20 Million Russians lives that were lost,334 and while 
Stalin had to deal with heavily damaged cities, industry and infrastructure, the US 
economy had been boosted by the war.335 Most importantly, the US military was not 
only technologically more advanced but also holding the monopoly over nuclear 
weapons.336 Ikenberry’s note that the pre-eminent position o f the US was recognized at 
the time is true for the German government, with Adenauer in October 1950 describing 
the US in the Bundestag as the most powerful actor since the Roman Empire (in 
Schroder 1988: 123). If, as Kissinger (1994: 443) writes “the much-advertised Soviet 
invasion o f Western Europe was a fantasy”, the point made here is that Adenauer made 
effective use o f this scenario to generate momentum for German rearmament. It was 
effective because it struck a familiar chord in the German and the American narrative 
and thus was accepted as a possibility.
The Korea model drew on several aspects of the German biography.337 There was the 
racist element, with Adenauer describing Russia as an ‘Asian’ space, tapping into the 
familiar theme of Europe facing a barbaric civilisation in the East (Neumann, 1999). 
Although as Baring (1969: 53) reminds us Adenauer used the term ‘Asia’ rather loosely 
when looking Eastward, his view of the Soviet Union being fundamentally different, 
backwards and aggressive echoed the anti-slavic sentiment fostered by the Nazis 
(Niedhart and Altmann, 1988: 102). The racist element was embedded in the larger 
enemy-image of the ‘red scare’ built up under Hitler and amplified by a fear o f a 
revenge-driven Red Army, fed by reports o f rape and oppression told by German 
refugees from the East.338 Most obviously Adenauer benefited from the Nazi’s anti­
communist propaganda and adapted it to remind o f communism’s disregard for 
traditional Christian values, warning that “a victory o f communist atheism” would 
destroy “everything Christianity has given to humanity over the 2000 years of its 
existence” (in Weidenfeld, 1976: 86). Finally, and most importantly, to make the Third
334 The figure is from Gaddis (1996: 13). Judt (2005: 18) puts the total Soviet losses at around 24 
million lives. Depending on sources, the US lost up to 400,000 lives.
335 Between 1938 and 1953 the US share of the world manufacturing output rose from 31.4 to 
44.7 percent, compared to Russia’s 9.0 and 10.7, see Ikenberry (2001: 168); Leffler (1984: 380).
336 In 1945 Washington’s share of military expenditures among the six great powers stood at a 
staggering 74.5 per cent against Moscow’s 7.1 (Ikenberry, 2001: 168). For an argument of 
American ‘weakness’ in the immediate post-war period due to demobilization, see Coker (1989; 
36ff.). This argument is not very convincing, however, because it downplays the nuclear 
advantage and does not provide a comparative perspective, without which ‘power’ cannot be 
measured.
337 On Adenauer’s enemy image of the Soviet Union, see also Niedhart and Altmann (1988). It is 
not unreasonable to assume that Adenauer never expected a Soviet attack. Certainly the Korea 
model had a brief life-span as the primary threat in Adenauer’s rhetoric, as less than a year after 
the outbreak of fighting he shifted his emphasis to the ‘Prague model’ (Schwarz 1986: 848).
338 See also Grossmann (1997); Gaddis (1996: 286f).
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Reich’s anti-Russian/Slavic/communist narrative fit with the notion o f a ‘new Germany’, 
Adenauer effectively merged it with the negative experience o f the Third Reich itself 
and painted the Soviet Union in the colours o f Nazi Germany by equating communism 
with totalitarianism. This was made ‘official’ in the commentary to the Basic Law and 
with Adenauer attributing an inherent aggressiveness to Stalin by comparing him with 
Hitler (Schwarz 1986: 523, 553). Thus, Adenauer tapped into a rich repertoire o f ‘usable 
pasts’ and although not all were convinced of an immediate Soviet attack -  Schumacher, 
despite being fervently anti-communist, accused Adenauer o f abusing the ‘fear from 
East’ for political purposes (Schumacher 1950) -  the familiarity was sufficiently strong 
that a majority o f Germans accepted the scenario (Volkmann).
The Korea model also resonated in the US. To be sure, it was taken with a grain o f salt. 
While the Pentagon also had produced scenarios of a Soviet invasion, an actual attack on 
Western Europe was considered unlikely (Leffler 1984: 359ff.).339 The consensus in 
Washington was that Adenauer painted an overly stark image o f the Soviet military 
threat and that his Korea-analogy was exaggerated. Pointing to their nuclear arsenal and 
superior naval power, US officials informed the German chancellor that they believed 
the likelihood of a Soviet invasion to be slim (Volkmann, 23 8f.; Sommer 1988).
That said, Adenauer’s framing o f a Soviet invasion as an attack not merely on 
‘Germany’ but on ‘Western civilisation’ (Volkmann 1990: 294f) fell on fertile ground. It 
resonated with the US view of the communist order as undesirable and the widespread 
belief that ‘the world’ was facing a ‘red tide’, revived with Kennan’s analysis of the 
‘character’ of communist Russia and accentuated with NSC 68 (Gaddis 2005). The 
image of falling dominos fitted well into the scenario laid out in NSC 68 and was 
“frequently raised” by US policymakers in the wake the Korean War, convincing 
Truman that “a worldwide Communist conspiracy had operated in Korea and would 
manifest itself elsewhere” (Kaplan 1984: 145ff.; Jervis 1980). Aware that Europe was a 
special ‘elsewhere’ for the US, Adenauer’s reaction thus merged the two places by 
sending a strong statement of solidarity with the American experience in Korea. The 
Korea model confirmed that the worlds o f Germany and the US significantly overlapped 
and that Adenauer understood US engagement in Korea as part of the project to 
strengthen the Western world -  “a test of the West’s steadfastness” (Kaplan 1984: 8; 
Milliken 1999). Indeed it is telling that Kaplan, who otherwise pays very little attention
339 According to Jervis the assessment was “mixed, if not incoherent” (Jervis 1980: 579).
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to German voices, notes that Adenauer “spoke for the allies” when he claimed that Stalin 
was ‘testing’ the West in Korea (Kaplan 1994: 42).
The Korea experience strengthened US commitment to NATO as the primary institution 
through which Western order was to be created (‘defended’). As Kaplan puts it, Korea 
placed the ‘O ’ into NATO: within six months o f the invasion the Alliance was 
restructured into an organisation with a strong headquarter, command structures, finance 
committees, etc. And for the Pentagon Germany emerged on the strategic map because 
of the military rationale: if Western Europe needed more troops, who would be better 
than the Germans in fighting the Russians? For the Joint Chiefs of Staff “a German 
component to NATO was no longer a matter of speculation” but was considered 
“mandatory” (Kaplan 1994: 44). The White House saw things slightly differently. 
Viewing NATO primarily as a vehicle for ordering Europe, it was concerned about the 
political threat to Germany-in-Europe. The overarching dystopia it shared with 
Adenauer was the possibility o f a communist Germany, what Germany-in-Europe could 
become if not for Westintegration.
Dystopia II: The ‘Prague’ Model
The vision that Germans could adopt the ‘wrong’ value horizon was captured in the 
‘Prague model’. Referring to the communist coup in Prague in February 1948, this 
scenario envisioned the communist takeover of ‘Germany’ through domestic political 
subversion supported from Moscow (a ‘fifth column’). The viability o f this image was 
fed not only by the Soviet determination to install Moscow-friendly regimes in Eastern 
Europe and its attempt to get a hold of Berlin but rested on Adenauer’s ‘distrust’ of 
Germans doing the right thing, namely that a disoriented society would fall for the 
communist promise (Baring 1969: 57f; Foschepoth 1994). It did not matter that the 
German communist party in the FRG was relatively weak and that the Social Democrats 
had a strong leader in Schumacher unwilling to cooperate with the communists; 
Adenauer linked the Prague scenario to everyone who questioned the path of 
Westintegration and envisioned German unity as a demilitarized and neutral state. By 
framing the rearmament decision as one between “Asian Pagandom” and “European 
Christendom”, he implied that those supporting a neutral Germany would be responsible 
for the downfall o f Western civilization.340
340 At a CDU party convention in October 1951 Adenauer warned: “Neutrality and 
demilitarization of Germany means that we will become a satellite state in a short period of time. 
This means, furthermore, that we will see the triumph of communism in France and Italy, which 
means that the Christian Occident will be finished, and that the United States will lose interest in 
Europe. Therefore, my friends: Those of you who want neutrality and demilitarization of
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At the same time, the government argued that rearmament was consistent with the 
trajectory o f a new Germany unfolding into a peaceful Europe. Heinrich von Brentano, 
Adenauer’s party colleague, argued that the term ‘rearmament’ was misleading because 
it “suggests that we intend to restore, or at least copy, the past”. Instead, he sought to 
reassure domestic critics, the intention was “to create something new”, assuring that 
“We do not want re-militarization; we do not want a national German army as an 
instrument o f power-politics. What we want is to make a contribution to a European 
army as part o f the integration o f Europe” (von Brentano 1950: 45). Rearmament thus 
would not mean a fall-back into a ‘militarization’ but was a necessary contribution to the 
Western project o f ‘peace through freedom and unity’.341 Reminding that US support for 
this project was vital, rearmament was to be an act o f reciprocity. Adenauer repeatedly 
noted that Washington expected Germany to contribute to the ‘protection’ of the 
Western space and that reluctance to do so would risk that the US loses interest in 
‘Europe’ and, consequently, would lead to the demise o f the Occident.342
The ‘Prague’ scenario resonated strongly in the US, where the possibility o f European 
nations falling for communism had become a familiar vision. As Acheson noted, the 
scenario was that the communist virus would infect others “like apples in a barrel 
infected by a rotten one” (in Kaplan 1984: 33). The objective of preventing political 
‘subversion’ o f European states by communist parties had o f course been central to 
getting the ‘Marshall Plan’ through Congress and by 1950 the image o f a ‘fifth column’ 
had even befallen American domestic life, captured in ‘McCarthyism’. US receptiveness 
for this dystopia was exploited by Adenauer to gain voice and improve his standing in 
the West. Pointing to his thin mandate -  Adenauer in 1949 had won election in the 
Bundestag by only one vote -  and the strong domestic opposition to his rearmament 
plans, in 1950 he repeatedly warned Washington that the forces favouring German 
neutrality were gaining strength and that support for his course of Westintegration was 
waning. Leaving aside whether Adenauer was really as weak domestically as he 
presented it to his American colleagues, he was most effective in transmitting the image
Germany are either extremely dumb or traitors” (cited in Baring 1969: 107, my translation, 
emphasis added).
341 An example of how German rearmament was portrayed as ‘European’ rearmament and 
justified with a combination of the ‘Korea model’ and the ‘Prague model’ is found in Die Welt 
from February 1951.
342 On Adenauer’s continuous worry about US isolationism, see Poppinga (1975: 80ff). In 1952 
Adenauer called on his Cabinet that it was important to demonstrate willingness for progress in 
the project of European unity to support Eisenhower in the upcoming US elections. Adenauer 
feared that the challenger, Tafts, would prioritize ‘Asia’ over ‘Europe’ (Maier, 1990: 115; 
Jackson 2006: 224).
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of a German society still unsure whether the most desirable future was found ‘in’ the 
West.
The warning that the US might ‘lose’ Germany tapped into the ‘Rapallo complex’. 
Referring to the 1922 treaty between the Germany and communist Russia, ‘Rapallo’ 
stood for the scenario of Germany turning towards Russia as a reaction to feeling 
humiliated/frustrated with the West. It was an analogy regularly used by US diplomats 
to refer to the possibility o f a neutral Germany bonding with Moscow (Schroder 1988: 
140). In March 1950, three months before the outbreak o f the Korean War, a report from 
the State Department invoked the possibility of another ‘Rapallo’. Acheson went on to 
note that a new initiative was needed to ensure anchoring Germany in the West. Later 
that year, after a meeting with Adenauer and Schumacher, McCloy reported back to 
Washington that the course of Westintegration was loosing attraction in the FRG and 
suggested “to take a drastic step toward political unity such as the establishing of articles 
of confederation for Europe” and to consider bringing Germany into NATO so that 
“Germans will begin to see promise in a future by the side o f Western democracies” (in 
Lundestad 1998: 3 5f.).
In sum, the analogies of ‘Korea’ and ‘Prague’ were used successfully by Adenauer to 
manifest a vision of what Germany/Europe could become if not for Westintegration. 
Those negative visions strengthened US commitment to invest into Germany-in-Europe 
and allowed Adenauer to reciprocate by offering German rearmament as a valuable 
contribution to the Western project, opening a window through which NATO 
membership could be claimed.
The Rocky Path from EDC to NATO
Even with the Bonn-Washington consensus on rearmament the path to German NATO 
membership was a difficult one. The six years which lay between Adenauer’s first 
mentioning this aim in March 1949 and its formal admission in May 1955 saw an 
intense period of negotiations between the Western Allies and Germany, which is worth 
sketching out because it exemplifies the bond between Bonn and Washington. The 
negotiations took the following steps: the revision of Occupation Statute in March 1951, 
followed by negotiations over its termination leading to ‘Bonn Conventions’ and parallel 
negotiations over the European Defense Community (EDC) culminating in the EDC 
Treaty. The two were signed in May 1952, with the clause that the former would not 
enter into force until the latter was ratified as well by all parties. When the French 
assembly failed to do so in 1954, bringing about the failure of EDC, the ‘Paris Treaties’
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in October 1954 finally allowed Germany to enter NATO and terminated the Occupation 
Statute, coming into force in May 1955.343
The main hurdle was French and British reservations about Adenauer’s strategy to 
increase Germany’s position in the West, echoed in their less than enthusiastic reception 
of his ‘communist threat’ scenarios. In Paris and London the question which direction 
Germany should not take had an answer already: it was the pre-45 Germany they knew. 
As noted earlier, the primary concern of the French was not the development of a ‘new’ 
Germany but oppressing the ‘old’ and familiar one. Yet also the British view that 
Germans could be gradually brought back into the circle o f civilized nations did not 
quite resonate with the Germ an-American stance that ‘Germany’ urgently had to be 
saved from becoming communist. The New York conference of Allied foreign ministers 
in September 1950 exposed the differences among the Western Allies on the issue of 
German rearmament and Adenauer’s demand for ‘equality’ (Baring, 1969: 95). Whereas 
the British were hesitant to have the FRG rearmed and put forward a proposal for 
establishing a West German police force, Paris rejected the idea o f German membership 
in NATO and expressed its sincere discomfort about rearmament plans.344
When the US pressured France to provide an alternative to German membership in 
NATO, Monnet came up with a design for a European Army in what came to be known 
as the ‘Pleven Plan’ (named after the Prime Minister Renee Pleven). This plan was 
rejected, in turn, not only by Adenauer but also by the US and Britain. It was strongly 
criticized not only by military experts for being unsound but was also politically 
unacceptable as it was highly discriminatory towards Germany and appeared to be 
designed mainly to drag out the issue of German rearmament -  precisely the reasons 
why the French National Assembly had accepted it (Maier 1990: 231; Kaplan 1984: 
24).345 Sensitive to French resistance, the US and Germany built on the idea of a 
European army under NATO’s oversight. Also for domestic reasons, Adenauer publicly 
rejected the idea of setting up a ‘national’ army. And while the Pentagon continued to 
emphasize NATO membership on pragmatic operational grounds (Maier 1990: 138), 
State Department and White House endorsed a ‘European solution’ because it fit with
343 As McAllister (2002: 24, Fn 54) points out, there is surprisingly little research on EDC in the 
English-speaking literature. He provides a good discussion on this and German rearmament from 
the US perspective (McAllister 2002, Ch. 5).
344 The French National Assembly in October 1950 explicitly rejected entrance of a state into 
NATO which might have territorial claims, a diplomatic shortcut for Germany (Maier 1990; 
Ruane2000: 17).
345 Adenauer, true to his game, blamed the French objection to German NATO membership to 
French communists undermining Schumann (Maier 1990: 93, 211).
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the integrative steps of the Schumann Plan and the conception o f Europe as a ‘third 
force’.346
After a number o f revisions which reduced German discriminatory measures in the 
French proposal and established a link to NATO, in September 1951 the Allies agreed to 
integrate a German defense contribution in a European Defense Community (EDC).347 
The EDC proposal maintained Monnet’s idea to have the European Army established as 
an element of political integration running parallel to and eventually merging with 
economic integration. While the Pentagon never warmed up to the EDC idea, 
Truman/Acheson and Eisenhower/Dulles came to see it as a central step towards 
securing the FRGs commitment to West and establishment o f a United States o f Europe 
within NATO’s sight. In other words, EDC was seen as the best option for creating a 
third force in the West. Assured that the US was underwriting the EDC proposal and that 
it was embedded in a larger Western project and linked to NATO, Adenauer agreed.348 
The chancellor even told the Bundestag in early February 1952 that joining the EDC 
would eventually lead to NATO membership (Baring 1969: 119). To accommodate 
French reservations, he publicly withdrew demands for direct NATO membership, 
though adding that EDC membership should not rule out the possibility of NATO 
membership in the future. In turn, the French National Assembly agreed to the idea o f a 
European army in which Germany could participate without discriminatory conditions 
(Maier 1990: 88-90).
The signing o f EDC and Bonn Conventions -  Adenauer’s wish o f calling it ‘Germany 
Treaty’ was blocked by the French -  in May 1952 were celebrated as a success in Bonn 
and Washington. Article 4 of the ‘Bonn Conventions’ crucially stated that Allied forces 
stationed on German territory would have the stated purpose “to defend the free world, 
to which the Federal Republic and Berlin belongs” (also Grewe 1960: 51). This 
transformation from ‘occupying’ to ‘defending’ forces was crucial because would mean 
de facto  Germany’s transformation as a place in the West.349 The hurdle, though, was 
ratification. Britain remained highly sceptical about the federal design and did not like
346 Disagreements between the military and the political viewpoints led to mixed signals coming 
out of Washington which only ceded somewhat when Eisenhower was persuaded of the political 
purpose of a European Army, a change of mind which as analysts suggests came after a meeting 
with Monnet in May 1951 (Winand 1993; Dwan 2000).
347 On how military integration was to be organised in EDC, see Ruane (2000: 16). The link 
between NATO and EDC was outlined in two protocols, see Maier (1990: 104f, 122f.).
348 On the importance of the link with the US for Adenauer during the EDC negotiations, see 
Gersdorff (1999).
349 For a discussion on why the term ‘sovereignty’ was omitted from the Bonn treaty, see Grewe 
(1960: 54f.)
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the idea o f tying Western defense to European integration. Only after Washington had 
accepted London’s unwillingness to play a significant role in the project, the British 
supported the EDC to keep the US happy and committed to Europe (Ruane 2000: 27ff; 
Maier 1990: 91). The problem was France, where military defeats in Indochina and 
British reluctance to get involved reduced confidence in EDC. When it became clear that 
ratification was in danger, the US exercised pressure on Paris through both sticks and 
carrots, though without much success (Ruane 2000: 46f.; Maier 1990: 138). Adenauer in 
1953 wrote to a party colleague “the Americans are currently our only friends” (in 
Schwarz, 1991: 47).
When the French parliament in August 1954 rejected the EDC, the German-American 
project appeared to have hit a wall. Eisenhower was frustrated and Adenauer was 
devastated, fearing that the US now would abandon the European project and with it the 
path carved out for the new Germany. The British government came to the rescue 
(Ruane, 2000). Privately welcoming the ‘death’ o f the federal utopia, Churchill and 
Eden saw a chance to revitalise NATO and, with French approval, worked out a 
compromise which paved the way for Germany into NATO via the ‘Western European 
Union’ (WEU) (Grewe 1960: 63f). Washington and Bonn welcomed the proposal, and 
the treaties where revised and in May 1955 the FRG acquired NATO membership, 
ensuring German participation in the debate about its future in the ‘free world’.
Conclusion
Against the backdrop of a reading o f security institutions serving the purpose of 
negotiating a common project among friends, this chapter provided evidence for the 
argument that German and American decision makers invested in NATO because they 
considered it the most suitable institution through which they could transform their 
shared experienced space, Europe, into a shared envisioned space. The chapter showed 
Adenauer, on the one side, and Truman, Acheson and Eisenhower, on the other side, 
coming to see each other as attractive partners -  more so than with either France or the 
UK -  for redefining their respective place in the world, that is, for rendering their 
‘being-in-Europe’ meaningful through the idea o f a peaceful Europe ordered around the 
value o f ‘freedom’ and ‘unity’. In other words, they shared the common interest of 
turning ‘Europe’ into a meaningful space through the vision (utopia) o f a ‘United States 
of Europe’ which resonated with respective national biographies and manifested 
German-American friendship in a shared Western project.
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It has also been argued that this investment provided Adenauer with a partner supportive 
o f German rehabilitation in a Christian/Occidental space willing to treat him as an 
‘equal’. At the same time it provided the Truman and Eisenhower administrations with a 
friend who understood their world and with whom they could build up a European 
‘Third Force’ supportive o f the US narrative. Both sides came to agree that NATO was 
the suitable forum for doing so and the discussion suggested that Adenauer’s push for 
rearmament was a strategy aimed at establishing Germany’s status as a formally ‘equal’ 
member in NATO. He mobilized negative visions, or dystopias, o f what Germany ‘could 
become if not for Westintegration, -  the Korea model and the Prague model -  to 
strengthen the bond with the US narrative and to justify the adjustment o f the pacifist 
element o f the FRG’s narrative domestically. The next chapter discusses why, two 
decades later, the German government deemed it necessary to invest in a new institution.
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CHAPTER NINE: CSCE / GERMAN-US TENSIONS (1965-1975)
In troduction
The previous chapter showed how, in the decade following World War Two, German 
and American policymakers bonded over the idea of how to order Europe through 
NATO in a way that resonated with their respective national biographies. This chapter 
focuses on Willy Brandt as the main figure representing the German narrative to offer an 
explanation for his motivation to invest in a new institution for ordering ‘Europe’, 
namely the Conference o f Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in which the US 
was reluctant to participate.350 Applying the estrangement lens developed earlier, I seek 
to explain this in terms of a divergence between German and American narratives of 
authentic becoming, specifically with an emerging dissonance about a desirable vision 
(utopia) for European order. To substantiate this argument, the chapter traces the 
narratives o f ‘Germany’ and ‘America’ in-the-world as formulated by Brandt/Bahr (on 
the German side) and Johnson and Nixon/Kissinger (on the US side) between 1965 and 
1975, with particular attention given to their visions of ‘peace in Europe’ and how these 
informed evaluations o f NATO and CSCE.
The discussion proceeds as follows: first, it outlines Brandt’s vision o f ‘Germany-in- 
Europe’, how it differs from Adenauer’s version, and how it motivates a policy of 
peaceful change. Second, it notes Kennedy’s influence in formulating this narrative and 
also shows how, at the same time, the Berlin Wall experience exposed the dissonance 
between German and American narratives. Third, it outlines attempts to tone down the 
dissonance through NATO’s Harmel Report and Brandt’s silence on the US engagement 
in Vietnam. Fourth, it discusses the Nixon administration’s reorientation of America-in- 
the-world and the ambiguous role o f Europe in this narrative and carves out the 
disagreements between Kissinger and Brandt over visions o f European order. The final 
part o f the chapter links this to German-American differences concerning the evaluations 
of CSCE and closes with a review of Kissinger’s failed ‘Year o f Europe’ attempt to 
reinvigorate the partnership.
350 There is very little literature on German motives and corresponding position in the CSCE 
process. See Becker (1992); Spohr Readman (2006), also Peters (1999). A recent and valuable 
publication which goes in the direction of the account presented in this chapter is Bange and 
Niedhart (2008). For the US position, see Maresca (1984). On the CSCE process and its effects, 
mostly with how it contributed to the end of the Cold War, see Bender (1996); Schlotter (1999); 
Thomas (2001); Adler (1996).
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Brandt
The (re)formulation o f Germany’s national biography in and the investment in CSCE in 
the period under investigation here was pursued most forecefully by Willy Brandt, first 
as Foreign Minister (1966-69) and then as Chancellor (1969-72). Brandt was the first 
Social Democrat holding a leading position in the federal government since the founding 
of the FRG.351 As a young social democrat, he had escaped Nazi persecution by going 
into exile in Scandinavia (mainly Norway) and returned to Germany after the end o f the 
war to resume both his citizenship and his political activities in the Social Democratic 
Party (SPD). With Schumacher’s help Brandt became a member of parliament in 1949, 
then serving as an assistant to Ernst Reuter, the mayor o f West Berlin, before taking this 
post himself in October 1957. In 1961 and 1964 Brandt was the (unsuccessful) SPD 
candidate for Chancellor, became the party’s leader in 1964 and in 1966 Foreign 
Minister in the Grand Coalition, with Kurt-Georg Kiesinger (CDU) as Chancellor. He 
succeeded Kiesinger as Chancellor in 1969, was confirmed in this position in a sweeping 
re-election in 1972 before forced to resign in 1974, handing the position over to his 
party-colleague Helmut Schmidt.
As will become clear in this chapter, the SPD’s understanding of Germany-in-Europe 
differed significantly from that propagated by Adenauer’s Christian Democrats. This 
inevitably made the Kiesinger/Brandt government’s formulation of the German narrative 
a compromise and less sharp. Kiesinger was willing, however, to shift away from 
Adenauer’s course and pursue some significant Ostpolitik initiatives.352 This created 
CDU-intemal tensions, however, with Adenauer loyalists accusing Kiesinger of 
compromising core principles o f Westintegration by giving in to Brandt’s course. 
Eventually the differences between Kiesinger and Brandt and their respective parties 
concerning the path Germany-in-Europe should take became unbridgeable and led to the 
break-up o f the coalition in 1969, with Brandt taking over as chancellor in a coalition 
with the Liberal Party (FDP).
351 Bom under the name of Herbert Frahm, he took on the pseudonym ‘Willy Brandt’ after Hitler 
came to power. For a biography, see Prittie (1974); Merseburger (2002).
352 Kiesinger gradually moved away from the Hallstein doctrine (or ‘around it’, as Kiesinger 
preferred to put it) by taking up diplomatic relations with Rumania in January 1967 and with 
Yugoslavia in early 1968, and establishing low-level contacts with the GDR (Hacke 2003: 134f). 
These initiatives stripped Westintegration of Adenauer’s maxim of non-engagement with ‘the 
East’. On Kiesinger’s Ostpolitik and the relations with the US, see Niedhart (1999); Hacke 
(2003).
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Like Adenauer, Brandt was a combination of a visionary and a practitioner of 
realpolitik.353 As Golo Mann (1971) reminds us in his foreword to a collection of 
Brandt’s speeches, Brandt was well aware of the importance o f moral forces, or values, 
in the Weltgetriebe and structured his conception o f Germany’s national biography. 
Brandt emphasised the importance of history as a guideline. In a book written during his 
time as foreign minister, he notes how he was guided by the “knowledge that you cannot 
escape your people’s history but carry it as a heritage and experience” and that the task 
was to use the various forces contained in this history in a fruitful way, emphasizing the 
responsibility to build on “the tradition of a movement for liberty and its will to 
form/create [Gestaltungswille]” (Brandt 1968: 2 If.). While less cunning than Adenauer 
in day-to-day practice, he shared the old Chancellor’s thinking in long term processes 
and his evolutionary understanding o f politics, the fixing a greater vision gradually 
approached through ‘politics o f small steps’ (Mann 1971: 15-20). Supported by Egon 
Bahr, a close aide whose conceptual thinking played an important role in Brandt’s 
formulation of the German narrative, the belief in social democratic principles and 
personal experiences Brandt to pursue a utopia of Germany-in-Europe different from 
Adenauer’s in important aspects.
Envisioning Germany-in-(G>eater-)Eiirope
For Brandt, the highest value for Germany’s future was ‘peace’ and, like his 
predecessors, Brandt conceived of a peaceful Germany as embedded in a united Europe. 
When in his two speeches at Harvard in 1962 Brandt emphasized the interdependence 
between the German question and the European order, this was a long-held conviction. 
Already in 1949 he spoke o f a “European solution” for the new Germany and that task 
was to think “about Germany’s place in the European order” (in Brandt 1971: 48-49).354 
Brandt envisioned to have Germany unfold in a ‘European Peace Order’ [Europaische 
Friedensordnung\ based on the familiar principles o f freedom/democracy and unity.355 
In a speech to Social Democrats in Berlin in May 1949 he referred to the Heidelberger 
Programme and its call for the creation of a ‘United States of Europe’ to note that 
commitment to European unity was central to social democratic thinking (in Brandt 
1971: 52). Almost two decades later, in a speech to the Council o f Europe in January 
1967 Brandt claimed that all the different paths pursued in Bonn were “striving towards
353 The latest biography on Brandt is subtitled ‘visionary and realist’ (Merseburger, 2002).
354 Before Thomas Mann put out his famous dictum, Brandt noted in 1946 that “the Nazis 
attempted to Germanise Europe in their own way. Now the task is to Europeanise Germany” (in 
Brandt 1971:41).
355 See the collection of his speeches in Brandt (1971). In Stockholm in February 1945 he noted 
that the post-war order would be marked by claiming rights of freedom and democracy (in Brandt 
1971:23).
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the same goal: European unity” (in Brandt 1970: 21). While the commitment to 
democracy was ingrained in the party’s identity, according to Kocka (2004: 41) the 
explicit adoption o f ‘freedom’ as a core value first occurred noted explicitly with the 
1959 Godesberger Programm, which also marked the SPD’s acceptance of 
‘Westintegration’ and, hence, the role o f the United States as a partner in creating 
Germany in the Western space.
That said, Brandt’s utopia was distinct from the one pursued by Adenauer in two 
fundamental ways. First, Brandt pursued the idea o f a Europe built on a social 
democratic order. His commitment to social democracy as an ordering principle, 
exemplified by his party affiliation, for the European space was fostered by his exile 
experience in Scandinavian social democratic countries during the war, in particular 
Norway. Oliver Bange even suggests that “Brandt’s idea o f a ‘social democratisation of 
Europe’ was bom in Scandinavia” (Bange, 2006: 715). Like Schumacher, for Brandt 
social democracy was the only alternative to communist totalitarianism, even noting that 
“the United States o f Europe will be filled with social democratic thinking or they will 
not be.” (Brandt, 1970: 53). Even though as Chancellor he sought to downplay the 
impression that he was pursuing a different conception of European order than his 
predecessors.356 ‘social(ist)’ values remained central to the Europe he envisioned, also 
exemplified in his attempt to bring Britain and Scandinavian countries into the EEC.357 
In March 1963 he noted that Europe was not limited to the six EEC members: “the signs 
of our times point towards greater integration (Zusammenschlusse). Nobody will stop 
this development” (Brandt, 1971: 77)
Here the second major departure from Adenauer’s course emerges. Whereas the latter 
planned to have Germany to unfold into a Europe anchored geographically in the South- 
West, Brandt undertook an adjustment of Germany’s path into a wider European space. 
Most importantly, when he discarded the project of a ‘small’ or ‘Vatican Europe’ and 
formulated the idea of Germany situated in a ‘Greater Europe’ [Gesamteuropa],358 this 
also encompassed ‘the East’. This crucial and most controversial spatial extension of 
Germany-in-Europe, which informed his Ostpolitik, was formed significantly through 
Brandt’s experience o f living in Berlin.
356 In a speech to the Bundestag in November 1970 Brandt noted that the project of European 
unity should not be hampered by tensions over ‘Christian Democratic’ or ‘socialist’ notions of 
‘Europe’, as both would share the deeper commitment to liberal, law-based and social 
democracy.
357 In July 1972 he noted to Pompidou that economic growth could not remain the only indicator 
of success in European integration and proposed a ‘Social Union’ (Brandt, 1976: 345).
358 The literal translation would be ‘entire Europe’.
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Whereas Adenauer was never fond of Berlin, Brandt conceived of the European space 
largely from Berlin. Until the wall was built in 1961, the city had been an example o f the 
permeability o f the borders between Eastern and Western zones. As discussed below, 
witnessing the division first hand, convinced Brandt of the human tragedy o f the 
division of Germany-in-Europe. It made him ‘see’ that the European space was not, and 
could not be, limited to ‘the West’ but needed to encompass ‘the East’ as well. In that 
sense, the Berlin years widened his horizon o f experience: despite his rejection o f the 
communist order, Brandt did not see ‘the East’ as a foreign, backward and 
fundamentally ‘different’ land as Adenauer had done. Just as the GDR was part of 
‘Germany’, most Warsaw Pact countries were part of ‘Europe’. Thus, in a speech to the 
Bundestag in November 1970 he stressed the importance of including the ‘East’ into the 
future o f Europe, warning o f an internal contradiction when “if we conjure the future 
(only) to the West and the past (only) to the East” (Brandt, 1976: 331).359
That said, Brandt’s vision of Greater Europe remained situated within the Western 
space. While his domestic critics complained that Brandt was pursuing the “chimera of a 
Grossraum Europer” at the cost o f West European integration (in Ash, 1993: 25), this 
was not the case. While Brandt did speak against a “one-sided West orientation” and 
favoured a policy of ‘Ausgleich' (Ash, 1993: 37f.), in line with the SPD’s programmatic 
‘turn’ at Bad Godesberg in 1959 in which the party formally gave up opposition to 
Westintegration, Brandt saw the project o f building a Greater Europe as occurring from 
within the Western space. He noted that Social Democratic internationalism in tune with 
the Atlantic Charter (Ibid., 26) and did not see a contradiction between West-European 
integration and the building of a Greater Europe, quite the contrary (Brand, 1976: 318- 
373). When taking office as Chancellor in 1969, he took steps to reinvigorate the EC 
process and repeatedly expressed how Western European integration was part o f the 
vision of a greater European order. Indeed, he wanted the EC to become an “exemplary 
order” which would serve as building block for his Greater European Peace Order 
[Gesamteuropdische Friedensordnung] (Brandt, 1976: 320, 331). As Bange puts it, 
Brandt saw the two processes as “two equally valued pillars o f an overarching concept 
for the ‘social democratisation’ of a Greater Europe” (Bange, 2006: 713). Brandt’s 
vision of Germany-in-Europe thus did not intend to replace ‘Western’ with ‘Eastern’
359 Already in 1945 he vowed that “the problem of Germany and Europe can only be solved on 
the basis of freedom and democracy. It can only be solved by bringing together West and East -  
and what lies in the middle” (Brandt 1971: 41).
229
orientation but, rather, to shift of the vision of Europe within the Western project. By 
doing so, he inevitably attempted to alter the character of the latter as visible in Brandt’s 
‘New Ostpolitik’.
Building the new European Order trough Peaceful Change
Traditionally, discussions o f Ostpolitik read it as Deutschlandpolitik and focus on the 
bilateral ‘Eastern’ treaties, treating the CSCE process as an add-on without greater 
political significance (for instance, Haftendom, 1985: 159-252). The Germany-in- 
Europe perspective does not consider ‘Germany’ isolated from the broader European 
space, and so in this chapter I follow the more recent interpretation o f Bange (2006) and 
read Ostpolitik as Europapolitik o f which the CSCE process became an intrinsic part 
(Bange, 2006).
Ostpolitik was driven by Brandt’s conviction that the division of Germany-in-Europe did 
not constitute a state o f peace and that building Germany-in-Europe required a 
transformation of the status quo (the order o f Yalta). Most importantly, it rested on his 
conviction that such a transformation was possible. In his Harvard speech in October 
1962 Brandt noted that recognition of ‘coexistence’ o f East and West was giving rise to 
a ‘chance’, with which he meant a perspective of change through small steps. Brandt 
was convinced of the artificiality and permeability o f the borders in Europe and noted 
that establishing points of contact between East and West would at core be about 
pursuing a “politics of transformation” (Brandt 1971: 89). A revitalised Europe “a self- 
confident, dynamic West” would provide an opportunity for “a peaceful offensive of 
freedom” which would contribute to the deconstruction of walls (in Brandt 1971: 111). 
These thoughts were reiterated in 1963 in Tutzing, where Brandt called for a “new 
dynamic” in orienting Germany and a policy of peaceful change which would break up 
the static division o f Europe. This approach was captured famously by Egon Bahr who 
in his Tutzing speech coined the catchy slogan ‘change through rapprochement’ [Wandel 
durch Anndherung].
It is important to note the intrinsic link Brandt made between ‘peace’ and ‘change’ when 
emphasising peaceful change. The conviction that “peace...is nothing static but a 
dynamic process” (in Brandt 1971: 110) reveals that for Brandt the process of 
transforming the space into a Greater and Social Democratic Europe was not simply 
means to an end. In an evolutionary national biography, ‘endpoints’ are never reached. 
Brandt’s vision established a new horizon in which the unfolding of Germany-in-Europe 
was to occur and there was no difference between this envisioned space and how to ‘get
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there’. By investing in the transformative potential of this vision, the process o f peaceful 
change was as an end in itself. Brandt was convinced that change was possible. For him, 
the building o f the Berlin wall and the violent oppression o f the reform movement in 
Czechoslovakia in 1968 were signs o f weakness of the communist order. And so rather 
than risking an infection of the Western space with the communist ‘virus’, as envisioned 
in Adenauer’s ‘Prague’ scenario (see previous chapter), Brandt was convinced that 
increased points of contact would have the opposite effect.360
A major target of this change was the conception o f ‘Germany-in-Europe’ in the national 
biographies of Eastern Europe. This was one o f the key points made by Egon Bahr. 
Upon becoming head of policy planning in the Foreign Office in 1967, Bahr organised a 
brainstorming session about how unification could be achieved. The result was the 
recognition that neighbours needed to feel so secure from ‘Germany’ that they would not 
be afraid of its unification, which lead to the subsequent question of how ‘Europe’ 
would have to be organised to provide security not only for and but also from Germany 
(Bahr 1996: 226). In other words, building a Germany in a Greater Europe meant 
creating a narrative o f the FRG whose ‘past’ and ‘future’ positively resonated not only 
with ‘the West’ but also with ‘the East’. This meant Brandt needed to adjust the FRG’s 
biography, that is, he had to devise a narrative which broke with the continuities 
Adenauer had maintained to the Third Reich, most notably the scathing anti-communism 
and the ‘forgetting’ of Nazi crimes.
Brandt did not make use o f the dystopia of a communist Germany. In his eyes, the 
Western branding o f communism as a threat had manifested the division of Germany-in- 
Europe. While Brandt/the Social Democrats rejected the communism as a desirable 
order,361 formally expressed in the 1959 Godesberger Program, they did not consider it 
an alien ideology, as Adenauer had done. Instead, the SPD’s (and Brandt’s) 
disagreement with communism was anchored on a different level, namely in the 
translation of socialist principles into political practice. This meant there was a shared
360 Brandt noted to NATO colleagues in April 1969 that the Prague Spring was evidence for the 
weakening of the dream of a communist Europe and, thus, for the possibility for changing views 
of the people in the Warsaw Pact towards something close to social democracy (Brandt 1976: 
282-288). Already in 1958 he claimed “we have much more chance of poisoning them, so to 
speak” (in Hofmann 2006: 436)
3 1 In a speech to his SPD colleagues in January 1949, at the height of the Berlin blockade, he 
noted that “today one cannot be a democrat without being anti-communist. But anti-communism 
is not the only criteria of the democrat” (Brandt 1971: 44).
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baseline which allowed offering nations in ‘Eastern Europe’ a democratic alternative 
from within the socialist narrative.362
A major hurdle was to address the ‘image problem’ the FRG had in the East. Just as 
Adenauer had projected memories of the Third Reich into the East through the ‘Korea 
model’, the same was done in reverse by Moscow and the GDR leadership, in whose 
narrative the FRG was the continuation o f German fascist order in the colours of a 
capitalist, imperialist, and aggressive state aimed at dominating ‘Europe’. This strategy 
of using each other for locating and disposing o f the ‘bad’ memories o f the Third Reich 
worked well as long as there were two ‘Germany’s’. Flowever, Brandt was well aware 
that a unified Germany would not have this luxury. Any attempt by the FRG to claim 
sole representation of the German national biography in Greater Europe could only 
succeed by taking on responsibility for what had happened in Germany’s name, that is, 
by taking ownership of and dealing with Third Reich memories. Already in a speech in 
Stockholm in February 1945 Brandt noted that „Unreserved recognition o f the crimes 
committed by Germans and in the name of Germany on other peoples is the first 
precondition of a healing [Gesundung] o f the German people” (in Brandt 1970: 36). This 
conviction lead Brandt to apologise to the Czechoslovak nation that the GDR had 
participated in the 1968 occupation, as well as his more well-known (and more 
symbolically profound) gesture of kneeling in front of the Warsaw-Ghetto memorial in 
December 1970.363
Redefining Germany-in-Europe thus required re-engaging the memory space created by 
the Third Reich and disseminating the new vision of (Germany in) a Greater European 
Peace Order. The Brandt government first pursued this through direct (bilateral) 
engagement with key nations in Eastern Europe, mainly through talks on the 
‘renunciation of the use of force’, which Brandt had pursued as foreign minister together 
with Kiesinger. As soon as he became Chancellor, the talks were intensified and, in a 
remarkable speed the Brandt government negotiated and signed treaties with Moscow 
(1970), Warsaw (1970), and the GDR (1972).364 Two crucial elements were required, 
however, to turn this into an enduring project within the Western space. First, it needed
362 That Brandt’s vision was appreciated in Eastern Europe is suggested by Jiri Dienstbier, one of 
the most prominent dissidents in Czechoslovakia in the 1970s and 80s, who prefaced his book 
entitled “Dreaming of Europe’ with the note that in thinking about the goal how to overcome the 
order of Yalta, Brandt’s Ostpolitik was the only larger conception developed in the West “which 
reckoned with a Europe other than the one to which we had all accustomed ourselves” (in Ash 
1993: 15).
363 On the symbolic power of that gesture, see Ash (1993: x); Markovits and Reich (1997:x).
364 For a discussion, see Haftendom (1985, Ch. X)
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to resonate with the partner most intimately linked with the FRG’s unfolding in the 
Western space, America. Second, the question was which institution was suitable to 
enable the successful negotiation o f this project, specifically whether and how NATO 
could be made that institution. It is these questions the discussion now turns to.
Locating Friends in the West: ‘Kennedy America’
As the friendship lens suggests, Brandt’s vision and transformative agenda o f having 
Germany unfold into a Greater European Peace Order was not created in isolation but 
with support from Western friends.
Within limits, Britain and France played important roles in Brandt’s project insofar as 
both could accommodate his vision of a Greater Europe and also provided creative 
impulses. The attempt o f the Labour government under Harold Wilson to bring Britain 
‘closer to Europe’ was supported by Brandt, who in December 1961 noted that Social 
Democrats “always were of the opinion that one cannot imagine the free Europe without 
England” (in Brandt 1971: 72) and in the following years repeatedly advocated Britain 
joining the EC (Ibid., 73, 129; Brandt 1970: 2 1).365 For Brandt, British membership in 
the EC was a central element in building a Greater Europe. The connection to London 
remained strong even when Wilson was replaced by a conservative government led by 
Edward Heath, whom Brandt describes as someone with whom he confidently shared 
‘European’ topics and a relationship “close to friendship” (Brandt 1976: 326). However, 
despite British willingness to consider a future ‘in Europe’, London was not in a position 
from where it could significantly engage with Bonn in building a Greater Europe 
because it lacked membership in the EC and was significantly outranked in NATO by 
the US.
While France remained a core partner in the process o f building Germany-in-Greater- 
Europe, for Brandt cooperation with Charles de Gaulle and since 1969 with Pompidou 
who, in Brandt’s view, was continuing Gaullist policies was not easy. It required 
navigating between the French desire to build a Europe independent from the US and 
one in which ‘Germany’ was not getting too strong (Hoffmann 1964, Bozo 2001). De 
Gaulle’s determination to create a European ‘third force’ under French leadership and 
his boycott o f institutions he considered not supportive of this aim affected both the
365 In a speech to the British parliament in March 1970, Brandt linked British participation in the 
project of “organising the peace” in Europe to the British democratic tradition and the memory of 
the second World War when Britain had “the power [Kraft] not to let the flame of freedom be 
extinguished when it was very dark on the continent”, as well as to British willingness for 
understanding for Germany’s “special problems and anxiety over Berlin” (in Brandt 1971: 186).
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Western and Eastern dimensions of Brandt’s project of building a ‘Greater Europe’. On 
one side, de Gaulle’s ‘empty chair’ in the EEC (Juli 1965 to February 1966), withdrawal 
from NATO’s integrated military structure in 1966 and the veto o f British EEC 
membership in May 1967 were seen as unhelpful to strengthening Western Europe. On 
the other side, de Gaulle was one of the early protagonists o f ‘detente’ and had loosely 
advocated the creation of a European security system ‘from the Atlantic to the Ural’ in 
the early 1960s. His increasing contact with Moscow and the three-step model from 
‘detente’ via ‘entente’ to ‘cooperation’ (Vahl 1979: 231) was an important factor in 
opening space for Kiesinger and Brandt to turn away from Adenauer’s path (Bange 
2006).
The key partner remained the US, however. Already in May 1949 Brandt noted that the 
reconstruction o f Europe was largely depended on American support, speaking 
favourably o f the Truman administration and noticing its commitment to democracy, 
freedom, and internationalism (Brandt 1971: 45). While in these early years one finds 
the occasional calls from Brandt for European ‘independence’, by the time he held the 
position o f mayor of Berlin, Brandt was convinced o f the importance o f close 
partnership with the US. In March 1963, in a debate over the Franco-German Elysee 
Treaty, he warned Adenauer not to strengthen the bonds with Paris at the expense o f the 
relationship with Washington. According to Brandt, “this friendship is vital 
[lebenswichtig].... not only... because America is the leading power o f the West, but it is 
a friendship founded in the dark days o f the Berlin blockade...no document can make 
changes to this friendship, this foundational structure of the free West” (in Brandt 1971: 
75). He repeated this stance in a television address on President Kennedy’s death in 
November 1963 where Brandt criticises Adenauer’s conception o f European order, 
specifically his focus on a ‘small Europe’.
John F. Kennedy played a crucial role in Brandt’s conception of the US as a partner 
which endured long after the US President’s death. Although there were also signs of 
dissonance, discussed below, it is suggested here that it was ‘Kennedy America’ which 
Brandt was looking for as a partner and hoped to build Germany’s future with. In 
addition to formally supporting German unity, this ‘Kennedy America’ was composed 
of two elements which profoundly influenced Brandt’s vision of Germany-in-Europe.366
366 In his memoirs Brandt devotes an entire chapter to Kennedy, the only person for whom he 
does so (Brandt, 1976: 71-100). On this relationship and its impact on respective thinking about 
detente, see Hofmann (2006).
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The first element was Kennedy’s conception of the relationship between the US and 
Europe as a “creative partnership of equals” (Winand 1996: 139). Invoking the image of 
‘two pillars’ carrying the Western project Brandt repeatedly referred to Kennedy’s 
speech from 4 July 1962 which renewed the view that a united Europe embodying the 
spirit “which gave birth to the American Constitution” was “a partner with whom we 
can deal on a basis of full equality in all the great and burdensome tasks of building and 
defending a community o f free nations”.367 Although Kennedy never imagined US 
giving up its leadership position, his ‘two pillars’ metaphor represented the relationship 
between the US and Europe as one of equals pursuing a common project or, more 
precisely, carrying a shared roof of ‘freedom’, ‘unity’ and ‘peace’. After Kennedy’s 
death Brandt declared it a core task to make this ‘active partnership’ a reality “not 
merely as a partnership o f defense but going far beyond that...as a partnership o f two 
world powers and crystallisation point o f free people” (in Brandt 1971: 110; Brandt in 
his 1962 Harvard speech, here p. 87). In an interview in February 1967 Brandt noted that 
“the politically organised Europe we aim at understands itself as a partner o f the United 
States and...as a factor in the stabilisation of peace”, adding that this was the vision of 
Kennedy and the “declared aim” of Johnson (in Brandt 1970: 3 1).368
The second element was Kennedy’s forward-looking optimism and courage to induce 
change (Brandt 1976: 100). Brandt saw not only a president who had vowed in his 
inauguration speech that “we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, 
support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and success o f liberty”. He also 
saw someone his own age, a representative o f a new generation with whom he shared 
the ability to think beyond tradition and who inspired to open up ‘new horizons’ (Brandt 
1976: 71). In an almost romantic flourish, Brandt notes Kennedy’s youth, energy, 
compassion, and courage to tackle difficult projects and heal divisions (Ibid., 99f). 
Brandt’s perception of Kennedy as a representative o f a courageous America promising 
a better future was echoed in Kennedy’s simultaneous toning down of the anti­
communist position and advocacy an ‘activist’ or ‘transformative’ approach towards ‘the 
East’.369 After the Cuban missile crisis Kennedy chose a course of peaceful engagement 
in which efforts to reduce tensions with Moscow through negotiations on arms control 
were coupled with establishing trade relations with East European states intended to
367 See Kennedy (1962). For the context, see Winand (1993: Ch. 7).
368 Yet he also knew that to be considered equal, the US expected Europeans to work closer
together. In a speech in Brussels in 1964, Brandt reminds his European socialist colleagues that 
“we are valued in Washington only as much as we in Europe and out of Europe can achieve
together and contribute” to the common project (in Brandt 1971: 130).
369 On the military dimension o f ‘flexible response’, see Gaddis (2005: 212f).
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progressively detach them from the Soviet Union by creating new aspirations (Winand 
1996: 364). This pursuit o f an active strategy o f gradual transformation stimulated 
Brandt’s thinking, as evident in his speeches at Harvard (1962) and Tutzing (1963) and 
influenced his conception of Ostpolitik (also Ash 1993: 258).
While Arne Hofmann (2006: 437) finds that the “general conceptual agreement between 
Brandt and Kennedy was extraordinary”, he also shows that within this dynamic there 
were important differences. This concerned, in particular, Kennedy’s view on the 
necessity o f recognising the ‘status quo’, which stood in tension with his transformative 
outlook and required some adjustment on Brandt’s side (Hofmann 2006: 440). Because 
this tension is indicative o f the dissonance Brandt experienced with later 
administrations, the episode at which it came to the forefront, namely the building o f the 
Berlin Wall in August 1961, must be looked at in more detail.
The ‘Berlin Complex’
Even after the termination o f the occupation statute, the Western powers continued to 
hold some formal and informal authority in the FRG, in particular when it came to the 
use of the Bundeswehr. Yet it was the unresolved status of Berlin where the anxiety- 
producing ‘Potsdam complex’ was most strongly felt. The city remained formally 
divided into four zones with the Occupation Statute still in force and, hence, was the 
place where the four powers continued to hold ‘supreme authority’. For Brandt, who as 
noted earlier lived in the city for two decades after the war, including as mayor, the 
Potsdam complex became the ‘Berlin complex’, the concern that negotiations between 
Washington and Moscow affecting European order were bypassing Bonn and that the 
two sides would come to an agreement detrimental to the vision o f having Germany 
unified in a Greater Europe. Brandt experienced the utter powerlessness o f the FRG vis- 
a-vis the occupying powers and, in particular, the potential dissonance between his 
vision and the one held in Washington in August 1961 when he witnessed the building 
of the Berlin Wall.370 Brandt begins his memoirs with an account of these days and was 
deeply affected by the event. Berlin was a highly symbolic place o f historical 
significance and, in Brandt’s view, was the likely capital o f a unified Germany. Most 
importantly it was the place where hope of overcoming the division was still alive. The 
unexpected building o f the wall and its death-strip reversed that vision and turned Berlin 
into the starkest symbol o f the divide. Bahr remarked the ‘loss’ o f the Eastern zone felt 
like the amputation of a leg (Bahr 1996: 133ff). Brandt recalled the feeling was that
370 Bahr recalls this dissonance became visible already in the reactions of the Western Allies to 
the June 1957 uprising (Bahr 1996: 81).
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“someone had lifted the curtain to show us an empty stage...we have been stripped of 
our illusions...which clung to something that had ceased to exist” (Brandt 1976: 17).
Central to Brandt’s disillusionment was the hesitant American reaction to the event. 
Brandt had placed high expectations in earlier statements from US officials insisting on 
the Allied ‘rights’ in Berlin, which to him meant that the city was part o f the Western 
project (Brandt 1976: 18). Moreover, as noted above Brandt thought highly o f Kennedy 
who had linked the idea of German unity with Berlin and had declared it a valuable 
place in the West. Yet for three days after the wall had gone up there was no substantial 
reaction coming out o f Washington, and then only after a strongly worded letter from 
Brandt voicing his frustration and in which he noted that there was the “danger of a 
crisis of trust [ Vertrauenskrise]” (Brandt 1976: 29). Although Kennedy in his response 
expressed sympathy, also sending Vice President Johnson for a visit and deploying some 
additional American troops in the city, he made clear that the wall only manifested what 
was ‘reality’. Changing the status quo would require a war which, Kennedy noted, was 
in no-ones’ interest (Bahr 1996: 136). From Kennedy’s perspective (as well as 
Adenauer) the building o f the wall was an unfortunate part o f the logic o f the division of 
Europe.
Brandt did not accept this assessment o f the inevitability o f the division. For him the 
building of the wall was a “human tragedy” deserving a reaction o f anger (Brandt, 1976: 
16f)> and he began to have doubts over the American commitment to the project of 
German/European unity: “If Berlin as the capital in waiting is put into question, what 
would then be the perspectives for Germany as a whole?” (Ibid., 25). Recognising that 
even an energetic visionary like Kennedy was willing to accept the status quo, Brandt 
adjusted his horizon of expectations vis-a-vis the Western project (see also Merseburger, 
2002: 396ff; Ash 1993: 58ff). In a Bundestag speech from December 1961 entitled 
‘sober assessment on the state of the nation’, Brandt emphasizes that the FRG must 
bring its own contribution towards ‘peace’, even noting that the FRG must put forward a 
vision of peace which “will relieve our friends and win new friends” (1971: 68f). While 
for Brandt the US remained the most important partner with whom Germany’s future 
could be built, the Berlin wall episode had made it clear that new initiatives were 
necessary for re-shaping the path through which Germany-in-Europe was to unfold. 
Looking back, he noted this episode forced him to recognise “that traditional formulas of 
Western politics had proven ineffective and even estranged from reality 
[wirklichkeitsfremd]“ (Brandt, 1976: 17).
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As Hofmann (2006: 440ff.) shows, Brandt adapted to Kennedy’s emphasis on 
recognising the ‘status quo’ and combined it with his transformative outlook. The 
resulting dialectic was reflected in his speeches at Harvard (1962) and in Tutzing (1963) 
and became the credo of Ostpolitik', ‘recognising the status quo in order to change it’. By 
attributing this dialectic to Kennedy, Brandt not only skilfully reconciled the tension 
between (i) accepting the status quo, including the GDR, which meant the death o f the 
Hallstein doctrine371 and was widely seen as undermining the idea that there was only 
one authentic vision for Germany-in-Europe, and (ii) maintaining the latter. It kept the 
impression that the US and Germany were still investing in the same project, thereby 
sustaining the friendship. This is testified in Brandt’s insistence later on that Kennedy 
had not undermined but continued to support his vision, which an in large parts be 
attributed to Kennedy’s willingness to reassure Germans o f commitment to a ‘free 
Berlin’ through his famous speech in June 1963, at the 15h anniversary of the air lift, 
declaring that he also was a ‘Berliner’.372
Johnson: The Fading of ‘Kennedy America’
Johnson’s link to Kennedy was sufficient to at least maintain the impression that 
Kennedy-America was still ‘there’ and Kennedy’s approach o f gradual engagement 
carried over into Johnson’s suggestion to build bridges in Europe (Froman, 1991: 26; 
Bange, 2008: 107). In a speech from October 1966 ‘Making Europe Whole: An 
Unfinished Task’, Johnson not only reiterated Kennedy’s image of the two pillars but 
also noted that the US expected Europe “to move more confidently in peaceful 
initiatives toward the East” and to “provide a framework within which a unified 
Germany could be a full partner without arising ancient fears” (in Winand 1996: 364). 
Johnson remained supportive of integration processes taking place in the EC and 
continued to see ‘Europe’ as the key political partner for building the Western world. 
When leaving office, he reportedly was disappointed that Western Europe had not come 
closer to unity as he considered it “essential to have an effective partner if the US role in 
the world is to be stabilized in the long term” (in Lundestad, 1993: 82).
371 On the Hallstein doctrine (the politics of non-recognition of the GDR), see Gray, 2003.
372 Kennedy skilfully reconciled the American commitment to the shared narrative when he 
declared “All free man, wherever they may live, are citizens of Berlin and, therefore, as a free 
man, I take pride in the words, Ich bin ein Berliner”. Brandt notes the enthusiastic reception of 
Kennedy’s visit and describes the speech as a highly emotional moment in which the US 
president provided the perspective of a “just peace” (72f). Looking back, Brandt defended the 
late Kennedy against the claim that he had tried to seek agreement with the SU ‘at the cost of 
Germany’ (in Brandt 1971: 109). On the importance o f ‘Berlin’ in the US narrative, see Risse- 
Kappen (1995).
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However, the notion of the EC as a ‘third force’ had become less attractive in 
Washington since de Gaulle gave this term a new meaning. Observing EC institutional 
reform and the establishment o f the Commission and the Council o f Ministers, a 
memorandum from the State Department’s European bureau to Dean Rusk from 
February 1965 recommended continued support further integration along a ‘federalist’ 
design, but also noted that EC members must not create a “small Europe” or ignore “the 
crucial collateral policy of Atlantic partnership” (in Lundestad, 1998: 78). In response to 
de Gaulle’s attempt to weaken the Atlantic framework and reduce US influence on 
building European order good relations with Bonn only gained in importance (also 
Winand 1996, Ch. 9.). To ensure that the EC was not ‘closing o f f  Western Europe from 
the US, the Johnson administration began to invest in the ‘Atlantic’ approach by 
confirming its commitment to NATO and emphasizing it as the primary forum for 
consultation. Johnson’s strategy was to “bind the Atlantic nations closer together [and] 
support, as best as we can, the long term movement towards unity in Western Europe” 
(in Lundestad, 1998: 80f).
Johnson’s support for ‘European unity’ mainly focused on Western Europe rather than 
Greater Europe. Enlargement in Washington meant British EC membership and not 
expanding European order towards the East. If the division of Europe/Germany was a 
result o f ‘tensions’ between the superpowers, these tensions needed to be reduced before 
divisions could be overcome. Maintaining a peaceful Europe thus meant keeping 
Western Europe close to the US and improving relations with Moscow, rather than 
actively pursuing a transformation of European order. While the Johnson administration 
maintained that overcoming the division of Europe was desirable and that it was 
committed to the idea o f German unification, “particularly as a means o f strengthening 
ties” to the FRG, “its immediacy disappeared” (Froman, 1991: 33). Oliver Bange’s 
(2006) finding that there is little to no evidence for any substantial ‘bridge building’ 
projects under Johnson is exemplified by George Ball’s testimony to the Senate in June 
1966 to explain what was meant by ‘bridge building’. Ball basically repeated 
Adenauer’s mantra by noting that the primary focus was on strengthening Western 
Europe which would then function “as a very powerful magnet” to Eastern Europe and 
that, specifically, German unification would be achieved by integrating the FRG in a 
system of Western unity whose magnetic forces would be the greater the closer it is 
connected to the US (Winand, 1996: 364). For the medium term, a policy o f strength 
meant strengthening the status quo (Thomas 1997).
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NATO’s ‘Harmel report’ and the Ambiguity of Detente
The differences emerging between German and American ideas of ordering Europe 
(transformation versus status quo) were managed until 1969 by Kiesinger moderating 
Brandt’s views and Johnson embodying the image o f Kennedy-America. They also were 
tamed by an important adjustment to the Atlantic Alliance as the institutional frame 
through which to order the ‘shared’ Western space with the help of a new strategic 
document.
Bonn was eager to legitimize its move towards Ostpolitik through NATO, and in a 
speech to the WEU assembly in January 1967, Brandt described NATO as “a living 
organism which adapts to changing demands (Anforderungen)” (in Brandt, 1970: 16). 
Support came from NATO Secretary General Manlio Brosio who in 1966 noted that the 
Alliance was loosing its shared sense o f a mission and its function as a center for 
consultation. In addition to the French exit from military integration and Washington’s 
focus on Vietnam, Brosio criticized that the ‘detente’ policies pursued in Western 
capitals were conducted without coordination, let alone consultation (Bagnato, 2006: 
174-177). Upon the initiative of Belgian foreign minister Pierre Harmel a working group 
was put in place with the task to come up with a document which would ensure NATO’s 
viability as a forum for pursuing a common project. The resulting document from 
December 1967 was entitled “The Future Tasks of the Alliance” and informally called 
the Harmel Report.m
From Bonn’s perspective the Report was important in manifesting that “the ultimate 
political purpose of the Alliance is to achieve a just and lasting peaceful order in 
Europe” and that to this end “the possibility of a crisis cannot be excluded as long as the 
central political issues in Europe, first and foremost the German question, remain 
unsolved.” It then combines two views on how this “uncertainty” should be dealt with, 
namely (i) through the maintenance of “a suitable military capability to assure the 
balance of forces” to create “a climate of stability” in which (ii) the Alliance can “pursue 
the search for progress towards a more stable relationship in which the underlying 
political issues can be solved”. As such, the report states that “military security and a 
policy of detente are not contradictory but complementary” . Furthermore, the report 
recognises that the German question is an open one and declares
“no final and stable settlement in Europe is possible without a solution of
the German question which lies at the heart o f present tensions in
373 North Atlantic Council (1967). See also Hafitendom (1985: 117-123; 2006: 107-113).
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Europe. Any such settlement must end the unnatural barriers between 
Eastern and Western Europe, which are most clearly and cruelly 
manifested in the division o f Germany”
It goes on stating that, consequently, the Allies would examine “suitable policies 
designed to achieve a just and stable order in Europe, to overcome the division of 
Germany and to foster European security”. While stating that “the participation of the 
USSR and the USA will be necessary to achieve a settlement of the political problems in 
Europe” the report reiterates that NATO was the primary forum for dealing with 
European order, noting “the way to peace and stability in Europe rests in particular on 
the use of the Alliance constructively in the interest o f detente”. Here the report also 
describes NATO as “an effective forum and clearing house for the exchange of 
information and views” and recognises that “to this end the practice of frank and timely 
consultations needs to be deepened and improved”, in particular when discussing “the 
problem of German reunification and its relationship to a European settlement”.
The achievement of the Harmel Report was the prominent place it attributed to this 
ambiguous term: detente. To be sure, this did not ease the frustration o f Brosio, for 
whom detente remained a “political mirage”, no more than “a word, a smoke” (in 
Bagnato, 2006: 180). Yet ambiguity was intrinsic to the term since it had entered the 
political discourse of the West in the early 1960s, some described it as a “mood of spirit” 
(Seabury, 1973: 62). On the most general level, detente meant a relaxation of tensions 
and captured the spirit of cooperation for ‘peace’. It stood for all kinds of policies 
intended to reduce tensions between ‘East’ and ‘West’, that is, any motion “from the 
pole of war to the pole of peace” (Kohler, 1981: 41) and as leading “to a more normal 
situation” meaning ‘more peaceful’ (Maresca 1984 : 3).374 By inserting a commitment to 
‘detente’ into NATO’s task catalogue the Harmel Report provided the framework into 
which various national detente policies could be integrated (Haftemdom 1985: 119; 
Thomas 1997: 88-101). It allowed policymakers in Bonn and in Washington to 
understand detente as leading to a ‘more peaceful Europe’ and to agree that it was a 
vision worth investing in.
Yet there was the question what a ‘peaceful Europe’ looked like. For Bonn the value of 
the Harmel Report was its commitment to overcoming German division/the ‘unnatural’
374 One scholar tracing the development of the idea of ‘detente’ in US administrations from the 
1950s onwards notes it was “among the most contentious terms in diplomatic discourse” 
(Froman, 1991: 1). Indeed, it was not always clear whether detente was replacing or refining 
containment. On the difficulty of defining detente, see also Frei (1981); Hanhimaki (2000).
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barriers in Europe, thus allowing Brandt to interpret the ‘European settlement’ a as 
Greater European Order and ‘detente’ as accommodating a transformative Ostpolitik. 
Among German policymakers, this made the Harmel Report the central reference point 
for NATO’s purpose for decades to come, indeed as Ash points out it was considered 
“the bible of East-West relations” (Ash 1993: 4 1).375 However, in Washington a peaceful 
European order meant primarily reducing the possibility o f conflict and reaching a 
mutually agreeable level of ‘coexistence’ with the Soviet Union rather than transforming 
the European space. In the words o f one US official the report was “to fill in a mental 
picture of the Atlantic system we wish to build”, which basically meant to solidify the 
cohesion of the Western space and to complement a ‘peace through strength’ with talks 
with Moscow about arms control (Thomas 1997: 89f., emphasis added), displayed in the 
Harmel Reports’ emphasis on stability/stable relationships rather than change.
Pushing the Limits of NATO
While the vague meaning of ‘detente’ provided sufficient manoeuvring space for 
German and American policymakers to continue speaking of a shared commitment to a 
common ‘Western’ project pursued through NATO, both sides saw limits o f the 
institution concerning its ability to embed respective narratives o f ‘world building’.
In Bonn, Egon Bahr most clearly identified the limits of the Harmel Report for the 
German narrative. He noted that despite its endorsement of detente the emphasis on 
stability/stable relationships cemented the division of Europe into two blocs and 
displayed the limits of NATO as that institution for building Germany in a Greater 
Europe (Bahr 1996: 228). As a consequence, Bahr advocated an alternative institution to 
NATO. In June 1968 his policy planning staff produced an important paper entitled 
“Conception o f European Security” which laid out three visions of a European peace 
order achieved through (i) significant reduction o f tensions between the two pacts 
through arms reductions, (ii) connecting the two pacts through gradual 
institutionalisation of a common security conference, and (iii) replacing the two pacts 
through a European security system supported by both superpowers without having them 
as members.376 The paper noted that the first option was the most likely and would at 
least keep the German question open and the second would be desirable for Germany’s 
neighbours but would offer little perspective for overcoming the division. The third 
option would open up the possibility to fundamentally reorder Europe and “create a
375 See also Haftendom (1985: 117-123; 2006: 107-113).
376 Tellingly, the three security systems were discussed in purely political terms, with the report 
noting that it had “abstained from the presentation of military aspects” (in Hacke, 2003: 155).
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political basis for the reunification of Germany and a European peace order” and be the 
best scenario from a German perspective (Bahr 1996: 227f.). Although he conceded it 
was also the least likely to happen, this third version was the one Bahr recommended. 
While he knew that the idea of building Greater Europe through an institution from 
which the US was excluded was not acceptable for either Brandt or Kiesinger, the paper 
was effective in making clear the need to go beyond the Atlantic Alliance, a view shared 
by Brandt (Hacke 2003: 154).
Bahr’s paper not only coincided with a 1967 French study laying out de Gaulle’s 
tripartite ‘detente-entente-cooperation’ idea (Bahr, 1996: 228; Vahl, 1979: 230f.), and 
his third version resonated with the idea o f a European Security Conference proposed by 
the Warsaw Pact. A 1954 proposal from Moscow attempting to reduce US control over 
the FRG and prevent the latter’s entry into NATO had been taken up by the Polish 
foreign minister Adam Rapacki in October 1957 and modified into a proposal to create a 
nuclear-free zone in Central Europe. Repeated by diplomats and scholars calling for 
some sort of pan-European security system, by 1966 the idea of a European conference 
had become “a recurring theme” in statements coming from the Warsaw Pact (Maresca 
1984: 5). As o f yet, neither Washington nor Bonn had responded to these proposals 
because they implied participation of the GDR and only observer status for the US, and 
because they made the inviolability of existing borders a precondition for talks. NATO 
members only confirmed their general commitment to detente in the ‘signal’ of 
Reykjavik from June 1968 in which they agreed to discuss mutual and balanced force 
reductions (MBFR).
In Washington, the Harmel Report was interpreted not only as a document of detente 
which confirmed US leadership in ordering (stabilizing) Western Europe, but also as 
approving the spatial extension of the Western project beyond Europe. By noting that 
“the North Atlantic Treaty Area cannot be treated isolated from the rest o f the world”, 
that “crises and conflicts arising outside the area may impair its security” the report 
indirectly sanctioned US military engagement in Vietnam. This tacit widening o f the 
scope to the ‘global’ hinted at later attempts of using the institution for ‘out o f area’ 
missions, discussed in the next chapter. Moreover, in the view of Secretary o f State 
Dean Rusk it encouraged members to cooperate over security issues outside the treaty 
area without requiring them “to go at the speed of the slowest ship” (in Sherwood 1990: 
133f.). While the Vietnam engagement gradually expanded the American experienced 
space, for the present purpose the German reception must be noted because the 
difference to Adenauer’s reaction to the Korean War is telling.
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Vietnam is not Korea: Brandt*s Silence
Expanding the Western project through NATO beyond Europe did not meet enthusiasm 
in Bonn. Initially, the narrative coming out of Washington was reminiscent of ‘Korea’, 
justifying the engagement with the familiar formula o f Vietnam being a test for Western 
steadfastness in support of freedom loving people. The engagement was to secure South 
Vietnamese independence and to demonstrate US determination to oppose the expansion 
of communist order, there or ‘elsewhere’ (Gaddis, 2005 (1982): 264). This narrative was 
adopted by Kiesinger at first; however, when the US stepped up its military involvement 
the German support did not go beyond offering a medical vessel in February 1967 
(Schoellgen 1999: 76). In stark contrast to Adenauer’s leading voice two decades earlier 
in merging US engagement in Korea with ordering Europe, this time the German 
government joined other NATO allies resisting US attempts to make Vietnam “a 
genuine NATO issue” (Nuenlist and Locher: 13). As Elizabeth Sherwood notes on the 
subject of the war in Vietnam “NATO remained mute” (Sherwood, 1990: 133).
Brandt’s silence was an attempt of not fostering the dissonance in German-American 
world-building narratives. While the Chancellor privately noted that he did not see 
Berlin being defended in Vietnam, in public he only came up with vague formulations 
on the government’s position which were often dropped under the pressure o f his foreign 
and defence ministers (Merseburger 2002: 562, 626). When in his 1973 governmental 
declaration he refused to criticize US bombing campaigns Brandt was heavily criticized 
within his party and in public. The SPD-intemal newspaper asked “Why is Brandt 
silent?” and a list of 150 German academics and public intellectuals called on the 
chancellor not to become guilty in sharing the American failure in Vietnam 
(Merseburger 2002: 670). The Chancellor’s silence did not just stem from not wanting to 
openly criticize a friend in trouble; it expressed a fundamental ambiguity Vietnam 
brought into the German-American relationship: On the one hand, he saw Johnson as an 
extension of ‘Kennedy-America’ pursuing the ‘transformative’ agenda which also had 
inspired him and he acknowledged the Nixon administration’s difficulty of withdrawing 
from the conflict. He also did not want to be associated with the increasingly harsh anti- 
American undertone found in the critique voiced in Germany, going as far as associating 
US activities with those of the Third Reich (Mueller and Risse-Kappen 1987: 76-78). On 
the other hand, Brandt was unable to positively insert ‘America-in-Vietnam’ into the 
shared project o f building the West. The forceful extension if the Western space into 
South-East Asia did not fit with the ‘peaceful change’ agenda of Ostpolitik, most 
obviously as American military activity was irreconcilable with the pacifist principle of
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the German narrative. Indeed, the escalation appeared as a failure in US judgment, 
generating doubt about Washington’s virtue and its contribution to the Western project.
Nixon/Kissinger: Reorienting America-in-the-World
When Richard Nixon took over the White House in 1969, the Vietnam experience had 
begun to bring uncertainty into the American narrative. This uncertainty arose over the 
question what the US was doing in Vietnam, which had gradually evolved into a costly 
military campaign which did not succeed and had become questionable on moral 
grounds at home and abroad. In addition, with Western Europeans getting stronger 
economically and the Soviet Union apparently reaching ‘strategic parity’, there was a 
general feeling o f American power in decline. To Nixon the direction of US foreign 
policy was in dire need for reorientation, or what Kissinger in 1968 called 
“philosophical deepening” (in Gaddis, 2005: 275). This deepening, that is, the Nixon 
administration’s conception o f America-in-the-world and the place of Germany/Europe 
took in it, was significantly shaped by National Security Advisor, and after September 
1973 Secretary o f State, Henry Kissinger.377
In particular when it came to grand strategy and the US approach to ‘detente’ in Europe, 
Kissinger was the leading thinker and practitioner. His academic background made him 
well equipped to come up with a “conceptually coherent” (Gaddis) narrative of 
America’s place in the world, which he did by resorting to ‘realist’ principles to 
conceive of the world as one o f ‘great powers’ (Gaddis 2005: 272ff). Specifically, he 
saw the US unfolding in a ‘pentagonal’ world populated by the United States, the Soviet 
Union, Western Europe, Japan and China. According to the model, relations among 
these entities were facilitated by a common interest for ‘security’ and pledge to non­
intervention. Ideology was to play a reduced role in judging others, there was no 
‘communist block’, and no need to change the internal order of others; that is, there was 
to be no transformative agenda. Vietnam was to be reduced to “a small peninsula on a 
major continent” (in Gaddis, 2005: 275) without greater value for America. What Nixon 
liked to called a ‘structure o f peace’ was achievable in this world through balancing 
coalitions and deals struck among the great powers. According to Gaddis, Nixon took 
his conception o f the condition o f peace from Kissinger’s book ‘A world restored’ when 
noting in a Time interview in 1972, “the only time in history o f the world that we have
377 On Kissinger’s influence, see Kohl (1995); Hanimaki (2004); Dallek (2007). Oddly, the latter 
two contain very little on Kissinger’s view of Europe and the tensions with Germany, in 
particular.
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had any extended period o f peace...is when there has been a balance o f power” (in 
Gaddis 2005: 278).
Although there was a need to bring more certainty into America’s unfolding, the 
theoretical lens applied here suggests that Kissinger’s ability to ‘rethink’ America-in- 
the-world, that is, his ability to change the American narrative, was limited. As noted 
earlier, the phenomenological perspective holds that one cannot withdraw from a world 
once disclosed and cannot strip it of values/meaning. Thus, while Kissinger’s frame (as 
presented by Gaddis) was useful for providing the Nixon administration with a strategy 
to withdraw militarily from Vietnam, it did not change the fact that ‘Vietnam’ became a 
significant experience in the memory space of the American biography.
Most important, while Kissinger’s ‘realist’ model suggests a world without friendship, 
the lens applied here points attention to the fact that this was not the case. For the Nixon 
administration the building o f a meaningful Western space containing ‘Europe’ and the 
seeking of intimate bonds with certain European counterparts remained central to the 
agenda of manifesting ‘America-in-the-world’. As Gaddis notes, while according to 
Kissinger relations were to be “purged o f (their) sentimental and emotional components” 
and instead build upon “those common interests” of survival and security” he also added 
“a congenial international environment” to the list (Gaddis, 2005: 277). The meaning of 
‘congenial’ is open to interpretation, yet that Nixon was very much looking for friends is 
noted by Kissinger himself when he recalls that the President was eager to revitalise the 
special relationship with Britain (under Heath): “[Nixon] wanted nothing so much as an 
intimate collaboration o f a kind he would grant to no other foreign leader” and 
especially wanted Britain to be this “kindred spirit” whom he would “not need 
constantly to buttress, and from whom we might learn a great deal” (Kissinger, 1979: 
932f.). This unsuccessful attempt to strengthen bonds with Britain378 can be explained 
with the administration’s discomfort with Brandt’s course. Before outlining the 
dissonance, it must be shown that ‘Europe’ remained a valued space in 
Kissinger/Nixon’s vision o f the world.
Keeping *Europe ’ Close
For Kissinger the US relationship with ‘Europe’ was that o f an ‘uneasy alliance’. He 
recalls that Washington looked back in nostalgia to US-‘European’ cooperation during 
the time of Marshall Plan, which was seen as a time of harmonious relations where
378 When London turned down the offer for a special relationship Nixon was greatly disappointed 
according to Kissinger (1979: 933).
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American moral leadership had evoked “spontaneous and authentic consensus” from 
Europeans (Kissinger: 1979: 380). This nostalgia was an indicator that Washington was 
not quite happy with the ‘Europe’ it was dealing with now. Kissinger captured this basic 
discontent when noting “Europe was proceeding toward political unity -  if not always 
along the route we favored” (Ibid., 381). The kind of route he favoured, of course, was 
one in which ‘Europe’ was supportive o f the multipolar ‘structure of peace’ he 
envisioned. Yet as ‘Europe’ was a valued space the ordering o f which was part o f the 
Western project, Kissinger’s attempt to reduce it to a ‘pole’ was beset by ambiguity.
To begin with, the Nixon administration decided to take a “low profile” on the project of 
European unity and wanted to stay out of “intra-European quarrels”, pretending to 
pursue an approach based on concern for “what the Europeans want for themselves” 
(Kissinger, 1979: 390). While this gave the impression that Washington had lost interest 
in the European project, this was not the case. Rather than being indifferent about the 
direction ‘Europe’ was taking, Kissinger preferred that to maintain a European order it 
could understand. The tension arising out of not wanting to engage questions of 
European integration but at the same time wanting ‘Western Europe’ to remain a 
familiar space was visible in two ways.
First, while in Kissinger’s pentagonal world Western Europe was a ‘unit’, he did not 
really want it to be one. Indeed, as Lundestad (1998, Ch. 8) points out, the Nixon 
administration shut the door to the ‘Europeanists’ and was the first administration which 
did not fully support the vision of European unity. When testifying to the Senate in 
1966, Kissinger noted that he would prefer a confederal Europe (i.e. the way it currently 
was) over a federal one because the former would permit the US to maintain its 
influence “at many centers” while a more united Europe might become more ‘Gaullist’, 
that is, take an anti-American stance. With his suggestion that Anti-Americanism might 
become the “one cohesive bond” among Europeans, Kissinger departed from the view 
that a more united Europe would remain a natural partner o f the US (Kissinger 1979: 
390).
Second, while Kissinger did not want to create an ‘organic’ bond to ‘Europe’, he wanted 
it to stay close to the US. In 1966 Kissinger expressed his discomfort with the idea of 
forming some sort of Atlantic community and noted that his “instinct” was that Europe 
and the US would work together for “common interests” without being “organically tied 
together” (in Winand 1996: 363). In a meeting with the British prime minister, Nixon 
noted that he would like to see Britain in a “strong” Europe which was independent but
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“going parallel with the United States” (in Kissinger 1979: 418). That the US conception 
of an ‘independent’ Europe was ambivalent is also exemplified by a report to Congress 
from February 1970 in which the Nixon administration advocated its ‘strategy for peace’ 
and noted that the US could not detach itself from Europe just like it could not detach 
itself from Alaska. In other words, ‘Western Europe’ was expected to remain an intimate 
part of the Western space.
To keep it there, the Nixon administration further endorsed the building o f ‘Europe’ 
through NATO. It reacted positively to a proposal by Britain’s Minister o f Defense, 
Denis Healy, from March 1969 for creating a ‘European’ group within NATO. Whereas 
some were concerned that such a European caucus might divide the Atlantic Alliance, 
Kissinger was “generally favourable” of European attempts “to create a more coherent 
voice within NATO” because, in his view, “there was no conceivable contingency in 
which Europe would be better off without American support” (Kissinger 1979: 385, 
emphasis added). The conception that NATO allies were engaged in a common project 
also was visible in the ‘burden sharing’ debates. These were not merely about the US 
trying to get Europeans to invest more in military capabilities in the current of the new 
NATO strategy o f ‘flexible response’ and pressure by Congress to cut defense 
expenditures.379 Like his predecessors, Nixon used this as a lever to get Western 
Europeans to help the US with its balance of payments and other economic problems 
(Lundestad 1998: 102f; Duke, 1993). At bottom the White House never intended to 
withdraw US troops from Europe because their presence provided an effective lever to 
exert influence over any order-building enterprise (Kissinger 1979: 393ff.).380
Hence, Kissinger in a memo to Nixon from March 1970 argued that policy towards 
Europe should adhere to three principles: (i) to remain ‘sober’ when dealing with the 
Soviet Union so Europeans would not “grow to fearful of a US-Soviet deal”, (ii) to be 
‘meticulous’ in consultation with NATO allies so they could “be sure that their vital 
interests would be protected”, and (iii) to avoid unilateral decisions o f withdrawing 
forces from Europe to avoid any “tendencies o f submission to the Soviet Union” 
(Kissinger 1979: 382). These points show that Kissinger was not only well aware o f the 
Bonn’s ‘Potsdam complex’, that is, of being ‘left out’ in vital decisions about Europe’s
379 In the US this strategic shift was neither new, nor was it clear what exactly ‘flexible response’ 
meant militarily (Kissinger 1979: 393, 398).
380 This was highlighted in the debate around the Mansfield amendment from May 1971, which 
(once again) demanded to cut US forces in Europe by half. The White House defeated the 
proposal by gathering the support of old pro-European luminaries such as Acheson, McCloy, and 
Ball. Nixon also asked Brandt to issue a statement warning that US withdrawal would leave the 
impression that “the United States is on its way out of Europe” (Kissinger 1979: 938ff.).
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future (Kissinger 1979: 400ff.). They also hint at the vitality o f the ‘Rapallo complex’ 
emerging in the dissonance with the Brandt government.
Discomfort with ‘Brandt Germany’
The Nixon administration continued to see Germany as playing a central role in the 
making o f European order. Kissinger noted (and presumably not only with the hindsight 
of 25 years): “There were only three powers capable o f disrupting the postwar status quo 
in Europe -  the two superpowers and Germany” (Kissinger, 1994: 735f.). He was also 
aware of Bonn’s “unfulfilled national aims”, specifically that unification would always 
be an overarching aim that would be difficult to achieve in a divided Europe (Kissinger 
1979: 96ff). Yet while German unification may have been desirable in principle, in 
Kissinger’s world Germany-in-Europe was to remain a stable space.381 As he put it 
diplomatically, the Western powers were “willing to wait; they were not prepared to run 
significant risks on behalf of reunification” (Kissinger 1979: 411).
Yet, as noted earlier, ‘waiting’ was not the vision energizing Ostpolitik and the 
dissonance generated anxiety in Washington. On his first visit to Western Europe after 
becoming President in 1969, Nixon expressed scepticism about the popularity of detente 
he encountered, concerned that the European commitment for peace was “played on” 
cleverly by Moscow. To keep Europeans from slipping away, he concluded that “we 
could best hold the Alliance together by accepting the principle o f detente but 
establishing clear criteria to determine its course” (Kissinger 1979: 403). Behind this 
assessment lurked the spectre of Rapallo and the discomfort with Brandt’s Ostpolitik.
Kissinger’s assessment was that Ostpolitik was “not without dangers”. The State 
Department in October 1969 suggested that under the new Brandt government “an active 
all-German and Eastern policy will have the first priority” but also that Bonn “could not 
pursue simultaneously active policies towards East Germany and integration of the 
Federal Republic into Western Europe” (Kissinger 1979: 408). The implication was that 
Bonn’s Ostpolitik was conducted at the expense o f ‘Western European’ integration. 
Although Kissinger did not assume that Brandt wanted to ‘defect’ from the West, he saw 
this as a possible unintended consequence of Ostpolitik. In a memo to Nixon he noted 
“there can be no doubt about their [the Brandt government’s] basic Western orientation. 
But their problem is to control a process which...may shake Germany’s domestic
381 How Kissinger felt about the country of his birth and how his personal experiences of the 
Third Reich impacted his thinking about Germany-in-Europe is an important question. 
Unfortunately, I am not aware of a study addressing it in a substantial way.
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stability and unhinge its international position” (Ibid., 408f.). Kissinger’s scepticism 
echoed Adenauer’s reasoning in suggesting that Brandt’s course could turn into “a new 
form of classic German nationalism” and that “from Bismarck to Rapallo it was the 
essence of Germany’s nationalist foreign policy to manoeuvre freely between East and 
West”. Only through NATO and the European Community the FRG had become 
grounded firmly in the West (Kissinger 1979: 409).
Uncertainty over whether the unfolding ‘Germany’ would remain in ‘the West’ 
concerned the Nixon administration,382 and its discomfort with Brandt-Germany was 
reflected in how the personalities, Brandt and Bahr, were evaluated. From Kissinger’s 
memoirs it is clear that among Western European leaders, Brandt was liked the least by 
Nixon. While the president admired de Gaulle and hoped to establish a special 
relationship with Heath, neither he nor Kissinger spoke favourably of the Chancellor. In 
private, Nixon expressed outright dislike of the ‘socialist’ and worse (see Merseburger 
2002: 626). Kissinger also had little sympathy for Bahr, his ‘back channel’ contact. 
After the latter’s first visit in Washington in 1968, Kissinger concluded that Bahr was 
not committed to the German-American friendship: “a man o f the left...above all a 
German nationalist who wanted to exploit Germany’s central position to bargain with 
both sides”, who “believed that Germany could only realize its national destiny only by 
friendship with the East” and who “was obviously not as unquestionably dedicated to 
Western unity as the people we had known in the previous government; he was also free 
of any sentimental attachment to the United States” (Kissinger 1979: 41 Of). These 
meetings were hence not characterized by an intimate connection and were not a creative 
source for world building. After their first meeting, Kissinger complained about “single- 
mindedness” o f Brandt and Bahr “asking not for our advice but for our cooperation in a 
course to which its principal figures had long since been committed” (Kissinger 1979: 
41 If.).
Instead of voicing this concern openly, Kissinger decided “to mute the latent 
incompatibility between Germany’s national aims and its Atlantic and European ties” 
and to channel Brandt’s policy “in a constructive direction” (Kissinger 1979: 410). A 
‘constructive direction’ meant supporting Ostpolitik where it fit the US agenda of
382 Considering German public opinion’s desire for ‘equidistance’, the US had reasons for 
questioning the FRG’s ‘Western’ commitment. In a poll from May 1973 the majority (54%) 
thought Bonn should pursue a strategy of equal cooperation with Washington and Moscow, 
whereas 36% preferred closer cooperation with the former and 3% with the latter. See Clemens 
. (1992: 43, 51). Kissinger’s concerns were not limited to Germany. He also feared a communist 
takeover in Italy: “These trends seemed obvious to me” (Kissinger 1979: 920fi).
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stabilising Europe and where it offered a lever in negotiations with Moscow, and 
remaining passive, at best, where Bonn’s course risked undermining Kissinger’s world. 
The overall aim was not to allow Brandt to redefine the Western project, while at the 
same time not letting him become frustrated with the US and loosen ties. To keep Brandt 
close, Nixon took up his request for regular ‘consultations’ -  Brandt recalls an 
“unprecedented” close contact between the Chancellery and the White House -  and 
sought to make sure all major Ostpolitik initiatives went through NATO, without 
energizing them.383 Hence, when in a meeting with Nixon in December 1971 Brandt 
expressed his gratification for NATO’s support for Ostpolitik “Nixon frostily corrected 
him, saying the Alliance did not object to the policy” (Kissinger 1979: 966, emphasis in 
original).
Brandt: Discomfort with Nixon/Kissinger America
The Brandt government was aware that its ambitions to introduce fundamental changes 
into the design o f Europe were not shared in Washington. Although the White House 
never openly expressed doubts about Ostpolitik or European unity towards him, Brandt 
noted the “ambivalence” and scepticism he encountered in meetings and registered 
unwillingness to engage in a constructive discussion about European order.384 Moreover, 
open critique to his course from the old US foreign policy establishment, in particular its 
‘Europeanists’. Encouraged by an active CDU/CSU lobby trying to mobilise 
Washington against Ostpolitik, figures like Clay, Ball, McCloy and Acheson variably 
accusing Brandt of weakening the FRG’s commitment to NATO and to the EC (Brandt 
1976:386).
The Chancellor worked hard to counter this impression and dispel American doubts 
about his government’s commitment to the Western project, repeatedly assuring that his 
Ostpolitik was a German contribution to detente.385 On every possible occasion he 
emphasized to American audiences the importance of the FRG’s partnership with the US
383 Symbolic was the meeting in December 1971 where Nixon assured Brandt that despite the US 
focus on the Soviet Union and China “Europe is the most important, and the key to Europe is 
Germany (...) The future of Germany and its position in the Alliance always stands in the 
foreground of American considerations. Maintaining the strength of the Alliance...[is] the 
precondition for the efforts to detente” (in Brandt 1976: 397f.).
384 In his memoirs, Brandt recalls a confusing conversation with Nixon over US support for his 
negotiations on the ‘Eastern Treaties’. He even prints an transcript extract to demonstrate his 
difficulties in understanding Nixon’s position when he said things like “the USA will respect 
[Bonn’s] decision with benign neutrality” (in Brandt 1976: 401).
385 To the American Council on Germany in New York he presented his policies as “the logical 
complement and extension” of what NATO allies were doing (Brandt 1976: 394fi).
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and assured that his government was not going ‘off course’.386 He buttressed this by 
arguing that in his understanding the German and American biographies remained 
intimately linked. In a dinner speech at the White House he stressed the German 
commitment to the values o f liberty/freedom, democracy and self determination which 
“corresponds not only our experience but also determine our spiritual position in world 
politics” (Brandt 1976: 381). At the National Press Club in Washington in April 1970, 
Brandt praised the American support in rebuilding Germany after the war as a high 
moral accomplishment and the ‘rescue of Berlin’ in 1948/49 as unforgettable (ibid., 
384f). Yet he also noted that overcoming the frozen European fronts and working 
towards peaceful coexistence in Europe would require leaving behind outdated theories 
and making an effort towards “a new synthesis o f reality and ideals” (ibid., 385). In the 
same vein, in a speech in Yale in 1971 he called for the “willingness and ability for 
permanent reform” (ibid., 387).
In this aspect Brandt had great difficulties to see in the Nixon administration the desired 
partner for building a shared European order. To him “the role o f the United States in the 
world...had undergone substantial [wesentlich] change since the time of Kennedy” 
(Brandt 1976: 379), with ‘wesentlich’ describing a change that cannot be captured in 
measurable quantities but points to a change in a state of authentic being. That Brandt 
was thinking in these terms becomes clear when noting that he took ‘Kennedy America’ 
as a point of comparison against which ‘Nixon America’ appeared as a power in decline 
with a conservative president who seemed insecure and never really seemed at ease 
(Ibid., 375). In particular when it came to discuss ‘Europe’ he encountered a US 
administration whose position ranged from being vague and indifferent to the confused 
and defensive.
Brandt recognized the importance of Kissinger in shaping the American conception of 
the world and regarded the basic principles of this outlook as problematic. For the 
Chancellor, the world at the end of the 20th century could “never match the ‘concert of 
the powers’, which had determined politics and diplomacy of the 19th century” (Brandt 
1976: 376f). He sensed that with this frame in place Kissinger’s willingness to engage 
the European project did not go far. According to Hanrieder, the Chancellor was “fully 
aware” that Washington pursued an “essentially conservative” European policy 
(Hanrieder, 1989: 98). Herbert Blankenhom, the FRG’s ambassador in London, assessed
386 This also motivated Brandt’s strategy to remain silent over the issue of Vietnam noted earlier.
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in 1969 that “the American government...does not want to touch upon the European 
status quo at this point” (ibid.).
Thus, when it came to the issue of European order, Brandt complained that Kissinger did 
not show sufficient understanding and was unwilling, even unable to be a creative 
partner. In his memoirs he recalls that “the word Europe...also hints at the shadows 
which occasionally touched my relations with Kissinger. I could not fight the impression 
that he did not want to fully acknowledge the reality o f the slowly and laboriously 
[muhselig] growing European Community -  as if it was particularly difficult for him to 
understand the changing Heimat of his parents and forefathers” (Brandt 1976: 377). He 
goes on describing his American colleague in rather unflattering terms when noting how 
Kissinger often reacted impatiently and that “perhaps...he [Kissinger] was overburdened 
not only physically but psychologically” (Ibid., 377). Brandt’s disappointment with the 
lack of fruitful interaction is also noted in his observation that Kissinger seemingly 
wanted to take East-West questions in his own hand and considered himself in a position 
from which he could see better: “He sometimes seemed to look (down) at the old 
continent with the contempt of the new Roman for the Hellenic small states” (Brandt 
1976: 377ff).
NATO or CSCE? Tensions Towards Helsinki
Recognising that NATO was not the institutional frame through which ‘Germany’ could 
unfold into a Greater European Peace Order, the proposal for a European Security 
Conference (ESC) gained momentum in Bonn. The ‘Budapest Appeal’ from March 
1969 renewed the proposal for a ESC and dropped the demand that NATO would have 
to be dissolved. The same month, Brandt made a positive remark about such a 
conference in the Bundestag, and in April he suggested to Nixon and Kissinger to 
engage the proposal to make further progress on the way to ‘peace’ by linking it to talks 
on force reductions (Brandt 1976: 248f.). NATO foreign ministers offered to look into 
how a useful process of negotiation could be initiated, insisting that US and Canadian 
participation would be necessary in a conference o f this kind, which was accepted by the 
Warsaw Pact in June 1970. After some back and forth establishing the conditions under 
which the conference would take place, concerning in particular the demand by Brandt 
that the status of Berlin and the relationship between FRG and GDR had to be clarified 
prior to the conference, talks on what now was called a Conference on Security and
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Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) were opened in Helsinki in July 1973.387 This was 
followed by working level negotiations in Geneva from September 1973 to July 1975 
and concluded with a meeting o f heads of states in Helsinki on 1 August 1975.
As John Maresca recalls, it was clear to participants that at core of the CSCE 
negotiations was the question of Germany in Europe: “although it was never mentioned 
publicly...all of the delegates at the Conference realised that the CSCE was, in fact, 
about Germany, and that it would bear importantly on the status o f that divided nation in 
the future” (Maresca 1984: 8 1).388 In light o f the dissonance o f how to envision 
Germany-in-Europe, American and German approaches to the negotiations differed 
significantly.
For Brandt the idea o f a pan-European security conference was not a ‘Soviet’ idea. Even 
though the first concrete proposal had come from Moscow, the idea o f such a conference 
and the notion o f ‘collective security’ it promised had circulated among Social 
Democrats since the 1950s. This allowed Brandt to adopt and substantiate the proposal 
with his own ideas o f order, appropriating it for his project o f a ‘Greater Europe’. Given 
Moscow’s eagerness to engage the conference, it also enabled the Brandt government to 
practice ‘linkage’ politics similar to those Adenauer had used towards NATO 
membership.389 As noted earlier, Brandt had accepted that negotiations about change 
required the quasi-recognition of the GDR, but the aim was to tie the latter to the former. 
The conference offered a lever for bilateral negotiations concerning the status of Berlin 
and of the FRG-GDR relationship, as otherwise participation o f both FRG and GDR 
would de facto  legitimise the latter as a state equal to the FRG (Brandt, 1976: 248; 
Tessmer 2004: 58). Yet the conference was far more than a lever. The ‘Eastern treaties’ 
and the Helsinki Final Act were interwoven, part of a two-step strategy.390 When Brandt 
noted in March 1973 that the time had come where the bilateral elements of Ostpolitik 
were to be replaced by multilateral ones (in Roloff 1995: 83), he saw CSCE as the 
necessary forum through which the development o f a Greater European order could be
387 In May 1970 a NATO communique laid out (Bonn’s) precondition that the bilateral 
negotiations between the FRG and the Soviet Union, Poland and the GDR would have to be 
completed beforehand. After the Germany-Soviet treaty was signed in August 1970 and the 
Germany-Poland treaty in December that year, Bonn insisted on a four power agreement on 
Berlin before starting preparatory talks for a ‘European’ conference. Moscow, in turn, asked for 
the bilateral treaties to be ratified in the Bundestag before singing the Berlin agreement. When 
the FRG and the GDR agreed on a ‘basic treaty’ establishing mutual recognition in December 
1972, the way to CSCE was opened.
388 While many saw the Helsinki document as a de facto peace treaty thirty years after the end of 
the Second World War, Germany sought to prevent this, which is why it was called ‘Final Act’.
389 On the Brandt government’s linkage policy and the use of back channels, see Geyer (2004).
390 For the link between CSCE and Deutschlandpolitik, see Spohr-Readman (2006).
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pursued and in which a change o f the narrative of Germany-in-Europe could be 
embedded, Domestically, this move produced a heated debate over its impact on the 
Western project. Brandt and Scheel were accused by the CDU/CSU of abandoning he 
Hallstein Doctrine/recognising the GDR and o f weakening the FRG’s ties with the West, 
indeed of pursuing a course o f ‘changing camps’.391 The government countered that 
Ostpolitik was the German contribution to the Western detente effort operating firmly 
within the frame formulated in the Harmel Report and intended to strengthening the 
West (Knapp 1974: 169f.).
The Nixon administration was not at all enthusiastic about the prospect o f a conference 
which could only introduce uncertainty into European order. Rather than seeing it as an 
opportunity to recreate the Western project, Nixon considered the conference “a Soviet 
project” (Maresca, 1984: 42). In his eyes Moscow was seducing Western Europeans 
with a false promise for peace by being extraordinarily persevering in proposing such a 
conference over and over again which “like drops o f water on a stone... sooner or later 
erode the resistance o f restless democracies” (Kissinger 1979: 413). Hence, once the 
talks got underway the Nixon administration exercised a Tow profile’ approach. When 
in early 1971 Brandt again brought up the topic in Washington he found his discussion 
partners “surprisingly indifferent” (Brandt 1976: 386), an attitude which according to 
Brandt did not change (Ibid., 391 ).392 This attitude o f ‘indifference’ is confirmed by John 
Maresca, the senior American diplomat participating in the negotiations process, who 
recalls that the administration showed a “desire to deliberately downgrade (its) 
significance” (Maersca 1984: 64). The US delegation was not provided with specific or, 
indeed, any written instructions and throughout the conference used three different chief 
negotiators with little experience (Ibid., 44flf.). At the same time, Washington pressed for 
an early conclusion of the negotiations, with Kissinger at one point calling for an end of 
the “theological debate” in Geneva (Ibid., 65f). Kissinger also publicly ridiculed the 
number of Western proposals tabled and fostered the view in the American public that 
the CSCE was “a somewhat silly haggle among diplomats” (Ibid., 68).
The American Tow profile’ approach is sometimes explained with Washington’s desire 
not to disturb its negotiations with Moscow over MBFR and the preoccupation with
391 The CDU/CSU rejected the Helsinki Final Act. On the CDU/CSU position to Brandt’s 
Ostpolitik more generally, see Clemens (1989).
392 The ESC receives very sparse attention in Kissinger’s accounts of his time in the White 
House: three out of almost 1500 pages, which mainly note its ‘irrelevance’. Similarly, 
Lundestad’s (1998) appraised account of the US policy towards European integration does not 
mention the CSCE.
255
finding an ‘honourable’ way out of Vietnam (Kissinger 1979: 1249f; Maresca 1984: 45). 
Yet the theoretical lens used here suggests that Washington toned down its involvement 
not because it considered the CSCE process irrelevant but because it unsettled the 
American understanding of European order and, hence, the Western project. With the 
fears o f a ‘selective’ detente and Rapallo lurking, the position o f the Nixon 
administration was indifferent only at the surface. Given its potential to change the 
status quo in Europe, the display o f indifference masked a feeling o f uneasiness. Thus, 
when Brandt complained that the Nixon administration did not “clearly enough 
[recognize] the great opportunity which could arise out of this novel...connection to 
Europe” (Brandt 1976: 386f.), he failed to notice that it did  care. As Kissinger writes in 
his memoirs, directly referring to Brandt’s assessment: “He was wrong. We got the 
point. We simply were not persuaded by the argument and we thought it to be more 
tactful not to pursue it” (Kissinger 1979: 424). What to Brandt looked like an 
opportunity to create something new, for Kissinger it brought an uncertainty into the 
Western space he did not like.
The ‘Year of Europe’
Kissinger tried to counter the growing popularity o f the ESC idea with initiatives to 
revitalize the Western project through NATO. Yet given the lack o f a shared vision of a 
future European space, these attempts only exposed the dissonance over ideas of order. 
Two initiatives exemplify this. As soon as entering the White House in 1969, Kissinger 
had tried to revitalize NATO as the primary institution for shared world building in 
Europe. In April he emphasized in a memo to Nixon the need for “consultations within 
NATO designed to develop coherent western positions” (Kissinger 1979: 415) and 
proposed a ‘Committee on the Challenges of Modem Society’ within NATO, as well as 
suggestions for a more frequent mid-level meetings. Nixon put these ideas forward in his 
speech on the twentieth anniversary of the Alliance in April 1969 (Ibid., 386). Kissinger 
complained that this proposal only received a “lukewarm reception” from Bonn, which 
he took as proof that German/European calls for rethinking the purpose o f the Alliance 
were not serious and that demands for more consultations were only meant “to limit 
America’s freedom of action” (Ibid., 387). Yet Kissinger had failed to accommodate that 
Brandt was not asking for working-level meetings and talks about environmental 
protection and improving transportation but was looking for top-level exchanges 
working towards the peaceful transforming of Greater Europe.
Similarly ill conceived, yet more revealing, was Kissinger’s proposal for a ‘New 
Atlantic Charter’ from April 1973 (Kissinger 1973), which can be seen as a response to
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the EC’s communique from October 1972 calling for a ‘constructive dialogue’ with the 
US. In this proposal, Kissinger called for making 1973 the ‘Year of Europe’. Noting that 
“the problems in the Atlantic relationship are real” Kissinger rightly identified the 
challenge as whether its unity can be restored by drawing “new purpose from shared 
positive aspirations” (Kissinger 1973: 188f.). Indeed, he went as far as saying that “the 
Atlantic nations must join in a fresh act o f creation, equal to that undertaken by the post­
war generation of leaders in Europe and America”. For this purpose Nixon would 
“embark on a personal and direct approach to the leaders o f Western Europe ( ...)  to lay 
the basis for a new era of creativity in the West” and to reinvigorate “shared ideals and 
common purpose with our friends” (Ibid., 189).
Apart from complaining about rising economic competition and lacking reciprocity in 
defence spending, Kissinger identified two key problems. First, his note that the US had 
global interests and responsibilities whereas Europeans had regional ones and his 
suggestion to include Japan in the common project, point to the difference between 
American and European spatial horizons in their world building ambitions. Second, 
Kissinger’s remark that “some of our friends in Europe seemed “unwilling to accord the 
United States the same trust in our motives as they received from us” (Kissinger 1973: 
191) pointed to a divergence of horizons of expectations. However, while Kissinger 
recognised these fundamental problems and called for “a shared view of the world we 
seek to build”, the initiative was, in the eyes o f one close observer, “a failure” because it 
“created more discord than it alleviated” (Kohl 1975: 18). It was perceived not as an 
invitation for building a shared world but for contributing to Kissinger’s world.
It was not only that the speech was crafted and delivered without any prior notification, 
let alone consultation of NATO allies, leaving them surprised and suspicious of 
American intent (Ibid.). The key problem was that Kissinger, while paying lip service to 
the continuous US support for “the unification o f Europe” (Kissinger 1973: 190), 
depicted a united Europe primarily as an economic rival. From the German perspective, 
in particular, Kissinger’s ‘New Atlantic Charter’ lacked a sense o f the European project 
as one of transformation. Brandt, in a response to Kissinger’s speech in the New York 
Times, stressed that the European project was growing beyond economic integration and 
that “the major task of all Europeans [is] reuniting our divided continent”. Indeed, 
whereas Kissinger did not specify the shared project Brandt noted that Ostpolitik has 
released “energies for the construction of a common Europe” (Brandt 1973: 193). 
Notable in this response is that it maintains that this development is anchored in 
Jefferson’s ‘pursuit of happiness’ principle, while at the same time calling it an
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‘emancipated partnership’ built on a “new self-awareness o f Europe” and a “consensus 
of opinion within the European Community...formed around the nucleus of Franco- 
German solidarity” (Brandt 1973: 194f.).
With this last point Brandt also refers to the support the CSCE conference received from 
other Western European governments. When the US took a low profile stand Brandt 
successfully moved to the EC as the primary forum for coordination and consultation 
among Western Europeans. The Luxembourg Report from October 1970 was an 
important stepping stone in establishing the EC’s new ‘European Political Cooperation’ 
(EPC) mechanism and for forming the EC subcommittee in the CSCE process which, as 
analysts have pointed out, was quite successful in devising joint positions and 
influencing the negotiations (Smith 2004: 69-89; Maresca 1984: 19; Spohr Readman 
2006: 1101). While Western Europeans, in particular France, may have opted for close 
consultations in the EC in part because they wanted to keep a close watch on Germany, 
the EC caucus was an effective forum in the negotiations because its members could 
agree on the purpose of the conference as instilling opportunities for changing Europe’s 
order (Maresca 1984: 43).
Conclusion
This chapter sought to explain the tensions entering German-American relations in the 
decade leading up to the Helsinki Final Act. Framed as a process of estrangement, the 
objective was to assess why and in what way political leaders in Germany and the US 
came to disagree about the relative value o f NATO and CSCE as the most suitable 
institution through which their respective understanding o f ‘Germany’ and ‘America’ in 
the world could unfold. The discussion traced this disagreement to dissonance over 
visions of an order of Europe at peace.
The discussion laid out Brandt’s vision o f ‘Germany’ becoming unified in a Greater 
European Peace Order, which motivated his policy of overcoming the order o f Yalta and 
rendered Ostpolitik a kind of Europapolitik. While it was argued that Brandt’s 
transformative vision of Germany-in-Greater-Europe was developed in interaction with 
‘Kennedy America’, his relationship with the Nixon/Kissinger administration, in 
particular, was not marked by creativity but by dissonance over the meaning o f ‘peace in 
Europe’. It was shown that in contrast to Brandt’s transformative vision, from 
Washington ‘peace in Europe’ meant stability o f the order o f Yalta and that Kissinger’s 
conception o f ‘Europe’ was not only static but also ambiguous about the value of
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European ‘unity’ for the Western project, rendering him unable to solve the tension 
between envisioning an independent yet ‘close’ Europe.
The chapter showed that German-American dissonance found expression in mutual 
suspicion about commitment to the Western project. In an attempt to maintain the 
friendship, it was mediated by silence on contentious issues, such Vietnam, and by 
hiding diverging paths under a shared commitment for ‘detente’ as formulated in 
NATO’s Harmel Report. The chapter suggested that despite Nixon/Kissinger’s efforts to 
curtail Ostpolitik through NATO and revitalize the Atlantic frame, Brandt considered 
NATO insufficient for Germany’s authentic becoming in a ‘Greater Europe’ and sought 
investment in CSCE. It interpreted the Nixon administration’s reluctant support of the 
conference and attempt to decrease its importance through a show of ‘indifference’ was 
as a strategy to keep Brandt committed to the Western project yet reduce his ability to 
bring uncertainty into European order.
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CHAPTER TEN: CFSP / GERMAN-US DIVERGENCE (1985-1995)
Introduction
The previous chapter explained German-American tensions over investment in CSCE, 
specifically Bonn’s pro-active stance and Washington’s reluctance, with dissonance over 
the meaning o f ‘peace in Europe’ signifying a process o f estrangement. This chapter 
addresses the divergence in German-American security cooperation in the decade 
surrounding the end of the Cold War, specifically Bonn’s investment in CFSP as an 
alternative to NATO and CSCE. The theoretical lens applied here suggests that during 
this period one can witness an enduring dissonance between German and American 
narratives of being-in-the-world prompting the Kohl government to pursue a strategy of 
emancipation. Corroborating this argument is not an easy task as it runs counter three 
conventional wisdoms. First, Kohl is known for his pro-American attitude and the 
Germany/Europe-friendly reputation of the three US administrations, lead by Ronald 
Reagan, George Bush and Bill Clinton, increased from the first to the last. Second, 
German unification is generally considered an example o f close and harmonious 
German-American cooperation rather than part of an estrangement/emancipation 
process. Finally, NATO’s engagement in Bosnia in 1995 is generally seen as affirming 
its relevance and symbolising the failure of CFSP. This chapter does not repudiate these 
points, but it suggests that if looked at carefully they did not halt the process of 
estrangement but were either hiding or even fuelling it.
The discussion proceeds in three parts. The first part lays out the orientation o f the 
Kohl/Genscher government as a merger o f Adenauer’s and Brandt’s narrative of 
‘Germany-in-Europe’ and points out the tensions in place with the Reagan 
administration. The second part outlines the close cooperation between Bonn and 
Washington during the negotiations leading to German unification to suggest that it left 
untouched the dissonance over the vision of European order. The third part shows how 
dissonance resurfaced in the evaluation of the meaning o f the 1991 Gulf War and the 
conflict in Bosnia for the ‘Western’ project, discussing German resistance to building a 
‘New World Order’ with military force and lacking American commitment to invest in a 
‘European Peace Order’. The discussion concludes with arguing that to compensate the 
estrangement process with Washington, Bonn throughout pursued a strategy of 
emancipation by cooperating with France to invest in CFSP.
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Merging Adenauer and Brandt
Brandt’s successor Helmut Schmidt (SPD), Chancellor from 1974 to 1982, did not 
formulate a new/original vision of Germany-in-Europe to the extent Adenauer and 
Brandt did but self-confidently steered the FRG on a path balancing Ostpolitik and 
Westintegration. Schmidt is often described as a manager who, after having completed 
the CSCE talks in Helsinki, pursued a strategy o f “consolidation” o f Ostpolitik 
(Hanrieder 1989: 209f.) while focusing on making the FRG “the second world power in 
the West” (in Niedhart 2004: 51). As such, he placed less emphasis on the vision o f a 
‘Greater Europe’ and more on strengthening the FRG’s position in the Western space. 
While developing strong bonds with France and considering the EC a valuable 
institution for deepening the Western European integration, Schmidt regarded friendship 
with the US a “clear priority” (in Banchoff 1999: 111). Thus, although Foreign Minister 
Hans-Dietrich Genscher worked hard to keep the CSCE process alive (see below), 
Schmidt moved the government’s emphasis back to NATO. But his relationship with the 
Carter administration was tense and produced few impulses for common creative 
endeavours, and his famous ‘double-track decision’ was controversial domestically and 
played a key role in his political downfall in 1982.393
Since 1982 the government was formed by a coalition between Christian Democrats and 
Liberal Democrats, headed by Chancellor Helmut Kohl (CDU) and, until 1992, Foreign 
Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher (FDP). Despite the fact that the FDP was only a minor 
coalition partner, Genscher exerted considerable influence on the government’s path. 
Even more so than Schmidt the narrative of Germany-in-Europe it pursued was a merger 
of the orientations of Adenauer and Brandt, that is, a bifurcation o f Westintegration and 
Ostpolitik.
As part of the Flakhelfer generation which had experienced the war as teenagers, Kohl 
and Genscher shared the anti-war sentiment characterizing the narrative o f post-45 
Germany. They also shared the sense that the FRG’s prosperity was owed largely to 
having adhered to Western ideals. Thus, they were both committed to continue building 
Germany in a peaceful European space valuing ‘freedom’ and ‘unity’. Beyond that,
393 The anti-American sentiment expressed by domestic critics of Schmidt’s ‘double-track’ 
decision did not translate to dissonance amongst the political leadership, or to a German move 
away from NATO. Schmidt’s decision against domestic opposition was motivated in part to 
ensure that the West remained ‘strong’ and Germany a ‘reliable ally’. Underlying was Schmidt 
view that peace in Europe, a process aimed at overcoming division, could only succeed from a 
position of strength/military balance. The domestic peace-movement, by contrast, upheld a 
stricter interpretation of the pacifist principle and called for ‘making peace without weapons’ 
[Frieden schaffen ohne Waffen]. See Mueller and Risse-Kappen (1987); Rupps (1997: 256ff);
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Kohl and Genscher favoured two slightly different visions o f Germany-in-Europe, with 
the former emphasizing the ‘Western Europe’ space o f Adenauer and the latter 
favouring the notion o f a ‘Greater Europe’ reminiscent of Brandt.
Kohl grew up in Ludwigshafen in the Rhine region, the Palatine, and after the war joined 
the newly founded CDU in 1946. He gradually climbed up the ranks o f the party, 
becoming minister president o f Rhineland-Palatinate in 1969, federal chairman of the 
CDU in 1973 and three years later leader o f the parliamentary opposition in the 
Bundestag. In 1982, after Schmidt’s resignation, Kohl was elected Chancellor and held 
this position until 1998. Regarding himself as the political heir o f Adenauer,394 Kohl 
upheld the maxim that German unity would be desirable only within the ‘free world’ 
(Kohl 1996: 2 Iff.). His ‘Report on the State o f the Nation in a divided Germany’ from 
March 1984 was entitled ‘Freedom is the core of the German question’ and declared that 
“the protection o f freedom takes priority over all other goals” . It claimed “we know 
where we belong; we know where we stand: on the side o f freedom” and that, therefore, 
Germany’s place would always be in the West (Kohl 1984; also von Weizsaecker 1986). 
Kohl’s commitment to ‘freedom’ was combined with a strong commitment to European 
unity. In the abovementioned report he noted that “we must unify Europe to also 
complete the unification of Germany” and that the lessons from the mishandling of 
Germany’s position at “the heart o f Europe” was that “we have to and want to shape our 
future within a European framework and resolve our national question as a work of 
peace” (Kohl 1984: 3).395 For Kohl, the creation o f a united Europe was in Germany’s 
“existential interest” (Bering 1999: 159; Banchoff 1999; Duffield 1998).
Kohl’s agenda of revitalizing the vision of German unity was thus built on a strong 
commitment to the space of Western Europe. Like Adenauer, Kohl was a Catholic from 
the Rhine-region and liked to stress his Heimat roots in the Palatine from where he 
conceived of Europe as a Christian space. In his memoirs Kohl describes in grandiose 
terms how the Palatine is intertwined with the history of Heimat Europa and manifests 
“to be from the Rhine means to be from the Occident”.396 Kohl held a very positive 
image o f the US. He “grew up in a CDU that was wedded to German-American
394 Kohl even liked to refer to himself as Adenauer’s grandson (Bering 1999: 43)
395 During a visit of Thatcher, Kohl reportedly asked one of her advisors to “convince her that I 
am not German but European”, to which Thatcher is said to have responded “My god, Helmut is 
so German!” (in Papcke 1993: 11).
396 Kohl invokes the cathedrals in Speyer and Worms as places from which the German Kaiser 
“carried the consciousness of the Occident world, this... Christian shaped cultural space”. He calls 
Palatine the center of the Holy Roman Empire and “a European coreland (Kernland)” and traces 
all values guiding his vision o f ‘Europe’ into this region (Bering 1999: 29; Kohl 2004: 26-29).
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partnership” (Clemens 2001: 180; Zimmer 2001: 144f.) and according to one biographer 
believed that the Americans were needed “as an important stabilizing factor for the 
German psyche” (Bering 1999: 14). The friend Kohl wanted as a stabilizing partner, 
however, was ‘Truman America’. As Clay Clemens notes, Kohl’s positive image of 
America was anchored in memories o f US support for the ‘new Germany’ during the 
post-War decade. The Chancellor was an admirer of Truman who in his view had placed 
America “at the heart of a historic shift in [Germany’s] orientation...to a respected 
democracy”. For Kohl the value of the German-American relationship was thus 
maintained by a feeling of gratitude which proved “remarkably durable...despite what 
remained his own fairly modest level o f specific knowledge (of) the US itself’ (Clemens 
2001: 179ff, Bering 1999: 45).
Genscher saw things differently. He grew up near Halle and initially chose to stay in the 
Soviet occupied zone after the end of the war, where he studied law and joined the 
newly founded German Liberal Democratic Party. Yet this attempt to built up his life in 
the Eastern Zone eventually conflicted with the political project pursued by the leaders 
of the GDR and, by extension, Moscow. By 1952 he felt ‘out o f place’ in the GDR and 
concluded it was “not my state” (Genscher 1965: 65), deciding settle over to Bremen in 
the FRG where he joined the Free Democratic Party (FDP). After fighting tuberculosis, 
in 1965 Genscher became a member o f the Bundestag, serving in several party offices, 
including chairman of the FDP (Genscher 1995: 55-68). He was Minister o f the Interior 
in Brandt’s cabinet and in 1974 became Foreign Minister under Schmidt and in this 
position in the Kohl government until his retirement in 1992. During his 18 years as 
Foreign Minister, Genscher became one of the FRG’s most popular politicians and 
profoundly shaped the office, so much that in the remaining three years o f the period 
under investigation here his successor and protege Klaus Kinkel can be seen as operating 
within Genscher’s orientation.
Not surprisingly given his party affiliation, Genscher championed a liberal order, once 
noting that “freedom is the breath of progress” (Genscher 1995: 523). Yet despite the 
obvious resonance concerning the desirability o f liberal order, the connection to the 
American narrative was not a deep, emotional one. In contrast to Kohl, Genscher’s 
appreciation of the US was less sentimental. While he agreed that US assistance was 
instrumental for allowing a new ‘Germany’ to emerge, his personal experiences o f the 
post-war decade were not filled by friendly GI’s and CARE packages but, as noted 
earlier, by trying to build up his life in Halle and finding his place in the West. While
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committed to having ‘Germany-in-Europe’ unfold in the Western space, Genscher’s 
vision of a desirable European order was less ‘Adenauer’ and more ‘Brandt’.
Genscher was not simply a ‘liberal internationalist’ but committed to the idea o f a united 
Europe. In 1981 Genscher attempted to revitalize the vision o f a European Union, 
claiming that “(from) the great goal of political unification o f Europe...we shall derive 
the strength to act in a spirit o f solidarity and to take decisions...which are genuinely 
forward-looking solutions”. Yet other than Kohl, he was oriented towards a ‘Greater 
Europe’. Raised as a Protestant and skeptical about using Christian beliefs as the maxim 
for guiding politics, the notion o f a ‘Vatican Europe’ did not resonate with him 
(Genscher 1995 : 55).397 Moreover, his roots in East Germany bestowed him with a 
horizon of experience reaching deeper into the East than Kohl and, thus, an emotional 
attachment to the space beyond the wall.398 A critique of Adenauer’s course, already in 
1966 he advocated a “clear concept for the future development in Europe” which “has 
nothing to do with a policy o f strength” (Genscher 1995: 93). With entering the SPD-led 
government in 1969, the Liberal Democrats signed on to Brandt’s Ostpolitik, adopting a 
similar vision of a Greater European Peace Order and stating in its electoral platform the 
aim to prevent any “one-sided dependency” o f Germany. So when shifting to the CDU- 
led government in 1982, Genscher saw himself as “the guardian o f the Ostpolitik 
tradition” (Zimmer 2001: 149).
Despite these differences there was sufficient overlap between the two leaders and their 
respective parties to allow for a workable coalition government steering the path of both 
Westintegration and Ostpolitik. Kohl did not consider the East a completely Alien 
land399 and, other than his party-internal rival Franz-Josef Strauss, was open to the 
FDP’s insistence to continue some form of Ostpolitik, though preferring the term 
Entspannungspolitik (Hanrieder 1989; Banchoff 1999: 120ff.). Theo Sommer noted in 
1988 that “there is no break in the continuity o f Bonn’s Ostpolitik. As Brandt laid it 
down, and Schmidt played it in, so it is advanced by Kohl” (in Ash 1993: 33), leading 
Ash to even suggest that “there was one ‘Ostpolitik’ o f the Federal Republic of
397 However, Genscher agreed with Pope John Paul II over the desirability of overcoming the 
division of Europe peacefully and speaks of “extraordinary cooperation” between Bonn and the 
Vatican on issues concerning the CSCE process (Genscher 1995: 288f).
398 On Genscher’s Heimat feelings for, in particular, Halle, see Genscher (1995:66f., 1024ff.)
399 When opening the German Historical Museum in Berlin in October 1987, Kohl emphasized 
that the opposition between East and West could only be overcome through a “lasting 
overarching European Peace Order”. He also noted that Berlin was intimately interwoven with 
the German narrative and that there was “hardly any other place so suitable” for hosting the 
museum (Kohl 1987).
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Germany” (Ash 1993: 33). This was possible because Genscher was not calling for a 
social(ist) but for a liberal democratic Europe and accepted the central place of the US 
in the German narrative. In short, they converged around the authentic narrative o f 
Germany-in-Europe stressing familiar core values o f freedom, anti-militarism and unity. 
Recognition as a ‘normal’ Western state thus meant recognition as a liberal democracy 
committed to European integration through a politics o f ‘checkbook diplomacy’, a sense 
o f Self which has also been called a “Civilian power” (Maull 1990; Duffield 1998).
Dissonance with Reagan’s World
The problem was that the intersubjective integration of this narrative in the Western 
project and its stabilization with the United States as the significant Other was difficult 
to pursue with the Reagan administration. Ronald Reagan entered the White House in 
1982 at a time of perceived ‘decline’ of America in its world. A significant part o f this 
world was the Western space and Reagan declared it his aim to reclaim US leadership in 
the shaping o f the Western agenda. In the imagery of one analyst, buoyed by a domestic 
constituency which called for “strength and toughness in foreign affairs” (Schneider 
1983: 43), Reagan aimed at moving the US from an ‘entangled’ to a ‘defiant’ eagle (Oye 
1983; Posen and Evera 1983). This meant not an isolationist strategy o f withdrawing 
from the world but one of engaging it more forcefully on ‘American terms’. Like 
Adenauer in the 1950s, Reagan sought to strengthen America’s voice in the West by 
mobilizing the enemy-image o f communism and buttressed his rhetoric o f ideological 
confrontation with a significant military buildup. Such a strategy had little sympathy for 
an approach seeking gradual change through dialogue and so the Reagan administration 
was “sharply hostile and skeptical of negotiations and remnants of detente” (Kahler 
1983: 28If.). Secretary of Defense Weinberger informed his European counterparts that 
“ if detente is progress, then let me say that we cannot afford much more progress” (in 
Lundestad 1990: 49).
Yet as scholars have pointed out, despite the moral righteousness with which Reagan 
instilled the aim of restoring US primacy, his policies were far less clear in direction 
than his stark rhetoric suggested (Kyvig 1990). It was difficult to see the strategic 
rationale behind Reagan’s policy of strength, that is, his denouncement o f ‘detente’ and 
the focus on military buildup, including the controversial Strategic Defense Initiative 
(SDI), in dealing with the Soviet Union (Posen and van Evera 1983: 75ff). Reagan’s 
vision of America-in-the-world remained blurry in particular when it came to the
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question o f European order.400 Certainly ‘Europe’ was still important, but it was less 
clear what place it had in the American narrative. More precisely, it was not clear what 
place the idea o f a united Europe had in America’s West. The rise o f the EC as a serious 
economic player (‘rival’) was seen as a central factor in the (felt) decline o f US power 
(Oye 1983: 7ff.). And the dispute over the pipeline project into the Soviet Union in the 
early 1980s and tacit European attempts to address security issues in an institutional 
setting outside NATO (see below) cast doubt that a stronger Europe was a ‘natural 
partner’ and fed concerns that Europeans might ‘gang up’ against the US (Lundestad 
1998: 111). Thus, ‘Europe’ was a place where the US needed to reassert its authority.
On a more fundamental level the Reagan administration was confronted with Kissinger’s 
ambivalence, mentioned in the previous chapter, about the value o f European integration 
for America’s unfolding: if a project committed to the idea o f a unified Europe was 
actually closing the space to American influence was it still worth supporting? The 
answer given by the Reagan White House was negative. As Klaus Larres points, out 
Reagan was “not the least interested in a supranational Europe” (Larres 2001: 106). 
Thus, Reagan’s policy o f strength and what Larres calls his “arrogant inattention” 
towards Europe go together. Rather than seeing Reagan’s ‘defiant eagle’ approach as 
directed primarily against Moscow, the friendship lens interprets it a strategy to regain 
voice in the Western project and shift it away from a European order of ‘unity’. 
Reminiscent o f Adenauer’s strategy of rearmament in the 1950s, discussed in chapter 
eight, Reagan sought to reassert America’s leadership position in strategic debates 
within NATO.
The problem with Reagan’s approach, and the reason why one might see it as one of 
‘inattention’, was that the administration was not merely unsupportive of European 
integration but was indecisive as to what would make a desirable European order. More 
precisely, in particular from the German perspective the ‘defiant eagle’ narrative was 
devoid of a vision of a ‘peaceful Europe’. Whereas for Nixon/Kissinger ‘peace’ had 
meant stability of the status quo, the Reagan administration neither appeared to pursue a 
policy of stability, nor did its policy of strength seem embedded in a vision of peace in 
Europe. Even after Reagan toned down the confrontative rhetoric and shifted to portray 
itself a “party of peace” (Kahler 1983: 301; Lundestad 1990: 52), the lacking willingness 
to engage a discussion on European peace order, combined with a continued emphasis 
on US military capabilities, did little to counter the view, prevalent in the peace
400 Some of the literature on Reagan’s foreign policy makes no mention of a ‘European policy’.
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movement, that Reagan accepted the possibility o f ‘Europe’ as a nuclear wasteland 
(Mueller and Risse-Kappen 1987: 8Iff.).401
Given Reagan’s discomfort with the vision o f European unity it is not surprising that he 
bonded with Britain’s Margaret Thatcher, with whom he shared the project o f countering 
a feeling of decline with bold ‘conservative’ policies (Krieger 1987). However, 
Germany continued to matter and the Reagan administration welcomed Kohl’s Western 
commitment and his seemingly humble and decisively pro-American attitude. It was 
irritated, however, by Genscher and his insistence on Entspannungspolitik. As one not- 
so-neutral observer put it, Reagan officials considered the German Foreign Minister as a 
“royal pain in the neck” because he seemed “incapable o f uttering a sentence without 
words like ‘cooperation’, ‘peace’, ‘dialogue’, ‘conciliation’, ‘European security 
conference’, or ‘detente’ tumbling uncontrollably form his tongue” (Bering 1999: 21). 
Behind these and similarly harsh descriptions of Genscher as an “ambiguous figure” 
portraying “weakness” (Weinberger) and “a guy who was very slippery, who could 
change any time” (Richard Burt), the Reagan administration showed anxiety about 
Germany moving in a direction which did not seem to strengthen the American 
narrative.402 In other words, its frustration with ‘Genscherism’ echoes Kissinger’s 
problem with Ostpolitik (personified by Bahr) discussed in the previous chapter, namely 
the concern of an unpredictable German maneuvering between East and West captured 
in the ‘Rapallo complex’.
Kohl attempted to keep the bond intact by denouncing domestic criticism o f the US and 
by trying to be supporting o f US initiatives 403 Yet while a ‘policy o f strength’ approach 
resonated with Kohl in principle, he also felt uneasy with Reagan’s course. It was not 
only the concern that a renewed confrontation between Washington and Moscow would 
‘freeze’ the status quo, which threatened to deprived Europe o f a “supportive political
401 Critique was most vocal in the left wing of the Social Democrats, whose leader, Oskar 
Lafontaine, wrote a book entitled “Fearing the friends”. On the debates within the SPD in the 
1980s, see Ash (1993: Ch. VI). A poll from May 1984 among Germans showed 53 per cent 
feared that Reagan’s re-election was bad for world peace (Mueller and Risse-Kappen 1987: 60). 
For a discussion of the phenomenon of ‘anti-Americanism’ in Germany, see Diner (1996); 
Gassert (2004); Morris (2004).
402 Quotes are taken from Bering (1999: 2 If).
403 Eventually Kohl even responded positively to a US invitation to participate in SDI research, 
against the protest of Genscher, who threw his weight behind the French EUREKA initiative 
(Sandholtz 1992: 263f). Although Kohl was “extremely cautious” in his official remarks on SDI 
and did not endorse the military rationale, his government only came to support EUREKA “once 
it became clear that it was not an alternative to SDI but rather parallel to it” (Sandholtz 1992: 
272). For a detailed discussion, see Sandholtz (1992, Ch. 9), also Smyser (1990: 5 Iff); Genscher 
(1995: 376ff).
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atmosphere” in which the unity of Germany-in-Europe could be pursued (Hanrieder 
1989: 213). Even when Reagan shifted away from his confrontational stance in his 
second term, he continued to discomfort the Kohl government with unexpected moves 
on strategic policies affecting European order. Symbolic was his meeting with 
Gorbachev in Reykjavik in October 1986, which involved significant discussions about 
US nuclear strategy without any prior notification, let alone consultation, of NATO 
allies. Tellingly, not only were US officials surprised when Bonn reacted with serious 
discontent about being sidetracked, even more “this mutual misunderstanding was never 
adequately clarified” (Smyser 1990: 59). Thus, ‘Reagan America’ kept the ‘Potsdam 
complex’ alive in Germany, visible in complaints about his policies as being 
contradictory and, hence, unpredictable voiced by moderate and centrist voices 
(Genscher 1995: 528; Mueller and Risse-Kappen 1987).
To reduce the uncertainty, Kohl’s approach of not criticizing Reagan was complemented 
by a campaign o f stabilizing Germany’s narrative as a ‘normal’ Western European state, 
to confirm, as Kohl put it “the solid mooring and position of the Federal Republic of 
Germany in the West” (in Verheyen 1999: 158). In this campaign the notion of 
‘normalization’ became a “tirelessly repeated formula” (Ash 1993: 15). Domestically, 
the ‘normalization’ agenda sparked the Historikerstreit, a major controversy among 
German historians about the place of the Third Reich in the German biography and the 
weight of its lessons.404 Externally, Kohl’s normalization agenda was pursued with 
France and the US and received symbolic approval through joint appearances with 
Mitterand at the military cemetery in Verdun in 1984 and with Reagan to a German 
military cemetery in Bitburg in 1985. It not only allowed Kohl to continue an intra- 
German “selective detente” (Hanrieder) but also to regain US commitment for a shared 
vision of ‘unity’, as displayed in Reagan’s Berlin speech from June 1987 in which he 
called on Gorbachev to “tear down this wall!” (Reagan 1987).
Institutional Choices: Dealing with Dissonance
The basis on which Bonn evaluated security institutions was captured by Genscher in 
1986 when he noted that Germany was looking for an institution providing the frame of 
action [.Handlungsrahmen] which allowed it to pursue its “legitimate wish for a 
condition of peace in Europe within which in can regain its unity in free self
404 At the core was an attempt by some historians to rehabilitate the Kaiserreich as a positive 
memoiy space, while at the same time toning down the uniqueness of the Holocaust, not only its 
importance within the German biography (as the sole focus) but also as an event in general by 
comparing it with Stalin’s Gulag (Kattago 2001; Verheyen 1999).
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determination” through “trustworthy and peaceful cooperation with all its neighbours” 
(Genscher 1995: 318). This was a diplomatic formulation of the Kohl government’s 
narrative: the vision o f a unified Germany in a free and peaceful Greater Europe. The 
security institutions available were NATO and CSCE. While Kohl’s ‘normalization’ 
agenda largely concealed the estrangement with Reagan America over the 
Western/European project, it was visible in Bonn’s exploration of the EC as an 
alternative security institution.
In Bonn, NATO remained the primary institution for negotiating the Western project. 
Kohl’s Western orientation and commitment to German-US relations made him a strong 
supporter of NATO, with one biographer describing him as “fundamentally a deep 
believer in the NATO alliance” (Bering 1999: 14). The sense fostered under Schmidt 
that the FRG was the most important European member and an “indispensable part” of 
the Atlantic Alliance was maintained even by Genscher: “NATO relied in the first place 
on German participation and American engagement in Europe” (Genscher 1995: 349). 
However, in contrast to the Reagan administration, the Kohl government read NATO 
through the Harmel Report, that is, as an institution committed to ‘detente’. The aim of 
bringing about peaceful unification of Germany-in-Europe was still considered “the 
heartpiece” of the report, which Genscher called “the Magna Charta o f the transatlantic 
policy o f responsibility” (Genscher 1995: 466). Given Reagan’s rejection of detente, 
what was left from Bonn’s perspective was to continue Schmidt’s strategy and influence 
in the ‘strategic’ debate on arms control,405 while de-emphasizing military instruments as 
a means of achieving national objectives and resisting US pressure to increase defense 
spending (Allan and Diehl 1988). The ‘Civilian power’ narrative was reconciled with the 
Bundeswehr as the largest conventional army in Western Europe by it being integrated 
into NATO and with Articles 26 and 87a of the Basic Law restricting its use for 
defensive purposes only, explicitly denouncing the right to attack, making the very 
scenario of Bundeswehr engagement outside the Western European space a “foreign 
world” (Hilz 2005: 44).
German support for CSCE was steady, but here Kohl and Genscher differed in their 
assessments. The Christian Democrats had of course rejected the Helsinki Final Act and 
although Kohl appreciated the CSCE as a forum for Entspannungspolitik he did not 
consider it the primary forum through which to build Germany-in-Europe. By contrast,
405 Specifically when it came to US missiles stationed in the FRG, with Genscher in 1988/89 
blocking US modernization plans. See Banchoff (1999: Ch. 4); Broer (2001); Genscher (1995: 
Ch. 15).
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Genscher was enthusiastic about CSCE’s potential to pursue a Greater European Peace 
Order (1995: 100, 212-216, 299-323). He had participated in the final stages o f the 
Helsinki negotiations and considered CSCE the most suitable negotiating frame for, as 
he put it diplomatically, the aims formulated in NATO’s Harmel Report (Genscher 
1995: 315). In 1985 he initiated a 10-year anniversary meeting in Helsinki as well as a 
cultural forum in Budapest and was an active force in the third follow-up meeting in 
Vienna ffom 1986 to ‘89. Yet these attempts of keeping the Helsinki process alive were 
hampered by continued disagreement with Washington over its purpose (Genscher 1995: 
229f., 303-320). Instead of seeing CSCE as a forum for negotiating a transformative 
path into a Greater Europe, US administrations interpreted the Final Act as a formal 
acknowledgment o f the ‘status quo’ order of Yalta and used it as a tool in its 
confrontation with the Soviet Union, specifically as a vehicle to criticize Moscow for its 
record of human rights violations.406 For Genscher, the US approach did not correspond 
with “the European CSCE philosophy” (Genscher 1995: 312; Lucas 2001: 71f; Ash 
1993: 263f.).
Notable developments were occurring in the EC and the WEU. While the 1980s are 
generally known for reviving economic integration, culminating in the 1987 Single 
European Act (SEA),407 attempts were made to also move the EC into the security realm. 
Here the German government found common ground with member states. Genscher’s 
initiative from November 1981 to extend the EC’s competence in ‘external’ relations, 
strengthening EPC and incorporating ‘security’ issues into the EC’s domain found its 
way into a ‘Solemn Declaration’ in Stuttgart in 1983 (Genscher 1995: 362-366). It was 
picked up again by France in 1984 with a proposal to revive the WEU, leading to the 
Rome declaration from October 1984 in which EC foreign and defense ministers 
promised “to increase cooperation between member states in the field o f security policy” 
(WEU 1984). In October 1987, the WEU Ministerial Council adopted a Platform on 
European Security Interests which declared that “we are convinced that the construction 
of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does not include security 
and defence” (WEU 1987). In pursuing these investments Bonn relied on the availability 
of European partners, particularly France. As Smyser observed, “after Reykjavik, Kohl 
and Mitterand turned to each other”, intensifying consultations and high-level visits
406 The US participated only reluctantly in meetings in Belgrade (1978) and Madrid (1981-83), 
which were characterized by clashes with Moscow. In the latter meeting the US agreed on 
signing a final declaration only after Kohl persuaded Reagan to do so (Lucas 2001: 70).
407 On the negotiations leading to the SEA, see Moravcsik (1991).
270
which produced also bilateral initiatives like the joint Franco-German Brigade (Smyser 
1990: 59).
While playing the ‘European card’ (Krieger 2001: 195), Kohl did not want to loosen ties 
with the US. He remained sensitive to a warning from the State Department in March 
1985 to WEU members not to seek common positions on security/defense matters 
outside NATO (Lundestad 1998: 111) and endorsed the emphasis in the 1987 ‘Platform’ 
that the revival o f WEU was to occur within NATO and for the sole purpose “to 
strengthen the European pillar o f the Alliance” (WEU 1987; see also SEA, Title III 6(a) 
and (c)). Still, Smyser notes, Washington realized that “the German moves towards Paris 
represented a kind o f insurance policy that reflected some German doubts about the 
United States” (Smyser 1990: 61).
Unification and the Question of Germany-in-Europe
The ‘end of the Cold War’ did not bring about a radical change in the German-American 
relationship. The period surrounding the years 1989/90 -  the fall of the Berlin Wall and 
the formal unification of ‘Germany’ -  followed by the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
and the Warsav Pact, is generally considered a transformative ‘moment’ in European 
order. Yet from a phenomenological perspective for there to be change within ‘the 
world’ friends disclose and build together it must be incorporated into their meaning 
structures as ‘change’. In other words, this period did not designate a historical ‘break’ 
unless it was construed as such. Hence, without denying Timothy Garton Ash’s 
observation that between November 1989 and October 1990 “more happened in ten 
months than usually does in ten years. The whole map of Europe was -  or began to be -  
redrawn” (Ash 1993: 343), the point is that the ‘redrawing’ o f the European map did not 
happen on a tabula rasa but occurred within existing narratives o f authentic becoming. 
And these narratives, by definition, are coherent (‘stable’). German and American 
policymakers were giving meaning to ‘what is happening’ and channelled it in a 
direction that strengthened the project they invested in. Even though both sides saw ‘the 
end of the Cold War’ as an opportunity for reinvigorating the relationship and the 
Western project, as discussed below their different views about the place o f ‘Europe’ in 
the same were carried over.
Bonn’s Agenda o f ‘Continuity’
In 1989 the overarching concern for the Kohl government was that the dynamic 
witnessed in the GDR and Central and Eastern Europe would be channeled into the 
‘right direction’. This direction was given by the vision o f Germany-in-Europe
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formulated and fostered in Bonn over the years. And so, while formal unification of 
FRG and GDR changed the physical appearance o f ‘Germany’, adding population, 
territory and, in March 1991, full legal sovereignty, from national biography perspective 
also “unification amounted to little more than a takeover of the GDR by the 
Bundesrepublik” (Markovits and Reich 1997: 24).
The Kohl government’s desire to keep the ‘Germany’ narrative stable found expression 
in a policy o f ‘continuity’. As Kohl promised his NATO colleagues on 4 December 
1989, there would be no German ‘special path’ (Kohl 1996: 188). Indeed, as Mark 
Duffield notes, Bonn’s commitment to ‘continuity’ appeared to become an end in itself 
(Duffield 1998: 66). Under a policy of continuity, the usable pasts and desirable futures 
lending coherent meaning to the narrative o f Germany-in-Europe were merely adjusted. 
As President Richard von Weizsaecker put it “Germany has become a completely 
Western country and will fully remain so following unification” (in Duffield 1998: 63). 
The government remained dedicated to the idea of European unity, manifested in the 
revised preamble o f the Basic Law committing the German people to European 
integration. At the first congress of the reunited CDU in 1991 Kohl claimed that 
“German unity and European unity are two sides of the same coin” and that “Europe is 
our future” (cited in Markovitz and Reich 1997: 45).408 In short, unified Germany was to 
continue to exist as a ‘Civilian Power’, as a ‘normal’ liberal democratic and peaceful 
state in the Western world committed to building a united Europe.
By emphasizing ‘continuity’ the government attempted to prevent a reopening o f the 
infamous ‘German question’.409 More precisely, the ‘continuity’ strategy was so 
important because Kohl knew that the question of which was the ‘normal’ Germany was 
back on the table. Neighbours in both East and West continued to harbour concerns 
about ‘Germany’ falling back into its ‘old’ Third Reich being and reviving its hegemonic 
aspirations. Not surprisingly, these concerns were strongest among those who had the 
most intense experiences o f the belligerent ‘Germany’, namely France and Britain in the 
West, where German unification had a “seriously unsettling effect” (Markovits and 
Reich 1997: 134), and Russia and Poland in the East. In these countries, the ‘pessimist’s 
view’ prevailed as the ‘Germany’ narrative had not or only partly shifted away from the
408 Hence I disagree with Ash’s characterization that unification was “closer to Adenauer 
hopes...than it was to Brandt’s” and that it was “fundamentally different from anything that West 
Germany had done, dealt with, envisaged, or planned in its Ostpolitik” (Ash 1993: 343, emphasis 
added). While the precise timing and circumstances were envisaged in neither of the two 
narratives, the unification process unfolded within the familiar horizons of experience and 
expectations characterizing both Westintegration and Ostpolitik.
409 A succinct statement of the US view of the ‘German question’ is Zelikow and Rice (1995: 47).
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negative image anchored in the memory space created by the Third Reich (Markovits 
and Reich 1997: 50-55, also chapters 4, 8 and 9; Ash 1993). And given the important 
role these countries played in enabling German unity to take place,410 Bonn’s effort to 
maintain the ‘Germany-in-Europe’ narrative made perfect sense.
Facing a process in which the four victorious WWII powers were negotiating about how 
to situate a united ‘Germany-in-Europe’, Bonn was dealing, once again, with its 
‘Potsdam complex’. Kohl’s strategy to tame the anxiety and influence the terms of how 
Germany was unfolding in 1989/90 was to rely heavily on Bonn’s intimate relationship 
with Washington. For instance, in the run-up to a summit between Bush and Gorbatchev 
in Malta in late November 1989, he sought repeated reassurance from Bush that ‘Malta’ 
would not become another ‘Yalta’, which, just like Potsdam, stood for great powers 
deciding over the future order of Germany-in-Europe.411 Indeed, there is general 
agreement among analysts and involved officials that the process leading to German 
unification was marked by an extraordinary degree o f close cooperation between the 
FRG and the US, captured in what Robert Hutchings calls a “Bonn-Washington nexus” 
(Hutchings 1997: 109)412
Bush and the Question o f ‘Europe ’
In January 1989 Reagan was succeeded by his former Vice President, George H. W. 
Bush. While more moderate/cautious than Reagan and often described as a ‘pragmatic 
realist’ sceptical about the ‘vision thing’, Bush reportedly encouraged his staff to “dream 
big dreams” (Zelikow and Rice 1995: 24). And these were needed as his administration 
needed to integrate the events in Europe into the narrative o f America-in-the world. 
While a “lonely superpower” in military terms (Krauthammer 1991), from a friendship 
perspective the US did not seek to build the post-Cold War world on its own. Instead, it 
was first and foremost looking for someone in ‘Europe’ to rebuild the Western space 
with rather than against someone.
On the one hand, the understanding was that the US had won the Cold War and that 
‘freedom’ had prevailed lead to what Snyder (1992) calls “end-of-history optimism” 
about the superiority o f (American) values of economic and political liberalism 
(Fukuyama 1992). At the same time, the changes in Europe and the disappearance o f the
4,0 Poland due to the unsolved legal status of ‘Germany’s Eastern border, which Kohl initially 
tried to keep open, see Hutchings (1997: 115f.).
411 Kohl (1996: 168, 173); Zelikow and Rice (1995: 122); Hutchings (1997: 113).
412 Kohl (1996); Genscher (1995); Zelikow and Rice (1995); Risse (1997); Kuesters (1998); Cox 
and Hurst (2002).
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‘order o f Yalta’ affected the configuration o f the Western space and, hence, required 
adjustment of the Western project. As one astute observer pointed out, “the existence 
and meaning o f Europe dominated international politics in 1989” and ‘defining Europe’ 
once again became “a practical problem” (Hoagland 1989: 34). Yet the Bush 
administration had its difficulties with formulating a vision of a desirable ‘Europe’.413 
While willing to take a more positive stance towards European integration than his 
predecessor, the lacking vision o f a desirable European order had been carried over from 
Reagan. Bush once described himself as “ less of a Europeanist” (in Zelikow and Rice 
1995: 28) and the first months of his administration were marked by a careful attempt to 
formulate American Europapolitik. Even when the political dynamics in ‘Europe’ made 
this a more pressing matter, there was no clear sense of a desirable European order 
beyond a general commitment to a Europe that was “whole and free” and ‘stable’.414 As 
Robert Hutchings, Director for European Affairs with the NSC at the time, recalls:
“We wanted a strong, more cohesive Europe as our main partner in 
world affairs, and we were prepared to lend our support and 
encouragement to that end...But these abstract judgments still begged 
the question o f what kind of Europe” (Hutchings 1997: 29).
Again, the question was whether a united Europe would be a ‘natural partner’ or a 
competitor. Alongside the hope that European unity would “reduce the burden on 
ourselves, yielding a new transatlantic balance of roles and responsibilities” (Hutchings 
1997: 158f.) was the concern of an emerging ‘Fortress Europe’. Whereas Bush 
reluctantly accepted the development of the EC into a potential economic competitor,415 
he did not want this to spill over into the security realm. Such a Europe, he feared, might 
become “more exclusionary and potentially in competition with the Atlantic Alliance” 
(Hutchings 1997: 29), which is another way of saying that it would reduce Washington’s 
ability to shape European order. The overarching aim was to ensure that a ‘united 
Europe’ remained in the Western space -  “to forge a unity based on Western values”, as 
Bush put it (in Zelikow and Rice 1995: 31) -  by maintaining a permanent American 
‘presence’ in Europe and promoting a “new Atlanticism” .416 As Hutchings recalls, the
413 In light of my analysis, the claim that Bush was “outlining a future for a new Europe which 
was more ambitious than anything his postwar predecessors or, for that matter, his 
contemporaries...had been prepared to contemplate” (Cox and Hurst 2002: 133) cannot be 
upheld.
414 An NSR document on ‘Comprehensive Review of US-West European Relations’ (NSR 5) 
from 15 February 1989 remains classified.
415 The EC’s emergence as an economic ‘block’ yet its diffuse Gestalt as a negotiating partner 
during the 1991 Uruguay Round frustrated the Bush administration (Hutchings 1997: 159f.).
416 The title of a speech given in Berlin by Secretary of State James Baker on 11 December 1989, 
see Zelikow and Rice (1995: 142). See also Hutchings (1997: 150).
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aim of keeping the US ‘in’ Europe was “our central vision and key organizing principle” 
and the driving force behind a new European strategy group (Hutchings 1997: 157).
While the question remained what exactly the US would do with its European 
‘presence’, it was clear to the Bush administration that the ‘European question’ was 
intertwined with the ‘German question’. An NSC memorandum from March 1989 held 
that “the top priority for American foreign policy in Europe should be the fate o f the 
Federal Republic o f Germany...we cannot have a vision for Europe’s future that does 
not include an approach to the ‘German question’” (in Zelikow and Rice 1995: 26-28). 
The US commitment to build ‘Europe’ with Germany was reflected in Bush’s Mainz 
speech from May 1989, in which he famously declared the two countries to become 
“partners in leadership”. Indeed, given the amount of attention Germany received at the 
time, Hutchings feels compelled to remind that among US policymakers “ in 1990 the 
question was not so much about Germany but about the European order into which it 
needed to fit” (Hutchings 1997: 141).
The *Bonn-Washington Nexus’
Although there were voices who continued to see the division of Germany-in-Europe as 
a stable source o f peace, the possibility of overcoming of the status quo was cautiously 
accepted in the White House, with the NSC memorandum recommending “we should 
offer some promise for change” to Germany (in Zelikow and Rice 1995: 26-28). In an 
attempt to give meaning to events and move them in a fruitful direction, the Bush 
administration resorted to the view that the American narrative had always envisioned 
German unity as a good thing. Thus, once the possibility was raised by Kohl, the Bush 
administration was supportive and gave ‘Germany’ a strong voice in the process to “take 
the lead in deciding (its) future” (Hutchings 1997: 97, 113). With that, the US position 
differed significantly from the sceptical views held by Germany’s European neighbours. 
In September 1989 he denounced the view prevalent “in some quarters” that a unified 
Germany would be detrimental to the peace of Europe (in Nye and Keohane 1993: 117). 
Reminiscent o f the supportive attitude during the post-45 decade, Bush trusted that Kohl 
was moving Germany in the right direction: “I felt that Germany had learned its lesson” 
(cited in Bering 1999: 135).
To be sure, even though the Bush administration saw in ‘Kohl Germany’ a loyal and 
reliable partner, the ‘Rapallo’ complex -  the concern that a Germany striving for 
unification might accept the status of ‘neutrality’ to accommodate Soviet demands -  did 
not disappear (Hutchings 1997: 107). While full o f praise of Kohl’s pro-Western
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orientation and his commitment to NATO, US officials continued to be wary of 
Genscher and the direction he seemed to represent. Many in the Bush administration saw 
Genscher as “undercutting Western positions” (Bering 1999: 138).417 Hutchings puts it 
diplomatically: “it was simply that Kohl was seen as more reliable than Genscher when 
it came to the integrity o f the Western alliance” (Hutchings 1997: 19). To prevent 
‘Genscherism’ from becoming too influential, keeping Bonn close and strengthening 
Kohl’s position thus only gained in importance.
The American offer for renewing the partnership was welcomed by Kohl, who described 
Bush as “the most important ally on the path to unification...capable o f real friendship” 
(Kohl 1996: 185; also Zelikow and Rice 1995: 187). The seemed to be confirmed with 
Kohl’s famous ‘Ten Point Plan’ from 27 November, a road map for unification which 
combined elements o f Ostpolitik with elements o f ‘change through strength’. It was a 
clear signal of Kohl claiming agency in defining the path of ‘Germany-in-Europe’, as 
the plan was devised by Kohl without consulting the Western allies, or Genscher.418 Yet 
whereas London and Paris criticized Kohl’s handling and the content o f the plan -  
Mitterand expressed his concern that ‘Europe could fall back into the imagined world 
( Vorstellungswelt) of 1913’ (Kohl 1996: 183f.) -  Washington accepted both and worked 
on rallying Britain and France behind the plan. And when Kohl asked Bush to support 
the points in his meeting with Gorbachev, the President assured him that “we are on the 
same wavelength” and told reporters afterwards “I feel comfortable...I think we’re on 
track” (Kohl 1996: 157-167; Zelikow and Rice 1995: 120ff; Hutchings 1997: 99). From 
a US perspective, the track was a reorganization o f the Western space and given 
Germany’s potential there was “much to gain from the prospect o f a strong, democratic, 
and united Germany” (Hutchings 1997: 97).
This last claim hints at why the close and productive relationship over German 
unification did not halt the process the estrangement. Mutual support for ‘world 
building’ was not supposed to end with German unification. Whereas in Bonn, the 
expectation was that the US would also be there to ‘complete’ the unification of 
‘Europe’, in Washington Kohl’s commitment to the West was seen as a guarantee that a 
unified Germany would be a creative partner in reordering the Western space on a global 
scale and with military means, if necessary. As the remaineder of this chapter shows,
417 As Risse (1997: 161, 172f.) rightly points out, US suspicion of Genscher and the downplaying 
of his role in the unification process also pervades the account of Zelikow and Rice (1995).
418 According to Kohl, he informed Bush about the plan a few hours before everyone else (Kohl 
1996: 167-176).
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both expectations remained unfulfilled. The consensus on German unification as a ‘good 
thing’ did not encompass the question what space this ‘new’ Germany would be 
embedded in and what ‘world building’ project it would contribute to.
The Ambiguity of the Western Project
Two formative events, the 1991 Gulf War and the conflict in Bosnia, exposed the 
fragility of the Bonn-Washington nexus. The meaning attributed to them and, hence, the 
place these events took in the project of building a post-Cold War world exposed the 
dissonance between German and American ideas of order. The 1991 Gulf War made 
clear that German commitment to ‘continuity’ had failed to take into account the 
American understanding o f the Western project, in particular its ‘global’ scope and its 
acceptance of war as a means for creating an order where peace was achieved through 
freedom. The conflict in Bosnia exposed the second fault line in the German-American 
project or, more precisely, another aspect o f the divergence: it revealed the American 
indecisiveness about how to order ‘Europe’ and its hesitancy to stress ‘unity’ as a 
reading of peace and, correspondingly, its ability to accommodate the German vision of 
a European Peace Order. Together, they motivated the Kohl government to invest, with 
France as the main partner, in CFSP as an alternative to CSCE and NATO.
Exposing Dissonance I: Gulf War 1991
In August 1990, one week following the invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi forces, President 
Bush announced large-scale military assistance for Saudi Arabia and asked for allied 
support. In an attempt to place this event and the US response in a meaningful frame 
which purported to “keep the dangers o f disorder at bay”, on September 11 Bush 
announced to a joint session of Congress a ‘New World Order’ (NWO) under the 
auspices of American leadership (in Kennan 1991: 26; Hutchings 1997: 146f.). In 
formulating this vision Bush could not quite resist “the Wilsonian temptation” 
(Hutchings 1997: 149) of making the world safe for democracy and echoed familiar 
traits of American liberal internationalism, supplemented with the promise for reviving 
the United Nations as a forum for debating and enforcing order.419 A month later in 
Prague, he wove together the task o f fulfilling “the promise o f a Europe...that is truly 
whole and free” and a ‘Europe’ that would accept new responsibilities and “work with 
us in common cause toward a new commonwealth o f freedom..., a moral community 
united in its dedication to free ideals...(t)hat is why our response to the challenge in the 
Persian Gulf is critical” (in Hutchings 1997: 147f.).
419 On the ‘New World Order’ concept, see Nye (1991); Buzan (1995); Van Hoonacker (2001).
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While the Bush administration expected Germany, the creative partner in the Western 
space, to be part of this response, the Kohl government decided to lay low.420 Although 
it condemned Iraq’s actions as a breach of international law and supported the set-up of 
sanctions, it did not want to share political responsibilities for military engagement. 
While there were intense domestic debates and calls for a diplomatic solution, the Kohl 
government’s external response to the outbreak o f hostilities was perceived as “largely 
one o f awkward silence” (Duffield 1998: 180). Bonn only dispatched at the last possible 
moment and after a long, and for external observers incomprehensible, debate over 
Germany’s alliance obligations a small number of fighter jets to Turkey, which were not 
allowed to participate in any offensive action.
The decision not to participate militarily in the campaign against Iraq was explained 
with the value o f anti-militarism marking the German narrative. The government argued 
that articles 87a and 26 of the Basic Law restricted the German security space to ‘NATO 
territory’ and that Bundeswehr engagement in ‘out-of-area’ operations were hence 
illegitimate, a position which was echoed across party lines.421 O f course, the 
constitutional constrains were not as decisive as the government put it;422 Kohl simply 
was guided by the understanding that offensive military action was not part of normality, 
more precisely, where war was not seen as an acceptable continuation of politics but the 
breakdown thereof. Foreign policy of unified Germany was to remain ‘peace policy’ 
(Friedenspolitik), aimed at making war a thing o f the past (Berger 1996; Duffield 
1998).423 As such, Bonn’s response was a logical consequence of the ‘continuity’ 
strategy with which the government sought to maintain the familiar narrative of 
‘Germany’ and assure both domestic and external audiences that unified Germany would 
remain a ‘civilian power’.424
To its surprise, the German government earned harsh criticism from the US officials and 
the American media, accusing Germany of being a ‘reluctant ally’ and a ‘free rider’. At 
the heart of this critique was a sense of lacking reciprocity, specifically the 
government’s unwillingness to publicly share the political responsibility and to carry the
420 Bennett et al (1994); Hellmann (1997); Hutchings (1997).
421 Bundestag (1990a: 11/221, 17468-17469); Bundestag 1991a; Genscher (1995: 90If)
422 See Lamers (1991); Zehfuss (2001); Becher (2004: 399-400).
423 The governments decision was accompanied by massive anti-war demonstrations all over 
Germany, with about 200.000 people protesting in Bonn in late January (see Duffield 1998: 180).
424 Kinkel (1992); Genscher (1995: 907); Duffield (1998); Meiers (2006: 249f). In that sense, I 
disagree with Hellmann’s (1997) view that the government was not fulfilling US expectations 
because it was ‘distracted’ by unification.
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political burdens for an operation which Washington perceived to be in the “common 
interest of the West” (Bluth 2000: 57). Bonn’s refusal to openly lend political support to 
Desert Storm was perceived as a sign of lacking solidarity and unappreciative of 
American support in the unification process and left the Bush administration “very 
disenchanted” (Hutchings). Bush warned that “to conclude that these challenges are not 
everyone’s concern” would put “at risk everything we have achieved” (Riddell 1990). 
Similarly, the US media commented that “German wobbling puts the Trans-Atlantic 
partnership at risk” (Hutchings 1997; Hoagland, 1991; Fehr 1991). While Bonn ended 
up contributing DM 18 billion to Operation Desert Storm, a sum amounting to more than 
one-third of its annual defense-budget and over half o f which went directly to 
Washington (Otte 2000: 93), in Washington the German contribution was considered 
“too little, too late” (McArdle Kelleher 1993: 275).
Quo vadis, Germany?
As the friendship lens would expect, the American criticism caused anxiety in Bonn. 
The US perception o f unified Germany as a ‘free rider’ which was not contributing to 
the Western project was destabilizing because it exposed a disconnection between 
German and American horizons o f expectations. Paradoxically, Kohl’s attempt to 
maintain ‘continuity’ had produced the opposite effect: it raised questions of whether 
‘Germany’ really was a reliable and trustworthy partner in the West. To counter this 
unpleasant dynamic, the government saw a need to re-evaluate the understanding of 
Germany in the world. According to Karl Lamers, influential foreign policy 
spokesperson for the CDU, the impact of the Gulf War on German politics was 
“cathartic” (Lamers 1991b). As Defense Minister Volker Ruehe (CDU) phrased it, the 
Gulf War had cast “a bright light on the need to redefine united Germany’s international 
role” (in Duffield 1998: 181). The Kohl government came to realize that just when 
‘Germany’ had become a coherent and stable narrative as ‘normal’ state in the Western 
space, the contours of this space were changing.
It was not so much that the US had extended the spatial horizons o f the Western project 
-  after all it had done so many times before with engagements in Korea and Vietnam, 
and with trying to include Japan in the Western world. The key problem was that 
becoming a creative agent in the New World Order required adapting the German 
‘Civilian power’ narrative embedded in the vision of unfolding into a Greater European 
Peace Order. Such an adaptation was extremely difficult. When Ruehe conceded that 
Germany had to face a new reality in which “war...has returned as an instrument of 
politics” (Ruehe 1992), this ‘reality’ stood in stark contrast to the world in which
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Germany had unfolded since 1945 and where it gained its sense of authentic being 
through the conviction that, in the words o f Brandt, war was “the ultima irratio of 
politics” (in Baumann and Hellmann 2001: 70).
Yet the Kohl government had to come to terms that for Washington a unified Germany 
was a ‘new’ Germany in the sense of it being a more ‘powerful’ partner expected to act 
‘accordingly’. Karl Lamers reminded in an internal paper that “responsibility is 
contingent upon power” and warned that German denial about its power could lead its 
Western partners to think the country was back on a Sonderweg: “If Germany acts as if 
it has no power, it will awaken only mistrust among its neighbors. Germany must 
therefore acknowledge its power” (cited in Anderson and Goodman 1993: 48). It is 
worth reminding here that, as discussed in chapter six, ‘power’ here is understood as 
creative potential. Unification had not suddenly brought more economic and/or military 
capabilities; if anything, the costs of incorporating the former GDR were draining 
German resources. Rather, the question was how to use the creative potential of unified 
Germ any-in-Europe, how to adjust the German narrative without losing its authenticity.
Thus, the question was how to re-engage its memory space and draw new lessons from it 
without discarding the vision o f a peaceful Germany-in-Europe. This dilemma was well 
captured in Lamers’ remark that “without forgetting its history, Germany must become 
as normal as possible” (in Anderson and Goodman 1993: 48). The government 
addressed this dilemma with contradicting and vague assurances to its Western partners 
that German foreign policy would remain “marked by continuity” while at the same time 
stressing its “reliability and calculability” (Kinkel 1992). Such promises were 
problematic, o f course, as they implied that Germany would remain on its ‘familiar’ 
path, the definition o f which had become less clear. Thus they were followed by 
promises that Germany was open for “new developments” (Ibid.). Yet such 
‘developments’ de facto  required a reinterpretation o f the desirable order ‘Germany’ was 
unfolding into, that is, the project unified Germany was responsible for (Baumann and 
Hellmann 2001). The question, then, became with whom, in advance o f what project and 
through which institution this potential could be used and where the coherence of 
Germany’s biography could be restored without too much adjustment.
Signs of Institutional Rivalry
Scholars like to argue that Bonn and Washington agreed to embed a unified Germany- 
in-Europe in NATO, CSCE, and EC/WEU, satisfying the various parties involved, and 
that these were ‘interlocking’ institutions complementing each other (Anderson and
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Goodman 1993: 39ff).425 The theoretical lens applied here suggests, instead, that Bonn 
invested in those three institutional frames to assess through which it could offset the 
dissonance with the US exposed by the Gulf War, that is, which was most suitable for 
negotiating its national biography without losing its sense o f authenticity.426
For reasons noted earlier, the Bush administration made it clear to Kohl that it expected 
unified Germany to remain in NATO, a requirement shared by France and Britain in 
their reluctant agreement to unification (Zelikow and Rice 1995: 13If, 141, 154). The 
US National Security Strategy from March 1990 stressed that NATO was to remain the 
primary security institution in Europe which “sustains the overall structure o f stability” 
(in Theiler 2003: 185). And while Kohl did not mention NATO in his T en  Points’, he 
repeatedly assured Bush of the German commitment to NATO (Hutchings 1997: 100; 
Kohl 1996: 166). Yet as noted earlier, the German commitment to NATO was reading it 
through the Harmel Report as an institution through which a unified Germany in a 
Greater European Peace Order could be built. In December 1989 Kohl noted to his 
NATO colleagues that the goal was “a European peace order in which all 
Europeans...come together in freedom” (Kohl 1996: 189). Bush appeared to confirm 
this reading at the same meeting by stating that the Alliance was to provide “the 
architecture for continued peaceful change” (in Zelikov and Rice 1997: 132). With that 
assurance, Kohl signed up to NATO’s London declaration from July 1990 which 
proclaimed NATO as the primary security institution in Europe and agreed to its 
function as “the principle venue for consultations” in May 1991 (Hutchings 1997: 279).
However, Bonn’s hope that NATO would transform into a forum for negotiating a 
Greater European Peace Order was compromised by US plans to build a New World 
Order beyond Europe. Although NATO was not formally involved in the 1991 Gulf 
War, in the eyes o f the US the operation served to redefine NATO’s scope as a more 
globally oriented institution an attempt which, as we have seen, can be traced back to the 
late 1960s. The strategic concept agreed upon in Rome in November 1991 suggested 
that the scope of NATO missions was not limited to Europe by noting that “Alliance 
security must take account o f the global context” (NATO 1991, § 12) and that members 
“could...be called upon to contribute to global stability” (Ibid, § 41). It also emphasized
425 The notion of ‘interlocking institutions’ was stated in NATO’s 1991 Rome communique.
426 Although outside the scope of this analysis, Germany’s attempt to participate in formulating 
Bush’s ‘New World Order’ included investment in the United Nations (UN). The Kohl 
government advocated the importance of international law, supported UN ‘peacekeeping’ 
missions and bid for a permanent seat in the Security Council (Ruehe, 1992a; Thraenert, 1993; 
Kuehne 1996; Daalgard Nielsen 2006).
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the continued primacy of conventional and nuclear capabilities and cleared the ground 
for the 1992 Oslo agreement which expanded NATO’s strategic scope by adopting the 
possibility of ‘out o f area’ missions authorized by the UN Security Council. The 
doctrinal shift towards ‘power projection’, pushed forward by the US military, largely 
sidetracked the political debate (Schake 1998; Sandler and Hartley 1997: 60).
In light o f the Iraq experience, these adjustments did not resonate well in Bonn. Yet the 
Gulf War ‘defection’ had politically weakened the Kohl government and left it with little 
influence in the negotiations over NATO’s military strategy, exemplified by complaints 
coming out of the Ministry o f Defense about ‘unilateral’ decision-making among NATO 
allies, a ‘nationalization’ o f NATO, and o f being downgraded to a ‘second-class 
member’ (Honig, 1992; Thraenert, 1993).
The Kohl government was more successful in persuading the US to strengthen the non­
military dimension o f NATO and reach out in cooperation with Central and Eastern 
Europe. Genscher played a key role in inserting commitments to preventive diplomacy 
into the Rome document which emphasized the importance o f CSCE (Genscher 1995: 
787ffi; Otte 2000: 170f). Yet for Washington this link was a concession to Bonn in an 
attempt to keep it from investing in alternative institutions rather that a genuine 
determination to transform NATO in this direction. While the Bush administration 
accepted the ‘Helsinki Principles’ as part o f the negotiations about Germany’s future in 
an ‘All-European process’ and saw CSCE as a potentially useful instrument for 
promoting political and economic liberalism in Eastern Europe (Hutchings 1997: 191 f.)» 
at bottom it still considered CSCE a ‘Soviet design’ resurfacing in Gorbatchev’s vision 
of a ‘Common European Home’ and, hence, “the most unwieldly European forum 
imaginable” (Hoagland 1989; Zelikow and Rice 1995; 127, 133).
Whereas the US gave only low key and last-minute support for CSCE meetings, Bonn 
held high expectations for this institution (Genscher 1995: 320). In his Ten Point Plan 
Kohl had described the CSCE process as the heart piece o f the ‘Greater European’ 
architecture and the government put great efforts in revitalizing it (Kohl 1996: 165f., 
Peters 1999). As one astute observer notes, in the reform process o f CSCE and the EC 
the Germans were “the movers and shapers” (Pond 1991: 125). The assessment that 
CSCE could be used for building a Greater European Peace Order was widespread 
around the time of its rejuvenation in November 1990 with the ‘Charter of Paris’, and, 
indeed, the view that CSCE might be a potential alternative to NATO was not
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uncommon across the political spectrum.427
The most significant move, however, occurred in the reform of the EC. As noted earlier, 
the main partner in the EC was France, which had made Kohl’s commitment to 
European integration a precondition for supporting German unification. Building on the 
dynamic from the 1980s, the idea of European unity was taken head on during the 
Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) in 1990/91, where Bonn and Paris shifted the 
emphasis o f the EC from economic to political unity. An initiative by Kohl and 
Mitterand from December 1990 called for a strengthening o f the Community’s political 
and security realm, followed by a number of further Franco-German initiatives pushing 
for the integration of the WEU into the EU and suggesting to expand the German-Franco 
brigade into a multinational corps answerable to the EU (‘the Eurocorps’) (Meiers 2006: 
125-138). This set the agenda for negotiations among EC members leading to the 
integration o f the EPC into the Treaty o f the European Union (TEU) and to the creation 
of a pillar o f ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy’ (CFSP) within the EU’s new 
institutional framework. By pushing for the prospect of having defence issues discussed 
in the EU, the Treaty broke with the understanding that ‘defence’ was a term exclusively 
reserved for NATO (Hill and Smith 2000: 152).428
That these developments in the EC did not quite fit Bush’s ‘Atlantic frame’ and laid the 
groundwork for a potential alternative to NATO was recognized in Washington. The 
Bush administration worried that Kohl was responding to French overtures of creating 
an institution which was “taking Germany farther away” from NATO and responded 
sharply. In the ‘Bartholomew-telegram’ from February 1991 the US warned EC 
members rather undiplomatically not to undertake “efforts to construct a European pillar 
by redefining and limiting NATO’s role” (Meiers 2006: 219). Later that year at NATO’s 
Rome summit Bush claimed that the US was “an unhesitating proponent of the aim and 
process of European integration” yet warned that this should not lead to a “European 
alternative to the Alliance”. Behind close doors, he bluntly asked “if Western Europe 
intends to create a security organization outside the Alliance, tell me now!’’(Hutchings 
1997: 277-281).
The American warnings effectively put German commitment to NATO on the spot. In 
an attempt to alleviate tensions Bonn reassured Washington that NATO was to remain
427 BT (1990b: 11/236, 18863-68; 18893-95); Gutjahr (1994); Otte (2000); Genscher (1995: 319).
428 "The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of 
the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defense policy" (Article J.4, 1, TEU).
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the primary security institution. The purpose of CFSP was not to establish a rival to 
NATO but, resorting to Kennedy’s metaphor, to strengthen the ‘European pillar’ o f the 
Atlantic Alliance and, as such, to bring France closer to NATO. To this end, the German 
government successfully lobbied for the ominous European Security and Defense 
Identity (ESDI) within NATO and came to echo the British view that WEU served as a 
‘bridge’ within NATO (Tams 1999; Kirchner 2000; Theiler 2003: 184ff; Hilz 2005). In 
turn, Bush renewed his offer for building the New World Order as partners in 
leadership,429 and he expressed his hope that “a more united Europe offers the United 
States a more effective partner, prepared for larger responsibilities” (in Lundestad 1998: 
116). However, the estrangement dynamic could not be reversed. As the next section 
shows, the German-American dissonance over the meaning o f the Western project was 
further exposed over the question how to respond to the conflict in Bosnia.
Exposing Dissonance II: Bosnia (1992-95)
Tensions among groups in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) had been rising 
since 1991 and in Bosnia war broke out in April 1992. The ‘Europe’ this conflict 
portrayed was neither ‘whole’ nor ‘free’, let alone ‘at peace’. Yet between Washington 
and Bonn there was no consensus as to what this conflict meant, that is, how it was 
integrated into the Western project and how to engage it.
America: ‘No Dog in This Fight*
In contrast to the Gulf War, the US government decided to play a low-key role and not 
to intervene.430 Counter to previous assurances that the US “shares Europe’s 
neighbourhood”,431 the Bush administration now applied a very narrow interpretation of 
the Western space and considered the Balkans as peripheral to its agenda of building a 
post-Cold War world. As such, NATO was not to become involved. In the words of 
NATO’s Supreme Allied Command Europe, the Balkans were “not within NATO’s 
defense zone” (in Hutchings 1997: 308). Robert Hutchings’ recollection that “We never 
decided whether important US interests were at stake. We never decided whether 
Yugoslavia mattered enough” (Hutchings 1997: 312) is revealing in itself, yet US
429 Bush noted to Weizsaecker in 1992: “Just as Germany has transcended...its past, so has the 
German-American relationship shed the burdens that were history’s legacy. A united Germany, 
champion of a more united Europe, now stands as our partner in leadership. Together, we have 
achieved our common goal of a Germany united in peace and freedom. But our partnership did 
not end with that. To the contrary: now that we are free of the dangers and divisions of Europe’s 
Cold War confrontation, the German-American partnership has really just begun.” (cited in 
Hutchings 1997: 162).
430 Hutchings (1997); VanHoonacker (2001)
431 James Baker in his Berlin speech in December 1989, cited in Nuttall (2000: 62)
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passivity indicates — and others, like Senator John McCain, noted more openly — that 
neither was the case.432 Hutchings’ acknowledgment that the watchword for American 
policy became “We got no dog in this fight” is another way o f saying that the conflict 
did not touch on US ‘vital interests’ and an engagement did not seem to contribute to the 
Western project. As Lene Hansen notes in her analysis of the US discourse on Bosnian 
conflict, the Balkans were conceived as spatially outside ‘Western civilisation’ (Hansen 
2006: 105ff, 136).
To be sure, as Hansen (2006: 135) points out, there were voices in Congress calling for 
US engagement, but these remained ineffective until Clinton shifted course in 1995. 
Behind the American reluctance to get involved was the administration’s lack of a robust 
utopia for a peaceful ‘Europe’, that is, the missing of a clear vision o f a desirable 
European order it wanted to invest in. That Bush was not really committed to a Europe 
‘whole and free’ became visible in the assessment that ‘unity’ and ‘freedom’ seemed to 
contradict each other as a meaningful principle for ‘peace’; and in the American 
narrative the latter trumped the former, with Baker stressing on a visit to Belgrade that 
the US would “always choose democracy over unity” (cited in Hutchings 1997: 310). 
Supporting the principle o f self-determination yet not the unity o f ‘Europe’ was made 
easier in that Yugoslavia’s disintegration was seen as part o f the process of self- 
determination in Europe.
Ambiguity concerning the desirability of a unified Europe was complemented by the 
view that ‘unity’ among people in the Balkans was difficult, if not impossible to 
accomplish. The dominant interpretation in the Bush administration was that the fighting 
was the inevitable result o f historical tensions, ‘ancient hatreds’, which had been ‘deep 
frozen’ under the East-West conflict (Hutchings 1997: 318; Hansen 2006: 107fi, 134).433 
Thus, although some sceptics saw this as a prelude for what could happen in all of 
Europe with the order of Yalta gone, in the administration the view prevailed that the 
fighting was a ‘local’ conflict, not representative of something ‘bigger’.434 This reading 
further justified US non-engagement by integrating the image o f the Balkans as a 
quagmire into the American narrative through the memory o f ‘Vietnam’. With the swift 
victory in the Gulf War just having added an experience widely seen as ‘overcoming’
432 McCain quoted in Hansen (2006: 134).
433 Hansen (2006: 148-156) attributes the popularity of this image to Clinton reading Robert 
Kaplan’s ‘Balkan Ghosts’. Given that the narrative was already present during the Bush 
administration, Hansen’s argument, in my view, exaggerates the importance of Kaplan’s text.
434 The scenario of the resurfacing of “long oppressed ethnic antagonism and national rivalries” 
was formulated most famously by Mearsheimer (1990), who famously argued that the breakup of 
the Soviet Union would lead to new instabilities in Europe.
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the trauma of Vietnam, the possibility o f becoming entangled in a civil war with 
complex ethnic roots in a ‘far away place’ trumped the humanitarian discourse (Hansen 
2006: 134, 138; Hutchings 1997: 314). While Clinton had vowed to change course, his 
administration maintained its predecessor’s interpretation o f the conflict as one of 
ancient hatreds and, thus, continued the passive stance until 1995 (see below).
During the electoral campaign in 1992 Clinton had criticized Bush for “failing to 
provide a broad vision o f America’s world role” (Hyland 1999: 16). Once in the White 
House, he formulated such a broad (and familiar) role, namely o f America as a global 
force for the good life, promoting the pacifying power of liberal values and the 
humanitarian purpose of UN peacekeeping missions.435 National Security Advisor 
Anthony Lake described the strategic outlook o f the Clinton administration as one of 
‘pragmatic neo-Wilsonianism’ and ‘helping the helpless’, criticized by others as an 
attempt to “turn American foreign policy into a branch o f social work” (Mandelbaum 
1996: 18; Hyland 1999: 58). In this narrative European unity was not a prominent 
concern, symbolised by Secretary o f State Warren Christopher’s note that American 
policy had been too ‘Eurocentric’ (Smith and Woolcock 1994; Hyland 1999: 94). The 
Bosnian conflict was considered a ‘European problem’ which could be safely left 
outside the ‘global’ responsibility of the US.
‘Europe’ entered Clinton’s world when half-hearted interventions in Somalia and Haiti 
in 1993 exposed a lack of determination in his approach and drew heavy domestic 
criticism. He sought to counter this slump by revitalizing the Western project with 
European friends, taking up an invitation made by Kohl already back in November 1992 
(Lundestad 1998: 124). Visiting Europe for the first time in January 1994, almost a year 
after his inauguration, Clinton worked hard to reassure his counterparts of US support 
for European integration (Clinton 1994; Eizenstat 1994). Yet while his positive 
assessment of the EU as an economic partner carrying a liberal world order and his call 
for a new transatlantic security partnership “improved the atmosphere”, his visit did not 
address deeper issues (Smith and Woolcock 1994: 473f.; Clinton 1994; Lundestad 
1998). Specifically, it was not accompanied by a shared reading o f the conflict in Bosnia 
and did not lead to a significant US investment in the vision o f a European Peace Order.
435 In his inaugural address Clinton promised that “our hopes, our hearts and our hands are with 
those on every continent who are building democracy and freedom. Their cause is America’s 
cause”.
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Germany: *Europe* cannot End in Sarajevo
As noted earlier, the Kohl government had intimately linked the notion o f unified 
Germany unfolding in a united Europe, claiming that Germany’s “European path” would 
be “without any alternative” (Kinkel 1992a). The debate on German responsibility in the 
wake o f Iraq was considered “fundamental for the future of our country and the part we 
want to play in Europe” (Lamers 1991). Such claims, voiced parallel to the negotiations 
leading to the Maastricht Treaty, were possible because there was a strong sense of 
shared commitment among governments o f EC member states to invest in a ‘united 
Europe’. Yet it was still necessary to concretize this vision and, by doing so, the 
‘European path’.
One o f the dominant images coming out o f the Maastricht negotiations was that of 
‘Europe’ as a pacifying project,436 which closely resonated with the narrative of 
Germany in a European Peace Order. The Kohl government, together with governments 
of other EC member states, took the conflict in Bosnia as an opportunity for manifesting 
the commitment to build a European Peace Order by framing it as that what ‘Europe’ 
could be allowed to not become. Rather than placing the Balkans outside the Western 
space, the conflict was pictured as “the return of war into the heart of Europe” (Ruehe 
1994). And rather than viewing it as tragic yet local conflict which was inevitable due to 
unbridgeable ethnic divides and ancient hatred (the US version) it was pictured as a 
challenge to the European Peace Order. In other words, the fighting was integrated in the 
narrative of Germany-in-Europe as a dystopia, a negative vision o f ‘Europe’ as a 
fragmented space. This image also was formed out o f the memory space o f Europe’s 
conflictual past, yet where the White House saw a conflict limited to the Balkans, 
German policymakers together with European colleagues magnified the conflict into a 
vision of European fragmentation as a possibility to be prevented. Mobilizing memories 
of the First World War having been ‘triggered’ in Sarajevo, the view was nurtured that, 
once again, the Balkans could be burying the prospect o f peace in Europe raising the 
possibility of ‘Balkanization’ o f the European space.437 The dystopia was captured by 
Claus Leggewie in the question “Does Europe end in Sarajevo?” (Leggewie 1993).
In Bonn the answer was a resounding ‘no’. Policymakers agreed that decisive action was
436 As Christopher Hill (1998: 34) has shown, following Maastricht the EU was perceived as 
potentially (1) a replacement for the USSR in the world balance of power, (2) a regional pacifier, 
(3) a global intervenor, (4) a mediator of conflicts, (5) a bridge between the rich and the poor and 
(6) a joint supervisor of the world economy.
437 The 1994 Whitebook of the Ministry of Defense warned that “the development towards 
peaceful coexistence in the whole of Europe is not irreversible” (Weissbuch 1994: 23, 27, 30).
287
needed to “clarify that Europe won’t allow its values to be ridiculed in this manner” 
(Lowack 1994). In a speech to the Bundestag in January 1994, Kohl argued that the 
conflict demonstrated that the development of a European Peace Order and the political 
unity of Europe were “more important than ever”. He famously claimed that “the 
question of European unity has always been a question of war and peace (...)  The fact 
that we can look back on 48 years o f peace...is partly the result of the ability of Europe 
to come together” (Kohl 1994). This was echoed in an influential position paper 
published by the CDU caucus in September 1994, during the German EU presidency, 
which argued that the unity o f Europe was at risk. And “if Europe were to drift apart” 
the paper warned it would be “difficult for Germany to give a clear orientation to its 
internal order” (Lamers 1994: 105).
In short, by framing it as a warning what ‘Germany-in-Europe’ could become if it was 
not for integration, the Bosnian conflict served to strengthen the commitment to a vision 
of a European Peace Order with EC member states. Just as Adenauer had used ‘Korea’ 
to mobilize the dystopia o f a communist Europe for manifesting German commitment to 
the Western space of ‘freedom’, now the commitment to idea of ‘peace-through-unity’ 
was confirmed through the dystopia of Europe’s disintegration (Waever 1996; 1998).
Adjusting the German Narrative
As discussed in Chapter Six, an ontology of authentic becoming holds that the vision 
toward which leaders direct the narrative of ‘the state’ guides their policies. 
Consequently, Bonn’s framing o f the Bosnian conflict as a commitment to the vision of 
a Greater European Peace Order also mandated a ‘peaceful’ solution to the conflict, that 
is, it confirmed the superiority o f civilian means. The Kohl government put significant 
effort into mobilizing EC/EU diplomacy and devising “a new form of crisis 
management” through a strengthened CSCE (Genscher 1995: 320ff; 759f.). Yet 
diplomatic efforts, monitoring missions and sanctions through CSCE and EC/WEU did 
not prevent the tensions from escalating, neither did UN conferences, the ‘Vance-Owen’ 
diplomacy and arms embargos against Belgrade. The CFSP initiative by Kinkel and his 
French counterpart Juppe in November 1993 also showed no significant effect, and 
Bonn’s hope for a diplomatic solution was laid to rest as UN ‘peacekeepers’ were unable 
to protect declared ‘safe havens’ and prevent mass killings in Srebrenica in July 1995 
(Hilz 2005: 255-256; Genscher 1995; Meiers 2006).
In light of these developments, the Kohl government had to push for a change o f the 
German narrative. The Gulf War had already made clear that military means had not
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been banned from the Western project, and the apparent failure o f civilian means in 
bringing the conflict in Bosnia to and end raised the possibility o f military intervention 
there. Given its investment in a European Peace Order and its commitment to avoid 
European ‘fragmentation’ the Kohl government could not ‘defect’ from such a 
possibility. After all, under the German presidency the WEU had in June 1992 
committed itself to engage in “humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; tasks 
o f combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking”, the so-called 
Petersberg tasks (Western European Union 1992). The problem was that the latter 
remained outside the horizons o f the German narrative. Despite declaring the Balkans to 
be at the heart o f Europe, they were outside the territory o f NATO member states and, 
thus, outside the space o f possibility o f military engagement in Germany’s world. To be 
able to support any kind o f military engagement ‘out o f area’ an adjustment o f this space 
was required.
In March 1993 the government introduced a bill to clarify the ‘casus foederis’, arguing 
that military missions ‘abroad’ were to be allowed under a UN mandate without change 
o f the constitution (Gutjahr 1994: 217). In a landmark decision, the Federal Supreme 
Court in July 1994 confirmed this position. The Court argued that a lack o f German 
support in UN missions would lead to a loss of confidence in its Buendnisfaehigkeit 
among Western allies. Referring to Article 24 o f the Basic Law which states that “With 
a view to maintaining peace, the Federation may enter into a system of mutual collective 
security”, the Court argued that participation in ‘out of area’ missions was in harmony 
with the Basic Law as long as these missiond took place within the framework of 
‘systems of collective security’ “strictly bound to the preservation o f peace” and 
approved by a simple majority of the Bundestag. Importantly, in the Court’s view the 
UN, CSCE, WEU and NATO all qualified as systems of collective security.438
While the ruling opened the door to significant changes, doorstops were put in place to 
ensure it would not be opened too widely. In addition to the Court’s insistence on the 
need for parliamentary approval, the government echoed the peace ‘preserving’ aim of 
any Bundeswehr activity and emphasized that military force remained the very last 
resort and also limited the spatial horizon of possible out-of-area engagements. Kinkel
438 BVerfG: Urteil 12. Juli 1994, Pkt. 5b, reprinted in Stichworte zur Sicherheitspolitik, 7/1993, p. 
17. While the Court was criticized for defining alliances such as NATO and WEU as systems of 
collective security, which for critics was reserved for UN and CSCE, the Court’s view 
corresponds to the treatment of these organisations in this thesis. However the debate can be seen 
as reflecting domestic differences about which institution was most appropriate for embedding 
Germany’s ontological security. See also Meiers (2006: 274-277). For a detailed legal-political 
analysis o f ‘systems of collective security’, see Jaberg (1996).
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assured that “normalcy in foreign and security policy does not mean to act as the worlds 
policeman, it does not mean to send German soldiers to all the burning spots worldwide” 
(Kinkel 1994b). The 1994 Whitebook of the Ministry o f Defense stated the primary goal 
o f security policy to be “the political formation [Gestaltmg] o f peace in the near and 
expanded periphery o f Germany” (Weissbuch 1994: 43; Ruehe, 1995), and Kohl 
declared that the Bundeswehr would not get involved in territories which had once been 
occupied by the Wehrmacht. In other words, there were limits to support for ‘out o f area’ 
missions if the ‘Civilian Power’ narrative of Germany-in-Europe was to maintain its 
authenticity.
The adaptation o f Germany’s national biography was practically manifested in the 
support o f NATO’s air-campaign in Bosnia in June 1995 with non-combat forces439 and 
occured on the back o f a tense and well-documented domestic debate.440 The coherence 
o f the narrative was maintained by arguing that the German memory space generated 
two lessons, namely the moral maxim ‘never again genocide’ and ‘never again war’, and 
that if the two were in conflict the former trumped the latter. This re interpretation was 
made possible, first, because it was inscribed into the utopia of a European Peace Order 
emphasising ‘unity’ and supported by the dystopia o f the disintegration o f the value 
space of ‘Europe’, with Joschka Fischer of the Green Party famously arguing that 
pacifists could not accept “the new form of fascism” he saw in Bosnia (Fischer 1995). 
Thus, as with Adenauer, a dystopia was used to generate significant changes to the anti­
militarism of the German narrative. Second, as suggested by the friendship lens, the 
government argued that the change was necessary because core partners committed to 
the same vision expected Germany to adopt this new stance. As Kinkel argued, the 
‘culture of restraint’ was not acceptable to Western friends who had liberated ‘Germany’ 
in 1945 and who now expected Germans to “actively contribute towards the protection 
of the international order...especially in Europe” (Kinkel 1994a). Yet, again, the 
government made clear there were limits to maintain the coherence o f the biographical 
narrative. The use of force was to be a ‘last resort’ if all else had failed. As Kinkel 
stressed, “especially we Germans want to hold on to the culture o f non-violence, 
dialogue, and the readiness to compromise” (Kinkel 1994a).
The crucial point for the present argument is that this adjustment of the German 
narrative did not occur primarily with the US and within NATO. Instead, the Kohl
439 The Bundestag approved with 386 to 285 votes, 11 abstentions, see Otte (2000: 104).
440 See Bundestag (1994a: 17428C-17430C; 1994b); Lamers (1994); SPD (1995); Fischer (1995); 
Meiers (2006: 282-291); Dalgaard-Nielsen (2006).
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government embedded the redefinition o f German ‘responsibility’ in foreign and 
security policy in the project of European integration (Kreile 1996). This must be looked 
at more closely.
Estrangement: Doubts about NATO/US
The US did not appear as the most attractive partner and NATO not the most suitable 
institution in which this adjustment of the German narrative could be safely negotiated. 
W ashington’s hesitancy to get involved in Bosnia had already cast doubt over its 
commitment to a Greater European Peace Order and this doubt was confirmed when the 
US became involved more actively.
In 1995 the Clinton administration shifted course and declared the conflict in Bosnia a 
Western matter that could only be solved with US leadership through NATO. Suddenly 
the Balkans became a symbol for “Europe’s freedom and Europe’s stability” and “vital 
to our own national security” (Clinton 1995 in Hansen 1995g). As Hansen points out, 
this shift in the American narrative was made possible by replacing the image o f a 
localised conflict at the margins of Europe beset by ‘ancient hatred’ with an image of 
‘genocide’ occurring at the heart of Europe and within a multi-ethnic Western space 
(Hansen 2006: 140-144). Although in this aspect Clinton’s narrative connected with the 
German reading, the shift did not reflect a commitment for the same project. The 
American incorporation of the Balkans into the Western space and through NATO was 
not the same as investing in the vision o f a European Peace Order. While before his 
administration had effectively vetoed European diplomatic initiatives,441 Clinton now 
claimed that the US needed to take on the responsibility of leadership because “Europe 
alone could not end the conflict” and it was necessary to bring in America as “freedom’s 
greatest champion”. In a Newsweek article entitled Why Bosnia Matters To America, 
Clinton justified US engagement as necessary not only to end human suffering and build 
a peaceful Europe, but also to maintain NATO’s status as the dominant institution for 
ordering Europe: “If the US does not do its part in a NATO mission...we would also 
weaken NATO -  the anchor of America’s and Europe’s security -  and jeopardize US 
leadership in Europe” (Clinton 1995b).
The problem was that in doing ‘its part’ in the NATO mission the US was not engaging 
in shared world building. The memory o f Vietnam, revived by the debacle in Somalia in
441 Bonn was frustrated by US rejection of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, the lack of US support 
for the EU Action Plan and that in May 1993 it excluded Germany from the talks producing an 
alternative Joint Action Programme (Owen 1995: 179).
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October 1993, remained too powerful and made it impossible for the Clinton 
administration to commit to ground troops. Instead, it continued to press for a strategy of 
‘lift (the sanctions) and strike (from the air)’, a practice opposed by European NATO 
allies who wanted to uphold sanctions and strengthen the UN troops stationed on the 
ground (Owen 1995; Hansen 2006). When Washington got its way, NATO allies were 
sidelined in the planning and conduct of combat operations, as well as in the peace 
negotiations leading to the Dayton agreement. Resentment about US dominance -  o f not 
being treated as an equal -  transpired also into German criticism of how the US 
approached the peace-building task, such as its rejection o f UN oversight of civilian 
relief efforts in coordination with peacekeepers and its plans to rearm the Bosnian army 
(Whitney, 1995).442
In short, the Bosnia experience confirmed what had been become apparent in the Gulf 
War, namely that despite Clinton’s charm offensive in 1994 the American narrative had 
moved the Western project away from the vision o f a Greater European Peace Order. 
This turned the American claim for leadership through NATO into a problem. US 
passivity had prevented the institution from taking a more active role early on and the 
sidelining o f Allies during the operation, stretching into the post-conflict stage, had 
exposed the limits of US willingness to work together. Given the Court’s ‘door opener’ 
mentioned earlier, this raised the concern in Bonn that the US path o f action might not 
come to support the vision of a European Peace Order through which the ‘out of area’ 
adjustment had been justified. In other words, the government might sign off on a 
NATO mission whose conduct and consequences come to violate domestic values. In 
crude terms, the relationship with the US within NATO had become a generator rather 
than a controlling mechanism of German anxiety.443
Emancipation: Investment in CFSP/France
As for the alternatives, the high hopes for CSCE as a forum for building a Greater 
European Peace Order had not been fulfilled. Formally Bonn continued to support 
CSCE, most notably by turning it into an actual organisation (OSCE), yet US disinterest 
in the institution and its apparent ineffectiveness in ‘managing’ the Bosnian conflict 
diminished its value considerably for negotiating German authentic becoming.
442 The US oversaw NATO’s Implementation Force to which Bonn contributed 4,000 troops 
(Schake 1998).
443 Scholars have identified this in more traditional ‘alliance’ terminology as a German/European 
fear of entrapment (Press-Bamathan 2006; Hilz 2005).
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While Bosnia had also exposed what Christopher Hill (1993) famously called the 
“capability-expectations gap” o f CFSP, building an alternative through the EU with 
France as the creative partner appeared the most promising option. Already during 
Germany’s 1994 EU presidency a consensus formed in the government that it was 
necessary to give ‘face and voice’ to CFSP. The 1994 coalition treaty and the subsequent 
Bundestag address of the re-elected Kohl government voiced support for the 
development o f an independent European security and defence identity (Bundestag 
1994c). Four o f the five central security objectives listed in the Whitebook explicitly 
linked German security to European integration, with only one stressing the importance 
o f the transatlantic alliance “because the global power o f the United States is 
indispensable for international stability” before in a separate point calling for the 
creation of a “new security order encompassing all European states” (Whitebook 1994: 
42).
The aforementioned CDU position paper called for closer cooperation with France and 
the deepening o f European integration by “raising the Franco-German relationship to a 
new level”. It suggested creating a French-German “hard core” and in improving 
CFSP’s capacity for “effective action”, explicitly noting that this would constitute an 
“indispensable factor in endowing the EU [read: Germany] with an identity of its own” 
(Lamers 1994: 113). The paper even went so far as suggesting that “the USA can no 
longer play its traditional role” and that Germany’s relations with France were now “the 
yardstick by which to measure its sense of belonging to the W est’s community o f shared 
political and cultural values” (Ibid., 112). This was accompanied by a number o f high 
level affirmations of the French-German ‘special relationship’ in the Summer o f 1994, 
symbolized in the participation of German Eurocorps units in the 14 July parade in 
Paris. The sincerity of this shift towards France was also indicated by the concern among 
Atlanticists that the Kohl government was undermining the Germany’s Western identity 
and even ‘the W est’ as such.444
To be sure, this move did not involve a denouncement o f the German-American 
relationship or of German commitment to NATO. Emancipation is a painful and slow 
process and among conservatives, in particular, the Atlantic Alliance continued to enjoy 
high support (Leggewie 1993: 20; Schaeuble 1994). Kohl did not stop calling NATO the 
“security anchor” and “bedrock” of Europe’s security architecture (Duffield 1998: 118)
444 See Weissmann (1994); Gillessen (1994); Diner (1994); Baring (1994). Similar voices are 
found among conservatives in the US (Gompert 1997). For debates between ‘Europeanists’ and 
‘Atlanticists’ over what role the US could/should (not) play in Europe, see Weidenfeld (1996).
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and liked to claim that ‘Germany’ was equally committed to relationships with the US 
and with France, always courting both as ‘core allies’.445 Along the same times, German 
officials always assured that their institutional commitments in the EU and in NATO 
were complementary. Again, Kennedy’s metaphor o f the two pillars proved particularly 
helpful here. Policymakers in Bonn and Washington could agree about the idea o f the 
WEU as the ‘European pillar’ o f NATO and put in place various rhetorical and 
institutional links between the two. These bridges always seemed to uphold the primacy 
o f NATO, such as in the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF), which would make 
“collective assets” available for WEU operations “on the basis o f consultations in the 
North Atlantic Council” (NATO 1994, Sect. 6) and the earlier mentioned idea o f a 
European Security and Defence Identity within NATO, supported by Clinton during his 
1994 visit and confirmed at the 1996 Berlin summit.
The key problem (or appeal) with the ‘pillar’ metaphor was that the question what ‘roo f 
the European pillar was carrying was ultimately left open: was it NATO, or was NATO 
the second pillar? And if WEU/CFSP and NATO were two pillars standing next to each 
other, what roof were they carrying? This was the question o f the common project. And 
from that angle, the issue was not one o f complementarity between institutions but one 
o f resonance among significant others about visions of European order. And so it was in 
an attempt to improve the latter that Bonn continued to cooperate with France to 
enhance WEU capabilities and integrate them into the EU, as in a French-German 
‘Common Security and Defense Concept’ from December 1996 and during the 
following Intergovernmental Conference in Amsterdam (Jopp and Schmuck 1996; Hilz 
2005: 163-179; Meiers 2006: 1138-156).
Conclusion
This chapter assessed the argument that German investment in CFSP was a reaction to a 
process o f estrangement in German-American relations. It provided evidence for 
enduring dissonance between German and American narratives o f being-in-the-world 
which rendered NATO unsuitable as a forum through which to negotiate a shared project 
in which an authentic German narrative could be embedded and provided a rationale for 
creating an alternative.
445 See Duffield (1998); Hilz (2005); Meiers (2006). Kohl’s comment to US Ambassador Robert 
Kimmitt that while France was Germany’s ‘closest’ ally he considered America to be its ‘most 
important’ ally is exemplary (Bering 1999: 45).
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Continuing a trend started by Kissinger (see chapter nine), this chapter showed lacking 
support for the vision o f a united Europe as envisioned by Germany among all three US 
administrations (Reagan, Bush, Clinton). The view that such a ‘Europe’ did not 
contribute to America’s narrative as the leader of the Western world was strongest under 
Reagan and ambiguous under Bush. The chapter showed that German unease with 
Reagan was alleviated by Kohl’s commitment to the friendship and by his strategy of 
‘normalization’ and that the ‘Bonn-Washington’ nexus over the issue o f German 
unification disrupted the estrangement process only on the surface. The close 
cooperation between Bush and Kohl was merely hiding the dissonance by blending out 
the question o f how to order ‘Europe’ and how a united Germany would be integrated in 
the Western project. While both sides thus considered the relationship as a creative 
source for building a post-Cold War world, by blending out the parameters which had 
nurtured the estrangement process the Bonn-Washington’ nexus gave the misleading 
impression that their horizons o f expectations were aligned when in fact they were not. 
As such, the collaboration over German unification raised false expectations.
It was demonstrated that the dissonance resurfaced in interpretations o f the 1990 Iraq 
invasion o f Kuwait and the conflict in Bosnia. Different view of what these events meant 
for the Western project and, correspondingly, how to respond to them revealed that 
horizons of expectations were not aligned. The Gulf War challenged the German 
narrative in positing that the global projection of military force was considered an 
acceptable part of the Western project, exerting pressure on the Kohl government to 
adjust. The German reading of the conflict in Bosnia as a confirmation of its 
commitment to a Greater European Peace Order and, by contrast, the American view 
that Bosnia was situated outside the Western space and its hesitancy to get involved 
further confirmed the dissonance. American leadership in building Western order 
through NATO t hus generated anxiety in Bonn and rendered the Atlantic Alliance 
unsuitable for adjusting the German narrative and ‘opening the door’ to ‘out o f area’ 
missions. Hence, the chapter suggested that the Kohl government pursued a strategy of 
emancipation by turning to France as that friend with whom it could invest in 
(W)EU/CFSP as an alternative forum for negotiating a project which required less 
compromise to the authenticity o f the German narrative.
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CHAPTER ELEVEN: CONCLUSION
This thesis has attempted to assess, conceptually and empirically, the motives behind the 
emergence and the decline o f interstate security cooperation, defined as the costly 
investment in a common international institution and applied to German-American 
relations between 1945 and 1995. It took as its starting point Germany’s subsequent 
investment in three different security institutions for the purpose of ‘European security’ 
which over time came to exclude the United States, namely (what became) NATO, 
CSCE and CFSP. This investment was framed as a phenomenon of German-American 
security cooperation moving from ‘consensus’ (1945-55) via ‘tension’ (1965-75) to 
‘divergence’ (1985-95). When the logical thrust o f the three main IR theories -  realism, 
institutionalism and constructivism -  were shown to be unable to provide a coherent 
explanation for this dynamic, the phenomenon turned into a puzzle (chapter one). 
Against this backdrop, the thesis attempted to build a new theoretical argument for 
explaining interstate security cooperation and apply it to the historical case of German- 
American cooperation. Below I briefly summarize the argument and highlight some of 
the contributions to IR theory and to our understanding o f German-American security 
cooperation.
Argument
The basic argument advanced in this thesis was that states invest in common 
international institutions to pursue a shared project of ‘world building’. More precisely, 
it was suggested that (1) states are driven by the aim to control anxiety through the 
formulation o f a meaningful narrative o f (coming into) ‘being-in-the-world’ and that (2) 
the formulation and practical maintenance of such an authentic biographical narrative is 
pursued with states regarded as friends. It was further argued that (3) enduring 
dissonance between friends about visions of order signifies a process of estrangement 
which brings ambiguity in the biographical narrative and undermines the friendship’s 
ability to control anxiety. And if states cannot reduce this dissonance (4) they will 
pursue a strategy o f emancipation by seeking new friends with whom they can invest in 
an alternative/new institution to pursue a world building project which better 
accommodates their understanding of meaningful becoming. Using this theoretical lens, 
the dynamic o f German-American cooperation was captured as moving from friendship 
(consensus) to estrangement (tensions) and, eventually, emancipation (divergence) and 
explained with (dis)agreements among political leaders over visions of a peaceful 
European order and its place in respective national biographies.
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I explored this argument empirically beginning with chapter eight, which examined the 
shared commitment to NATO in the post-war decade (1945-55). It was argued that the 
German-American consensus o f NATO as the security institution for ordering ‘Europe’ 
rested on the agreement of a shared project o f ‘world building’ in which respective 
national biographies -  narratives of authentic becoming -  were embedded. More 
precisely, the chapter showed that policymakers in Bonn and in Washington, in their 
attempt to meaningfully inscribe ‘being-in-Europe’ in respective national biographies, 
came to share the vision of a ‘United States of Europe’ marked by ‘freedom’ and ‘unity’. 
This shared vision generated commitment to building such a ‘Europe’ in the Western 
space through NATO, a project in which the US was willing to regard ‘Germany’ as an 
equal partner and Adenauer could reciprocate by pushing for rearmament. It was shown 
that against French opposition and buttressed by the dystopia of a communist Germany- 
in-Europe, Adenauer and US administrations under Truman and Eisenhower worked 
closely together to bring the FRG into NATO.
While both sides remained committed to the value of ‘freedom’, chapters nine and ten 
suggested that a gradual withdrawal of US commitment to the vision o f a ‘united’ 
Europe came into conflict with a growing German vision of a Greater European Peace 
Order, leading to (dis)agreements about the suitability o f NATO for negotiating their 
respective national biographies of ‘Germany’ and ‘America’ in the world. Specifically, 
the analysis of the second period (1965-1975) developed in chapter nine highlighted the 
dissonance between Brandt’s and Kissinger/Nixon’s conception o f a peaceful ‘Europe’, 
with the former pursuing a transformative and the latter a static/conservative vision. In 
an effort to maintain the friendship and, thus, the commitment to build the West through 
NATO, this dissonance and the sense o f lacking reciprocity was muted by silence on 
contentious issues, such as Vietnam, by channelling diverging paths through NATO’s 
emphasis on detente, and by an American approach o f ‘indifference’ to Brandt’s attempt 
to pursue the vision of Germany-in-(Greater)Europe through CSCE.
Finally, chapter ten examined German-American dissonance about the meaning and 
desirability of a ‘united Europe’ in the Western project period surrounding the end of the 
Cold War (1985-95). It was argued that tensions were visible during the Reagan 
administration and that close cooperation between Kohl and the Bush administration 
over German unification misled both sides in assuming that horizons o f expectations 
were now aligned. The chapter showed that dissonance was exposed in disagreements 
over how to integrate the 1990 Iraq invasion of Kuwait and the conflict in Bosnia into
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the Western project. Whereas US administrations expected unified Germany to support 
the widening o f the Western space in a post-Cold War world, the Kohl government 
feared a direction which did not contribute to the building o f a Greater European Peace 
Order and could not accommodate the anti-militarism principle, thus alienating 
‘Germany’ from its authentic post-45 narrative. This led the Kohl government to invest, 
via the WEU, in CFSP.
Contributions
The first contribution the thesis makes is that it offers a strategy for how to build a 
theory (of interstate security cooperation). It puts forward the notion of a ‘deep theory’ 
as a causal narrative starting on the level o f ontology which anchors the meaning of the 
state and its ‘national security interest’ in an account of the human condition (chapter 
two). It suggests that this offers a new way to understand the meaning o f a ‘common 
security interest’ as one o f sustaining a shared project which enables authentic 
becoming. In this context, the thesis suggests an approach o f ‘creative theorizing’ taking 
place in two steps: (i) the unravelling o f existing paradigms in IR for discerning 
conceptual openings, in this case realism, institutionalism and constructivism, which 
then are engaged by (ii) drawing on philosophical insights, in this case making particular 
use of Heidegger and Aristotle.446 Even if the result is still more a conceptual skeleton 
than a fully fledged theory, I suggest the discussion redirects thinking about interstate 
(German-American) relations in a number o f ways.
First, reading the human condition with Heidegger points to anxiety as the foundational 
sentiment of ‘being-in-the-world’ (chapter four), which offers an alternative to the 
Hobbesian reading that humans react to uncertainty with fear. It builds on the 
phenomenological insight that one cannot have an experience o f death and, hence, 
cannot have knowledge about what to fear to suggest that the unknowability of the 
future makes the Self anxious, not fearful. While the empirical discussion outlined the 
anxiety-raising conditions among policymakers, the ‘Potsdam complex’ in the German 
case and the ‘Rapallo complex’ in the American case (see, in particular, chapter eight), 
anxiety is a feeling and difficult to record. One can trace its effects, however, by paying 
attention to the strategies employed by the Self to control anxiety and, thus, understand 
the ‘national interest’ as the formulation of a coherent and authentic national biography 
(e.g., Williams 2005).
446 Again, the fact that these two thinkers inspired the argument at crucial stages does not mean 
that it intends or pretends to be a Heideggerian or an Aristotelian theory of IR.
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Second, by advancing a dynamic ontology o f ‘the state’ as something that unfolds in 
time and space, the thesis offers an alternative to the static and exclusive ontology o f 
states associated with Hobbesian ontology. It contributes to the “next step in 
Constructivist IR Theory” by ‘endogenizing’ the analysis o f state identity (Cedermann 
and Daase 2003), although this step remains one in the direction Onuf (1989) originally 
laid out, namely to study the ‘world o f our making’. More precisely, my 
conceptualization o f the state as a narrative of ‘authentic becoming’ defining its 
existence through a coherent national biography (chapter five) suggests a re-reading o f 
the spatio-temporal configuration of ‘the state’. It stresses the notion of an experienced 
space, a meaningful environment reaching beyond Westphalian boundaries and 
encompassing that ‘world’ which has gained meaning and become ‘known’ (disclosed) 
through significant experience. The philosophical grounding of the need for historical 
analogies and visions as anxiety controlling mechanisms directs attention to the temporal 
ordering o f this space by pointing to the creative act o f transforming memories into 
meaningful visions lending direction to unfolding. It highlights the importance o f 
memoiy and visions as politically contested existentials in the sense o f manifesting the 
existence of ‘the state’ in a national biography.
The existential reading of the state as a national biography directs attention to a certain 
reading of what drives the security policy o f governments. Rather than focusing on 
survival understood as the maintenance o f territorial integrity, the thesis supports the 
argument that states strive for ‘ontological security’ (e.g., Mitzen 2006). That said, it 
goes beyond the Giddensian focus on ‘routine practices’ by emphasizing the desire for 
authenticity which, it was argued, cannot be satisfied by routines (chapter four). In this 
current, the argument that governments are primarily concerned with formulating a 
coherent narrative of, for instance, ‘Germany’ situated in space and time offers an 
alternative to the argument advanced by Haftendom (1984) that ‘unity’ and ‘security’ 
were conflicting goals for German policymakers during the Cold War. The theoretical 
lens used here suggests these two goals did not stand in conflict because policymakers 
were concerned primarily with safeguarding a vision of a particular ‘Germany’ and, as 
such, a particular ‘unity’.
By emphasizing the ontological importance of the experienced/envisioned space, the 
thesis also provides a new angle for assessing the importance of spatial metaphors, such 
as ‘Europe’ and ‘the West’, within narratives of the state. It supports the task o f
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‘Europeanizing’ and ‘Westernizing’ the history o f both Germany and America447 and, 
correspondingly, suggests that analysts should take seriously how policymakers envision 
the future of ‘European’ and/or ‘Western’ order and how these are embedded in national 
biographies (e.g., Banchoff 1999; Jackson 2006). In this context, the thesis also suggests 
that the vision o f a desirable order (utopia) may be complemented by a negative vision 
(dystopias), as in Adenauer’s ‘Korea’ and ‘Prague’ scenarios (chapter eight) and Kohl’s 
‘fragmentation’ or ‘Balkanization’ scenarios (chapter ten). Here the empirical narrative 
suggested something not anticipated by the theoretical discussion, namely that dystopias 
are mobilised not merely to highlight which paths not to pursue, but for justifying 
significant adjustments of the biographical narrative, in this case to allow for German 
rearmament and participation in ‘out o f area’ missions, respectively.
Third, the thesis offers a substantial reading of interstate relations as ‘friendship’, 
conceptualized as an overlap o f national biographies embedded in a shared project of 
‘world building’ (chapter six). It does so by directing attention to the inter-subjective 
dimension of authentic becoming to argue that a coherent biographical narrative is 
achieved with a significant Other. The focus on friendship as a particular relationship 
reconciles the social dimension o f conceptions of Selfhood with the need for ‘substance’ 
(or authenticity) and, more broadly speaking, thereby offers an answer to the ‘structure- 
agency’ dilemma and to the ‘constructivist-essentialist’ debate. Furthermore, by 
suggesting that states seek friends to control their anxiety, the thesis shifts the focus 
away not only from the ‘collective’ but also from the ‘enemy’ as that through which a 
sense of Self is stabilized. By offering a reading o f security interdependence between 
Germany and the US as internally conditioned and sustained through friendship, this 
thesis substantiates the notion that German-American security cooperation is internally 
organised around shared values (e.g., Risse-Kappen 1995) and highlights the importance 
of a common spatial orientation, in this case the overlapping commitment to a particular 
order o f ‘Europe’ in ‘the West’.
Fourth, the friendship lens also offers a certain reading of institutions (chapter six). In 
contrast to the reading of institutions as either neutral ‘information providers’ (utilitarian 
institutionalism), or active ‘socializing agents’ (moderate constructivism), it conceives 
of international institutions as sites for friends to negotiate their common world building
447 As historians recently pointed out the ‘Europeanization’ of Germany occurred long before the 
framework of European integration was established (Fervert 2005: 11; Blackburn 2005). The 
spatial conception of ‘America’ requires even more rethinking, as despite the debate about 
American ‘empire’ the US is still read as a representative of the classic notion of sovereignty 
(Keohane 2002).
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project in both deliberation (discourse) and activities (practice). This is not to suggest 
that all members in international institutions are friends but, rather, that they are used by 
friends to order the experienced space and invest in a shared vision o f what this space 
should be. Other members of the institution may or may not support this project, and 
they also may want to use the institution for a different project.
Fifth, by discussing causes for the dissolution of friendships, the causal narrative fills a 
gap in the constructivist' literature whose socialization bias has, so far, prevented 
scholars from discussing why and how social relations deteriorate (chapter seven). In 
this context, the discussion o f the estrangement process also tackled the neglected 
question of how ‘identities’ are threatened in their existence. It was suggested that 
‘ambivalence’ threatens the stable sense of Self and that, from a friendship perspective, 
the existential threat to the same emerged from within the significant relationship rather 
than from without. This, it was argued, is the logical consequence o f the process of 
mutual empowerment among friends which generates existential interdependence and, 
thus, mutual vulnerability. By bringing in ‘the stranger’, the thesis contributes to the 
increasing recognition among constructivists that it is necessary to go beyond the ‘Self- 
Other’ binary (with the Other mainly understood as the enemy) and, thus, expand the 
range of ‘Otherness’ in IR’s analytical toolkit (e.g., Huysmans 1998a; Rumelili 2004; 
Diez 2005).
Sixth, the friendship lens enhances the understanding o f ‘power’ in international 
relations (Barnett and Duvall 2005; Berenskoetter and Williams 2007). It does so by 
highlighting two power phenomena in the process o f shared world building which 
significantly differ from the conventional (neo)realist reading: It was argued that central 
to friendship is (i) a process o f mutual empowerment lending direction and resolve and 
to each others’ unfolding and that within this process friends not only enable authentic 
becoming but, inevitably, also (ii) exert reciprocal ‘soft’ power over each other by 
requiring adaptation of respective national biographies (chapter six and seven)
This angle shines a light on the German-American relationship which is different from 
that of ‘great power competition’ and supports the scholarly agenda o f viewing Germany 
as a player rather than a playground (Banchoff 1999; Weber and Kowert 2007). It 
suggests that figures like Adenauer, Brandt and Kohl possessed a ‘soft power’ resource 
and, thus, agency in shaping the Western project. Specifically, by offering a reading of 
the Adenauer government as a creative force in the making o f the ‘Germany-in-Europe’ 
narrative (chapter eight), the thesis offers a correction to the understanding that “the
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founding o f the Federal Republic...was a decision o f the Western allies and a 
consequence o f the cold war” (Haftendom, 1985: 2) and, by extension, to the reading of 
German politics as passively reacting to the East-West conflict. Similarly, the discussion 
suggests that Brandt’s vision for embedding ‘Germany’ in a Greater European Peace 
Order (chapter nine) nudged the Western project into a new direction and into a new 
forum (CSCE). Finally, the Kohl/Genscher government demonstrated agency no only in 
negotiating German unification but also in pursuing a vision of Germany-in-Europe 
which, when US support was lacking, successfully tapped into long-standing French 
plans to establish an alternative to NATO.
Taking a look at the overall dynamic, the empirical discussion generated two further 
notable findings: First, in both the first and the third period the WEU provided a 
bridging function for channelling German ambitions to invest in NATO and CFSP, 
respectively. Moreover, as noted earlier, dystopias were used by both Adenauer and 
Kohl to justify significant adjustments o f the anti-militarism principle and confirm 
German commitment to, and manifest its voice in, these institutions. Second, while the 
Bosnian conflict exposed the inadequacy o f CSCE as a forum for negotiating a Germany 
in a Greater European Peace Order, its replacement by CFSP for pursuing this aim was 
neither radical nor entirely surprising. As noted in chapter nine, the institutional embryo 
o f CFSP, EPC, was founded in the context of and proved successful in the negotiations 
leading to the Helsinki Final Act. As such, in design and purpose CFSP must be seen 
less a late fulfilment of EDC (see chapter eight) but, rather, as an institution which 
comes closer to Bahr’s 1968 ‘third version’ of a European System of Collective Security 
(see chapter nine).
Looking Ahead
The expansion of the ‘data base’ provides important insights for understanding the 
opportunities and limits of contemporary US-German security cooperation, aided by that 
the analysis resisted the temptation o f rigidly separating the ‘Cold War’ and the ‘post- 
Cold War’ period (see chapter ten). Instead, by interpreting tensions between (now) 
Berlin and Washington as growing out o f a conflict between German plans for unfolding 
in ‘Europe’ and American vision o f the Western project, this thesis points to roots which 
lie much deeper than the question o f whether there were weapons o f mass destruction in 
Iraq or the personalities of office holders (Szabo 2004). If  these tensions and the parallel 
support of German governments for a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), 
established in 1999, are any indicator, then German emancipation has not been halted 
(Forsberg 2005). To be sure, this process is not path dependent. However, if support for
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the vision of a European Peace Order upheld through unity is central to German 
policymakers, an America whose national biography does not accommodate this vision 
and is unwilling to build ‘the West’ in a mutually empowering manner will not be that 
friend Germany is looking for.
If  that is so, and if German-American friendship is important to the vitality o f NATO, 
then doubts of whether NATO can re-invent itself as a creative forum for building ‘the 
W est’ should be taken seriously. Hence, my analysis suggests that Atlanticist scholars 
were not entirely wrong to diagnose the “twilight of the West” (Coker 1998) and to note 
that preventing its “collapse” (Harries 1993) required a new, unique long-term vision 
carrying the West and, hence, NATO (Huntington 1996). In other words, whereas 
constructivists celebrated the ‘survival’ of NATO throughout the 1990s as an intellectual 
triumph over realism, neoconservatives may have been more on target when they 
warned that the Atlantic Alliance lives on “borrowed time” and that “Europeans and 
Americans have yet to discover the idea that will energize their cooperation” (Gompert 
1997: 4). This warning holds if one takes into account that, from a phenomenological 
perspective, such a ‘discovery’ must be anchored in significant experiences. If, as 
suggested in chapter five, experiences of violent conflict leave a particular mark, then 
American interventions such as in Vietnam and the Gulf in 1991 and 2003 and the 
terrorist attacks from September 11, 2001, have reduced the shared experienced space. 
Common interventions in Kosovo (1999) and Afghanistan (2001), which required the 
Schroeder government to further adjust Germany’s national biography, did not appear to 
recreate common ground for resonance but, if anything, increased German commitment 
to ESDP (Berenskoetter and Giegerich, 2008).
That said, just as NATO cannot be reduced to a vehicle o f the German-American 
relationship, emancipation only occurs if dissonance is enduring and if there is an 
alternative significant Other with whom an authentic biographical narrative can be more 
satisfactorily negotiated. The thesis suggested that France emerged as this new friend for 
Germany, yet to assess its depth and complete the picture further research would need to 
flesh this out. Similarly, it would be necessary to more carefully assess the dynamic and 
depth o f the British-American friendship through NATO as an alternative to the 
German-American relationship. Here also arises a broader conceptual question not 
engaged in this thesis, namely that multiple friendships. Even though this thesis 
discussed friendship primarily as a dyadic phenomenon and made a case for the limit of 
multiple friendships due to the need of maintaining authenticity (see chapter seven), it 
did not exclude the possibility of there being more than one significant Other. Aristotle’s
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note that it is “impossible to be an extremely close friend to many people” (NE  Book IX, 
10) reminds that true friendship are rare yet does not put a specific limit onto the number 
o f close friends one may have. This opens up the question o f degrees o f friendship, that 
is, of whether some friends can be closer than others and whether multiple friendships 
may work in complementing ways.448 In that sense, more than anything, this thesis is an 
invitation to further explore the promises and limitations of friendship in international 
politics.
448 Consider the analogy of the Self as house with many rooms where different friends have 
access “to different rooms at different times or venture into them in a different order” (Allan, 
1989: 14f.). See also Simmel’s discussion of differentiated friendships (Simmel 1950: 324-326).
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